7 Assessing the suitability of the
UK's mission and goals
Protecting UK national security:
the core mission in Afghanistan?
177. When UK forces entered Afghanistan in October
2001, they did so in support of the United States, and in direct
response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. In a statement
to the House on 4 October 2001, the then Prime Minister Tony Blair
outlined the UK's objectives, placing them firmly in the context
of a limited counter-terrorism operation:
We must bring Bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders
to justice and eliminate the terrorist threat they pose. And we
must ensure that Afghanistan ceases to harbour and sustain international
terrorism. If the Taliban regime will not comply with that objective,
we must bring about change in that regime to ensure that Afghanistan's
links to international terrorism are broken.
I believe the humanitarian coalition to help
the people of Afghanistan to be as vital as any military action
itself. [
] The international community has already pledged
sufficient funds to meet the most immediate needs. [
] We
will give Mr Brahimi [Lakhdar Brahimi, former United Nations representative
for Afghanistan and Iraq] all the support we can, to help ensure
that the UN and the whole of the international community comes
together to meet the humanitarian challenge. [
][308]
178. Yet, as our predecessor Committee concluded
in August 2009, in the period between 2001 and 2009, the UK's
mission took on a significantly different, and considerably expanded
character, moving from its initial goal of supporting the US in
countering international terrorism, far into the realms of counter-insurgency,
counter-narcotics, protection of human rights, and state-building.[309]
The previous Foreign Affairs Committee stated that it was "struck
by the sheer magnitude of the task confronting the UK" and
concluded that there had been significant mission creep in the
British deployment, resulting in the British Government being
"committed to a wide range of objectives." The Committee
recommended that the Government set out, in unambiguous terms,
its first and most important priority in Afghanistan.[310]
179. For the previous and current Government, that
stated priority remains British national security. As we noted
above, the current Government's key objective in Afghanistan,
like that of its predecessor is that Afghanistan should not again
become a place from which al-Qaeda and other extremists can attack
the UK and British interests. Giving evidence to the Liaison Committee
in November 2010, the Prime Minister was asked whether 10 years
after the initial intervention, the Government was still receiving
advice that al-Qaeda will return to Afghanistan if troops were
withdrawn. In response, he said:
That is the advice, yes [...] Is it the case
that if we literally left now, and Afghanistan was left as a basket-case
country with the Taliban controlling part of it, with all the
bad people we know are in the tribal areas of Pakistan, al-Qaeda
could return to Afghanistan and re-establish a base there? Yes,
I think that is the case. [...] If you pull back on either side,
either in Pakistan or in Afghanistan, you create a larger amount
of space for al-Qaeda to exist in. Part of that could be in Afghanistan
if we weren't there.[311]
180. In a similar vein, General Petraeus, in an interview
with The Times, stated that "there have been and are
attempts by some [...] groups, including al-Qaeda, to seek sanctuary
in Afghanistan. We see it in north eastern Afghanistan, particularly
in Kunar province and Nuristan, because of the pressure that the
Pakistan military and other campaigns have put on al-Qaeda in
the FATA".[312]
181. This argument is not without its critics. Some
argue that the al-Qaeda threat emanates from Pakistan rather than
Afghanistan. Indeed, while it is difficult to assess the true
scale of al-Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan from open-source material,
it may be noted that in a speech delivered in September 2010,
the Director of the Security Services made references to the al-Qaeda
threat from Pakistan's tribal areas, but made no mention of Afghanistan.[313]
In October 2009, US National Security Adviser James Jones was
reported as saying that the "maximum estimate" of al-Qaeda
fighters in Afghanistan itself was less than 100 and there were
no al-Qaeda bases there."[314]
182. Other reports, including one published in September
2010 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS),
as well as some written evidence received, claimed that defeat
of the Taliban has become virtually synonymous with the defeat
of al-Qaeda and questioned the view that al-Qaeda would return
to Afghanistan if foreign forces withdrew. We heard similar views
from senior Afghans during our visit. James Fergusson told us
that there is "absolutely no evidence that al-Qaeda even
want to come back or that the Taliban would have them back if
they did. I've had this conversation so many times in Afghanistan
and I have not come across one Afghan who gets this justification
for our presence there at all. They do not believe it".[315]
Jolyon Leslie stated that there is an "an element of scaremongering
in the thought that if we take our finger out of the dyke, it's
all going to come down and get us. That is unhelpful, because
that is not what many Afghans are thinking".[316]
He added, "we should also bear in mind that there is a real
ambivalence among Afghans about Arabs in their midst, because
of the mujaheddin history. Most ordinary Afghans, who are not
even necessarily educated, don't want them there any more than
we do."[317]
183. Certainly, there are elements of the insurgency
that are known to be closely connected to al-Qaeda, particularly
some parts of the Haqqani network, but as Matt Waldman told us,
"If you talk to the Taliban there is no love lost between
them and al-Qaeda. They know that ultimately al-Qaeda was responsible
for their downfall. Indeed, Mullah Omar in his last public statement
[...] said, 'We want to conduct our foreign policy on the basis
that we will not harm foreign countries if they do not harm us.'
