Written evidence from The Henry Jackson
Society
The enclosed document sets out the corporate view
of the Henry Jackson Society on the keystone considerations of
the UK's foreign policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, addressing
the first, second and fourth queries contained within the Committee's
earlier call for evidence, and with a specific focus on Afghanistan.
The Henry Jackson Society is a cross-partisan, British-based
think-tank. Our founders and supporters are united by a common
interest in fostering a strong British and European commitment
towards freedom, liberty, constitutional democracy, human rights,
governmental and institutional reform and a robust foreign, security
and defence policy and transatlantic alliance.
As part of our programme of fostering debate on the
key issues of our day, we regularly arrange meetings with top
UK and foreign officials in the House of Commons to engage in
discussion with Parliamentarians, most recently hosting General
David Petraeus and General Sir David Richards to discuss issues
of security and defence in the context of the war in Afghanistan.
I hope the Committee will consider our contribution
of interest. If so desired, we would of course be happy to make
senior staff available to answer any further questions Members
may have.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- ¾ The
UK's foreign policy approach towards Afghanistan is both appropriate
and effective. In seeking to understand why, it is important to
emphasise the costs of failure, which would extend far beyond
Afghanistan if they are allowed to materialise. Failure in Afghanistan
would greatly hinder British counter-terrorism efforts, and could
be disastrous for regional security, not least in neighbouring,
nuclear-armed Pakistan. Moreover, the message that would be sent
out to both terrorist movements and hostile state actors worldwide
- that the United Kingdom can be both taken on and overcome by
violent means - is not one that anyone with a care for safeguarding
British national security and British foreign interests should
wish to send.
- ¾ In
order to assess the appropriateness and effectiveness of Britain's
foreign policy approach within Afghanistan, it is necessary to
define what success would look like. In its broadest sense, success
in Afghanistan means leaving behind a state capable of denying
the Taliban and al-Qaeda the ability to use that space to conduct
operations effectively. Specifically, success requires an Afghan
state that is capable of providing security for its people; that
is capable of facilitating economic development; and that does
itself reside within the rule of law.
- ¾ The
efficacy of British foreign policy in Afghanistan is dependent
upon the willingness of the British government and its international
partners seeing the process through to a successful conclusion.
Without this commitment, it will be impossible to persuade the
Afghan people to withhold their support for the insurgency and
to lend it to the government side. Likewise, it will be impossible
to persuade the Karzai administration to cease operating through
warlords and other powerful regional personalities and to commit
to operating within the rule of law. Finally, without this commitment
it will be impossible to persuade neighbouring Pakistan to withdraw
its historic support for the Taliban and to lend it to the Afghan
government, another important component for success.
- ¾ In
terms of assessing British policy on the ground at present, it
is clear that the current strategy is proving both appropriate
and effective. Significant improvements in security, development
and the rule of law are now taking place within its spheres of
influence in central Helmand. The increased progress on the ground
has been a direct consequence of the shift towards a properly
resourced and properly coordinated strategy that began at the
start of 2010 and which must now be allowed to continue.
- ¾ The
most important metric by which success in Afghanistan can and
should be measured is perception. Unless the Afghan people believe
that it is the Afghan government, and not the insurgency, that
offers the best hope of stability and progress in both the immediate
and the long term, then persuading them to support this endeavour
will be impossible.
- ¾ In
terms of the conflict, the metrics of success must be population-centric,
not enemy-centric. Progress cannot be measured in terms of battles
won, territory taken or enemy killed, but in terms of levels of
security for the population; access to clean water; and numbers
of people in the markets.
- ¾ At
the national and international level, the United Kingdom's foreign
policy performance and success must inevitably be measured by
the extent to which it leaves behind a secure, stable and independent
Afghanistan, at peace with its neighbours. Situated within one
of the most hostile and volatile regions on earth, the independence
of Afghanistan is particularly important, both from anti-British
states such as Russia and Iran, but also from India and Pakistan,
both of whom view an overly strong presence of the other in Afghanistan
as contrary to their national strategic interests.
