8 Communicating the case effectively?
Communicating the campaign in
Afghanistan
THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT
202. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the
international justification for Western intervention in Afghanistan
was clear: it was in the interests of international security to
remove the Taliban regime because of the sanctuary it provided
to al-Qaeda. However, as the Government acknowledges, in the interim
period, "unity of message has been more difficult. ISAF nations
have had differing experiences [and] confusion grew about whether
the international community's efforts were aimed at tackling international
terrorism, countering insurgency, humanitarian relief or promoting
democracy".[333]
Over the same period, the Taliban has shown itself to be adept
at using a full range of media successfully to tap into strains
of Afghan nationalism and has cleverly exploited policy failures
by the Kabul government and its international backers. The result
is weakening Afghan public support for the international effort,
even though few actively support the Taliban.[334]
203. The Government argues that coherence of communications
improved in mid-2009 when ISAF nations publicly endorsed the new
population-centric counter-insurgency strategy drawn up by the
then Commander of ISAF, General Stanley McChrystal. His replacement,
General David Petraeus, has publicly asserted his commitment to
the counter-insurgency strategy albeit with some tactical adjustments,
which we discussed above in paragraph 27. The Government adds
that international community messages are now broadly consistent,
focusing on the importance of building the Afghan National Security
Forces, combating corruption and improving governance in Afghanistan
to enable the Afghan government to take the lead on security throughout
the country and so that ISAF combat troops can begin to drawdown
towards 2015.[335]
204. However, witnesses were not convinced that ISAF's
message is resonating with ordinary Afghans. Michael Semple stated
that "we have a fundamental problem in the narrative of what
all these countries are doing in Afghanistan".[336]
Matt Waldman stated that "we have to accept that international
forces inside Afghanistan are part of the problem. There is no
doubt that their presence is energising the insurgency".[337]
He added that there had been a "colossal failure by the international
coalition to empathise with ordinary Afghans and act accordingly".[338]
According to a report by the Open Society Foundation, it is only
recently that Western policymakers have begun to accept that civilian
casualties, detention operations, and other activities that harm
Afghan communities have engendered distrust and anger, undermining
overall success in Afghanistan. Worryingly, the report states
that policies to reduce civilian casualties, improve detention
conditions and increase strategic communications in an attempt
to win Afghan 'hearts and minds' amount to "too little, too
late". It also states that by dismissing Afghan views of
the international community as pro-Taliban propaganda, policymakers
"have often failed to understand how much these negative
perceptions may be distorting their policies and efforts."
It concludes:
The international community needs the trust and
co-operation of Afghan communities for many of its crucial policies
to succeed, including counterinsurgency initiatives, strengthening
governance and rule of law, and reconciliation and reintegration.
Past civilian casualties, night raids, and detention operations
have not only deeply angered Afghans; they have negatively shaped
the way Afghans view foreigners, and have the potential to stymie
the success of both short and long term policy initiatives on
Afghanistan.[339]
205. The importance of clearly communicating to
Afghans why the international community remains in Afghanistan
and what its role will be over the longer term is crucial, particularly
given the announcement of deadlines for combat withdrawal by a
range of ISAF countries. We are particularly concerned, therefore,
that international efforts in this regard appear to be failing.
We recommend that the Government stress to ISAF partners the importance
of addressing this as a matter of urgency and of ensuring that
the presence of international forces in Afghanistan is recognised
as an important part of the problem.
ASSESSING THE UK'S EFFORTS
206. The UK has also been criticised for its approach
to communications with Afghans. In its written evidence, the Henry
Jackson Society states that the UK must "greatly improve
the quality and coherence of its public messaging efforts"
and concluded that it "is one of the most serious failures
of Afghanistan that in many respects the United Kingdom and its
allies are losing the war of information with the Taliban".
It continued:
In spite of the fact that the Taliban are responsible
for more than three-quarters of civilian casualties; in spite
of the fact that their interpretation of Sharia law allows for
the stoning of women, the murder of homosexuals and the slicing
off of limbs for even the most minor offence; and in spite of
the fact that genuine improvements in security and development
are taking place across central Helmand, nonetheless the UK and
its allies are too easily painted as the aggressors and the culprits,
who are failing to bring anything positive to Afghanistan.[340]
Dr Gohel also expressed his concern that the Taliban
have propagated a "well-rehearsed narrative on the notion
that the British army is in Afghanistan to seek revenge for 19th
century defeats". He stated that "there is no effective
counter-narrative to dispel the myths and half-truths aimed at
undermining the British presence. If there is no policy for a
strategic communication approach then Afghans will only be hearing
one perspective and that is from the Taliban".[341]
207. Giving evidence to us, the Foreign Secretary
conceded that strategic communications has been "a weak area"
and that the UK "ought to be able to do better over the coming
months and years in the strategic communication of what our objectives
are, how we are achieving them and how the nations of ISAFand
indeed the Afghan governmentare working together".[342]
The Foreign Secretary told us that it was being addressed in the
National Security Council and that he had recently raised it with
the NATO Secretary-General as something that requires better international
co-ordination.[343]
208. We recommend that in its reply to this Report,
the Government reports on what progress has been made in improving
its strategic communications in Afghanistan.
