Conclusions and recommendations
The Government's Annual Report on Strategic Exports
1. Given
the key importance of the arms export control policy as demonstrated
once again by recent events in North Africa and the Middle East,
we recommend that the Government ensures that in future the Annual
Reports on Strategic Exports be formally presented to Parliament
by the respective four Secretaries of State. (Paragraph 6)
The Government's policy
2. We
conclude that the validity of the Ministerial evidence we took
on 24 January and the wisdom of some of the export licences previously
granted need to be assessed against the Government's subsequent
abrupt changes in export licensing policy following the recent
uprisings against authoritarian regimes in North Africa and the
wider Middle East. We look at these issues at more depth later
in this Report [chapter 10]. We recommend that the Government
in its response to this report sets out how it intends to reconcile
the potential conflict of interest between increased emphasis
on promoting arms exports with the staunch upholding of human
rights. (Paragraph 18)
The Treaty on US/UK Defence Trade Cooperation
3. We
recommend the Government sets out in its response to the Report
what specific steps it is taking to ensure that UK exporters take
full advantage of the potential benefits of the Treaty on US/UK
Defence Trade Cooperation. We further recommend that the Government
sets out the respective roles and responsibilities of the British
Embassy in Washington and the British Consulate-General in New
York in obtaining the maximum benefit for UK industry from the
Treaty. (Paragraph 23)
The Performance of the Export Control Organisation
4. We
conclude that a well-functioning licence application system is
vital to the promotion of arms exports and that the system should
impose the least possible administrative burden on exporters,
consistent with an effective control regime. We further conclude
that it is a matter of concern that a prominent industry representative
body, such as the Export Group on Aerospace and Defence (EGAD),
has such a low opinion of the performance of the Export Control
Organisation (ECO). We recommend the Government reviews the performance
of the ECO and provide us with the results of this Review in its
response to this Report. We further recommend that the Government
reports to us the results of its review into the workings of the
Open General Export License system. (Paragraph 31)
Review of Arms Export Controls
5. We
conclude that the Government's timetable of before the end of
2011 by which the wording of the UK's Consolidated Criteria will
be updated to be wholly consistent with the EU Common Position
is too protracted. We recommend that the Government sets itself
a much shorter timetable in which to conclude this updating and
to inform us of the revised timetable in its response to this
report. We further conclude that, while the consolidated criteria
appear robust their application seems to be less so. We therefore
recommend that the Government ensures that the EU Common Position
is rigidly and consistently applied. (Paragraph 36)
'Brass plate' companies
6. We
conclude that the Government's current examination of ways to
tackle concerns about brass plate UK companies in the UK trading
in arms from overseas locations with virtual impunity because
of difficulties of enforcement is welcome. We recommend the Government
tells us in its response what precise action it will take, including
the results of its exploration of the possibility of using powers
under the Companies Act to dissolve a company which is operating
against the public interest. (Paragraph 40)
Pre-licence registration of arms brokers
7. We
recommend that the Government carries out a full review of the
case for a pre-licence register of arms brokers and that its review
includes a public consultation and is concluded with a Ministerial
decision within four months of the start of the consultation.
(Paragraph 46)
Extra-territorial arms export controls
8. We
conclude it is disappointing that the Government's discussions
with the industry and NGOs have not resulted in extra-territorial
controls being extended to include specific items in Category
C. We recommend that the Government re-engages with NGOs and industry
groups on this important policy issue and lets us know of the
progress being made in its response to this report. We further
conclude, as did our predecessor Committees, that there is no
justification for allowing a UK person to conduct arms exports
overseas that would be a criminal offence if carried out from
the UK. We note that extra-territorial legislation already applies
to a number of areas, including sexual offences against children
and young people, war crimes, terrorism, torture, bribery and
corruption and taxation. We conclude that there is no reason why
enforcing extra-territorial controls in connection with arms export
controls should be more difficult to enforce than in these areas.
We recommend that the Government extends extra-territoriality
to all items on the Military List in Category C. (Paragraph
57)
Military end-use control
9. We
conclude it is disappointing that the Government appears not to
have continued the previous Government's work and pressed for
an expanded Military End-Use Control. We recommend that the Government
immediately re-starts work in producing specific policy proposals
and to ensure that it has the requisite support for them at EU
level in time for the 2012 review of the EU Dual-Use Regulation.