- ¾ Many
lessons can be learned from Afghanistan with regards to the UK's
future foreign policy approach towards insecure states, the first
of which being the necessity of pursuing a coordinated approach
that does not separate traditional foreign policy from development
policy and from security policy. In addition, it is vital that
the FCO takes a firm lead in making clear the strategy and objectives
for any foreign operation of this kind, to avoid lack of continuity
and operational disconnect.
- ¾ Afghanistan
has also reminded us that interventions into insecure states are
highly resource intensive and take time. To conduct these kinds
of operations with too few personnel only increases the level
of conflict thus necessitating a still greater outlay of men and
resources in the future. Far better to resource the operation
properly at the outset, the result of which may be better progress
and a swifter withdrawal than would otherwise be the case.
- ¾ An
additional lesson is the importance for the United Kingdom of
pursuing a multilateral approach when confronted with insecure
states, given the resource-intensive requirements of such operations.
Equally important is that the UK agrees a common position with
its allies about what the objectives are, and what level of sacrifice
is acceptable to achieve them, before deploying. This is not something
that happened in Afghanistan and it has been greatly to the detriment
of the international effort there.
- ¾ Linked
to this is the vital importance of Britain's retaining the capability
to project its influence abroad and to operate effectively in
insecure states where necessary. If Britain wishes to pursue a
global foreign policy, it is imperative that it maintains the
resources necessary to do so. Moreover, policy makers need to
realise that once lost, these capabilities cannot simply be bought
back in better financial times, not least because of the loss
of institutional memory - which is vital if the same mistakes
are not to be repeated - that such cuts would entail.
- ¾ Finally,
Britain must greatly improve the effectiveness of its public messaging
efforts, especially given the nature of modern warfare and foreign
policy. Unless the United Kingdom's work in insecure states is
perceived and understood both by its own people and by those affected
as a positive and constructive influence, then it cannot and will
not succeed. It is a damning indictment of Britain's failure in
this regard that the Taliban are commonly perceived as winning
the war of information in Afghanistan. The United Kingdom is,
and remains to be, a force for positive good in the world, and
it is imperative that its work in insecure states is not unnecessarily
jeopardised by the fact of its being poor at communicating this
reality to others.
ON THE
APPROPRIATENESS AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE UK'S
CURRENT FOREIGN
POLICY APPROACH
TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN[1]
1. Britain is at war in Afghanistan, and any
assessment of the appropriateness and effectiveness of its foreign
policy there must consequently be conducted within a framework
that takes this into account. In such an environment, an assessment
of "traditional" foreign policy objectives, which largely
confine themselves to the political and diplomatic spheres, will
be greatly wanting if not understood as just one part of a larger
whole that also depends upon concomitant progress in the military
campaign and the development effort. This reality has been explicitly
acknowledged in the present government's National Security Strategy
and the lack of progress in Afghanistan until fairly recently
can in part be blamed on a failure to coordinate these different
components effectively.
2. Success in Afghanistan must be one of the
United Kingdom's over-riding objectives, and the effectiveness
and appropriateness of its foreign policy approach must inevitably
be measured against that objective. As to what success would look
like, this can broadly be defined as leaving behind a stable,
secure and independent Afghanistan that is capable of denying
the Taliban and al-Qaeda the space to conduct operations effectively.
3. Success in Afghanistan also requires the fulfilment
of the equally important, but perhaps less tangible objective,
of ensuring that internationally the United Kingdom is not perceived
to have failed, and particularly not by those minded to challenge
British interests by violent means. The message the United Kingdom
leaves behind in Afghanistan must above all else be that what
the Taliban and al-Qaeda attempted against Britain and its allies
failed, and that any similar attempts elsewhere in the future
would likewise not succeed.
4. To fail in Afghanistan would be to seriously
jeopardise British foreign policy interests and British national
security on a number of levels. The message that failure would
send out both to terrorist movements and hostile state actors
worldwide - that the West can be taken on and overcome by violent
means - is not one that anyone with a care for safeguarding British
national security should wish to send. In seeking to understand
this, the reasons for which al-Qaeda took the decision to attack
the United States on 11th September must be recalled.
