Formal Minutes
Wednesday 9 February 2011
Members present:
Richard Ottaway, in the Chair
| Mr Bob Ainsworth
Mr John Baron
Sir Menzies Campbell
Ann Clwyd
Mike Gapes
| | Andrew Rosindell
Mr Frank Roy
Sir John Stanley
Rory Stewart
Mr Dave Watts
|
Draft Report (The UK's foreign policy approach to Afghanistan
and Pakistan), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft
Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 7 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 8 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs—(Mr John Baron) —brought
up and read, as follows:
We recommend that the Government retains focus
on its stated key objective: to prevent Afghanistan once again
becoming a place from which al-Qaeda and other extremists can
attack the UK and British interests. Achieving this objective
is said to depend on four main goals, as highlighted above.
We recommend that attaining these 'goals' must
always be directed at the key objective. We are concerned that
there has been a disconnection between the key objective and the
attainment of these 'goals' so that they become ends in themselves
giving rise to "mission creep" and loss of focus. This
has produced a confusion of purpose which unintentionally has
become accepted thinking - talk of 'nation building' and concern
over human rights are two examples. However, this acceptance permeates
this report which is why it assesses progress against each of
these so called 'goals' instead of focusing on the key objective.
We recommend that the Government in pursuing its
key objective against al-Qaeda is mindful of and explores further
the distinction between al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The relationship
between al-Qaeda and the Taliban is complex and not well understood.
The key objective which is defined in terms of al-Qaeda has resulted
in engagement with the Taliban and the Afghan insurgency. The
threats from al-Qaeda and the Taliban have become conflated, and
the two have become almost synonymous.
Question put, That the new paragraphs be read a second
time.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 2
Mr John Baron
Andrew Rosindell
| | Noes, 8
Mr Bob Ainsworth
Sir Menzies Campbell
Ann Clwyd
Mike Gapes
Mr Frank Roy
Sir John Stanley
Rory Stewart
Mr Dave Watts
|
Paragraphs 9 to 27 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 28 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 29 to 37 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 38 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 39 to 42 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 43 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraph 44 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 45 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 46 to 53 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 54 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 55 to 63 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 64 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 65 to 74 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 75 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 76 to 154 read and agreed to.
Paragraphs—(The Chair) —brought
up, read the first and second time, and inserted (now paragraphs
155 and 156).
Paragraph 155 (now paragraph 157) read.
Amendment proposed, in line 3, after "deadline"
to insert "The imposition of an arbitrary deadline explicitly
contradicts 1) the four main 'goals' which are conditions based
and 2) the achievement of the key objective which is to prevent
once again Afghanistan being used by al Qaeda to attack UK and
Allied interests.". —(Mr John Baron.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 3
Mr John Baron
Andrew Rosindell
Sir John Stanley
| | Noes, 7
Mr Bob Ainsworth
Sir Menzies Campbell
Ann Clwyd
Mike Gapes
Mr Frank Roy
Rory Stewart
Mr Dave Watts
|
Paragraph agreed to.
Paragraphs 156 to 163 (now paragraphs 158 to 165)
agreed to.
Paragraph 164 (now paragraph 166) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraphs 165 to 173 (now paragraphs 167 to 175)
read and agreed to.
Paragraph 174 (now paragraph 176) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraphs 175 to 181 (now paragraphs 177 to 183)
read and agreed to.
Paragraph 182 (now paragraph 184) read, as follows:
We conclude that there is evidence to suggest
that the core foreign policy justification for the UK's continued
presence in Afghanistan, namely that it is necessary in the interests
of UK national security, may have been achieved some time ago,
given the apparently limited strength of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Although the Government disputes this, we are concerned that this
fundamentally important assessment appears to be based on intelligence
that has not been subject to parliamentary scrutiny. We recommend
that the Government makes this intelligence available to the Intelligence
and Security Committee, which should then report, as appropriate,
to the Foreign Affairs Committee on its veracity.
