Written evidence from Professor Sultan
Barakat & Mr Steven A. Zyck, Post-war Reconstruction and Development
Unit, University of York
Recommendations for a Diplomatic Strategy in Afghanistan
SUMMARY
The current UK and international strategy towards
Afghanistan is ineffective and is unlikely to yield stability.
While increased troop numbers will be beneficial in preventing
substantial increases in insurgent operations, no viable strategy
for improved governance or development exists (or would be likely
to yield results in the face of an uncooperative and decreasingly
credible government in Kabul).
A political settlement appears to be the only viable
strategy for achieving stability. Yet a negotiated solution will
require the realisation of a number of challenging and somewhat
unlikely achievements, which are outlined below (see Figure 1
for a snapshot). These should include the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO), particularly in the design of strategy and control
of communications, but will require the greatest contribution,
particularly in the short and mid terms, from the armed forces.
ABOUT THE
AUTHORS
Sultan Barakat
is Professor of Politics and Director of the Post-war Reconstruction
and Development Unit (PRDU) at the University of York. He has
been closely involved in Afghanistan since the late 1990s. In
addition to undertaking capacity development programmes for senior
Afghan officials, he also led the mid-term evaluation of the National
Solidarity Programme (NSP) in 2005 and 2006 and the British Government's
"Strategic Conflict Assessment" of Afghanistan in 2008.
Professor Barakat is editor of Reconstructing War-Torn Societies:
Afghanistan (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) and After the Conflict:
Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War (IB
Tauris, 2005).
Steven A. Zyck
is a current Associate of and former Research Fellow at the PRDU
at the University of York. He is presently working as a contractor
with the Afghanistan team at the NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre.
Mr Zyck, who formerly worked in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries
for international organisations, is the author of "Former
Combatant Reintegration and Fragmentation in Afghanistan"
(Conflict, Security & Development, 2008) and, with
Sultan Barakat, "Afghanistan's Insurgency and the Viability
of a Political Settlement" (Studies in Conflict
and Terrorism, 2010).
1. After nearly a decade of fighting the war
in Afghanistan, the situation continues to decline. This descent
is all the more troubling given that, in the past three years,
it has continued unabated despite the re-focusing of international
attention and financial, material, military and human resources
upon the country. Meanwhile, Pakistan has continued to be rocked
by internal conflict in the western border provinces and terrorism
throughout the country; Pakistan's mounting instability has, however,
been subject to sporadic and half-hearted attention despite the
threat it poses to broader regional and global security. HMG's
April 2009 strategy for "Af/Pak" primarily addresses
Pakistan insofar as it relates to Afghanistan. We strongly believe
that HMG must increase its focus upon Pakistan as a crisis and
as a context of fragility in its own right. Yet, while we feel
that Pakistan must be treated as a separate conflict (as well
as a partner in Afghanistan's stabilisation), humility impels
us to focus upon that context, Afghanistan, with which we are
far more personally and professionally familiar.
2. Progress in Afghanistan had previously been
hindered by insufficient levels of resources and the channelling
of resources outside of or around rather than through the Afghan
Government. Crucial capabilities failed to develop early and public
institutions which should deliver basic services are unable to
meet their mandates or the expectations of the Afghan citizenry.
It is increasingly apparent that the absence of a credible Afghan
partner and senior Afghan leadership poses the greatest threat.
From the start, there should have been a focus on building the
capacity of strategically selected individuals throughout the
Afghan administration as a means of fostering local ownership
and effective governance. Capacity-building measures, including
FCO-funded Chevening scholarships and fellowships, have been a
beneficial but exceptionally costly and scattergun approach of
enhancing skills.
3. As a result of limited attention to individual
capacity building, cultures of impunity and ineffectiveness have
been permitted to develop. Key elements of the Afghan administration
feel that preventing the discovery of corruption, criticising
Afghanistan's foreign partners, and perpetrating electoral fraud
are the most effective means of clinging to power. In such a context,
the Taliban increasingly appears to the Afghan people to be a
better or equally bad option. Indeed, the Taliban demonstrated
greater capacity to provide local security (despite also being
a source of violence), managed corruption, belatedly reigned in
the poppy industry and resulting levels of addiction, exuded a
sense of moral authority, and forbade (rather than pillaged) private
banks.