What led Osama bin-Laden to believe that such an attack would
not be to invite inevitable destruction, but could in fact yield
genuine and desirable results, was his analysis of the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, and the American humiliation
in Somalia in 1994:
5. "Using very meagre resources and military
means, the Afghan mujahedeen demolished one of the most important
human myths in history and the greatest military apparatus. We
no longer fear the so-called Great Powers. We believe that America
is much weaker than Russia; and our brothers who fought in Somalia
told us that they were astonished to observe how weak, impotent,
and cowardly the American soldier is. As soon as eighty [sic]
American troops were killed, they fled in the dark as fast as
they could, after making a great deal of noise about the new international
order."
6. Moreover, the objective of this assault was
not so much to strike a blow against the United States as an end
in itself, but to demonstrate the weakness of America, and by
extension the vulnerability of its supposedly client regimes across
the Middle East and beyond. In so demonstrating this vulnerability,
bin-Laden hoped to spark a series of revolutions across the Islamic
world that would drive the West out of the region, and usher in
a new Islamic Caliphate governed according to the Islamists' strict
and retrograde interpretation of Sharia law.
7. For the United Kingdom and its allies to fail
in Afghanistan would be to send the message both to Islamists
and others minded to challenge the West by violent means that
bin-Laden's essential premise was correct. The fact that al-Qaeda
itself has been shattered as an entity with any geo-political
capabilities of its own is largely immaterial; it is its ability
to inspire copycat movements that do retain these capabilities
that should be the primary cause for concern.
8. Moreover, should the Taliban be allowed to
return to power in Afghanistan, there is no reason to believe
that al-Qaeda would not benefit very significantly from the re-emergence
of a safe haven from which to plan and conduct operations. In
addition, both they and others minded to confront Britain and
its national interests would be confident that retaliation on
the scale of the international response to 9/11 would be nothing
like as probable the second time around, so encouraging them further.
9. It is also necessary to appreciate the serious
potential for regional conflict and instability should the Afghan
government fail after Coalition withdrawal, not least in neighbouring,
nuclear-armed Pakistan, or even India. Moreover, Afghanistan is
situated at the heart of a zone of conflict stretching from the
Middle East to Kashmir, and one that contains many regimes whose
hostility to the United Kingdom and its interests is well documented.
Failure in Afghanistan would very likely result in a violent power
vacuum that not only the Taliban would seek to fill, but also
other regional actors, including Iran, Russia and Pakistan. Not
only would the resultant conflict be catastrophic for the peoples
of that region, it would be highly likely to strengthen the position
of regimes hostile to British interests.
10. It is also necessary to appreciate the additional
danger of the conflict reaching British streets should the United
Kingdom and its allies fail to leave behind a stable, secure and
independent Afghanistan. The risk of providing a safe haven for
extremists has already been touched upon, but there is the further
dimension that the inevitable grievances and suffering of the
peoples in Afghanistan and surrounding areas would translate into
a still greater appeal of extremism, in a region where this is
already a major problem. This would be compounded by the fact
that Britain and its allies would be held directly responsible
for the failure in Afghanistan and the resultant fallout.
11. It has been established what constitutes
success in its broadest sense, and also why it is so important
that Britain does not fail in Afghanistan. More expressly, success
in Afghanistan must comprise the following three components:
12. First, that the Afghan state is capable of
providing security for its people and enforcing the rule of law.
Specifically, this means upholding the necessary security framework
such that the Afghan people do not feel compelled to withhold
their support from the government out of fear of the insurgency,
whilst at the same time understanding that to take up arms against
the government will not go unpunished.
13. Second, that within that secure environment,
the requisite infrastructure development is able to take place
such that members of the population do not feel compelled to take
up arms against the state in order to earn a living. This second
objective cannot be attained without the success of the first.
14. Third, that the government itself, and its
regional authorities, act within the rule of law. There can be
no question that a corrupt and predatory state is one of the most
serious hindrances to stability and economic progress in any country,
and Afghanistan is no different. A dictatorship in a stable country
can operate outside the law and survive for a time, though history
has proved that they will always fail in the long run. In a conflict
environment such as Afghanistan, however, if the people cannot
trust the government to represent their interests then they will
look outside the law for redress of their grievances, which may
very well mean to the insurgency.
