10 Learning lessons for the future
236. We have focused in this Report on a selection
of current issues of UK foreign policy concern in Afghanistan.
However, we have been struck by the number of witnesses and Afghans
who have indicated the extent to which the international community
still, after nearly 10 years in Afghanistan, seems unable to learn
from some of its past mistakes. Witnesses were adamant that these
must be taken on board in the future. Many spoke of the need to
ensure a co-ordinated approach within Government where the FCO
takes a firm lead in making clear the strategy and objectives
for any foreign operation of this kind, "to avoid lack of
continuity and operational disconnect".[384]
Some witnesses also suggested that a review of the merits of the
Comprehensive Approach may be advisable. Continuing lack of co-ordination
at an international level, too, was cited as an ongoing problem
which the Government must be mindful of in any future multinational
intervention.
237. Others spoke of the importance of ensuring that
missions are properly resourced from the outset and that, in multinational
ventures, objectives are clear and burden sharing is equitable.[385]
We also heard about the need for more modesty about the international
community's ability to build governance structures. Gerard Russell's
written evidence states that the UK's "post imperial capacities
and inclinations" are more suited to encouraging slow and
gradual reform and "avoid[ing] the ironic dilemma we face
in Afghanistan—where the scale of our political investment
has made the Afghan government feel that its international allies
need it more than it needs them".[386]
Finally, we heard about the importance of the UK's relationship
with the US and how it must continue to be seen as an effective
and dependable, but not slavish, partner.[387]
238. The Government states it is committed to learning
lessons from its experience in Afghanistan. In the last year,
a Conflict Lessons Working Group has been created to identify
lessons from a number of conflicts, including Asia and the Balkans,
and to disseminate information as appropriate. This Working Group
is chaired and supported by the Stabilisation Unit, and is attended
by DFID, FCO and MOD, with additional representation from the
military. The FCO states that there has been a "significant
increase in civil-military co-operation around lessons, an increase
in joint de-briefing of officers and officials returning from
the field, and an increase in joint investigations of themes of
further interest". Recent examples of joint lessons work
include: a Joint Civil-Military Doctrine Note on Security Transitions,
Joint Civil-Military investigation of the use of Money for Security
Effect, and Lessons from the Pakistan Post Crisis Needs Assessment
(PCNA). There are currently plans to carry out further investigation
into community engagement, informal justice and dispute resolution
and the factors which enable or impede stability at district level
in Helmand. The Stabilisation Unit is developing its "Top
Ten Lessons on Stabilisation", and is developing both public
and restricted access repositories where lessons and key documents
can be easily accessed.[388]
239. We asked the Foreign Secretary what lessons
from Afghanistan could be learned to improve British foreign policy
in the future. He told us that he was certain that there will
be many lessons to be learned and that some of them "will
require the wisdom of being able to look back on all this in the
future". He added:
To start with the lessons at the highest level,
this country needs to put as many resources as possible into conflict
prevention around the world, since we can see how expensive it
is and how it costs us dear, in human life as well as in financial
terms, to engage in long-term, substantial conflict. [...] There
will no doubt be other lessons about how a military intervention
should be handled, if it has to take place. There will be lessons
from Iraq, which the Chilcot inquiry is looking into at the moment.
I am sure there will be lessons about Helmand as well, about the
initial deployment and about many decisions taken since then.
We have to concentrate in Government on finding out ways of success
in this situation, and that has to be our prime concern.[389]
240. We recommend that in its response to this
Report, the FCO sets out what specific lessons it has learnt thus
far from its engagement in Afghanistan.
241. We conclude that there are numerous lessons
that must be learned from the intervention in Afghanistan which
are beyond the immediate scope of this Report. We recommend that,
at an appropriate point in the future, when British combat operations
have ceased, a full and comprehensive public inquiry into the
Government's policy towards Afghanistan be conducted. It should
include, but not be limited to, the decision to deploy to Afghanistan
in 2001, and Helmand in 2006, civil-military relations both in
Whitehall and on the ground, the efficacy of the comprehensive
approach, the appropriateness of the counter-insurgency doctrines
deployed, the adequacy of resources provided, the decision to
set a timetable for withdrawal, and what conditions should apply
in the future before the UK enters into a multinational military
effort.
384 Ev w2 Back
385
Ev w2 Back
386
Ev 58 Back
387
Ev w5 Back
388
Ev 4 Back
389
Q 170 Back
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