Written evidence submitted by Transparency
International
1. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The international arms trade is among the most corruption-prone
sectors. Arms deals tend to be surrounded by high levels of commercial
and national security. This makes the trade particularly susceptible
to the risk of corruption as a vehicle for illegal and undesirable
arms transfers. Illicit arms transfers have negative consequences
for international humanitarian law, human rights, and sustainable
development as well as for efforts to combat violent organised
crime and terrorism.
We thus recommend that the Committees on Arms
Export Controls:
¾ continue
to recommend to HMG that the Export Control Organisation (BIS)
test whether a licence application is free from corruption and
bribery before issuing an export licence;
¾ insist
that HMG implement the Committees' recommendations based on Chapter
6 of the First Joint Report of the Session 2009-10;
¾ consider
addressing corruption risks in export licensing beyond Criterion
8 of the EU and National Consolidated Criteria as corruption in
the legal global arms trade is not confined to those countries
qualifying for consideration under Criterion 8;
¾ recommend
that HMG work towards a robust UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
with a strong anti-corruption mechanism, preferably as a stand-alone
criterion; and
¾ recommend
that HMG work with other EU member states to amend the European
Council Common Position defining common rules governing the controls
of exports of military technology and equipment and agree
a new ninth criterion whereby prospective transfers would be refused
where there existed a clear risk that they might involve corrupt
practices.
2. BRIEF INTRODUCTION
TO THE
SUBMITTER
Since 2004, the Transparency International Defence
and Security Programme, based in London, has become the authoritative
actor on empowering civil society, defence contractors, and governments
to promote greater transparency and reduce corruption in defence
and security. Our role is fourfold: (1) To raise integrity in
arms transfers; (2) To support counter-corruption reforms in nations;
(3) To empower defence anti-corruption actors and actions by disseminating
expertise; and (4) To be a strong voice in the formulation of
international policy on the centrality of dealing with defence
and security corruption as a key aspect of strengthening development
and human security. We have found that our approach and our tools
work effectively in both peacetime and in conflict environments,
notably Afghanistan, where we are currently actively engaged.
FACTUAL INFORMATION
3. Corruption has long been acknowledged to
have a devastating impact on the legal global arms trade:
A 2006 survey by Control Risks showed that roughly one
third of international defence companies felt they had lost out
on a contract in the last year because of corruption by a competitor.i
The US Department of Commerce
claimed that the defence sector accounted for 50% of all bribery
allegations in 1994-99, despite accounting for less than 1% of
the world trade.ii It has been estimated that bribes
accounted for as much as 15% of the total spending on weapons
acquisitions in the 1990s.iii In 2005, the Defence
and Security Programme of Transparency International estimated
the global cost of corruption in the defence sector to be at
a minimum of around US$20 billion per year, which equates
to the global official development assistance provided to Iraq,
Afghanistan, Congo (DRC), Pakistan, and Bangladesh combined or
the total sum pledged by the G8 to fight world hunger in L'Aquila
in 2009. This estimate is based on data from the World Bank
and SIPRI and assumes that the defence sector is no more
prone to corruption than other sectors—an assumption that
conflicts with popular perceptions.iv
FIRST JOINT
REPORT OF
THE SESSION
2009-10, "SCRUTINY OF
ARMS EXPORT
CONTROLS"
4. The First Joint Report of Session 2009-10,
"Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls", includes an entire
chapter on "Challenging bribery and corruption".v
The UK Committees on Arms Export Controls "made a
series of recommendations relating to: the application of the
Criterion 8 methodology to test whether the contract behind
a licence application is free from bribery and corruption;
test creation of a requirement for those seeking export licences
to produce a declaration that the export contract has not been
obtained through bribery or corruption; the revocation
of licences where an exporter had been convicted of corruption;
and the amendment of the National Export Licensing Criteria
to make conviction for corruption by an exporter grounds for refusing
an export licence (emphasis added)."vi
5. In the First Joint Report of the Session 2009-10,
the Committees on Arms Export Controls still "adhere
to the recommendations on bribery and corruption made in our 2008
Report and we recommend that the Government consider them further
with a view to implementing the recommendations or explaining
why there is no need to do so (emphasis added).vii
UNITED KINGDOM
EXPORTS CONTROL
ANNUAL REPORT
2009
6. The United Kingdom Exports Control Annual
Report 2009 unfortunately fails to mention either bribery or corruption.
7. It is also notable that while the Committees
on Arms Export Controls have recommended that Criterion
8 methodology be applied "to test whether a licence application
is free from bribery and corruption" (First Joint Report
of Session 2009-10, p. 39), according to the United Kingdom Exports
Control Annual Reports 0 (zero) Standard Individual Export
Licence (SIEL) and Standard Individual Trade Control Licence (SITCL)
applications have been refused or revoked because of Criterion
8 ("Compatibility of the arms exports with the technical
and economic capacity of the recipient country") in 2009,
2008, or 2007.viii It is also very important to note
that corruption in the legal global arms trade is not
confined to those countries which qualify for consideration under
Criterion 8.
CONSOLIDATED EU AND
NATIONAL ARMS
EXPORT LICENSING
CRITERIA
8. The User Guide to European Council Common
Position defining common rules governing the controls of exports
of military technology and equipment considers best practice to
include assessing corruption risks for Criterion 2 (3.2.12),
Criterion 5 (3.5.4) and Criterion 7 (3.7.3). Unlike
the 0 (zero) licences revoked based on Criterion 8, the UK has
revoked or refused 61 SIEL and SITCL applications based on Criterion
2 and 43 SIEL and SITCL applications based on Criterion
7 in 2009 alone.ix
9. This further underlines that corruption
is a cross-cutting risk, affecting all eight criteria of the European
Council Common Position defining common rules governing the
controls of exports of military technology and equipment. Corruption
facilitates the diversion of arms (Criterion 7) to regions
for which UN sanctions are in place (Criterion 1) and where
they threaten international (humanitarian as well as human rights)
law (Criteria 6 and 2), hence posing a serious risk to
"regional peace, security, and stability" (Criterion
4) and facilitating "the existence of tensions or armed
conflicts" (Criterion 3). In the past, this has often
also meant that states have not "achieve[d] their legitimate
needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments
of human and economic resources" (Criterion 8).