Communicating the campaign to
British audiences
THE NATIONAL SECURITY NARRATIVE
209. Within the UK, the Government's primary communications
objective is to improve public understanding of, and support for,
the campaign in Afghanistan.[344]
As noted above, between 2002 and 2008 the Government provided
a series of reasons for the UK's presence in Afghanistan. In 2009,
partly in a bid to stem dwindling public support for the war effort,
and also to ensure consistency with the US's approach, the previous
Government opted to return to a single "narrative".
Official statements focused heavily on the link between a "crucible
of terrorism" in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area and
terrorist threats and attacks on British soil. The Government's
argument was that al-Qaeda would return to Afghanistan if international
forces were not present or if the Afghan state was weak.
210. As we discussed above in Chapter 7, the current
Government's strategy is similarly based on the view that a British
presence is necessary to ensure British national security by ensuring
that Afghanistan never again becomes a haven for terrorists who
attack the UK. It may be more accurate to say that if Western
forces left prematurely the immediate threat would be one of civil
war. As we also noted above at paragraph 181, the threat, in the
form of al-Qaeda and international terrorism, can be said more
properly to emanate from Pakistan. In reality, there is a strong
argument to be made that Afghanistan, and the Taliban insurgency,
does not currently, in itself represent an immediate security
threat to the UK. This would suggest that in public messaging
terms, there has been an inappropriate conflation of the threat
posed by al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Matt Cavanagh states: "The
decision to sharpen the message by shifting the emphasis from
nation-building to preventing the return of al-Qaeda [raised]
as many questions as it answered". He asks, "Couldn't
we achieve that in a different way with fewer troops and casualties,
and less money? Indeed, if it's all about al-Qaeda, why are we
in Afghanistan at all, rather than Pakistan, or even Somalia and
Yemen?"[345]
211. Michael Semple told us: "I had naively
thought early on that we were supposed to be about promoting peace
in Afghanistan after an excessively long war. Even after listening
to all the attempts to sum up national security interest in terms
of the hunt for al-Qaeda, I think that the pursuit of peace in
Afghanistan best sums up the common interest between countries
such as the UK, the US, Afghanistan and even Pakistan". He
added, "The issues of taking care of the terrorist threat
can be nicely parked inside the overall agenda of peace. When
you say that your primary business is promoting peacewith
a robust element to it as wellyou do not have to be frightened
of showing weakness by being prepared to come to accommodation,
because accommodation is fundamental to the pursuit of peace".[346]
212. We recognise the difficulties involved in
trying to develop a narrative on intervention in Afghanistan that
satisfies different audiences, both domestic and international.
However, the Government's current national security narrative
is out of step with the current situation and, in light of the
announcement of 2015 as a date for combat withdrawal, now out
of line with the general thrust of UK policy. The 2015 date jars
with the Government's national security justification which signals
something very different; namely that the UK must do whatever
is necessary to secure the safety of British interests. The two
positions are not compatible and send mixed messages to the public.
We recommend that the Government review its strategic communications
strategy as a matter of urgency to ensure that public messages
provide certainty about future plans, but also highlight that
the ultimate UK goal is a political settlement in the pursuit
of peace.
Parliamentary engagement on current
and future plans
213. As part of its strategy to keep the public informed,
the Government has made particular efforts to engage with Parliament
by providing quarterly oral reports and monthly updates to the
two Houses which it hoped would provide an opportunity for parliamentarians
to "help assess progress in Afghanistan, providing a regular
and transparent method of judging the success of UK policy".[347]
However, one significant development in Government policy, the
possibility that British combat troops could begin to be withdrawn
as early as 2011, was announced by the Prime Minister in media
interviews rather than in Parliament. As we discussed previously,
there is, as yet, apparently little clarity on what roles UK forces
will play in the post-2015 period and what shape British engagement
will take. Giving evidence to the Defence Select Committee, the
Secretary of State for Defence said that it was not possible to
decide upon this at the moment as it would depend upon the situation
and conditions at the time. We note that the Prime Minister referred
in media interviews last year to the possibility that troops could
start to be drawn down as early as this year. Such decisions have
the potential to have a marked impact on British troops, the UK
effort more generally, ISAF's campaign and the UK's relations
with key allies including the US. Along with planning for the
post-2015 period, we consider this to be a crucial issue and conclude
that it is vital that Parliament is kept fully informed of any
developments relating to the drawdown or re-shaping of the UK
effort in Afghanistan in a timely manner.
214. We welcome the Government's attempt to engage
more pro-actively with parliamentarians on Afghanistan. We therefore
regret that the Prime Minister used media interviews to reveal
the 2015 withdrawal date and to raise the possibility that British
combat troops could begin to be withdrawn as early as 2011, rather
than announcing this significant development in Government policy
in the first instance to Parliament. We recommend that in future
all such significant announcements should be made to Parliament
first.
333 Ev 22 Back
334
"Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?", Crisis
Group, Asia Report No158, 24 July 2008; See also "Why
the Taliban Is Winning the Propaganda War", Time,
3 May 2009; "U.S. struggles to counter Taliban propaganda",
Washington Post, 1 October 2010. Back
335
Ev 23 Back
336
Q 20 Back
337
Q 41 Back
338
Ev 52 Back
339
"The Trust Deficit: The Impact of Local Perceptions on Policy
in Afghanistan", Open Society Foundation, 7 October
2010 Back
340
Ev w7 Back
341
Ev 59 Back
342
Q 163 Back
343
Ibid. Back
344
Ev 23 Back
345
Matt Cavanagh, "Inside the Anglo-Saxon War Machine",
Prospect, December 2010 Back
346
Q 20 Back
347
Ev 3 Back
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