15. It must be emphasised that what is necessary
for success in Afghanistan is not the retention of foreign forces
until such time as they have succeeded in building "Hampshire
in Helmand". Rather what is necessary is the retention of
the international commitment to Afghanistan until such time as
withdrawal does not precipitate collapse, but the slow and steady
continuation of this progress under Afghan auspices.
16. It is also imperative to make clear that
what matters above all else in Afghanistan is perception. Unless
the Afghan people perceive that the Afghan government and its
international partners are in the ascendancy; unless they perceive
that to support the government now will not be to invite retribution
at the hands of the Taliban later; and unless they perceive the
state as capable of representing their interests and redressing
their grievances, then all else will fail.
17. This, of course, is why public statements
such as those by President Obama that the United States will start
to withdraw its forces by 2011, or by Prime Minister David Cameron
that "we can't be there for another five years, having been
there for nine already", are so hugely dangerous. They may
be intended to placate sceptical domestic publics and may well
be borne of genuine conviction, but they have the added consequence
of sending a message loud and clear to ordinary Afghans that we
are not truly committed to seeing this mission through. Make no
mistake that the Taliban are ruthless in conveying this message
to Afghans, with the added threat that to support government efforts
now will be to invite bloody retribution later.
18. Likewise, if President Karzai perceives that
his international partners will withdraw from Afghanistan before
such time as the requisite security and economic infrastructure
have been put in place to enable Afghanistan to progress independently,
persuading him to desist operating through warlords and other
power brokers will be immeasurably harder than it otherwise might
have been.
19. The same applies to Pakistan, without the
support of which achieving success in Afghanistan will be very
much more difficult. The example of Pakistan demonstrates well
the very serious limitations imposed upon efforts to disrupt terrorist
activity when denied the ability to operate effectively in the
country where such activity is being carried out. The reluctance
of the Pakistani authorities to collaborate in disrupting the
activities of Afghan Taliban operating from within their country
has been enormously damaging to the counter-insurgency effort
in Afghanistan.
20. Whilst it is true that the strength and threat
of Pakistan's own Taliban insurgency has reached a level that
not even the government in Islamabad can ignore, the fact is that
Pakistan will not withdraw its historic support for the Taliban
in Afghanistan unless they are certain that the Taliban will not
succeed in resuming power in Kabul. In order to understand why
this is so it is necessary to comprehend the rationale behind
Pakistan's historic support for the Taliban. The essential dynamic
in this is India, and Islamabad's belief in the necessity of supporting
the Taliban in order to counter its great rival's influence in
Afghanistan. Indeed, from the time of the Taliban's assumption
of power in Kabul in 1994, India lent its support to non-Taliban
elements, principally the Northern Alliance, and India has been
instrumental in supporting the Karzai government and re-development
efforts since 2001, much more so than Pakistan.
21. Only a clear belief that it is the Karzai
administration, and not the Taliban, that will ultimately prevail
in Afghanistan will persuade Islamabad to support the government
in Kabul, and then only to be sure that they are not left on the
wrong side of the negotiating table going forward. If, however,
Islamabad perceives the Afghan government as unviable once its
international partners leave, then persuading it to fully withdraw
its historic support for the Taliban will likewise be that much
harder. It must be emphasised, therefore, that the success or
failure of British foreign policy with regards to Pakistan is
at present very much dependent upon success or failure across
the Durand line in Afghanistan, and no amount of politicking will
change that fact.
22. Success in Afghanistan will ultimately depend
upon the willingness of the United Kingdom, the United States
and others currently engaged there to see this process through
to a successful conclusion. Indeed, it is a refrain too often
heard from those with first hand knowledge of the situation, both
military and civilian, that this conflict will not be won or lost
in Kabul or Kandahar, but in Washington and Whitehall.
23. Indeed, when judged against the three criteria
for success hitherto outlined, the assessment is that - contrary
to much popular opinion - British foreign policy in Afghanistan
is both appropriate and effective at the present time.
24. The reason for this is that, as of the commencement
of the US-led troop surge at the start of 2010, both the correct
strategy and the resources necessary to support it have been put
in place. The population-centric counterinsurgency strategy that
ISAF and Afghan forces are currently pursuing is the correct one,
and all the indications are that it is starting to yield results.