10. EU Member States, including the United
Kingdom, have expressed themselves anxious to stamp out corruption
wherever possible, including in the context of arms transfers,
and have signed up to various anti-corruption agreements
(such as the UN Convention Against Corruption; the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions;
and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention Against Corruption).
It would therefore be consistent with this stance for Member
States to amend the Common Position and agree a new ninth criterion
whereby prospective transfers would be refused where there existed
a clear risk that they might involve corrupt practices.
UK BRIBERY ACT
AND UK FOREIGN
BRIBERY STRATEGY
11. After campaigning for many years for the
reform of UK anti-bribery law, Transparency International UK has
welcomed the 2010 Bribery Act, which was passed into the
statute book on 8 April 2010. When in force, it will make the
UK fully compliant with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
as well as the UN Convention Against Corruption, and will
provide prosecutors with an effective legal framework to prosecute
bribery. From a corporate perspective, the Bribery Act is one
of the best anti-bribery laws in the world. The Act was the
product of lengthy and conscientious public consultation and parliamentary
scrutiny. It represents the best consensus that can be attained
among all stakeholders. It acknowledges that the UK must play
its part in helping to combat one of the world's most pernicious
evils.
12. HM Government's UK Foreign Bribery Strategy
(January 2010) also reminds us that "the fight against
bribery can not be an optional extra or a luxury to be
dispensed with in testing economic ties" (section 1.2).x
ANTI-CORRUPTION
IN THE
UN ARMS TRADE
TREATY (ATT)
13. While the First Joint Report of the Session
2009-10 also discusses the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT),xi
it unfortunately fails to link the ATT to the strong
recommendations on addressing corruption and bribery when issuing
arms export licenses.xii
14. UN members agreed in 2006 to create a legally
binding multilateral arrangement to regulate the legal international
trade of conventional weapons, the ATT. The ATT will summarise
and combine the current arms trading obligations of states under
international law to ensure that the same strong standards
are obeyed by all arms importers and exporters. The process
of negotiating commenced at the first and second back-to-back
ATT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) in New York in July 2010 and
is scheduled to conclude at the UN Conference on the ATT in 2012.
The next PrepCom is scheduled for 28 February to 4 March 2011.
Without anti-corruption previsions in the ATT, bringing arms
trading under closer control will create new incentives and opportunities
for those who, either as suppliers or customers, would want to
avoid or circumvent those proper controls. It will, in
short, offer new opportunities for corruption.
15. At the first two back-to-back PrepComs in
July 2010, the argument that a robust ATT needs an anti-corruption
mechanism was emphasised by the European Union, Colombia,
Costa Rica, India, France, Mexico,
Morocco, South Africa, and Sweden.
16. At the end of the second PrepCom in July
2010, "corruption" was included in the Chairman's Draft
Paper, and the Facilitator's Summary on Parameters mentions as
a "specific parameter" the "Consideration of other
issues such as the proliferation record and other patterns of
behavior of the actors involved, the risk of corruption associated
with the transfer, and the potential of transit of the arms
through or to zones of conflict" (emphasis added).
17. In their 2007 replies pursuant to
paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 61/89 to the UN
Open-Ended Working Group, the following states included corruption
as a factor to be considered when issuing an export licence:
Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina-Faso,
Chile, C¼te d'Ivoire, France, Iceland,
Japan, Liberia, Mali, the Netherlands,
Niger, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Togo,
the UK, and Zambia.
18. Existing legally binding regional arms treaties
with an anti-corruption mechanism include the ECOWAS (Economic
Community of West African States) Convention on Small Arms
and Light Weapons (incorporating corruption prevention measures
"at any stage—from the supplier, through any middlemen
or brokers, to the recipient") as well as the Nairobi
Protocol. The politically binding UN Disarmament Commission
Guidelines on Arms Transfers and OSCE Document on Small
Arms and Light Weapons also feature anti-corruption provisions,
as does the UN Guide to SALW legislation.
19. Rees Ward, the Chief Executive of the the
UK's AeroSpace, Defence and Security trade organisation (A|D|S),
has stressed that "the UK's aerospace, defence and security
industries support the Bribery Act and its aims" (emphasis
added), adding that their "sectors have developed ethics
policies that are an example to any other area of business in
Britain".xiii Tim Williams, Policy Adviser of
the Society of British Aerospace Companies (SBAC) Aerospace Defence
and Homeland Security Society, by now merged into A|D|S, pointed
out that "[t]he Arms Trade Treaty is an important initiative
and one that is wholeheartedly supported by industry in the UK"
(emphasis added) as "[t]he prospect of a global standard
for defence exports was quickly and warmly welcomed by British
defence firms".xiv
20. A strong anti-corruption provision in
the ATT would not create additional burdens for UK industry.
The UK Bribery Act as well as the US Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (as well as additional laws in many other
countries) require UK industry to take steps to eradicate corruption
in their own business transactions. A strong anti-corruption
mechanism in the ATT will encourage other exporting countries
to put in place similar measurements and legislations, ultimately
creating a level playing field for UK firms who may currently
be somewhat disadvantaged by other countries. This is in line
with UK industry who "will also be making it clear to the
Government that they must do everything possible to ensure a level
playing field in global markets by ensuring that other governments
clamp down on unfair competition and extortion in their markets."xv
A strong anti-corruption mechanism will, over time, also encourage
importing countries to implement stronger anti-corruption measures.
21. Considering the risk of corruption during
the licensing process in the UK will only require some
additional scrutiny of some licenses. The corresponding
risk management models could readily be included into SPIRE, the
export licensing IT system, so as to flag up those license applications
requiring closer scrutiny.
22. While exporting states have a clear
duty to eradicate corruption in arms trading, importing states
want to be sure that they can secure the weapons they want at
a fair (uninflated) price, to secure the adequate equipment
they actually need, and particularly in developing countries,
to not waste funding that could be invested in other crucial
areas, including sustainable development. Victims, many
of which are the most needy developing countries, also have
a very strong interest that corruption is tackled, both in
their own countries and also (often even more so) in neighbouring
countries from which arms are smuggled.
