Written evidence from the British and
Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG)
The British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group
(BAAG) is an information and advocacy network of 27 British and
Irish Non Governmental Organisations that support relief and development
programmes in Afghanistan. See: http://www.baag.org.uk
This written submission has been prepared by BAAG's Secretariat.
Its content of this submission may not represent the views of
all BAAG member agencies.
SUMMARY
1. The United Kingdom has made an important contribution
to security and development assistance since the fall of the Taliban
and in many respects its policies are generally regarded as effective
in terms of good practice and taking a long term view of the country's
needs. However, certain parts of UK policy should be revised in
order to enhance the focus on meeting the immediate security and
humanitarian challenges as well as creating the conditions for
sustainable and equitable development.
2. The UK government must work with its international
partners to ensure that commitments made at the London Conference
to increase the transparency and effectiveness of international
aid are honoured. Civil society's role in ensuring accountability
also needs to be strengthened. The Government of Afghanistan,
the UK and its international partners must support and encourage
consultation with a broad spectrum of civil society: local communities,
NGOs, civil society organisations and activists and the private
sector in the design and implementation of policy and programmes.
Existing aid co-ordination and consultation mechanisms must be
broadened to ensure regular dialogue and input from civil society.
3. The application of the comprehensive approach
in Afghanistan has resulted in an instrumentalisation of aid.
Too often the international community has looked for "quick
fixes" to problems relating to development needs. The UK
Government must ensure that it works with its international partners
to ensure that aid is delivered according to needs and in line
with national development plans and not on the basis of strategic
military priorities. The role and responsibilities of the international
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in providing relief and development
should be transferred to civilians as soon as practicable. A conflict-sensitive
approach to development is critical. Local ownership and broad
participation and representation, are key to successful and sustainable
development.
4. In the current period in which efforts to
secure the rights and safety of women are increasingly fragile,
the UK and its international partners must work actively to ensure
that the experience, knowledge and interests of women are listened
to and brought to bear in security, development and peace and
reconciliation agenda.
5. Civilian protection requires legitimate, accountable
and capable national security and justice institutions. The British
Government must work with its partners in the coalition to end
programmes, such as community defence initiatives or the use of
irregular armed militia, that establish parallel, competing systems
to those of the state and that divert resources (financial and
human) away from the development of an accountable Afghan National
Security Force. It must make every effort to strengthen the protection
of the civilian population and to investigate and bring to justice
perpetrators of violations of human rights. The UK Government
must also focus on ensuring that Afghan National Security Forces
are supported to understand and respect human rights and their
obligations under international humanitarian law and to institute
mechanisms to ensure accountability in security operations.
INTRODUCTION
6. The United Kingdom has made an important contribution
to security and development assistance since the fall of the Taliban
and in many respects its policies are generally regarded as effective
in terms of good practice and taking a long term view of the country's
needs. However, certain parts of UK policy should be revised in
order to enhance the focus on meeting the immediate security and
humanitarian challenges as well as creating the conditions for
sustainable and equitable development. It is also clear that given
the scale of the international interventions, particularly the
number of actors involved, good policy and practice on the part
of the UK alone are unlikely to bring about the much needed change
for which all, but particularly the Afghan population, long.
7. In 2010 at the London and Kabul Conferences,
the International Community and the Government of Afghanistan
have made important commitments to address the security, development
and economic needs of the Afghan people. Yet there is a growing
scepticism among many people in Afghanistan of the value of such
conferences, which seem to make little difference to their lives,
or adequately recognise the challenges that they face. In addition,
the International Community and the Afghan Government have repeatedly
missed important opportunities at these conferences by failing
to adequately engage with civil society in important discussions
on critical issues of peace, development and good governance.
8. The UK Government must therefore work with
its international partners and the Government of Afghanistan to
ensure that concrete action is taken to honour these commitments;
particularly as they relate to increasing the transparency and
effectiveness of international aid, enhancing sub-national governance
and the rule of law, ensuring more effective and properly resourced
civilian engagement to improve the impact of international civilian
assistance and strengthening the role of civil society. Despite
growing scepticism not all opportunities to turn the situation
in Afghanistan around have been lost, but there is an urgent need
for a rethink of how future policies should be framed.
TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
9. According to Integrity Watch, Afghan citizens
paid almost £658 million in bribes last year to access government
services, with corruption in the police and the justice sector
having the highest impact on households.[21]
It is no doubt that allegedly few of the cases that do get reported
to authorities lead to proper investigation and even less to conviction.
A ministry official observed in a recent interview that none of
the 200 plus cases that their ministry had reported to the relevant
department had been investigated.
10. The ways in which contracts are awarded both
by the Afghan government ministries and international agencies
is no less problematic. It would appear that few contracts are
given on the basis of capacity, professionalism or value for money.
Contractors are often former warlords or their associates or other
power brokers with interpreters who work for the PRTs sometimes
playing an important role in the process. Use of political patronage
is allegedly a deciding factor in decisions over who wins a bid.
11. Transparency International lists Afghanistan
as the second most corrupt country in the world. Given that every
year billions of dollars are directly spent by donor and troop
contributing countries through contracts with private (international
and national) security and construction companies totally bypassing
the Afghan government systems, the international community is
also to blame for the rampant corruption that exists in the country.
12. The lack of transparency and accountability
has exacerbated negative perceptions with many Afghans regarding
the international community complicit in not playing their part
in tackling corruption. In Helmand, for example, the widespread
rumours about the involvement of a substantial bribe in the improved
wheat seed distribution project under the Food Zone programme
which allegedly resulted in farmers receiving low-quality wheat
unsuitable for cultivation remain unaddressed. The absence of
open and accountable bidding processes has led to accusations
that contracts are only awarded to those who have links to senior
government officials or other contracting bodies and who is willing
to pay the highest bribe often as a percentage of the overall
project budget.
13. Furthermore, low quality standards inherent
in projects undertaken by unprofessional and unaccountable private
firms exacerbated by a lack of effective management and oversight
have led to accusations of fraud involving material and labour
costs. Some roads, including highways that cost close to half
a billion dollars to re-build have reached a near-total state
of disrepair within just a few years.
14. Projects should be evaluated more rigorously
and the results should be communicated to communities. The British
Government could assist the Government of Afghanistan to develop
a set of standards to assess the qualification and suitability
of contractors and to ensure that contract management and procurement
policies are effectively implemented.
15. The planned establishment of the Major Crimes
Task Force and Anti-Corruption Tribunals and a set of measures
aimed at enhancing government capacity for audit are important
steps to tackle corruption. However, the Government of Afghanistan
will need much support from its key international partners to
implement these programmes.
16. Civil society's role in ensuring accountability
also needs to be strengthened. It is incumbent on the provincial
and national government with support from the UK and its international
partners not only to allow this to happen, but also to support
and encourage it. The Afghan government with the support of the
international community must implement procedures to ensure that
those involved in non-government civil action that calls for change
of policy or greater accountability do not face retribution and
have the necessary protection against threats by anti-government
forces and others.
THE ROLE
OF CIVIL
SOCIETY
17. Problems of accountability have been compounded
by an apparent lack of political will on the part of the Afghan
Government and donors to ensure that the views of civil society
organisations are integrated into policy formation processes.
Consultation with a broad spectrum of actors; local communities,
NGOs, civil society organisations and activists and the private
sector is needed to design and implement good public policy that
responds effectively to the needs of the Afghan people. At the
London Conference calls were made for strengthening the role of
civil society. Yet on many occasions it has taken civil society
organisations weeks of intense negotiations to secure representation
in discussions and consultations on national and international
policy on Afghanistan; sometimes with unsatisfactory results.
For example, after weeks of lobbying only one civil society representative
was allowed to participate in the Kabul Conference of 20 July
- an event in which the Afghan Government was supposed to affirm
its commitment towards the Afghan people.
18. Similarly, women's rights groups have had
to work extremely hard to get a place at discussion tables. Only
as a result of determined and persistent advocacy by women's rights
groups, the number of female delegates invited to participate
in the Consultative Peace Jirga of June 2010 was raised from 20
to 310. Whilst this was welcomed by many women's groups, they
argue that the government's approach to inclusion has been far
from consistent.
WOMEN'S
RIGHTS
19. Despite the progress that has been achieved
in women's rights, significant challenges remain; Afghanistan
is currently the lowest ranking country on the Gender Development
Index in South Asia. Women face serious and indeed growing insecurity
in the public sphere. Female candidates for both the Presidential
and parliamentary elections faced a campaign of intimidation and
death threats with the campaign staff of some candidates murdered
or abducted. Attacks targeting schools, teachers and students
have increased over recent years. Girls' schools have been particularly
targeted.