It must be emphasised that the strategy being pursued in Afghanistan
at present differs fundamentally from the course of operations
between 2001-2009, in that for the first time, both the correct
strategy, and the resources necessary to carry it through, are
in place.
25. The painful but necessary lesson of the past
nine years has been that any strategy that does not seek to combine
governance, development and security will fail. Likewise, victory
cannot be achieved through the mere elimination of insurgents;
what is required is the elimination of the conditions that give
rise to, and sustain them in the first place.
26. The case of Sangin, a region in Helmand province
that has become almost synonymous with violence and failure in
the minds of many, provides a good and tangible example of the
appropriateness and effectiveness of the strategy currently being
pursued. Though the new strategy is still at an early phase, making
a firm assessment extremely difficult at this stage, all the signs
are at present very positive. In terms of security, the number
of violent incidents dropped by 80% in the month July-August,
and this improvement has been sustained. This has been credited
on all sides, by the military, by British officials, and by local
Afghans - as the consequence of the newly reinforced counterinsurgency
approach. With the increase in security, development has likewise
improved, and senior sources in both the military and the tri-departmental
Stabilisation Unit, as well as the media, report that key indicators
such as the number of people in the market, the number of women
on the streets, and access to basic amenities, are all much improved.
A final and critical component of this improvement has been the
success of the new governor, Mohammed Sharif, who is by all accounts
uncorrupt and highly effective, both in terms of his understanding
of the people and their grievances, and his relationship with
Kabul.
27. Within the Afghan Development Zone (ADZ)
to the south, the situation is also much improved. The ADZ is
a roughly 400 square kilometre triangle running between the provincial
capital of Lashkar Gah, the economic capital of Gureshk, and the
Nad Ali district, comprising roughly 500,000 people, about a third
of Helmand's 1.4 million inhabitants. Military sources expect
the situation within the ADZ to improve still more in the coming
months thanks to the withdrawal of British forces from Sangin
and their redeployment to the ADZ, which has, for the first time
since the original deployment in 2006, provided the ADZ with the
correct force density to make counterinsurgency operations maximally
effective. The transformation of Lashkar Gah since 2006 is also
something that has been picked up by the media. Again, security
has greatly improved, credited to the work of Coalition forces
and their Afghan partners, as has development in terms of market
activity, the number of cars on the roads, and - in Lashkar Gah's
case - the use of the local airport, which now provides daily
flights to and from Kabul. Residents have credited the work of
British Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and other civilian
actors in facilitating this development in a secure environment
generated by the military. Finally, the governance aspect appears
also to be in place, and the provincial governor, Gulab Mangal,
is also widely recognised as honest and effective. Perhaps the
best evidence of the increased self-sufficiency of Lashkar Gah
is the fact that British forces no longer operate inside the town
itself, but confine themselves to surrounding areas, having deemed
Afghan security forces sufficiently competent to operate independently.
28. Whilst the case has been made that the strategy
on the ground within the United Kingdom's zones of responsibility
in central Helmand is effective, foreign policy must of course
concern itself with strategy at the national and international
level. One of the most serious and important challenges for the
Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) in Afghanistan will be
to persuade President Karzai to move away from his preferred style
of government as the projection of powerful tribal personalities
as opposed to the building of accountable institutions. Central
to this effort must be persuading Karzai and the Afghan government
that Britain and its Coalition partners are committed to the development
of Afghanistan to the point where withdrawal will not result in
the descent of the country to a level of feuding and violence
that would render these structures redundant, but where they are
recognised as the best and most efficient mechanisms through which
to govern the country.
29. In this context, one must first appreciate
the extremely difficult environment in which President Karzai
and his government operate. Confronted with a still formidable
insurgency; dependent upon the international community for his
survival; and operating in a country with no tradition of strong
central government, Karzai knows that the position of himself
and his government is weak. Karzai believes that only by operating
through warlords and powerful tribal personalities can he hope
to project any authority in the regions, whilst remaining in power
in Kabul. Though Karzai recognises that this system does not serve
the people well, since these power-brokers are always liable to
abuse their positions of power, he nonetheless continues to use
it to his advantage, believing it to best serve his interests
at the present time.