PRE-LICENCE
REGISTRATION OF
BROKERS
23. We fully agree with the Committee on Arms
Export Controls' recommendation in the First Joint Report of the
Session 2009-10, which the Committees had already made previously,
"that the Government establish a pre-licensing register
of brokers in order to reduce the possibility of undesirable entities
trading in arms overseas". This would indeed be a major
step to "reduce the possibility of undesirable entities trading
in arms overseas".xvi It would also be in line
with the EU Common Position on the control of arms brokering
adopted on 23 June 2003 as well as brokering registration requirements
in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, and Spain.
A pre-licensing register would furthermore make it more difficult
for brass plate companies to register in the UK and to trade
arms without the appropriate licences from the Export Control
Organisation.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
ACTION
24. Because of the devastating impact that corruption
continues to have on the licit global arms trade it is vital that
the Committees on Arms Export Controls continue to recommend
to HMG that the Export Control Organisation (BIS) test whether
a licence application is free from corruption and bribery before
issuing an export licence and that the Committees on Arms Export
Controls insist that HMG implement their recommendations based
on Chapter 6 of the First Joint Report of the Session 2009-10.
25. Due to the cross-cutting nature of corruption
risks in the arms trade, we furthermore recommend that the Committees
on Arms Export Controls considers addressing corruption risks
also beyond Criterion 8 of the EU and National Consolidated Criteria,
as corruption in the legal global arms trade is not confined
to those countries which qualify for consideration under Criterion
8. This would also be in line with the User Guide to European
Council Common Position defining common rules governing the controls
of exports of military technology and equipment as well as Transparency
International's recommendation for EU Member States to amend the
Common Position and agree a new ninth criterion whereby prospective
transfers would be refused where there existed a clear risk that
they might involve corrupt practices.
26. We congratulate the Committees on Arms
Export Controls on acknowledging the devastating impact of
corruption on the legal arms trade, and we recommend that the
Committees also extend their recommendations made in Chapter 6
of the First Joint Report of the Session 2009-10 to the UN Arms
Trade Treaty (ATT).
27. Based on the evidence provided above, we
believe that there cannot be a robust ATT without a strong anti-corruption
mechanism. It is therefore vital that corruption continues to
be high on the agenda in preparation for the next PrepCom in February/March
2011.
28. We are furthermore convinced that a robust
ATT would ideally include "corruption" as a stand-alone
criterion/parameter. The inclusion of corruption within only one
parameter risks ignoring the important cross-cutting role that
corruption plays both in influencing procurement decisions (of
particular importance to any sustainable development criterion)
and in diversion (itself likely to be a criterion which cuts across
many other criteria). Given the pervasive and insidious affect
of corruption on a wide range of individual criteria, it makes
good sense for it to be incorporated as a separate criterion in
its own right.
29. We fully agree with the Committee on Arms
Export Controls' recommendation in the First Joint Report of the
Session 2009-10, which the Committees had already made previously,
"that the Government establish a pre-licensing register of
brokers in order to reduce the possibility of undesirable entities
trading in arms overseas".
22 November 2010
REFERENCES
i Control Risks
/ Simmons&Simmons, International business attitudes to corruption—survey
2006, p. 5
ii US Department
of Commerce Trade Promotion Co-ordinating Committee Report (March
2000).
iii Tanzi, V,
Corruption around the world: causes, consequences, scope, and
cures. IMF Staff papers 45, pp. 559-594.
iv The World Bank
estimated that more than US$1 trillion dollars (US$ 1,000 billion)
is paid globally in bribes each year (2004). The World Bank also
put World GDP at US$41.5 trillion (current prices, 2004). Global
military expenditure in 2004 was approximately US$1 trillion (current
prices, SIPRI). If $1 in every US$41.5 is misappropriated globally
each year, then for the defence sector, worth approximately US$1
trillion, the cost of corruption each year is about US$20 billion.
This assumes that the defence sector is no more prone to corruption
than other sectors—an assumption that conflicts with popular
perceptions.
v First Joint
Report of the Session 2009-10, Chapter 6, pp. 38-41.
vi First Joint
Report of the Session 2009-10, p. 39.
vii First Joint
Report of the Session 2009-10, p. 40.
viii Annual Report
2009, p. 23; Annual Report 2008, p. 23; and Annual Report 2009,
p. 27.
ix United Kingdom
Exports Control Annual Report 2009, p. 43.
x HM Government's
UK Foreign Bribery Strategy, January 2010, section 1.2.
xi First Joint
Report of the Session 2009-10, Chapter 7, pp. 42-45.
xii First Joint
Report of the Session 2009-10, Chapter 6, pp. 38-41.
xiii A|D|S News
Release PR 2010 075, 8 November 2010.
xiv The Scope
of the Arms Trade Treaty, speech delivered at the 888th Wilton
Park Conference, 7-10 December 2007.
xv A|D|S News
Release PR 2010 075, 8 November 2010.
xvi First Joint
Report of the Session 2009-10, p. 20.
Written evidence submitted by the UK Working
Group on Arms (UKWG)[1]
SUMMARY OF
RECOMMENDATIONS
With regard to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) the UKWG
would urge the UK Government to:
¾ Press
for a comprehensive scope for the ATT including all forms of international
transfer of all conventional weapons, parts, components, ammunition,
ordnance, explosives and associated support services.
¾ Ensure
that the ATT parameters reflect states existing international
legal obligations and that they are commensurate with the UK's
commitments under the EU Common Position on Arms Exports.
¾ Engage
with sceptical states in order to minimise opposition and facilitate
consensus at the highest level possible.
¾ Continue
to demonstrate strong and effective leadership throughout the
period leading up to agreement on the ATT.
¾ Vocally
support and facilitate the inclusion of civil society at all stages
of the ATT negotiation process.
In addition, the UK Government should:
¾ Revise
current UK arms transfer legislation to reflect the wording of
the criteria of the EU Common Position. We would also urge the
UK Government to participate actively in the Dutch-led initiative
to review the operation of Criterion 8 and to promote similar
processes for the other criteria.
¾ Propose
to its EU partners to extend the EU denials-notification database
to include information of note regarding licences authorised as
well as refused.
¾ Extend
extraterritorial brokering controls more broadly across the UK
military list, and establish a formal register of arms brokers.
¾ Tighten
the rules governing and oversight over registration and incorporation
procedures for companies involved in the defence or security sector.
