Conclusions and recommendations
1. The
police recorded 14,250 offences in which a firearm was fired,
used as a blunt instrument or to threaten in England and Wales
in 2008/09, the last year for which complete figures are available.
This represents only 0.3% of all recorded offences and a 41% fall
in firearms offences since 2003/04. However, to put this into
context, the reduction came from a historic peak in levels of
gun crime reached in the early years of the 2000s. Where firearms
are used, it can be to devastating effect: they were responsible
for 39 homicides, and around 2,000 injuries, in 2008/09. Moreover,
the extent to which firearms, especially air weapons, are used
in less serious crimes is likely to be higher than is recorded;
and a number of firearms-related offences are not captured in
these statistics. While it is heartening that official figures
show the use of firearms in crime to be declining, these figures
should not be allowed to fuel complacency. (Paragraph 12)
2. We heard contrasting
views about the extent to which legally-held firearms are used
in crime. It is difficult to form an accurate assessment, given
the limitations of available data. Certainly licensed firearms
do not appear to be used in the majority of cases. They are infrequently
used in serious and organised crime, which is fed by illegal firearms,
particularly converted and realistic imitation weapons. Mass shootings
with licensed weapons, such as the terrible crimes perpetrated
by Derrick Bird, also thankfully remain rare, but the fact that
they were carried out by licensed gun owners should not be overlooked
in any further consideration of firearms legislation. Offences
with low-powered air weapons, the possession of which is not illegal,
comprise a substantial proportion of all gun crime. Moreover,
legal firearms were used in at least 10% of firearms homicides
in 2008/09, which, while it represents a tiny number of individual
incidents, is not an insignificant proportion of these homicides.
On the basis of data submitted to the Cullen Inquiry, and that
collected more recently by Professor Squires and the Gun Control
Network, we are concerned about the use of legal firearms in domestic
incidents, often linked to domestic violence. (Paragraph 21)
3. There are 138,728
section 1 firearms certificate holders and 574,946 shotgun certificate
holders in England and Wales. The proportion of licence holders
who use their guns in crime is tiny. Many representations were
made to us by individual shooters and their representatives about
their legitimate enjoyment of shooting sports, about the need
for farmers in particular to have access to firearms in the course
of their professional activities and about the wider benefits
shooting brings to the UK economy. (Paragraph 26)
4. There is considerable
evidence, although it is not clear-cut, that well-designed legislation
to regulate and restrict the legal supply of firearms can reduce
gun crime. The UK has strict gun laws and comparatively low levels
of gun crime. The link should not be overstated—there is
no direct correlation in recent UK history between levels of gun
ownership and gun crime trends. However, it is fair to assume
at least in part that this demonstrates the success of the licensing
regime, in place since 1968, which enables the authorities to
satisfy themselves that those owning firearms are fit to do so.
We do not believe that a total outright ban on ownership and use
of section 1 firearms and shotguns would be a proportionate response
to the risks posed by these weapons. There is, however, scope
for further minimisation of risk through adjustments to the licensing
process, which we consider in more detail in chapter three. We
also believe that more effective measures could be put in place
to tackle criminal use of those firearms which are not currently
subject to a licensing regime; we consider this in chapter four.
(Paragraph 35)
5. An onerous burden
is placed on the police and on the public because of the difficulty
of understanding and applying the 34 relevant laws which govern
the control of firearms. It is unreasonable to expect members
of the public to know their responsibilities when the law is so
complex and confused. It is also unreasonable to expect the police
to apply the law accurately in all cases when it is so complex.
This is unhelpful to good relations between the police and the
public. We recommend that, rather than adding new rules and greater
confusion, the Government provides proposals for early consultation
on how to codify and simplify the law. Along with the proposals
themselves, we urge the Government to give careful consideration
to how it will publicise the legislation in order to give greater
clarity to the lay person. (Paragraph 36)
6. The supply of firearms
is only part of the challenge of reducing gun violence. We understand
that the Government is to publish details of its crime prevention
strategy at the end of the year. In order to tackle the drivers
of gun crime, we recommend that this strategy should explicitly
link to long-term measures to reduce domestic violence, measures
to tackle the social factors which foster extreme violence and
measures to clamp down on illegal drug markets and other forms
of serious and organised crime. We are concerned about the potential
for sensationalist media coverage of shootings to encourage copycat
killings. In respect of this last point, we recommend that the
Government ask the media regulatory bodies to enforce a code of
practice which both prohibits overtly sensational media coverage
of shootings and offers greater protection to victims and their
families against intrusive reporting. (Paragraph 42)
7. We note the evidence
given to us about the need for a 'public health' approach to preventing
and limiting violence. We also note that the unique and imaginative
approach to the collection and analysis of data about violent
incidents led by Professor Jon Shepherd in Cardiff has delivered
major improvements, measured by the significant drop in the number
of victims needing treatment at Accident and Emergency. We recommend
that a careful analysis based on science and 'engineering' methodology
should be applied to this field of prevention. (Paragraph 43)
8. We welcome the
recent agreement between the Association of Chief Police Officers
and the British Medical Association that the police alert GPs
to every new and renewal licence application. We consider this
to be an important step in ensuring that the licensing authority
receives accurate medical information about applicants, given
the cases we have heard in which applicants have failed to provide
this, some of which have resulted in murder. Ultimately, police
licensing officers must take responsibility for the decision as
to whether or not to grant or revoke a licence. We note that there
is already a duty on doctors to communicate their concerns if
they judge that a patient poses a danger to themselves or to others.
