Policing - Home Affairs Committee Contents


Memorandum submitted by Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland

  When I appeared before the Select Committee on 27 July you asked that I write to you with ACPO's position on the police service structure—and in particular, on mergers and collaboration.

BACKGROUND

  It is worth remembering that these issues have been debated in policing for many years. The report of the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police observed that "|the structure of the police system today, and its legal basis, echo not only the requirements of policing a century ago, but also the fears and prejudices, as well as the political wisdom, of the Victorian Age. However successfully therefore this system has been adapted there is no excuse for shirking some fundamental re-thinking about the purpose of the police and how this purpose can best be served in our own generation".

  For a number of years ACPO has been concerned about the structure of the Service. For example an ACPO debate in 2002 proposed strategic mergers. The Service was last restructured 40 years ago in response to the Royal Commission—the general professional view is that forces need to have greater capacity and capability to meet the 21st Century needs than the present structure provides. In 2005 and 2006 the debate crystallised around proposals for merger following the HMIC report Closing the Gap, which largely confirmed views that the Service needed to change.

  The position of Chief Officers remains positively, though not unanimously, in favour of the strategic merger of forces in the future. That position is based upon the same premise the 1962 Royal Commission laid down: namely that there is no excuse for not considering the way in which the purposes of the police can best be served. Those purposes are to keep the public safe and protect against harm, summarised by the Home Secretary (herself restating Sir Robert Peel) in her speech to the ACPO National Policing Conference earlier this year, as to prevent crime and disorder.

FINANCIAL CONTEXT

  It is very clear that policing must prepare for a significant reduction in funding over the coming years. Cumulatively, the projections on central government grant funding, locally generated precept funding and standstill pressures leave police authorities facing an unprecedented funding gap. With over 80% of the police budget made up of people, there is little question of an impact on police service strength. Chief Constables face some tough choices and must ensure all avenues for efficiencies are exploited before reaching the point where the "frontline" is affected.

COLLABORATION

  Since 2006, when the merger proposals became stalled, the Service has been grappling with the concept of collaboration. Where there has been both central direction and incentivisation, in some places it has been possible to overcome some fundamental obstacles that confront any collaborative effort—the growth of the national CT structure is the most strikingly obvious example. In other areas the obstacles have remained too fundamental.

  These obstacles include sovereignty, accountability and governance overwhelmingly loaded towards the provision of local services. Even where these issues have been addressed barriers to progress include different levels of sunk investment in capability and technology; differential impact, real and perceived, on our workforce; and "net donor syndrome" where contributors believe shared resources will be disproportionately deployed away from the home force.

  In terms of governance of collaborations, HMIC have stated they find existing arrangements "dilute the clarity of leadership, inhibit dynamic decision-making and impose a degree of Bureaucracy".[1] For smaller forces in particular, collaborations that, on paper, appear to be strong often are left under-resourced, creating a perception of a lack of value and buy-in. Smaller forces that contribute resources sometimes feel they do so by denuding their own expertise and capacity whilst seeing no return on investment, as assets are drawn into the more problematic conurbations; whilst in larger forces, some describe the relationship as almost parasitic.[2]

DELIVERING PROTECTIVE SERVICES

  HMIC, in its seminal reports on Protective Services—Mind the Gap (2003) and Closing the Gap (2005) considered delivery models other than collaboration. More recently a speech by Sir Paul Stephenson explored the same themes in consideration of options for better equipping the police service to confront serious and organised crime. A range of independent think tanks have covered the same ground, most recently the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in its publication Responding in a Modern World: An Investigation into UK Policing Structures.

  Sustaining an effective and efficient service means policing must remain capable of delivering both visible and invisible parts of policing: both a locally responsive presence in neighbourhoods and a capability to respond to the threat of serious harm. The latter takes in keeping people safe from a whole range of largely unseen but major threats, from sexual or violent offenders to organised crime and terrorism.

  As we approach unprecedented cuts financial projections indicate that many forces will struggle to remain fully resilient and efficient in balancing the fight against serious and organised crime while upholding their capacity to deliver neighbourhood policing locally. This new economic reality means that some may become unviable as separate entities. In all likelihood, the prospect of force amalgamations will be forced back on the table. There will need to be a plan for this potential outcome.

  The recent experience of Bedfordshire Police and Hertfordshire Constabulary provides a case study in how strong the business case for merger can be. By contrast, extended collaborative options still needed to retain two governance bodies and strategic corporate infrastructure, as well as limiting the savings that could come from operational areas such as control rooms, custody suites and senior command structures. The business case also showed how much more complex running large scale collaboration would be.

  Merger offered substantial savings through the rationalisation of two corporate infrastructures and support service functions into a single organisation. It allowed delivery of service from a single location, thereby enabling greater economies of scale to be achieved. Set up costs could be paid back within 18 months. The precept levels of both forces were nearly identical. The projected savings generated equated to between 180 and 360 police officer posts against options involving collaboration.

CONCLUSION

  It is ACPO's position that the Government should now give consideration to a review of the number of existing forces with a view to developing an organised road-map for the reconfiguration to a smaller number of strategically sized forces that will support the delivery of both local policing and protective services. Without a plan to govern central direction, there is a danger that we end up with a regionally piecemeal and disorganised approach to collaboration that will inhibit rather than assist consistent service delivery.

  Local policing teams represent a cornerstone of policing and regardless of the method of their organisation, the public should enjoy the familiarity and accessibility of a local policing service. This unswerving commitment is central to our position. Visible and responsive policing is delivered in communities by neighbourhood policing teams, already brigaded under forces of differing shapes and sizes. As the largest force in terms of capacity the Metropolitan Police Service is among the leaders in delivering neighbourhood policing.

  Chief Officers acknowledge the Government's indication that mergers will not be allowed to happen unless they are voluntary and supported by local communities. However, in providing any professional advice to either your Committee or to the Government, we are obliged to offer our professional view, which is that the most effective and efficient means of delivering both local policing and protective services is through a smaller number of strategically sized forces.

  In 1962 the Royal Commission recognised increasing specialisation in policing and the non-viability of smaller forces. It is not surprising that nearly 50 years on the same issues are making the current structure increasingly suboptimal.

  Over the coming months, if ACPO can be of any further assistance to the Committee on this or any other policing matter, do not hesitate to contact me.

September 2010












1   HMIC (2005) Closing the Gap: A review of the fitness for purpose of the current structure of policing in England and Wales p.74. Back

2   Ibid. Back


 
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