4. As such, there is an opportunity for the international
legitimacy and resources of the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan (GIRA) and the moral legitimacy of the Taliban
to be combined: a negotiated settlement between the two and the
institution of a power-sharing arrangement. Despite the frequency
with which such a statement has been made in the course of the
past one to two years, few policymakers, diplomats, or scholars
have articulated how such a settlement may best be pursued and
implemented. This evidence builds upon our past research and strategies
into this issue and is rooted in our evolving understanding of
the situation.[33]
5. The Afghan population has increasing cause
for grievance with the international intervention and with the
GIRA. Its support will not be thrown behind NATO's International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or the GIRA - even if the performance
of either merited such allegiance - given the threat posed by
an insurgency which has essentially established itself as a powerful
shadow government. Even those segments of the population pleased
with reconstruction assistance, impressed by the hitherto mediocre
performance of the Afghan public administration, or ideologically
opposed to the insurgents' aims will not passively or actively
oppose the Taliban for fear of violent reprisal. Reconstruction
and development funding will not - and cannot - purchase stability
in such a security context and in light of the genuine opposition
which has grown throughout the Afghan population as the result
of years of misplaced poppy eradication efforts as well as OEF
and ISAF-inflicted civilian casualties. While reintegrating "reconcilable"
insurgents may appear attractive and have a certain rhetorical
charm, few such insurgents will take up such an offer due to pride
or fear of retributive attacks. Additionally, the levels of assistance
intended to entice opposition fighters into the Government's fold
are insufficient (though many imposters may benefit).[34]
6. The Taliban and its numerous affiliates must
be brought to the negotiating table. However, they will only do
so if they feel that their only other option is military defeat;
even then, some will certainly resist any political settlement.
As such, a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Afghanistan
will only be possible following the continuation and expansion
of international military operations; the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) certainly have a role to play, but, as experience
has demonstrated time and time again, it ultimately lacks the
skills and willingness to confront the insurgency directly without
massive international assistance and support. While celebrating
the growth of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to 134,000 members,
others reported that approximately a quarter of these were "phantom"
soldiers who either did not exist or who were absent without leave
(AWOL). As such, this war will continue to be fought and won or
lost primarily based on the performance of the international troops
in the country. Even then, maintained or increased numbers of
troops on the ground still may not have the geographical coverage,
operational mandate, or contextual familiarity to win the war.
7. If the troops do prevail in making insurgency
membership too dangerous for most Afghans to consider - and if
significant proportions of its leadership are eliminated - then
the Taliban may consider entering into negotiations if, indeed,
it is able, at the very least, to convince its insurgency partners
in the Haqqani network and Hizb-e Islami to do so. Even then,
a credible offer of negotiation must be (a) extended, (b) accepted
within a specific timeframe and according to mutually acceptable
conditions, and (c) recognized fully and unconditionally by the
international community. Such an offer must be genuine and not
a political manoeuvre intended to appeal to the anti-war populace
in troop-supplying nations or to make the Afghan Government appear
conciliatory in the eyes of its international financiers. At that
point, negotiations must ultimately be implemented successfully
- carefully shepherded and not thrown off track by security or
political incidents - and be backed up by a credible offer of
enforcement by a neutral-as-possible third party. The individuals
involved must be carefully chosen and genuinely committed to an
effective resolution of the conflict rather than to scoring points
with their constituencies, as has happened so commonly in other
protracted conflicts around the world.
8. This process, outlined in Figure 1, essentially
requires that at least eight achievements be reached in a timely
manner without being thrown off course by spoiler violence or
opposition from key Afghan and international stakeholders, including
HMG, the US Government, Afghan political parties, international
terrorist networks (including their financiers) and the Pakistani
Government (and, specifically, the Inter-Services Intelligence
agency). The plausibility that these will be achieved is already
slim and is further undercut by the dissipating engagement of
ISAF's troop supplying members.
Figure 1.
Eight Achievements Necessary for Afghanistan's
Stabilisation
9. If these achievements are not achieved, or
if it becomes apparent that one has not been achieved or is unfeasible,
HMG and its international supporters may need to come to the conclusion,
prematurely reached by some, that the intervention in Afghanistan
will never result in stability. At such time, HMG may have no
choice but to limit its ambitions and strive for a next-best solution,
namely the achievement of a perpetual state of neither war nor
peace in which insurgents engage in continued attacks while being
pursued by the ANSF as well as by drones and small cadres of special
operations forces from the United States and other willing countries.