There is not a strong alliance between the Talibs and al-Qaeda.
Could you get solid guarantees that they would not work together
in the future? Probably not, but this time they will know what
the consequences would be were they to support and to harbour
extremists of that kind".[318]
184. We conclude that there is evidence to suggest
that the core foreign policy justification for the UK's continued
presence in Afghanistan, namely that it is necessary in the interests
of UK national security, may have been achieved some time ago,
given the apparently limited strength of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Although the Government disputes this, we are seriously concerned
that this fundamentally important assessment appears to be based
on intelligence that has not been subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
Are the UK's goals appropriate
and achievable?
185. The Government states that it has four main
'goals' in Afghanistan and that achieving these are necessary
if the Government is to achieve its core objective, as discussed
above, of preventing the return of al-Qaeda to Afghanistan. We
return to assess this statement below at paragraph 201, following
a discussion of the four 'goals', which are as follows:
i. a more stable and secure Afghanistan;
ii. the conditions for withdrawal of UK combat
troops by 2015, including capable Afghan National Security Forces;
iii. an Afghan-led political settlement that
represents all Afghan people; and
iv. regional political and security co-operation
that supports a stable Afghanistan.[319]
In preceding chapters we have discussed the progress
that has been made towards the achievement of these goals. In
this section, we consider their overall appropriateness in light
of the evidence we have received.
A MORE STABLE AND SAFER AFGHANISTAN
186. The British Government's desire to create a
more stable and safer Afghanistan is supposed to be achieved by
the implementation of a full-scale counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy
based on the doctrine of 'clear, hold and build'. Lord Ashdown
of Norton-sub-Hamdon explains the rationale behind counter-insurgency
campaigns in the following terms: "in counter-insurgency
operations, the job of the soldier is not to chase the enemy,
but to help win the support of the population. Their principal
task is not to seek out and kill, but to take ground so that the
reconstructors can move in and establish the rule of law, effective
governance,[...], a basis for economic livelihoods and the framework
of a peaceful life, supported by the local population. The short-hand
term for this strategy is 'clear, hold and build', with the soldiers
clearing and holding, while the re-building takes place in the
secure space they have created".[320]
Although top military commanders have always been at pains
to say that the Iraq 'surge' solution does not apply in Afghanistan,
in reality, thinking on the 'Iraq surge success', has indeed had
a significant impact on thinking throughout the chain of command
in both the US and UK military. Although the COIN strategy is
being implemented through the multinational ISAF, it was the UK
that was instrumental in advocating this approach and ensuring
that it was adopted by its ISAF partners.
187. Looking at the situation as a whole, and according
to the evidence we received, success appears to be eluding ISAF
and by implication, the UK: insecurity and civilian casualties
are reported to be higher than ever before and the insurgency
is gaining momentum in areas previously considered to be stable.
Meanwhile, rural areas in Afghanistan remain far more alien, isolated,
conservative and resistant to change than is often publicly acknowledged.
We also heard that the focus on population, which is so central
to the counter-insurgency campaign, may actually be making the
situation worse. Gilles Dorronsoro stated, "advocates of
a continued push will argue that only now are the resources in
place for the counter-insurgency strategy to be effectively carried
out and more time is needed to assess results. But this line of
reasoning ignores reality that the strategy has already failed
on the ground and there is no evidence that the situation can
be reversed in strategically decisive ways".[321]
188. When it comes to economic development and the
aim of winning hearts and minds, our witnesses were equally sceptical
that the strategy being deployed is, or ever will be, successful.