We recommend that the Government provides us with an update on
how this work is progressing when replying to this report. We
further recommend that the Government in the meantime makes the
necessary amendments to UK legislation to rectify the present
deficiencies in military end use controls. (Paragraph 61)
Torture end-use controls
10. We
conclude that the slow pace of progress towards an EU torture
end-use control is very disappointing. We recommend that in its
response to this report, the Government provides detailed information
on the parameters of the torture end-use control it intends to
propose to the EU. We further recommend that the Government simultaneously
prepares draft UK legislation on this issue for public consultation.
(Paragraph 65)
Sodium Thiopental - US for use in lethal injections
11. We
conclude that the export of sodium thiopental from the UK for
use in executions in the United States is deeply disturbing as
is the elapse of time between this information becoming public
and the Government making an Order under the Export Control Act
2002 during which further shipments were reportedly made. We recommend
that the Government in its response to this report sets out what
monitoring and procedural changes it has made to prevent any similar
avoidance of export controls occurring. (Paragraph 70)
'No re-export clauses and undertakings
12. We
recommend that the Government provides us with an assessment of
how no re-export undertakings are working, and details of the
Government's methodology for assessing their effectiveness. We
also recommend that the Government provides us with information
as to which other countries have no re-export clauses in their
contracts, as opposed to in their undertakings, and the effects
of such clauses. (Paragraph 79)
Enforcement
13. We
recommend that in its response to this report, the Government
explains what action, if any, was taken in the 290 cases of misuse
that did not result in a warning letter following the 836 enforcement
visits in 2009. (Paragraph 81)
Civil Penalty regime: compound penalties
14. We
conclude that it is too early to assess fully the effectiveness
of the compound penalty regime since it has been in operation
for barely one year. However, we further conclude that even at
this early stage the penalty system seems to lack clarity and
therefore fairness. We recommend that the Government considers
the industry's concerns and make public the criteria used for
imposing compound penalties and how the amounts of such penalties
are calculated. (Paragraph 86)
15. We also recommend
that as compound penalties are applied to cases which would justify
being referred to the Crown Prosecution Service for consideration
for prosecution, the Government holds open the possibility of
making public the names of companies and individuals who have
breached arms exports controls sufficiently seriously to attract
compound penalties. (Paragraph 87)
The UK Government's role in negotiations
16. We
conclude that the Government's statement that it is fully committed
to securing a robust and effective Arms Trade Treaty is to be
welcomed. We look to the Government to deliver on its commitment.
(Paragraph 94)
A strong ATT or one based on consensus?
17. We
conclude that the Government seems to have adopted a different
policy from its predecessor; appearing to be prepared to weaken
the Arms Trade Treaty in order to try to ensure that key arms
exporting countries become signatories. We recommend that the
Government continues to try to achieve the strongest possible
Treaty, including exports of ammunition, with the maximum number
of key countries including the United States, as signatories,
but should not adopt a strict consensus or lowest common denominator
approach which is likely to result in an Arms Trade Treaty being
ineffectual. (Paragraph 102)
18. We further recommend
that the Government, in its response to this report, sets out
its policy on including anti-corruption provisions in the Arms
Trade Treaty with details of the provisions it would wish to see
incorporated. (Paragraph 103)
Sustainable development—Criterion 8
19. We
conclude that deciding whether to approve arms exports to developing
countries in relation to Criterion 8 can be difficult given that
other policy considerations may need to be taken into account.
However, we recommend that in its response to this report, the
Government provides a full statement of the methodology it uses
in relation to Criterion 8 in deciding whether or not a specific
arms export licence should be approved. (Paragraph 107)
A specific Criterion
We conclude that the Government has failed to demonstrate
satisfactorily whether, and if so how, it assesses the risk that
individual arms exports may be linked to bribery and corruption
during the licence approval process. We recommend that the Government
sets out fully in its response to this Report whether such an
assessment is made for all arms export licence applications, and
if so how. (Paragraph 115)
20. We further recommend
that, given that Criterion 8 applies only to developing countries
and that bribery and corruption are not confined to such countries,
the Government gives full consideration to proposing the insertion
of an additional Criterion into the EU Common Position on arms
exports obliging Member States to assess the risk of bribery and
corruption before approving an arms export licence to any country.