An Amendment made.
Another Amendment proposed, in line 5, to leave out
from "scrutiny" to the end of the paragraph. —(Sir
John Stanley).
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 6
Mr John Baron
Sir Menzies Campbell
Ann Clwyd
Mike Gapes
Andrew Rosindell
Sir John Stanley
| | Noes, 4
Mr Bob Ainsworth
Mr Frank Roy
Rory Stewart
Mr Dave Watts
|
Another Amendment proposed, at the end, to add "The Prime
Minister has suggested that al-Qaeda would return to Afghanistan
if our troops were withdrawn. This view is not universal and needs
to be examined further.". —(Mr John Baron).
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 5
Mr John Baron
Andrew Rosindell
Mr Frank Roy
Rory Stewart
Mr Dave Watts
| | Noes, 5
Mr Bob Ainsworth
Sir Menzies Campbell
Ann Clwyd
Mike Gapes
Sir John Stanley
|
Whereupon the Chair declared himself with the Noes.
Paragraph, as amended, agreed to.
Paragraphs 183 to 190 (now paragraphs 185 to 192)
read and agreed to.
Paragraph 191 (now paragraph 193) read.
Amendment proposed, in line 6, after "Afghanistan",
to leave out to the end of the paragraph. —(Sir John
Stanley.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 1
Sir John Stanley
| | Noes, 9
Mr Bob Ainsworth
Mr John Baron
Sir Menzies Campbell
Ann Clwyd
Mike Gapes
Andrew Rosindell
Mr Frank Roy
Rory Stewart
Mr Dave Watts
|
Another paragraph—(Mr John Baron) —brought
up and read, as follows:
The relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban
is complex and not well understood. The distinction between al-Qaeda
and the Taliban is the key to understanding the nature of the
conflict in Afghanistan. It should be explicitly stated. We have
common interests with the Taliban: We both want foreigners out
of Afghanistan. These interests should form the rational basis
of a negotiated settlement with the Taliban to achieve a peaceful
withdrawal from Afghanistan, free of al-Qaeda.
Question proposed, That the paragraph be read a second
time: —Paragraph, by leave, withdrawn.
Paragraphs 192 to 195 (now paragraphs 194 to 197)
read and agreed to.
Paragraph 196 (now paragraph 198) read, amended and
agreed to.
Paragraph 197 (now paragraph 199) read.
Amendment proposed, in line 4, to leave out "but
US driven". —(Sir John Stanley.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 1
Sir John Stanley
| | Noes, 9
Mr Bob Ainsworth
Mr John Baron
Sir Menzies Campbell
Ann Clwyd
Mike Gapes
Andrew Rosindell
Mr Frank Roy
Rory Stewart
Mr Dave Watts
|
Paragraph agreed to.
Paragraph 198 (now paragraph 200) read and agreed
to.
Paragraph 199 (now paragraph 201) read.
Amendment proposed, in line 10, to leave out from
"question" to "whether" in line 12. —(Sir
John Stanley.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 2
Ann Clwyd
Sir John Stanley
| | Noes, 8
Mr Bob Ainsworth
Mr John Baron
Sir Menzies Campbell
Mike Gapes
Andrew Rosindell
Mr Frank Roy
Rory Stewart
Mr Dave Watts
|
Paragraph agreed to.
Another paragraph—(Mr John Baron) —brought
up and read, as follows:
There appears to be a fundamental incoherence
between the "key objective" and the "four main
goals". Our operations in Afghanistan are described as "goals".
This vocabulary is unfortunate, suggesting that these are somehow
free-standing ends in themselves, however, desirable. They are
not: instead, they are the means to an end. Our objective is essentially
a military one. There is "mission creep"; the endeavour
to attain these goals has resulted in suggestions to widen the
operations to "nation building" of Afghanistan; there
is concern about human rights and in particular women's rights.