¾ Adopt
the now-widespread best practice of applying "no re-export
without permission" controls as a matter of routine.
¾ Pursue
adoption of a military end-use control in discussions with other
EU Member States.
¾ Better
regulate the activities of overseas companies subsidiary to or
under the effective control of UK companies, particularly in respect
of embargoed destinations.
¾ Introduce
specific licenses for licensed production arrangement overseas
where this is for the manufacture of controlled items, stipulating
the maximum quantities to be produced, the duration of production,
and permitted export markets for the finished items.
¾ Improve
enforcement activities at UK defence exhibitions to stop the marketing
and promotion of prohibited weapons.
¾ Commit
to ending indirect financial support for the producers of cluster
munitions and establish a joint financial services, NGO and Government
working group to address this issue at the earliest opportunity.
¾ Establish
a torture end-use "catch all clause", through an amendment
to EC Regulation 1236/2005. If introduction of such a catch-all
is likely to take more than six months, or is rejected by EU partners,
it should be introduced unilaterally in the UK.
¾ Investigate
without delay whether military aircraft, weapons, in-country military
support to the Saudi Arabian armed forces or UK personnel have
been involved, knowingly or otherwise, in serious violations of
international human rights or humanitarian law; and report these
findings to Parliament. Pending the results of this investigation,
suspend any current or future supplies of military equipment likely
to be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international
human rights or humanitarian law.
ARMS TRADE
TREATY
Progress to date
1. Inadequate and ineffective controls over the
international trade in conventional arms have contributed to tremendous
human suffering across the world. Irresponsible transfers have
fuelled armed conflict, facilitated serious human rights violations,
and undermined efforts to eradicate poverty. Latest estimates
(from the Global Burden of Armed Violence report of 2008) suggest
that 2,000 people each day die from armed violence; many thousands
more are injured or forced to flee their homes; schools, hospitals
and markets are destroyed.
2. In December 2009, after three years of consultation,
and meetings of a Group of Governmental Experts and of an Open-Ended
Working Group, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 64/48
mandating the move to formal negotiation of an Arms Trade Treaty
(ATT) by 2012, to create a legally-binding instrument based on
the highest possible common international standards for the transfer
of conventional arms. The first two PrepComs took place consecutively
on 12-23 July 2010 at the UN in New York. The next PrepCom takes
place on 28 February-4 March 2011; the fourth and final substantive
PrepCom is on 11-15 July 2011. The Chair, Ambassador Moritàn
of Argentina, is aiming to achieve consensus at each stage, moving
slowly and trying to ensure that all sceptical states remain part
of the process. UKWG members and the international Control Arms
NGO Coalition are concerned that progress is too slow, given the
complexity of the negotiations, the perceived threat some states
feel an ATT represents to national security, and the very tight
timescale to reach agreement.
3. The PrepComs produced a Chairman's Draft Paper,
and it is widely anticipated that a draft Treaty text is in preparation,
and that it will be introduced at some point during the next PrepCom.
While many elements of a robust ATT including strong human rights/international
humanitarian law and development parameters for refusing deals;
a wide scope and strong implementation proposals were included
in the basket of ideas contained in the first PrepCom documents,
it is vital that these are now translated into robust text.
Particular issues of concern
4. For the Treaty to be effective in preventing
irresponsible arms transfers that fuel conflict, poverty and serious
human rights abuses, it needs:
¾ Comprehensive
scope: cover all types of weapons transfer, and all types of conventional
arms, ammunition, parts and components. It is of great concern
that the US is currently opposed to the inclusion of ammunition.
¾ Robust
criteria. The parameters of an ATT must include tough criteria
around international human rights and humanitarian law and socio-economic
development, which need to be translated into strong text (..a
transfer shall not be authorized if.."). Some states are
already arguing for language ("take into account") which
would render these criteria extremely weak.
¾ A transparent
and effective Implementation mechanism.
5. Smaller states have capacity concerns as to
the infrastructure an ATT will require of them, and it is incumbent
on larger exporters therefore to negotiate a system that is effective
while being workable at all levels of capacity.
Progress needed during the 2011 PrepComs
6. While the 2010 PrepComs set the stage for
debate, there is a need for the pace of work to accelerate, with
only two weeks of formal PrepCom time remain before the 2012 Conference
begins. In particular it is essential that the two remaining PrepComs
develop a robust and comprehensive draft treaty text, building
on the base established during the first PrepCom. If this is not
achieved then there will be insufficient time in 2012 to complete
treaty negotiations in line with the UN General Assembly mandate.
7. As a consequence several years of UK leadership
on the ATT, the UK position continues to have a significant impact
on other states. During the July PrepComs, rightly or wrongly
the UK was perceived to have stopped providing this leadership;
it was seen to be relying on others, such as the EU, to take a
lead. Several UK statements outside the UN, for example in the
Strategic Security and Defence Review, which offers support to
the ATT but does not provide evidence of an intention to continue
to lead, reinforce this perception. The US, France and Australia
are now beginning to dominate a process which has been central
to British foreign policy. This will potentially make it harder
for British goals to be achieved. It is also affecting other supporter
states, which look to the UK for leadership, and consider the
UK's positioning on this issue as a barometer for global consensus.
Therefore a UK which is no longer strongly arguing for a robust
humanitarian and human rights basis to the Treaty may be inadvertently
perceived as having shifted position on these issues.
8. The Government should maintain a leadership
role, working with other supporter states to push for an effective
Treaty, including developing and defending strong draft ATT text,
encouraging active engagement from supportive states, and investing
political capital in addressing the more sceptical states. It
is critical that sufficient resources are provided to ensure that
appropriate staff and adequate time are made available in all
relevant ministries—including BIS, DfID, the FCO, HMRC and
the MoD—to pursue a strong and robust Treaty.
The role of civil society in the negotiating process
9. The ATT Resolution from 2009 requires the
PrepCom to: "… be undertaken in an open and transparent
manner." Regrettably, civil society representatives were
denied access to much of the first two PrepComs, despite these
being general and conceptual rather than detailed negotiating
sessions. The UK should use its influence to push for the meetings
to remain open, so that international civil society is able to
enhance the level of resources and expertise available, especially
to less-resourced states
10. In the national context, the UK Government
has so far actively drawn upon civil society expertise through,
for example, involvement in the ATT cross-Whitehall "virtual
team", in technical meetings and through significant input
into policy discussions. We urge the coalition Government to maintain
this constructive partnership, and we hope that it will work to
ensure the maximum participation for global civil throughout the
ATT process.