10. Such an eventuality would require continued
support for Pakistan in the form of development assistance and
military aid to ensure that it does not allow insurgents the opportunity
to use Afghanistan as a staging point for the destabilisation
of Pakistan. Drone patrols and airstrikes along the border between
the two countries would need to be stepped up, as the administration
of US President Barack Obama has already done, and would need
to be accompanied by intensive narcotics and financial interdiction
efforts. Governments in countries through which Afghan poppies
are smuggled would need to be provided with unprecedented incentives
to disallow and strongly counter the transport of poppies, opiates,
and precursor chemicals (which allow for processing of raw poppies
into opiates). To counter the effects of such activities, development
assistance - or, more likely, basic relief aid - would need to
continue flowing to Afghanistan, Pakistan and other parts of Central
and South Asia.
THE ROLE
OF HMG AND
THE FOREIGN
& COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
11. Despite the limited chance that the eight
achievements above will be attained, the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO) and the entirety of HMG's intervention in Afghanistan,
including the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Department for International
Development (DFID), and the Stabilisation Unit, must be orientated
around just such an outcome. The FCO, in particular, will need
to ensure that the UK's unequivocal military commitment to Afghanistan
is fully communicated to the Afghan people and the insurgency,
which are both increasingly aware of the opposition to the conflict
in the United States, United Kingdom, and elsewhere (and which
hence predict that foreign forces will depart quickly). Second,
while emphasising the military campaign, the FCO will also be
required to coordinate a message - also communicated by top British
military commanders - that the international community is committed
to supporting and honouring any negotiations and political settlements
pursued by the GIRA. Such a message will be received more fully
and will be viewed credible if Western Governments do not sacrifice
their trust in the Islamic world through provocative acts from
highly-publicised Quran burnings to rabid and mean-spirited opposition
to mosque-building and burqa-wearing. This non-coercive, diplomatic
strategy should be delivered, not at press conferences and in
the international press, but by local spokespersons or British-Afghans
or British Muslims.
12. Furthermore, the FCO must begin to develop,
with input from its diplomatic corps and range of experts throughout
Britain, a strategy by which the GIRA can propose and shepherd
negotiations leading to a political settlement. Such inputs can
help to ensure that negotiations are not presented as a form of
"take it or leave it" or as a "with us or against
us" ultimatum, but as a means of dialogue through which the
most unbeneficial forms of confrontation may be avoided. Disposed
elements must be identified and discrete talks utilising diplomatic
channels should be pursued. While such negotiations must be led
by the Afghan Government, the FCO should play a key role, based
on its experience in Northern Ireland and elsewhere, in supporting
Afghan leaders in designing their strategy, conducting negotiations,
establishing neutral-as-possible implementation, and monitoring
and enforcing arrangements. One lesson which the UK can bring
to negotiations in Afghanistan - and which both the GIRA and the
Taliban-led insurgency realise - is the integral role to be played
by regional powers and other Islamic countries. While much attention
has been paid thus far to the potentially negative role played
by Pakistani elements in Afghanistan, there has been inadequate
consideration given to the promising role which Iran can play
in Afghanistan. Indeed, Iran may be the one country with the most
to lose from a destabilised Afghanistan and it should be viewed
as a partner in peace, rather than an inherently hostile source
of insecurity. The same message applies to many Arab countries,
from Saudi Arabia to Qatar and Kuwait, which have recent historical
ties to all factions within Afghanistan and which could be viewed
both as a neutral facilitator of a political settlement and as
significant providers of development financing.
13. The UK may also make other contributions
beyond the scope of the eight integral achievements. These may
help to support the pursuit of an effective political settlement,
but are more orientated around reconstruction and development.
Potential contributions, for example, should focus on the need
to foster increased professionalism and capacity within the Afghan
Government at all levels. Such an outcome must be understood as
a generational process not necessarily achievable to any meaningful
degree within the coming few years, though groundwork may be laid.
For instance, the plethora of capacity-building programmes implemented
within Afghanistan has not been adequately studied; we do not,
essentially, know what does and does not work. The UK should finance
a major evaluation of such initiatives and then fully support
a multi-donor programme to establish a series of capacity-development
academies throughout the country. These must be run by capable
service providers and should move beyond the costly, limited-output,
and low-impact approaches previously developed by some UN agencies,
NGOs, consulting firms and others within Afghanistan.