However, the goals as presently constituted are unrealistic and
cannot be achieved. The "key objective" must be clarified
and narrowly defined in terms of our national security and al-Qaeda,
not the Afghan insurgency - the insurgency itself is difficult
to characterise. Our operations in Afghanistan should not be characterised
as "goals" but rather as the means to an end.
Question put, That the new paragraph be read a second
time.
The Committee divided.
Ayes, 2
Mr John Baron
Andrew Rosindell
| | Noes, 8
Mr Bob Ainsworth
Sir Menzies Campbell
Ann Clwyd
Mike Gapes
Mr Frank Roy
Sir John Stanley
Rory Stewart
Mr Dave Watts
|
Paragraphs 200 to 209 (now paragraphs 202 to 211) read and agreed
to.
Paragraph 210 (now paragraph 212) read.
Amendment proposed, in line 9, after "public"
to leave out to the end of the paragraph and add "There
is little point in the Government reviewing its strategic communications
strategy given that the mission itself is incoherent - there is
little point in shooting [or reviewing] the messenger.".
—(Mr John Baron.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 2
Mr John Baron
Andrew Rosindell
| | Noes, 8
Mr Bob Ainsworth
Sir Menzies Campbell
Ann Clwyd
Mike Gapes
Mr Frank Roy
Sir John Stanley
Rory Stewart
Mr Dave Watts
|
Paragraph agreed to.
Paragraphs 211 to 238 (now paragraphs 213 to 241)
read and agreed to.
Paragraphs—(Mr John Baron) —brought
up and read, as follows:
Incoherent mission
There is a fundamental incoherence between the "key
objective" and the "four main goals". We recommend
that the Government retains focus on its stated key objective:
to prevent Afghanistan once again becoming a place from which
al-Qaeda and other extremists can attack the UK and British interests.
However, achieving this objective is said to depend on four main
goals:
- a more stable and secure Afghanistan;
- the conditions for withdrawal of UK combat troops
by 2015, including capable Afghan National Security Forces;
- an Afghan-led political settlement that represents
all Afghan people; and,
- regional political and security co-operation
that supports a stable Afghanistan.
The use of the term 'goals' is unfortunate, suggesting
that these are somehow free-standing ends in themselves. However
desirable, they are not. Instead, they are the means to an end.
We recommend recommends that attaining these "goals"
must always be directed at the key objective. We are concerned
that there has been a disconnection between the key objective
and the attainment of these "goals" so that they become
ends in themselves giving rise to "mission creep" and
loss of focus. This has produced a confusion of purpose which
unintentionally has become accepted thinking - talk of 'nation
building' and concern over human rights are two examples.
The key objective must be clarified and narrowly
defined in terms of our national security and al-Qaeda, not the
Afghan insurgency. Our operations in Afghanistan should not be
characterised as 'goals' but rather the possible means to an end.
Exploring the relationship between the Taliban
and Al Qaeda
If the key objective is to secure us from attack
by al-Qaeda in this country, the question arises as to why are
we engaged just in Afghanistan and against the Taliban? Al-Qaeda
has a stronger presence in Somalia and Yemen. The central paradox
seems to be that an intended conflict with al-Qaeda has resulted
in a conflict with the Taliban as the principal insurgents.
The Afghan insurgency itself is not readily characterised.
There is evidence that the insurgency is heterogeneous, each group
pursuing its own economic, political, criminal and social agendas
and interests. Moreover, the relationship between the Taliban
and al-Qaeda is complex and not entirely understood. Michael Semple
said in evidence: "...most of the Taliban leadership might
be pragmatic enough to consider entering peace talks if it was
felt to be in their interests and would have little hesitation,
as part of a deal, in agreeing to sever all ties with al-Qaeda."
Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles said: "They hate foreigners, and
among foreigners they include not just Americans and Brits, but
Arabs and Pakistanis...". Jolyon Leslie stated: "...there
is a real ambivalence among Afghans about Arabs in their midst...".
Matt Waldman stated: "If you talk to the Taliban there is
no love lost between them and al-Qaeda. They know ultimately al-Qaeda
was responsible for their downfall..."