20. As insecurity grows, women's rights and access
to basic services are diminishing in rural communities affected
by conflict. Research also indicates that gender based violence
is widespread in the country; especially at the community level
where there is a serious, and in some areas a total vacuum of
functional state judicial institutions. Efforts should be made
to ensure the strengthening of the formal justice system at the
national and local levels.
21. As the Afghan Government takes further practical
steps towards peace and reconciliation, ensuring women's involvement
in consultations leading to possible negotiations, and in such
negotiations themselves, should be an integral part of the policy.
With only six seats in the 70-member High Peace Council - the
body set up by the Afghan Government to seek peace with armed
anti-government groups - it is likely that the voices of the female
delegates in the Council will be drowned out in the decision making
processes that have the potential to result in worrying change
in their status. Furthermore, it is critical that the rights of
women and girls are not compromised in the reconciliation process.
Only an inclusive, just and fair process that has the rights and
interests of Afghans, particularly of women, at its hearth can
lead to a lasting peace.
22. We welcome the Secretary of State for the
Foreign and Commonwealth Affair's recent statement of commitment
to promote human rights painstakingly and consistently.[22]
In this period of growing fragility in securing the rights and
safety of women, the UK and its international partners must work
actively to ensure that the experience, knowledge and interests
of women are listened to and brought to bear in security, development
and peace and reconciliation agenda.
HUMANITARIAN AND
DEVELOPMENT NEEDS
23. A more joined-up approach to the overlapping
challenges of conflict, reconstruction, humanitarian assistance
and development in Afghanistan will help enhance the effectiveness
of UK policy in Afghanistan. However, in practice the application
of such a comprehensive approach has too often resulted in an
instrumentalisation of aid. Politicians and military officers
from NATO countries place significant emphasis on "winning
hearts and minds" through aid and reconstruction. Too often
the international community has looked for "quick fixes"
to problems relating to development need. Recent research has
shown that many Afghans perceive the creation of a political economy
of aid in Afghanistan as extremely dangerous. They contend that
inadequate oversight mechanisms of development aid delivered through
the military or PRTs means that it is easily manipulated to fit
particular patronage, ethnic or tribal agendas to the exclusion
of the most vulnerable and marginalised. This lucrative aid economy,
in turn, has resulted in the consolidation of noxious elite that
have an interest in subverting or retarding the state building
process.[23]
24. In multi-national missions, such as Afghanistan
where individual countries have lead responsibility for specific
provinces, policy coherence across all participating actors is
extremely important. Security and development in Helmand are influenced
by, and in turn impact, events not only in the neighbouring provinces,
but further afield. The way insecurity has spread leaves doubt
that a proper analysis of conflict dynamics and vulnerabilities
has underpinned the strategies of the Afghan Government and the
coalition. In the past three years many provinces previously regarded
relatively secure have seen a significant rise in armed violence.
25. Similarly, the potential of appropriately
designed and delivered development programmes in tackling some
of the causes of the conflict in regions that until recently had
not been affected by the insurgency in the same degree as the
southern and eastern provinces was significantly underused. Notably
among these are Badakhshan in the north, Ghor in the centre and
Nimroz in the south-west which have experienced a significant
rise in security incidents in the last couple of years.
26. A conflict-sensitive approach to development
is critical. Local ownership and participation are key to successful
and sustainable development. DFID, through the multi-donor monitoring
and evaluation of implementation of the DAC Fragile States Principles
and through the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, is widely respected
for its innovative approach to conflict sensitivity. These efforts
should be encouraged and built on in Afghanistan.[24]
Development interventions are most effective and sustainable when
led by civilian actors who have experience and knowledge of local
contexts. The role and responsibilities of the international Provincial
Reconstruction Teams in providing relief and development should
be transferred to civilians as soon as practicable.