Jolyon Leslie, who has more than twenty years experience of international
development in Afghanistan, perhaps best summed up the views of
other witnesses on this strategy when he said, "I often feel
very disappointed that we are still peddling this mythology to
some extent about the fact that we can go in and hold, clear and
build an area. It is so patently clear at the village level [...]
that outsiders cannot do that. Even if you can clear, you are
unlikely to hold, and you certainly cannot build".[322]
Meanwhile, Matt Waldman stated:
Consider that many Afghans, especially in southern
Afghanistan, are profoundly Islamic, conservative, and have an
understandable mistrust of foreign forces. In their perception
western forces, garrisoned in fortified compounds, launch attacks
which kill, injure or antagonise Afghan civilians (often without
proper, visible accountability or redress); collude in the empowerment
and enrichment of abusive strongmen and a corrupt regime; maladminister
assistance funds; and herald the commencement of their departure.
Most Afghans live in difficult conditions and will accept what
support they can get, but in light of the above considerations,
and in the face of systematic Taliban intimidation, it is increasingly
unrealistic to expect western soldiers to win Afghan hearts and
minds.[323]
189. The idea, also central to the current counter-insurgency
campaign, that "money is ammunition"[324]
was also criticised by a number of those who submitted evidence.
We saw for ourselves in Herat the extent to which ISAF funds,
controlled by the Italian-led PRT, and supplemented significantly
by the US through its Commander's Emergency Response Fund (CERF),
were used to fund projects in a bid to 'buy' support. In areas
like Herat, where the situation is more stable, there may arguably
be some merit in this approach. However, in areas where the surge
has resulted in widespread destruction and instability, witnesses
found it difficult to imagine that success could be 'bought' by
aid delivered in conjunction with military effort. Mr Leslie,
for instance, said he was worried that "one of the central
planks of winning hearts and minds is delivering aid". He
added:
We have obviously failed at that, because we
have not won hearts and minds through culverts, irrigation channels,
shuras, [or] training programmes [...]. It is just not going to
work like that. In the middle of Marjah, where most of the population
has been forced out, areas have been laid waste, vineyards have
been laid waste and houses have been blown up, how can we dare
to talk about development? It is a scorched earth policy, a lot
of it.[325]
Gerard Russell made a similar point when he relayed
comments made by an elder in Khost Province. The elder said: "You
can give us all the aid you want to build the schools, as many
as you wish, and we welcome that, but if somebody comes and puts
a knife to my throat in the night, what am I supposed to do?".[326]
As Gerard Russell stated, "That isn't actually something
that a military operation can easily address".[327]
Jolyon Leslie concluded:
We need to be honest that we cannot do development
in full-body armour. [...] The Afghans are beginning to move on
from being sceptical to actually being angry about some of these
issues, because they are having to swallow some of these resentments.
It's making them very cynical about everything that we do as a
result. That is a sadness, because the will is there and the intention
is good, but we need to be more brutally honest about what we
cannot do.[328]
190. In the area of governance, the British Government
has initiated a series of programmes which in many instances are
regarded internationally as models of good practice. However,
in spite of these good intentions, overall progress has been slow
in some cases and completely lacking in others. The fact that
40 districts in the South were supposed to have been stabilised
and transferred to Afghan government control during 2010 (but
have not been), that there continues to be full Afghan authority
in only a minority of districts, and that warlords continue to
hold sway in many northern areas, highlight both the intractable
nature of the problem in Afghanistan and the inappropriateness
of the international solutions being implemented as part of the
ISAF counter-insurgency strategy. As Matt Waldman told us, "we
need to reframe our objectives, minimising the harm that we cause.