11. The UKWG urges the UK Government to:
¾ Press
for a comprehensive scope for the ATT including all forms of international
transfer of all conventional weapons, parts, components, ammunition,
ordnance, explosives and associated support services.
¾ Ensure
that the ATT parameters reflect states existing international
legal obligations and that they are commensurate with the UK's
commitments under the EU Common Position on Arms Exports.
¾ Engage
with sceptical states in order to minimise opposition and facilitate
consensus at the highest level possible.
¾ Continue
to demonstrate strong and effective leadership throughout the
period leading up to agreement on the ATT.
¾ Vocally
support and facilitate the inclusion of civil society at all stages
of the ATT negotiation process.
UPDATING LICENSING
CRITERIA
12. Since its adoption in December 2008, the
UK is legally obliged to comply with the EU Common Position
2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports
of military technology and equipment (Common Position). Currently,
Article 9 (8) of the UK Export Control Act 2002 establishes that
the UK applies its own "consolidated criteria" when
assessing arms transfer licence applications. These are in certain
aspects weaker than the criteria set out in the Common Position,
most notably with regard to the application of international humanitarian
law. As a matter of urgency, the Export Control Act should be
updated to reflect the new requirements of the Common Position.
13. In addition, the UKWG notes that since the
EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export was first agreed in 1998 there
has been only one serious effort to elaborate the Code criteria,
a process completed approximately five years ago. While originally
conceived as an attempt to identify best practice and to refine
the criteria so as to improve their implementation, ultimately
this process merely constituted an elaboration of existing practice
across the EU, with no particular emphasis on establishing best
practice. When first agreed, the criteria were the product of
compromise by a number of states with limited experience of co-operation
on multilateral arms transfer controls, leaving considerable room
for interpretation. The transformation of the EU Code into a Common
Position in 2008 saw some reorganisation of the criteria and a
more principled approach to the treatment of international humanitarian
law; however, for the most part, the criteria were unchanged.
Given the wealth of experience the member states now have in terms
of both applying the criteria and co-operating on arms transfer
controls, a fundamental assessment of criteria implementation
is long overdue. Indeed, the moves afoot to liberalise transfers
among Member States, such as through the European directive on
intra-community trade in defence equipment, increase the need
for Member States to apply the same standards at the external
border of the EU, which again points to Member States revisiting
the question of criteria implementation.
14. Problems with implementation have, in effect,
already been acknowledged by Member States. The Netherlands has
just established a new initiative to reconsider how Criterion
8 (sustainable development) is being applied by different Member
States.
15. The UKWG recommends that the Government revise
current UK arms transfer legislation to reflect the wording of
the criteria of the EU Common Position. We would also urge the
UK Government to participate actively in the Dutch-led initiative
to review the operation of Criterion 8 and encourage HMG to promote
similar processes for the other criteria.
INFORMATION-SHARING
ON LICENCES
APPROVED, ESPECIALLY
REGARDING DIVERSION
RISKS
16. The recent NGO report entitled Rhetoric
or restraint? Trade in military equipment under the EU transfer
control system—a report to the EU Presidency, edited
by An Vranckx of the University of Gent,[2]
identifies how improvements in EU information-sharing could help
to prevent diversion of EU-sourced equipment. While Member States
share relatively detailed information on all cases where licences
are denied, there are no systems in place for sharing information
on, for example, problematic intermediaries, transporters or transfer
routes, or of instances where diversion has come to light. Rhetoric
or restraint includes a detailed study of the origins of small
arms seized from, or handed-in by, non-state actors in Colombia
(which included 13 EU Member States, though not the UK) and makes
it plain that Member States are failing to keep each other informed
about possible diversion risks.
17. At the moment knowledge of diversion risks
can only be circulated to EU partners where it relates to a licence
denials; no information may be circulated where information has
come to light following the approval of a transfer.
18. The UKWG recommends that the UK Government
propose to its EU partners to extend the EU denials-notification
database to include information of note regarding licences authorised
as well as refused.
ARMS BROKERING
AND SUPPORT
SERVICES
19. The UK has made strong headway on the control
of arms brokers, most recently with the extension of extraterritorial
controls to include the transfer of small arms and light weapons
(SALW), including important new controls on their transportation.
We believe, however, that the range of goods to which extraterritorial
controls should apply should be widened and that the ECO should
establish a formal register of UK arms brokers. Discussions between
Industry, NGO's and the Government on extending brokering controls
to other categories on the Military list should be re-instated
at the earliest opportunity, following the governments rejection
of join industry/NGO proposals made during 2009.
20. The UKWG remains very concerned about the
growing evidence that UK "brass plate"[3]
companies are being used to facilitate the unlicensed supply of
weapons to countries of concern. The UKWG urges the new Government
to take a wider review of the use of company registration in relation
to arms brokering activities and to consider tightening the rules
governing and oversight over registration and incorporation procedures
for companies involved in the defence or security sector.
RESPONDING TO
CHANGING PATTERNS
OF DEFENCE
PRODUCTION AND
TRADE
21. The UKWG is concerned that the UK regulatory
framework has not been keeping pace with trends towards a greater
use of civilian technologies in military production and the ongoing
Europeanisation and globalisation of the defence sector. On the
grounds that it is an area over which the EU has primary competence,
in February 2007, the UK Government announced that it was to promote,
at the EU level, the idea of a military end-use or "catch-all"
clause. This would mean that the Government would be able to require
a licence, should it deem it appropriate, for transfers of equipment
that is not on any control list but which is intended for a military
end-use.
22. The genesis of this commitment can be traced
back to the use of Land Rover vehicles in the Andijan massacre
in Uzbekistan in 2005. The Land Rovers had been assembled in and
exported from Turkey to Uzbekistan, but to a British design, using
British technology, and with approximately 70% of the components
coming from Land Rover in the UK. However none of these components
were controlled items and thus all were exported legally with
no need for an export licence. A military end-use control would
have given the Government the power to require Land Rover to apply
for an export licence in advance of any such transfer.[4]
23. However, actual activity in this direction
has apparently been minimal. In 2009 the Government was arguing
that attempting to move this forward at that time made no sense,
on the grounds that any business that was incomplete when the
2004-09 European Commission came to the end of its life would
need to be started again under the new Commission, and that this
particular issue was complex, requiring plenty of time. The 2010-14
Commission has since been established, and now would seem the
ideal time to follow up on this commitment.