27. A large proportion of the Conflict Poolapproximately
£40-50
million per yearis spent in Helmand through the PRT.[25]
Much of the US' Commanders Emergency Response Programme (CERP)
(to which the funding allocation for 2010 is over US$1 Billion
- more than the Afghan national annual budgets for agriculture,
health and education combined) was reported to have been earmarked
for Helmand province. More secure provinces in the north, centre
and west in which the security and development environment has
been more permissive have received just a fraction of this assistance.[26]
As the attention of the UK Government turns to stabilising 80
"key" districts, in working together with other major
donors it must ensure that a) critical humanitarian and development
needs across the country are not ignored in favour of the immediate
stabilisation concerns; b) a sound analysis of potential adverse
impact of inappropriately delivered aid funds on conflict supports
policy and practice and c) valuable resources are not spent on
"consent winning" projects the outcome of which both
in terms of acceptance and life-changing results has all too often
been proved inconclusive.
28. As insecurity is increasing and living conditions
have remained difficult and in some places worsened, Afghans have
grown increasingly sceptical and distrustful of the motives of
the international community. Their trust is crucial, but as long
as tactical consent winning replaces genuine effort at improving
their lives through poverty reduction, these negative perceptions
are likely to be exacerbated. Effective and lasting development
results are dependent on proper leadership of the process, which
in any context, but more importantly in fragile environments,
such as Afghanistan, only DFID can provide.
29. Furthermore, in line with good development
practice and the commitments that donors, including the British
Government, made at the London Conference of January 2010, practical
steps must be taken to improve openness and transparency in all
spending. Although the amount of information that the British
Government has submitted to the Afghan ministry of finance on
its disbursements has been more than that of most other donors,
comprehensive data on where and how funds are spent, are yet to
be published. Given rising concerns about corruption, timely and
accessible information will go a long way towards reassuring the
public in the UK and Afghanistan that British funds are spent
appropriately.
30. Crucially, a radically different approach
to gathering and applying knowledge is required. The first major
attempt in understanding the context appears not to have been
made until late 2008 when the Department for International Development
initiated the "Understanding Afghanistan" programme.
In terms of critical data collection the report of this programme
made two important recommendations: a) given that the "currently
fragmented nature of data collection makes data-based analysis
and policy making burdensome if not impossible", there was
a need to improve, widen and centralise the collection of data
concerning governance, corruption, social exclusion, conflict
vulnerability and economic growth; and b) given, Afghanistan's
rapidly changing context evidence based research, such as the
"Understanding Afghanistan", must be refreshed from
time to time.[27]
It is important that both of these recommendations are taken forward.
Moreover, whilst some country donors have commissioned studies
looking at provinces under their auspices, it appears that a comprehensive
country-wide analysis of the issues outlined above, particularly
conflict vulnerability, has not been tried.
31. Donors must urgently increase funding and
support for independent humanitarian action. Since the reestablishment
of OCHA in 2008, it has made some notable achievements while operating
under the constraints of limited resources, including the facilitation
of the production of two humanitarian action plans and regional
contingency plans, the establishment of five field offices, and
the set up of information management tools and the Emergency Response
Fund.[28]
The establishment of the Emergency Response Fund, in particular,
has enabled organizations, particularly Afghan NGOs, to quickly
access funding to respond to crises, but continued financial support
for the fund is needed.
32. As the humanitarian needs in Afghanistan
reach a critical stage, the UK Government must support OCHA in
an urgent redoubling of their recruitment efforts and consider
secondment options which will strengthen OCHA Afghanistan's effectiveness
in facilitating independent and principled humanitarian coordination,
outreach and response.[29]
33. Programmes emerging as a result of national
policies must sequence initiatives carefully to ensure effectiveness
and sustainability. This requires effective co-ordination between
donors and line ministries, but also within and between the Afghan
ministries themselves. There is a real need to bridge the current
gap between provincial/district and central level administration
and donors in the planning and budget making processes. In provinces
across Afghanistan, fractious relationships between provincial
governors and the central state, or ineffective communication
channels between central and provincial level administrations,
continue to hamper the implementation of new laws and procedures
meant to protect vulnerable groups.