It would be a legitimate objective, while at the same time making
greater efforts to listen to Afghans, to appreciate their interests
and their aspirations for the future, and to try to adapt our
policy and international policy accordingly".[329]
191. Simultaneously, the international approach is
being undermined by parallel decentralising structures created
by individual states and a continuing lack of co-ordination and
wasteful use of resources. Even if it were possible to overcome
these issues, the fact remains that the Afghan government is not
able to provide the leadership necessary to tackle corruption
or to address the lack of legitimacy which flawed elections and
widespread official corruption have engendered. We also note a
report by the International Institute of Strategic Studies which
stated that the counter-insurgency tactics being used are "too
ambitious, too removed from the core security goals that need
to be met, and too sapping of diplomatic and military energies
needed both in the region and elsewhere".[330]
192. As President Obama has stated, the US's goal
is:
not to defeat every last threat to the security
of Afghanistan, because, ultimately, it is Afghans who must secure
their country. And it's not nation-building, because it is Afghans
who must build their nation. Rather, we are focused on disrupting,
dismantling and defeating al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
and preventing its capacity to threaten America and our allies
in the future.[331]
We are concerned, however, that this vision of a
limited and focused counter-terrorist campaign is at odds with
the full-spectrum counter-insurgency campaign which is unfolding
today in Afghanistan.
193. We conclude that the evidence presented to
us suggests that the current full-scale and highly intensive ISAF
counter-insurgency campaign is not succeeding. We question the
fundamental assumption underpinning this approach, namely the
idea that success in Afghanistan can be 'bought' through a strategy
of 'clear, hold and build'. The distinction between al-Qaeda and
the Taliban, which is so often overlooked or confused in current
debates, is crucial to generating appropriate policy responses
in Afghanistan. We question the Government's logic that a full-scale
counter-insurgency campaign aimed at the Taliban is necessary
to prevent al-Qaeda returning or that it could ever succeed.
CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL
INCLUDING CAPABLE AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES
194. In the past year in particular there have been
tremendous efforts expended trying to improve the capabilities
of the Afghan National Security Forces. Yet, while headline goals
for the size of the ANSF look likely to be met, overall there
are real concerns as to whether capabilities can be sufficiently
improved in the time available, particularly given that the starting
baseline for quality is so low. The issue is not one of funding;
in spite of the US spending $2 billion a month on training the
Afghan National Security Force (a sum which exceeds the entire
annual income of the Afghan state), the evidence we garnered suggests
that the quality of training remains low, ethnic imbalance remains
a considerable problem and corruption in the police is a major
hindrance to its effectiveness and credibility. In light of these
concerns, we are concerned as to whether Afghan forces, which
are capable of taking lead responsibility from ISAF by 2014, can
be created.
AN AFGHAN-LED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
THAT REPRESENTS ALL AFGHAN PEOPLE
195. Regrettably, we have seen little sign of progress
on the Government's third goal. Although many hopes are rightly
being pinned on the prospect of a political settlement, as yet
the parameters and conditions for starting substantive negotiations
do not appear to exist. Creating these conditions is a major challenge.
NATO's policy on political reconciliation needs to be more coherent
and a way of inducing the positive buy-in of a wide range of regional
players has yet to be found. Nor is it clear how Pakistan will
approach a political settlement given its enduring preoccupation
with the perceived threat from India, or how Afghans will receive
Pakistan's involvement given the animosity many of them feel towards
Pakistan. It is of great concern, too, that neither the UK nor
even the US have been able to persuade Pakistan to move to a position
which more closely reflects Western interests. We also heard evidence
that the surge, rather than improving the situation, is actually
making such a settlement less likely and is counter-productive
because it reduces pressure on the Afghan elite to negotiate and
creates a situation that the Taliban thinks it can outlast.
196. We were told repeatedly that direct US involvement
in talks is crucial if negotiations are to have a chance of success.
However, we were also told that supportive voices in the US administration
are in danger of being drowned out by a powerful chorus of military
and domestic opposition to political reconciliation, arising in
some instances from a mistaken conflation of the threat posed
to Western interests by the Taliban as opposed to al-Qaeda.
197. We cannot overestimate the importance of
direct US support for, and leadership of, a process of political
reconciliation in Afghanistan. If the US wishes to disengage its
forces from Afghanistan, it must first engage more fully, and
swiftly, with the process of political reconciliation. Given that
the pre-requisites for a successful military campaign are currently
lacking, we conclude that the US should not delay its significant
involvement in talks. Without the US's support for talks with
the Taliban leadership, there can be no longer-term peace in Afghanistan.