24. The UKWG urges the UK Government to pursue
adoption of a military end-use control in discussions with other
EU Member States.
25. Previous UKWG submissions to the CAEC have
raised the way that some other aspects of modern defence manufacture
and/or arms transfer practice are not currently being dealt with
effectively by the UK system. These include:
¾ The
arms transfer activities of overseas companies under the effective
control of UK companies;
¾ The
licensing of items which, post-export from the UK, are to be incorporated
into military equipment for onward transfer; and
¾ Overseas
facilities that produce controlled goods under a production licence
from a UK entity.[5]
26. These issues remain of concern, and the UKWG
recommends that the Government:
¾ Investigates
how to better control the arms transfer activities of overseas
companies subsidiary to or under the effective control of UK companies,
at a minimum to embargoed destinations;
¾ Applies
the same criteria when deciding whether to authorise the export
of equipment to be incorporated into military equipment for onward
transfer as it does for other exports; and
¾ Requires
UK companies to apply for a specific licence to establish a licensed
production arrangement overseas where this is for the manufacture
of controlled items. Such a licence should stipulate the maximum
quantities to be produced, the duration of production, and permitted
export markets for the finished items. This is critical as a means
to restrict the proliferation of production capacity, which by
its very nature is even more problematic than the proliferation
of finished items.
RE-EXPORT
CONTROLS
27. The UK Government has for a number of years
resisted calls to introduce "no re-export without permission"
conditions into transfer licences. The UK has retained this position
despite the widespread use of re-export controls by many states,
including for example the other four Permanent Members of the
UN Security Council (China, France, Russia and the US) and EU
partners.
28. The UKWG welcomes the decision of the UK
Government earlier this year to require end-use declarations to
prohibit re-export to embargoed destinations without permission.
This would seem to acknowledge the principle that controls should
be applied to the re-export of strategic goods sourced from the
UK. However, the proposed condition is of extremely limited scope
and likely impact given that UK concerns about the appropriateness
of arms transfers extends, rightly, far beyond embargoed destinations.
Arms transfers are currently embargoed to only 17 states under
UK law. Of these, nine are covered by UN embargoes.[6]
In such cases, transfers are
already prohibited regardless of whether the UK introduces
this new requirement. This new policy will therefore be of extremely
limited effect, and the risk will remain that strategic goods
of UK origin are re-exported with negative consequences. In 2009
the UK denied licences for exports to 89 states not under embargo,
including for example Algeria, Israel and Ukraine.
29. Many
recipients of UK strategic exports themselves apply very different
systems and standards of arms transfer controls to that of the
UK. For example, the UKWG has previously given evidence to the
CAEC of how South Africa has licensed transfers of armoured vehicles
to destinations such as Guinea, India (for use in Kashmir), Nepal
and Uganda in circumstances where the UK would have been highly
likely to refuse the transfers. The benefits of providing a contractual
basis for UK involvement in decisions to re-export should therefore
be clear. Of course if a recipient state is set on re-exporting
irrespective of UK opinion, there is little the UK could do to
stop them. However, the Government claims that the pre-licensing
assessment process sifts out the problematic buyers, and thus
for the most part it seems reasonable to assume that the overwhelming
majority of customers will be reliable and concerned with their
good name to the point where they would be reluctant to re-export
in contravention of any contractual obligations.
30. It is difficult to understand the UK Government's
reluctance to properly address the issue of re-export. Re-export
controls will not harm UK industry, and will in fact improve its
profile as among the most responsible in the world. In addition,
introducing re-export controls would be easy and inexpensive with
little added administrative cost barring the simplification of
existing end-use documentation. Additional costs would accrue
from any additional licensing workload, but indications from other
EU Member States that already use these types of re-export control
are that the increase in licence applications is not significant.
31. The UKWG urges the Government to revisit
this issue and adopt the now widespread best practice of applying
"no re-export without permission" controls as a matter
of routine.
CLUSTER MUNITIONS
32. The UK is to be credited with its swift ratification
of the Oslo Treaty to ban the production, transfer, stockpiling
and use of cluster munitions, efforts that have secured unanimous
cross-party support in both Houses of Parliament. It is encouraging
that the current Government has also prioritised efforts to eradicate
cluster munitions and has undertaken outreach to states that have
not joined the Convention, with a particular focus on Commonwealth
States. It is important to recognise the particular contributions
made to outlaw these weapons in October 2008 by placing strict
prohibitions on the transfer of cluster munitions or their components,
including the provision of any ancillary services such as transport,
advertising and marketing activities.
Prohibiting marketing and promotion activities
33. This is especially important in light of
two recent findings.
34. We reported to the Committee in December
2009 that, at the Defence Systems and Equipment International
Exhibition (DSEi) held in September 2009 in London, the UKWG found
that Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) was advertising artillery
ammunition including its 155mm Base Bleed DP-ICM (Dual Purpose
Improved Conventional Munition)—a cluster munition—in
its product brochures. At the time of the exhibition, the organisers
were contacted about these promotional materials and an investigation
launched as to whether the exhibiter was in breach of its obligations.
At the time of writing, the outcome of this investigation is unknown.
35. In July 2010 UKWG researchers attended the
Farnborough International Air show held at Farnborough Aerodrome
and found a Russian company, Bazalt State Research and Production
Enterprise (FSUE SRPE Bazalt), advertising a range of cluster
munitions including some in model form and potentially a complete
sub-munition. A large display poster (see image below) on the
Bazalt stand at the air show in July 2010 clearly advertises a
wide range of "cluster bombs", including the RBK-500U
OAB-2.5RT, which is filled with 126, 2.5kg "fragmentation
bomblets".
36. It is of serious concern that such overt
marketing of prohibited weapons could have been allowed to take
place at a UK defence exhibition and the UKWG suggests that enforcement
of existing UK legislation in this area is not adequate.