(Paragraph 116)
Countries of Concern
China
21. We
recommend that in view of the continuing serious human rights
violations taking place in China, the Government maintains its
position of fully supporting the retention of the EU arms embargo
on China. (Paragraph 120)
Israel
22. We
note that the previous Government obtained a categorical assurance
from the Israeli Government, in writing, dated 29 November 2000,
which included: "No UK originated equipment nor any UK originated
systems/sub-systems/components are used as part of the Israel
Defence Force's activities in the Territories". In a letter
to the Chair of 10 February 2011, the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair
Burt, says:
I can confirm that UK policy on the export of
controlled goods and equipment to Israel has not changed since
the Coalition Government took office. All export licence applications
to Israel are considered on a case- by- case basis against the
Consolidated EU and National Export Licensing Criteria.
It is far from clear how this assurance can be reconciled
with the Government's response referred to in paragraph 122 above.
(Paragraph 124)
23. We conclude that
the present Government's policy on exporting arms or components
of arms that could be used in the Occupied Palestinian Territories
appears to be confused. Given that the Government in its response
to the previous Committees' last Report stated: "That the
UK Government does not have a policy that UK arms exports to Israel
should not be used in the Occupied Palestinian Territories",
we recommend that the Government re-states what specific arms
or components of arms it is willing to approve for export to Israel
that could be used in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. We
further recommend that if the Government is unable to identify
any such arms or components of arms, it formally withdraws the
statement of policy quoted in this paragraph. (Paragraph 125)
Saudi Arabia and Yeman
24. We
recommend that the Government keeps its policy on approving arm
exports to Saudi Arabia under review in the light of the specific
allegations surrounding the 2009-10 conflict in Yemen and current
events in Yemen, Bahrain, and the wider region. (Paragraph 130)
Arms exports to authoritarian regimes in North
Africa, Middle East and worldwide
25. The Government's policy on arms exports
to a considerable number of individual countries, and on making
arms exports generally a high Government priority, has been brought
sharply into focus by the uprisings and demonstrations in recent
weeks in North Africa and the Middle East, and the armed response
made to them which has resulted in the death or injury of civilians.
(Paragraph 131)
26. The government makes public on the BIS
and FCO websites a quarterly list of those export licences it
has granted. It also provides to the CAEC more detailed information
on a confidential basis. Tables using information from the BIS
and FCO websites of selected arms export licence approvals to
countries in North Africa and the Middle east of arms and components
of arms that could be used for internal repression are set out
in Annex 4. (Paragraph 132)
27. The Government's policy on arms exports
in relation to internal repression was clearly stated by the FCO
Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, in his letter to the Chair of
10 February 2011:
The longstanding British position is clear.
We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk
the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal
conflicts or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.
(Paragraph 133)
28. Since the uprisings and demonstrations
began, the Government has been vigorously backpedalling on its
arms exports to North Africa and the Middle East, and up to the
time this report was concluded has taken the following steps:
- On 17 February, the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair
Burt, announced that all arms export licences to Bahrain were
being reviewed.
- On 18 February, the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair
Burt, announced that a review of arms exports licences to the
wider region, including Yemen was on-going.
- On 26 February the UK Government supported
the United Nations Security Council Resolution (1970) imposing
an arms embargo on Libya
- On 28 February the UK Government supported
a European Council Decision to impose an arms embargo on Libya.[1]
(Paragraph 134)
29. We conclude that
both the present Government and its predecessor misjudged the
risk that arms approved for export to certain authoritarian countries
in North Africa and the Middle East might be used for internal
repression. We further conclude that the Government's decision
to revoke a considerable number of arms export licences to Bahrain,
Egypt, Libya and Tunisia is very welcome.
We recommend that, in its response to this Report:
- The Government provides us with full details
on arms export licences it has revoked since the beginning of
January 2011 when the recent uprisings and demonstrations in North
Africa and the Middle East started;
- The Government states what specific and systematic
consideration of arms exports is carried out within the National
Security Strategy and at meetings of the National Security Council;
- The Government states the outcome of its review
of arms exports to the wider Middle East region as announced by
the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, on 18 February;
- The Government states what changes it will make
to improve both its arms export control procedures and its judgements
about the risk of arms exported from the UK being used for internal
repression by authoritarian regimes.
We further recommend that the Government extends
immediately its review of UK arms export licences announced by
the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, on 18 February 2011 to authoritarian
regimes worldwide in respect of arms or components of arms which
could be used for internal repression. (Paragraph 135)
1 Details are available in Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP
(published in the Official Journal of the European Union L58,
3.3.2011, p53). The Council Decision was given legal force by
Council Regulation on 2 March 2011. Back
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