30. The fact is, however, that in the long run
this modus operandi is inherently flawed. It ensures that
the central government remains beholden to a small clique of corrupt
and abusive oligarchs as opposed to the people whose interests
it must serve if it is ever to garner genuine legitimacy.
31. The only way Britain will be able to persuade
Karzai to move away from this system is if he is persuaded that
both the United Kingdom and its Coalition partners will stay the
course in Afghanistan until such time as the security, economic
and governance infrastructure has reached a sufficient level that
international withdrawal will not precipitate collapse, but the
slow and steady continuation of this development under Afghan
auspices. In other words, Karzai must perceive that he will be
left with a viable alternative to power politics if he is ever
to move away from it.
32. It is also important to recognise that the
efficacy of British foreign policy internationally is also very
much dependent upon success in Afghanistan. It is imperative that
Britain retains its reputation with the United States as an effective
and dependable partner in challenging international situations,
and one that does not buckle when things become difficult.
33. If Britain fails in Afghanistan it will likewise
do serious damage to its reputation internationally, and will
make it far harder for Britain to assert itself and defend its
interests against regimes that will have been given good cause
to believe that the United Kingdom is a country whose interests
can be successfully challenged if it is confronted long and hard
enough. The effectiveness of the foreign policy of any country
depends in large part on the credibility and influence of the
country carrying it out. British foreign policy, whether operating
within international forums such as the United Nations or as an
independent actor, depends upon its being recognised as a country
with the capabilities to enforce its claims and objectives where
necessary.
HOW THE
UNITED KINGDOM'S
FOREIGN POLICY
PERFORMANCE AND
SUCCESS IN
AFGHANISTAN CAN
AND SHOULD
BE MEASURED
34. Because Britain is not just fighting a war
in Afghanistan, but a counterinsurgency, the metrics by which
foreign policy performance and success can and should be measured
are therefore different to what they would be in a non-conflict
environment, or even in a conventional war.
35. The first and most important metric by which
performance can and should be measured is that of perception.
Unless the Afghan people believe that it is the Afghan
government, and not the insurgency, that offers the best hope
of stability and progress in both the immediate and the long term,
then persuading them to support this endeavour will be impossible.
In this endeavour, above all else, the consent of the people is
the prize.
36. In terms of how progress in the conflict
can and should be measured, it is worth stating briefly the differences
between conventional conflict and counterinsurgency in this regard.
In conventional warfare the principal metrics by which performance
and success can be measured are territory taken, battles won and
enemy killed or captured. In counterinsurgency warfare, such as
is being fought in Afghanistan at present, the principal metrics
of success are quite different. Indeed, the pursuit of more conventional
ends at the expense of what is actually necessary to succeed can
in fact prove counterproductive to the overall success of the
campaign. Tactical successes in the wrong areas can often lead
to strategic failures.
37. Above all else, what matters is the security
of the population. Consequently, measures of the number of violent
incidents in an area - taking into account the increase in such
incidents that will inevitably occur in the early stages - are
more reliable than numbers of enemy killed.
38. Within this secure environment, measures
of success should include things such as access to clean water;
availability of food; availability of basic amenities; availability
of jobs; and levels of school enrolment.
39. Another indicator by which success can and
should be measured is the level of trust that the population have
in the authorities. This is harder to measure, but should include
regular surveys asking the people what their perceptions of the
authorities are; whether they have experienced maltreatment at
the hands of the authorities, particularly the police; and whether
they believe the insurgency has the capacity to regain control
of their area. Other indicators might include monitoring the number
of people on the streets after dark; the number of people in the
markets; and the number of women walking outdoors.
40. However, though the indicators hitherto outlined
are certainly the right ones by which to measure the success and
appropriateness of British policy on the ground, it must also
be borne in mind that in such an environment it is very rare to
find a straight trajectory between cause and effect. Moreover,
what would to British eyes seem like an obvious step in the right
direction may not always be what is required to convince Afghans
to support the government side. It is also the case that there
will usually be a time lag between the implementation of a certain
measure and its translating into tangible progress.