198. While there is common ground between the Afghan
government and the West as to the desirability of foreign troops
leaving Afghanistan, the gulf of difference over many other issues,
not least the protection of human rights, is treacherously wide.
Many organisations, both international and Afghan, as well as
the US Administration have expressed concern about the negative
impact that a return of the Taliban to government could have on
human rights and in particular women's rights. As we have stated
elsewhere in this Report, the Government is committed to a political
settlement which "is representative; gives no one group disproportionate
influence; upholds human rights and the rule of law and is in
accordance with Afghanistan's Constitutional framework".[332]
Given the significant governance and security
challenges which exist, and the limited timeframe in which the
UK is seeking to achieve the key goal of political reconciliation
in conjunction with its Afghan and international partners, we
recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government
explains the basis upon which a political settlement can be reached
which supports human rights and the rule of law, within the framework
of the existing Afghanistan constitution.
199. We conclude that of all the UK Government's
stated goals, the pursuit of a political settlement is arguably
the most relevant and most appropriately framed. Regrettably,
we see few signs that progress is being made on this front but
we continue to be of the view that an Afghan-led, but US driven,
process of political reconciliation is the best remaining hope
that the UK and others have of achieving an honourable exit from
Afghanistan, of achieving an outcome that serves as a tribute
to the sacrifice of British and other troops, and that helps to
justify the billions of pounds and dollars that have been spent
in and on Afghanistan.
REGIONAL POLITICAL AND SECURITY
CO-OPERATION THAT SUPPORTS A STABLE AFGHANISTAN
200. Although we understand the Government's desire
to see a regional political and security operation that supports
a stable Afghanistan, we have seen little evidence of progress
on this, the fourth and final UK goal. Our witnesses insisted
that there is no evidence that Pakistan has now been brought into
a stable and constructive relationship with Afghanistan. Equally,
Pakistan's failure to tackle the Afghan insurgency from within
its own borders is of significant concern, as is the evidence
which suggests that this attitude is unlikely to change. While
the UK, for historical and other reasons, may be in some respects
in a better position than the US to encourage Pakistan to adopt
a more constructive role, in reality, Pakistan's counter-leverage
is arguably far stronger.
CONCLUSION: THE UK'S FOUR GOALS
AND THE CORE MISSION
201. We conclude that the evidence presented to
us suggests that despite the significant resources that have been
invested in Afghanistan, and the enduring, wholehearted and admirable
commitment and sacrifices of British personnel, the UK has not
yet achieved its stated goals. This is in no way a criticism of
British personnel who are risking their lives on a daily basis
in Afghanistan, and whose efforts are rightly described in so
many instances as heroic. Nor does it mean that nothing has been
achieved in the 10 years since the US-led intervention. There
have, for instance, been significant improvements in education,
especially for girls, and in the fields of health, telecommunications,
human rights, and media freedom. However, at a strategic level,
we seriously question whether the efforts expended towards these
ends have a direct connection to the UK's core objective, namely
the national security of the UK and its allies and we also question
whether the ambitious aims of the Government and the international
community more widely are achievable.
308 HC Deb, 4 Oct 2001, col 675 Back
309
Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: Afghanistan and
Pakistan, para 225 Back
310
Ibid. Back
311
Q 117 Back
312
The Times, 23 September 2010 Back
313
Speech delivered by Jonathan Evans, head of MI5, to the Worshipful
Company of Security Professionals, 16 September 2010 Back
314
"State of the Union" programme, CNN, 4 October
2009 Back
315
Q 35 Back
316
Q 38 Back
317
Q 38 Back
318
Q 36 Back
319
Ev 1 Back
320
The Independent, 22 July 2009 Back
321
"Worsening Outlook in Afghanistan", foreignpolicy.com,
9 September 2010 Back
322
Q 30 Back
323
Ev 52-53 Back
324
COMISAF Counter-insurgency (COIN) Guidance, August 2010 Back
325
Q 56 Back
326
Q 117 Back
327
Q 117 Back
328
Q 30 Back
329
Q 57 Back
330
"Strategic Survey", International Institute of Strategic
Studies, September 2010 Back
331
Statement by President Obama on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Annual
Review, 16 December 2010 Back
332
"Quarterly report on progress in Afghanistan", Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, 27 October 2010 Back
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