Police guidance must make clear that GPs are not being asked to
predict future behaviour, as this is impossible, or to judge the
fitness of an applicant to possess a weapon themselves. One means
of dealing with this latter concern would be to consider requiring
applicants to undergo a compulsory medical check with a specially-appointed
medical examiner, but we note that this would be extremely resource
intensive, that it might be regarded as disproportionate, and
that we received no firm evidence that it would achieve the desired
level of certainty in the licensing process. (Paragraph 67)
9. We consider that
there should be both tighter restrictions and clearer guidance
on the granting of firearms and shotgun licences to individuals
who have engaged in criminal activity. Firstly, the legislation
should be amended to clarify that persons in receipt of wholly
suspended sentences are subject to the same prohibitions from
obtaining a licence to hold section 1 firearms or shotguns as
they would be if their sentence had not been suspended. We do
not believe it appropriate for those convicted of offences which
are serious enough to warrant a custodial sentence to retain their
firearms. We are also of the view that those who receive shorter
custodial sentences should not be allowed to possess firearms
and recommend accordingly. (Paragraph 72)
10. We understand
that police licensing officers are now encouraged to take into
account intelligence about criminal behaviour that does not result
in convictions, as well as convictions resulting in non-custodial
sentences, when considering whether or not to grant a licence:
it must be made explicit in police guidance that officers are
expected to take such behaviour extremely seriously, in particular
cases of bind-overs, arrests and police call-outs for domestic
violence, and an accumulation of convictions for offences whose
penalty falls short of that requiring prohibition. (Paragraph
73)
11. Given our particular
concerns about the use of legal weapons in domestic firearms incidents,
we consider that the Canadian requirement for partners and recent
ex-partners to sign licence application forms merits further exploration.
We recommend that the UK Government should hold a consultation
on the proposal that police licensing officers consult the current
and recent domestic partners of applicants in assessing a licence
application, and report back to us on the responses received.
(Paragraph 74)
12. We are not convinced
by arguments put forward in favour of decreasing the licence renewal
period from five to two years. We have not seen any evidence to
suggest that there has been an increase in misuse of lethal firearms
since the period was increased from three years in 1995, and the
proposal would place considerable pressure on police resources.
We are encouraged by early signs that police forces may be taking
a more proactive approach to licence revocations following the
Derrick Bird shootings and consider that such an approach, facilitated
by the National Firearms Licensing Management System, and greater
emphasis on medical checks, is the most effective way forward.
(Paragraph 78)
13. We advocate a
change in the law to create a single system for the licensing
of section 1 firearms and shotguns. Such a system should be based
upon the current process for granting licences for section 1 firearms.
The benefits of such a system would be two-fold: firstly, we consider
that allowing guns to only those individuals who have good reason
to hold them strikes the appropriate balance between personal
freedoms and public safety, and we see no reason why those applying
for a shotgun licence should be exempt from proving 'good reason'.
Secondly, it will render the process considerably more straightforward
and, we understand from the police, cheaper to administer. We
believe that this can be undertaken in such a way as to avoid
any undue restrictions on the use of shotguns. (Paragraph 81)
14. Current police
guidance on firearms legislation is out-of-date. We recommend
that the guidance is urgently updated to take into account recent
changes to legislation to ensure that officers are properly equipped
to take the best decisions that they can. Furthermore, the Government
should facilitate a change in the status of the guidance to make
it an Approved Code of Practice, to give police decisions greater
weight with the courts. While we have no wish to interfere with
the judicial process, we are aware of at least one case where
a magistrate has reinstated a firearm revoked by the police, only
for the firearm to be subsequently used in crime. (Paragraph
84)
15. There is concern
about the potential impact of police spending cuts on the firearms
licensing function. In particular, it is important to preserve
recent improvements in the rigour of the process, such as the
increase in home visits undertaken for renewal applications, which
we consider should be compulsory. One means of ensuring sufficient
funds is to increase applicant fees; given that the current fee
structure was set in 2000, we consider that the Home Office should
consider raising the current £50 fee to a level that covers
the reasonable costs of licensing. We also understand that substantial
savings could be made by extending the life of a proportion of
certificates in order to remove the peaks and troughs created
when the renewal period was extended to five years. The Home Office
should implement this proposal and report back to us within twelve
months on the steps that it has taken on this recommendation.