Other reports, including one published in September
2010 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS],
as well as some written evidence, claimed that defeat of the Taliban
has become virtually synonymous with defeat of al-Qaeda and questioned
the view that al Qaeda would return to Afghanistan if foreign
forces withdrew. There has been also an "inappropriate conflation"
of the threat posed by al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This confusion
is fundamental and substantive.
US sources have suggested that there are fewer than
100 al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan and no al-Qaeda bases there.
The key objective of ridding Afghanistan of al-Qaeda would appear
to have been achieved. The Prime Minister has suggested that al-Qaeda
would return to Afghanistan if our troops were withdrawn. This
view is not universal. James Fergusson stated that there was "absolutely
no evidence that al-Qaeda even want to come back or that the Taliban
would have them back if they did".
The distinction between al-Qaeda and the Taliban
is key to understanding the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan.
It should be explicitly stated. We have common interests with
the Taliban: We both want foreigners out of Afghanistan - 1) they
want us out of Afghanistan and we want to withdraw 2) evidence
suggests the Taliban may want al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan, as
do we. These common interests should be examined more closely
as they could form the rational basis of a negotiated settlement
with the Taliban to achieve a peaceful withdrawal from Afghanistan,
free of al-Qaeda. This possibility needs to be explored much more
rigorously which is why the Americans should be talking with the
Taliban. The British proved in Northern Ireland that one can talk
and fight at the same time.
The Military campaign
The British experience in Malaya suggests that the
pre-conditions for a successful counter-insurgency campaign are
simply not in place - control of the borders, a credible Government,
support from the majority of the people, and good troop density
numbers. None of these conditions exist in Afghanistan today.
ISAF will not beat the Taliban. At best, we can create a stalemate.
It is against this backdrop that the negotiations with the Taliban
mentioned above should proceed.
This view has been given added weight by the US Department
of Defence's latest report to Congress. This states that the Taliban's
strength lies in the Afghan people's perception that Western forces
will be leaving and that the Taliban will ultimately be victorious.
Shooting the messenger
There is talk of a need for the Government to review
its strategic communications strategy to ensure that public messages
provide certainty about future plans. However, there is little
point given that the mission itself is incoherent. The imposition
of an arbitrary 2015 deadline explicitly contradicts 1) at least
three of the four main 'goals' which are conditions based and
2) the achievement of the key objective which is to prevent once
again Afghanistan being used by al Qaeda to attack UK and Allied
interests. There is little point in shooting the messenger.
Conclusion
The distinction between the key objective and the
four main goals, and the need to examine more closely the differences
between the Taliban and al Qaeda are important. If we are in Afghanistan
to build a more stable and secure country, then we will probably
have to defeat the Taliban. If, however, we are in Afghanistan
to prevent al Qaeda returning, then we may not have to do so.'
Question put, That the new paragraphs be read a second
time.
The Committee divided.
Ayes, 1
Mr John Baron
| | Noes, 9
Mr Bob Ainsworth
Sir Menzies Campbell
Ann Clwyd
Mike Gapes
Andrew Rosindell
Mr Frank Roy
Sir John Stanley
Rory Stewart
Mr Dave Watts
|
Annex agreed to.
Summary amended and agreed to.
Motion made, and Question put, That the Report be
the Fourth Report of the Committee to the House.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 8
Mr Bob Ainsworth
Sir Menzies Campbell
Ann Clwyd
Mike Gapes
Mr Frank Roy
Sir John Stanley
Rory Stewart
Mr Dave Watts
| | Noes, 1
Mr John Baron
|
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed
copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the
provisions of Standing Order No. 134.
Written evidence was ordered to be reported to the
House for printing with the Report, together with written evidence
reported and ordered to be published on 20 October and 3 November
2010, and 12 and 19 January, and 2 February 2011.
[Adjourned till Wednesday 2 March at 2.00 pm.
| 