14. Furthermore, DFID may wish to take the lead
in designing a more comprehensive and meaningful package of assistance
for "reconciled" insurgents than is currently being
discussed. The UN agencies previously involved in demobilisation
and reintegration (D&R) in Afghanistan have shown themselves
to have little technical expertise in this area and to dedicate
more than half of all donor-provided funds to overhead costs.
DFID must ensure that the mediocrity which was allowed to flourish
under the 2003-2006 Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP)
is not repeated. Indeed, DFID may wish - taking D&R as a starting
point - to put forward a far broader reintegration package which
targets all boys and men between the ages of 12 and 35 in the
country. This group, in particular, must become awash in development
assistance, educational opportunities, micro-finance programmes,
agricultural development schemes and other livelihoods-orientated
interventions. If not, the current generation of young men may
grow up devoid of options and serve as fodder for the insurgency,
not only in the course of the next three to five years, but also
far into the future. Such assistance must be given in a relief
mentality that is orientated more around consumption than sustainability.
Large sums will be lost because of waste and corruption, though
the alternative - using development approaches which emphasise
beneficiary contributions and the provision of technical, rather
than material, assistance - will take too long to implement with
too high overhead costs (while still not likely achieving anything
approximating sustainability). Development, it should be said,
is far better at preventing conflicts than at ending them.
LESSONS FOR
UK FOREIGN POLICY
IN FRAGILE
SITUATIONS
15. There are a range of lessons which may be
learned from Afghanistan (as well as from Pakistan). First and
most important, however, is that elite bargains rarely, if ever,
work. Afghanistan was a victor's peace which excluded the toppled
regime. In doing so - and in not providing sufficient numbers
of troops to guarantee security on the ground - the intervening
powers ensured that spoiler violence would ensue. Such a mistake
should not be repeated and the international community would be
wise to recognise that they must work with those actors on the
ground that are deemed to be legitimate by the local population.
Attempting to impose officials who "we" believe are
legitimate is bound to fail.
16. Furthermore, the UK would be wise to put
less faith in the political centre when intervening into future
post-conflict contexts. For operational ease and visibility, the
international community so commonly stresses approaches which
focus upon capitals and elites. It is easier, after all, to craft
a healthcare policy and appoint a minister of health than to deploy
a nationwide system of medicine. Elections are held and central
ministries are erected years before the state is actually able
to deliver services on the ground. Such an approach is frustrating
for local populations, which are more concerned with local improvements
than with national political developments. Furthermore, a focus
upon a narrow handful of elites at the national level means that,
should these individuals fail, the entire intervention is unlikely
to succeed. In Afghanistan, the UK and others recognise that they
put all of their faith in a single individual who is growing increasingly
unwilling to pursue even the appearance of integrity and managerial
competence.
17. Finally, the UK - in its development policy,
in particular - would be wise to develop intervention strategies
which tackle the priorities of the local population. One can understand
how the Afghan population might negatively view an international
intervention primarily concerned with governance, elections, political
parties, gender relations, and counter-insurgency strategies while
rural communities and urban centres lack safe water, reliable
electricity supplies, irrigation canals, sufficient jobs, good
schools or basic safety. HMG institutions may wish to consider
the assumption that what "they" want is so different
from what "we" would want in the aftermath of a decades-long
war. Indeed, priorities are commonly one and the same, and HMG
may find its post-conflict assistance far more applicable if it
begins with the same sorts of aid which the British public most
urgently required in the aftermath of the Second World War.
6 October 2010
33 Sultan Barakat & Steven A. Zyck, "Afghanistan's
Insurgency and the Viability of a Political Settlement",
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33:3 (February 2010).
The authors have also contributed to an earlier strategy-formulation
process for HMG; see Sultan Barakat et al., A Strategic Conflict
Assessment of Afghanistan, a report of HMG's/DFID's "Understanding
Afghanistan" initiative (November 2008). Back
34
Indeed, as with the earlier disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
(DDR) process targeting the Northern Alliance, the levels of assistance
being proposed by UN agencies and others equal less than US$5,000
per combatant. If the previous DDR programme - which received
similar levels of funding - is any indication, only US$700 of
this assistance will ultimately reach reintegrated insurgents.
Also, as with the previous DDR process, anywhere from one-third
to two-thirds of all "reconciled" fighters will be fraudulent
or non-existent. See Steven A. Zyck, "Former Combatant Reintegration
and Fragmentation in Contemporary Afghanistan", Conflict,
Security & Development 9:1 (April 2009). Back
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