41. One very positive initiative to try and identify
where these discrepancies exist, and to identify measures that
genuinely lead to improvements, is the Department for International
Development (DFID)'s Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) programme
in Helmand, established in the Spring of 2010. The programme exists
not only to monitor key outputs such as access to clean water
and the provision of basic amenities, but also to try and get
a sense of what local people are thinking and why. The objective
is to identify what the common factors are that lead to improvement
or deterioration of conditions in a given district, and then to
react accordingly. The programme has yet to report back with any
data, but this is an excellent example of exactly how Britain's
foreign policy performance in Afghanistan can and should be measured.
42. At the national and international level,
the most important measure of the efficacy of British foreign
policy will be the extent to which it leaves behind a secure,
stable and independent Afghanistan. Above all else, it is clearly
imperative that Britain leaves behind an Afghanistan at peace
with itself.
43. More broadly, however, the success of British
foreign policy should also be measured by the extent to which
Britain leaves behind an Afghanistan at peace with its neighbours.
Regional stability matters first and foremost to Britain's security
interests, not least because of the increased risk extremism that
such instability generates. However, regional stability is also
important to British economic interests, not least because of
the increased importance of the developing world to British trade
and other financial relationships.
44. The extent to which the new Afghanistan is
acceptable to both Pakistan and India is also an important factor
to be considered. These two regional rivals arguably have the
greatest potential to influence events in Kabul and to generate
new conflict, and both view Afghanistan as a fundamental component
of their national strategic interests. Clearly, Afghanistan cannot
be left in the pocket of Islamabad, but nor should it become too
dependent on Delhi at the expense of its extremely insecure, nuclear-armed
neighbour.
45. Finally, it is also important that the Afghanistan
which Britain leaves behind is one that is capable of acting independently
of regional powers such as Iran and Russia, whose objectives very
often contravene British interests. Though it would be naïve
to hope to leave behind a fully functional liberal democracy in
Afghanistan, it is nonetheless important that Afghanistan is not
a country which supports dictatorships, or colludes in the suppression
of freedom and human rights on the world stage and in international
forums such as the United Nations.
LESSONS THAT
CAN BE
LEARNED FROM
AFGHANISTAN WITH
REGARDS TO
THE UNITED
KINGDOM'S
FUTURE FOREIGN
POLICY APPROACH
TOWARDS INSECURE
STATES
46. Moving forward, there are a number of lessons
that can be learned for the UK's future foreign policy approach
to insecure states. The first and most important is the lesson
that is embodied in the UK's new National Security Strategy, namely
that a world with insecure states requires an approach that does
not separate traditional foreign policy from development policy
and from security policy.
47. An additional and related lesson has been
that it is an absolute imperative that the FCO takes a firm lead
in setting the strategy and the objectives for any foreign operation
of this kind, and what is expected across departments and the
armed forces in order to attain them. The National Security Council
is a necessary recognition of this requirement, and it is important
that it is used to better plan operations of this nature in the
future. One of the most important components of success in an
operation such as Afghanistan is continuity of effort and coordination
between all those charged with carrying the operation out. The
Government's failure to set out clearly its objectives and methodology
has been greatly detrimental to progress in Afghanistan, not least
because this is an unconventional operation that takes considerable
time. The predicament of Britain's armed forces in Afghanistan
is instructive in this regard. The British Army works on six-month
rotations in Afghanistan, in an environment where progress toward
an objective may take several years. In lieu of a clear strategy
and clear objectives, senior officers deployed to Afghanistan
have frequently used their tour as an opportunity to "make
their mark", which very often has meant the setting of differing
objectives from their predecessor, in turn revised again by their
successor. This is absolutely the wrong way to conduct operations
of this nature. Likewise, the tendency of different government
departments to pursue their own often contradictory objectives
in lieu of an overall and coordinated plan has been a major problem
that has only recently started to be addressed.
48. Another lesson that must be learned from
Afghanistan is that in conflict-prone and insecure states, militancy
is merely the symptom and not the cause of unrest. Consequently,
any strategy that seeks merely to eliminate these militants, without
seeking to eliminate the conditions which give rise to and sustain
them in the first place, will surely fail.