Finance and investment
37. The UKWG welcomes the fact that UK law now
bans the direct financing of cluster munitions production, but
further work on indirect finance needs to take place. It is important
that commitments announced on 7 December 2009 to work with the
financial sector, NGOs and other interested parties to prevent
the indirect financing of cluster munitions are implemented at
the earliest opportunity, including through potential new legislation
should such efforts not signal an end to indirect financial support
to the producers of these weapons. These efforts are made even
more imperative given new research findings that show that during
2009, two UK banks—Barclays and RBS—renewed loans
and investment banking services worth approximately $476 millionto
cluster munitions producing companies L-3 Communications, Lockheed
Martin and Textron.[7]
TORTURE END-USE
CONTROL
38. The UKWG has welcomed the February 2008 policy
commitment to introduce a new EU wide end-use control for goods
used in torture. In 2008, the UK Government stated that:
We will be asking the Commission to introduce a control
where the exporter will be required to submit an export licence
application where they have reason to believe, or have been informed,
that the items could be used for capital punishment, torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.[8]
39. We are however disappointed that progress
on this end-use control (first announced in February 2008) has
been so slow. On 29 June 2010, the Government attended a meeting
to discuss the operation of, and amendments to, EC Regulation
1236/2005 (the "torture regulation"). It is our understanding
that discussions about an EU-level end-use control on equipment
suspected to be destined for use in executions, torture or other
ill-treatment were initiated at this meeting.
40. This issue is made all the more urgent in
light of the widely reported case of the potential export to the
USA by a UK company, of sodium thiopental, an anaesthetic drug
used as part of the lethal injection protocol. Although, following
judicial review, the UK Government has now announced that this
drug will require a licence for export, which will involve making
an emergency Order under the 2002 Export Control Act, other drugs
are now being considered by US states for use in executions. Oklahoma
has recently been granted permission to use pentobarbital, thereby
overcoming the difficulties in obtaining sodium thiopental. We
note that if the Government had delivered on its 2008 commitment
in this area, it would have been able to control exports of sodium
thiopental and any other similar drug or items, as soon as it
became known that they were being used in executions.
¾ To avoid
the necessity for repeated discussions about items that could
be used for executions and their addition to the UK export control
list, we call on the UK Government to press the European Commission
and EU Member States to urgently conclude the introduction of
a torture end-use "catch all clause" through an amendment
to EC Regulation 1236/2005.
¾ If introduction
of such a catch-all is likely to take more than six months, or
is rejected by EU partners, it should be introduced unilaterally
at a UK level (thereby setting an example for other EU partners
to follow), in concordance with the UK Government's previous statement
that it would consider introducing such a control independently.
¾ We also
urge the UK to continue its efforts to strengthen EC Regulation
1236/2005 to broaden the range of equipment covered, specifically
by updating the annexes on prohibited equipment (Annex 2) and
controlled equipment (Annex 3), to reflect developments in the
security equipment market.
TRANSPARENCY
41. The quality and quantity of information regarding
export and trade control licences that is included in the Quarterly
and Annual Reports on Strategic Exports has developed substantially
in recent years. The creation of the searchable online database
has been a major step forward and serves as an example that other
states would do well to follow. We also applaud the process that
led to the development of the database: as an idea it was first
proposed by the UKWG; subsequently it was developed in consultation
with the UKWG and industry. There are, however, further improvements
that could be made to the UK's reporting system. These include:
¾ More
information on the declared end-use and end-users of licensed
items (except where there are specific, compelling reasons for
withholding such information);
¾ More
information regarding actual transfers made, especially under
open licences; and
¾ The
inclusion of historical information in the searchable database.
42. The UKWG welcomes the developments with regard
to transparency in UK arms transfers that have taken place in
recent years and would encourage the Government to continue striving
toward further improvements in the quality, quantity and accessibility
of information provided.
PROMOTING ARMS
EXPORTS IN
SUPPORT OF
STRATEGIC AND
ECONOMIC PRIORITIES
43. As far back as September 2009, Dr. Liam Fox,
the then Shadow Defence Secretary, stated that one of the four
major priorities of defence procurement under a Conservative Government
would be to "preserve UK defence jobs by maximising exports".
He stated that the Conservative Party "will use defence exports
as a foreign policy tool and … will seek to increase Britain's
share of the world defence market".[9]
44. He also stated in March 2010 that a Conservative
Government will "make it its policy to maximise the UK's
share of global defence exports" for three reasons:
¾ Economies
of scale from increased sale volumes maximises returns for the
taxpayer;
¾ Increased
sale revenues through exports increases revenue to the national
purse through the multiplier effect;
¾ Exports
can be used a foreign policy tools to help underpin strategic
relationships with key allies and partners.[10]
45. This rhetoric has now been intensified within
the new Government. For example, in a statement that fits with
the Prime Minister's declaration of an era of "commercial
foreign policy", the Defence Equipment Minister Peter Luff
has stated that the Government is "not embarrassed"
to promote defence exports.[11]
46. The long awaited Strategic Defence and Security
Review (SDSR) made some welcome commitments to prioritise conflict
prevention "including… arms export control engagement
so as to promote regional stabilisation and reduce the risk of
conflict"[12]
and improve coordination among the UK's diplomatic, development,
economic, defence and intelligence efforts.[13]
However the SDSR also commits to prioritising our economic interests
overseas and embedding "a more commercial culture throughout
our overseas posts", including "working with the MOD
and Home Office, specifically to promote defence and security
exports for good commercial reasons and where this will build
the capacity of our partners and allies".[14]
47. It is not clear how the Government intends
to reconcile these potentially competing sets of priorities. The
UKWG is concerned that prioritising the establishment of a more
commercial culture could come at the cost of conflict prevention,
and by a reduced emphasis on responsible arms transfer controls.
In addition, a move towards defence and security exports as tools
to "build the capacity of our partners and allies" should
be applied with extreme care given that it is not necessarily
consistent with the UK's obligations as set out in the EU Common
Position. These state explicitly that considerations relating
to "defence and security interests [including] those of friendly
and allied countries … cannot affect consideration of the
criteria on respect for human rights and on regional peace, security
and stability".[15]
48. The UKWG is also concerned that ongoing pressures
on the budget of the Export Control Organisation (ECO), especially
if taken in concert with this apparent new direction, may weaken
the rigour and effectiveness of UK's arms transfer control system.