CIVILIAN PROTECTION
34. Care needs to be taken to ensure detailed,
objective examination of how security policy may affect the daily
lives of communities across Afghanistan. Superficial assumptions
appear to underlie the increasing use of so called "tribal
militias". Aside from perhaps some short term tactical military
gains, militias are known to have been a detriment to long term
stability. The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office recently reported
that "The use of Local Defense Initiatives (LDI) & Arbaki
... continues to fracture the security landscape ... reminiscent
of the 1963 South Vietnamese Self Defence Corps and LDIs are falling
prey to all the same vices with active ones being murdered en-masse
(Kandahar); smart ones partnering with AOG to exploit the population
and Government supplies (Kunduz/Takhar); bold ones just being
the AOG (armed opposition group) (Parwan) and timid ones keeping
the status quo (Wardak). Some Arbaki have joined AOG when Government
failed to give them weapons while others still have scared neighboring
villagers to turn to the AOG for protection. The "Village
Stability Program" (VSP, the US catchall moniker for such
activities) is perhaps the most disturbing development of the
year not least because it is so opaque with no single institution
having an overview, let alone control, of all activities under
this rubric".[30]
BAAG has grave concerns that initiatives to set up community defence
mechanisms that run in parallel with the Afghan security sector
have wide-spread negative implications for security, development
and human rights. We believe that the British Government must
work with its partners in the coalition to ensure this practice
stops.
35. The continued escalation of armed conflict
in Afghanistan has had significant consequences for civilian protection.
In the first half of 2010, there was a dramatic increase in civilian
casualties. In the period January to June 2010, UNAMA reports
"a 31% increase in the number of civilians who were killed
or injured in fighting in Afghanistan compared to the same period
in 2009".[31]
In the South, during the same period "there was a 136% increase
in civilian deaths". Women and children have been adversely
affected not only in terms of a greater exposure to danger, but
also in terms of violations of their basic human rights and increasing
barriers in access to services. "Community elders, provincial
officials, and others, who have supported or are believed to support
the Afghan Government and International Forces are being systematically
targeted through assassinations, abductions and executions".[32]
36. In the main, UNAMA attributes this increase
in civilian casualties to the activities of anti-government forces
and the Government and International Forces inability to protect
civilians in many parts of the country. However, Afghan civil
society activists are also deeply concerned by the increase in
the damaging influence of local warlords and former militia commanders
(nominally aligned with the international military forces) on
civilian protection, security and rule of law at a local and provincial
level.
37. Protection requires legitimate, accountable
and capable national security and justice institutions. These
alliances have offered militia groups a veil of legitimacy without
adequate mechanisms to ensure transparency, lines of authority,
sufficient monitoring of activity and accountability or capability.
This, in turn, undermines processes to enhance civilian protection
and foster the trust of local populations in the security architecture
in Afghanistan. The UK has legal responsibility concerning the
protection of civilians in situations where it is involved in
military action. It must make every effort to strengthen the protection
of the civilian population and to investigate and bring to justice
perpetrators of violations of human rights. The UK Government
must also focus on ensuring that Afghan National Security Forces
are supported to understand and respect human rights and their
obligations under international humanitarian law and to institute
mechanisms to ensure accountability in security operations.
NGO OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
38. British non-governmental organisations continue
to deliver humanitarian, reconstruction and development assistance
across Afghanistan despite the significant security risks and
challenges involved. Due to the deterioration in security, security
management costs are rising and NGOs are finding it increasingly
difficult to fund security needs from project or central budgets.
For example, these may range from increased expenditure on communication
equipment and security training to the costs associated with robberies
and attacks on offices as well as to those associated with delays
in project implementation resulting from specific security incidents.
NGOs would encourage a serious discussion within Whitehall about
funding for NGOs and support for them to put in place effective
measures to minimise risks to their staff.
11 October 2010
21 http://www.iwaweb.org/corruptionsurvey2010/Impact_on_population.html Back
22
15 September 2010, Lincolns Inn. Back
23
Wilder, Gordon. Back
24
Communication with member of BOND Conflict Group. Back
25
IDS Back
26
Oxfam
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/downloads/quick_impact_quick_collapse_afghanistan_en.pdf Back
27
Sultan Barakat, Synthesis Report, Understanding Afghanistan, The
Consolidated Findings of a Research Project Commissioned by Her
Majesty's Government, the University of York,
http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/poli/prdu/pub.Understanding%20Afghanistan%20Nov2008.pdf Back
28
See Humanitarian Reform Project letter to John Holmes, June 2010. Back
29
Ibid. Back
30
ANSO Back
31
Ibid. Back
32
Ibid. Back
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