49. Afghanistan has also reminded us that without
security, development and governance efforts are impossible and
that, moreover, providing this security is often militarily resource
intensive. This is because in an environment where an active insurgency
exists, the key to success is securing population centres, which
requires large numbers of military personnel to achieve. The lesson
of Afghanistan has been that to conduct this kind of operation
with too few personnel only increases the level of conflict thus
necessitating a still greater outlay of men and resources in the
future. Far better to resource the operation properly at the outset,
the result of which may be better progress and a swifter withdrawal
than would otherwise be the case. Though the proportion will vary
relative to the environment, current counterinsurgency doctrine
calls for a population to force ratio of approximately 50:1. For
the first time since 2006, that is almost precisely the ratio
present in Helmand right now.
50. In light of this, another lesson that should
be learned from Afghanistan is the necessity of the United Kingdom's
adopting a coherent multilateral approach at the international
level when dealing with insecure states. Particularly where military
deployments are called for, the lesson of Afghanistan is that
the United Kingdom simply does not have the capacity to conduct
operations of this nature without international assistance.
51. However, Afghanistan has also taught us the
lesson of the importance of the United Kingdom's agreeing a common
position with its allies about what the objectives of a given
operation should be, and what level of sacrifice is acceptable
to achieve it. The widely differing strategic objectives of various
NATO countries deployed to Afghanistan, combined with the imposition
of numerous caveats by several states about what their armed forces
can and cannot do has proved to be enormously damaging to the
efficacy of the NATO effort over the past four years.
52. Another important lesson from Afghanistan
must be that because interventions into insecure states are resource
intensive, and because this is not a problem that will go away
in the near future, it is imperative that the United Kingdom retains
the capability to project influence abroad and conduct operations
overseas if necessary. The possibility that Britain's defence
capabilities might be reduced to the point where it is not even
able to defend its overseas territories as a consequence of the
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) and the Strategic Defence
and Security Review (SDSR) would be disastrous. In order for Britain
to remain a global influence in the world, and to pursue a foreign
policy that reflects this, it must ensure that it properly resources
the capabilities necessary to that end. Policymakers must be under
no illusions that it is possible to somehow cut back on these
capabilities now and simply buy them back again in better financial
times. These capabilities take decades to acquire and extend far
beyond mere military hardware. Perhaps the greatest cost of such
a decision will be the invaluable loss of institutional memory
that is so necessary to avoid making precisely the same costly
mistakes in the future, the price of which will far outweigh any
financial benefit that may be accrued by the Treasury now.
53. Finally, the United Kingdom needs to greatly
improve the quality and coherence of its public messaging efforts,
especially given the nature of modern warfare and foreign policy.
Unless the United Kingdom's work in insecure states is perceived
and understood both by its own people and by those affected as
a positive and constructive influence, then it cannot and will
not succeed. It is one of the most serious failures of Afghanistan
that in many respects the United Kingdom and its allies are losing
the war of information with the Taliban. In spite of the fact
that the Taliban are responsible for more than three-quarters
of civilian casualties; in spite of the fact that their interpretation
of Sharia law allows for the stoning of women, the murder
of homosexuals and the slicing off of limbs for even the most
minor offence; and in spite of the fact that genuine improvements
in security and development are taking place across central Helmand,
nonetheless the UK and its allies are too easily painted as the
aggressors and the culprits, who are failing to bring anything
positive to Afghanistan.
54. In order to counter the Islamist narrative,
the UK must improve the efficient and intelligent recording of
data documenting progress, and get it into the public domain in
a speedy and believable manner. Gun battles, airstrikes and casualty
figures cannot and should not be the only metrics by which these
engagements are measured in the public consciousness. The United
Kingdom is, and remains to be, a force for positive good in the
world, and it is imperative that its work in insecure states is
not unnecessarily jeopardised by the fact of its being poor at
communicating this reality to others.
6 October 2010
1 For a more extensive analysis of operations in Afghanistan
by The Henry Jackson Society, please see our most recent report
on this issue, entitled Succeeding in Afghanistan. Back
|