We note that the ECO is looking to broaden the application of
general licences (see, for example, the new Open General Export
Licence (Military Goods), issued on 6 October 2010)[16]
and has already been encouraging industry to shift toward applying
for open and general rather than standard individual licences.
This may well reduce costs, but it may also reduce oversight.
49. The UKWG recommends that the Government clearly
set out its continued commitment to the criteria of the Common
Position as the fundamental underpinning of the UK arms transfer
control system, and clarify its commitment to providing all necessary
resources to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of the UK
export control system.
YEMEN
50. On 25 August 2010 Amnesty International issued
a detailed report on the deteriorating human rights situation
in Yemen, which also focused on the alleged use of Saudi Arabian
combat aircraft in conducting indiscriminate aerial attacks in
and around the Sa'sah governate in Northern Yemen. Of particular
concern is the possible use of UK-supplied weapons by Saudi armed
forces when conflict intensified in the autumn of 2009. Eyewitness
testimony, including photographic evidence, clearly conveys a
scene of near total devastation, with sustained and intensive
bombardment by Saudi Arabian planes reported to have killed hundreds
of people, caused widespread damage to homes and infrastructure,
and displaced up to 280,000 people.[17]
51. Amnesty International was particularly concerned
that two days after publication of its findings, a new Open General
Export License (Military Goods: Collaborative Project Typhoon)
entered into force, allowing inter alia for the maintenance
of Typhoon combat aircraft in Saudi Arabia. It is of serious concern
that such a permissive general licence with minimal scrutiny should
be available for end-use in Saudi Arabia.
52. Current UK arms export control policy is
designed to prohibit the supply of military equipment where there
is a clear risk that such equipment will be used in human rights
violations or violations of international law, the kind of attacks
that appear to have taken place in Yemen during the autumn of
2009.
53. In response to concerns raised by Amnesty
International, the Government has stated that it does not consider
the actions of Saudi Arabia to be in violation of international
law or to raise concerns under the UK consolidated arms export
criteria. However, it has also stated that:
The Government remains concerned, however, about
the impact of the conflict on Yemeni citizens….it remains
very difficult to estimate the impact of military action in Northern
Yemen because of a lack of access and the security situation in
the area.[18]
54. Given the lack of limited information regarding
the scale and nature of these attacks, it is not clear how the
Government can be so confident that Saudi Arabia did not misuse
UK-supplied aircraft, or other combat aircraft in its arsenal.
In light of these events, the Government should:
¾ Investigate
without delay whether military aircraft, weapons, in-country military
support to the Saudi Arabian armed forces, or UK personnel have
been involved, knowingly or otherwise, in serious violations of
international human rights or humanitarian law; and to report
these findings to Parliament.
¾ Pending
the results of this investigation, suspend any current or future
supplies of military equipment likely to be used to commit or
facilitate serious violations of international human rights or
humanitarian law.
¾ Ensure
that any future UK military supplies and assistance are conditional
upon the establishment of rigorous operational safeguards, including
training and accountability systems, designed to prevent the commission
of serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian
law by the Saudi Arabian armed forces.
November 2010
1 The UK Working Group on Arms comprises Amnesty UK,
Omega Research Foundation, Oxfam GB and Saferworld. Back
2
A Vranckx ed., "Rhetoric or restraint? Trade in military
equipment under the EU transfer control system-a report to the
EU Presidency", University of Gent, November 2010,
http://www.psw.ugent.be/crg/agenda/rhetoric%20or%20restraint_%20.pdf. Back
3
Brass-plate companies are those entities that tend not to have
an operational presence within the UK but do have a UK-registered
address. Back
4
Memorandum from the UKWG to the Committees on Arms Export Controls,
2006-07 Session,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmquad/117/117we02.htm;
See also, T Baldwin, "Uzbek massacre soldiers used Land Rovers
in defiance of arms control promise" The Times Online,
26 May 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article526600.ece. Back
5
See the Memoranda from the UKWG to the Committees on Arms Export
Controls, 2006-07, 2008-09 and 2009-10 Sessions,
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/other-committees/committee-on-arms-export-controls/publications/previous-sessions/.
Back
6
The UN embargo on Sierra Leone was lifted in September 2010, but
the corresponding EU embargo is still in place. Back
7
http://www.stopexplosiveinvestments.org/uploads/pdf/Worldwide%20Investments%20in%20Cluster%20Munitions%20-%20April%202010%20update%20full%20report%20DEF.pdf. Back
8
http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file49301.pdf. Back
9
Speech by Rt. Hon. Dr. Liam Fox, "Radical reform needed in
the MoD", http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2009/09/Liam_Fox_Radical_reform_needed_at_the_MoD.aspx Back
10
J Isaby, "Liam Fox attacks Labour's record on defence funding
as he promises that a Conservative Government would want to see
British defence and security companies flourishing", Conservative
Home, 19 March 2010,
http://conservativehome.blogs.com/thetorydiary/2010/03/liam-fox-attacks-labours-record-on-defence-funding-as-he-promises-that-a-conservative-government-wou.html Back
11
M Abbas, UK plans arms export drive to offset cuts, Reuters,
23 June 2010,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE65M24I20100623. See also
the speech delivered by Secretary of State for Defence at the
Farnborough International Air Show on Tuesday 20 July 2010,
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/SofS/20100720FarnboroughInternationalAirShow.htm. Back
12
"Securing Britain in an age of uncertainty: The Strategic
Defence and Security Review", pp. 44-45. Back
13
Ibid, p. 46. Back
14
Ibid, p. 66. Back
15
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing
control of exports of military technology and equipment, Article
2.5.a,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:335:0099:0103:EN:PDF.
(need to do this footnote in full) Back
16
Open General Export Licence (Military Goods), 6 October 2010,
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/eco/ogels-current/10-1191-ogel-military-goods.pdf. Back
17
"Yemen: Cracking down under pressure", Amnesty International
Report, August 2010 http://www.amnesty.org.uk/uploads/documents/doc_20631.pdf Back
18
Letter from Mark Prisk MP, Secretary of State, Department for
Business, Innovation and Skills, to Amnesty International UK,
18 September 2010. Back
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