(Paragraph 88)
16. It has been suggested
that prohibiting ownership of firearms and ammunition together
in the home would reduce both the risk of them falling into the
hands of criminals, through theft, and the ease at which they
could be misused by their legal owners in violent incidents. We
were inclined to agree with Mr Whiting's assessment, that the
need to fetch a weapon, or ammunition, from a storage facility
would be unlikely to deter those intent on murder. We are not
convinced that holding weapons at central locations would necessarily
reduce the risk of theft; it could indeed increase the risk of
theft. (Paragraph 94)
17. A large number
of young people enjoy shooting in a safe and responsible manner.
However, the legislation governing their use of firearms is extremely
complex and confusing. We recommend that the Government brings
forward proposals to simplify and clarify (a) the age at which
an individual is permitted to shoot under supervision in the controlled
environment of a shooting range; (b) the age at which an individual
is permitted to shoot under supervision outside of such a controlled
environment; and (c) the age at which an individual is permitted
to shoot unsupervised. In formulating such proposals, the Government
should be informed by our beliefs that the risks involved in shooting
are greatly mitigated under supervision; that the purpose of granting
a licence should be to allow an individual to shoot unsupervised;
and that we can see no good reason to maintain the current differences
in age restrictions between section 1 firearms and shotguns, the
origins of which are purely historical. (Paragraph 101)
18. Replica, converted
and deactivated firearms have emerged as a major source of illegal
guns, perhaps owing to the difficulties that criminals now experience
in acquiring genuine lethal firearms. In the past, policy-making
to tackle emerging threats has been hampered by the lack of an
effective evidence base about criminal use of firearms. We are
encouraged that the formation of the National Ballistics Intelligence
Service has gone some way towards addressing this deficiency.
While clearly we would not be in favour of any disclosure that
would compromise police operations, or assist criminals in accessing
lethal weapons, we urge the National Ballistics Intelligence Service
and the police to make generalised data about the illegal gun
market available to academics and policy-makers more widely where
this would not interfere with operational requirements, in recognition
of the contribution that such individuals can make to crime reduction.
(Paragraph 109)
19. Restricted intelligence
from the National Ballistics Intelligence Service indicates that
a significant number of pre-1995 standard weapons have been reactivated
into live weapons within the UK, and subsequently used in very
serious crimes. We therefore recommend that the Government introduces
a requirement for firearms that were deactivated before 1995 to
be modified to the 1995 standard, in order to make it harder for
criminals to gain access to readily-reactivated weapons. We also
recommend that deactivated guns are only sold through Registered
Firearms Dealers. (Paragraph 114)
20. The previous Government
introduced legislation enabling a more pro-active approach to
outlawing "readily-convertible" imitation firearms via
the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006, but did not take the necessary
action to bring this into effect. Restricted intelligence from
the National Ballistics Intelligence Service reveals the significant
role that converted firearms play in facilitating serious criminality.
We therefore recommend that the Home Secretary make regulations
under Section 39 of the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 to require
imitation firearms to conform to a specification that makes it
more difficult for them to be converted into firing weapons, and
that a process of type approval be introduced concurrently to
limit the introduction of non-compliant items into the market
place. (Paragraph 119)
21. The Government
should introduce legislation to amend section 1(6) of the Firearms
Act 1982 to ensure that the definition of a 'readily-convertible'
imitation firearm accurately reflects the abilities of contemporary
criminals to carry out such conversions, and introduce new offences
for supply and importation of firearms to ensure that those guilty
of such offences face appropriate penalties. Closer working with
the UK's European partners is also key to tackling the illegal
importation of firearms. (Paragraph 124)
22. Reported air weapon
offences have been falling since 2003/04, possibly in response
to legislation, although we appreciate that such offences are
likely to be under-represented in official figures. We were encouraged
by the number of successful prosecutions for possession of air
weapons in public or by underage individuals, and improper firing
of air weapons, that have been undertaken since 2008. Greater
enforcement of air weapon offences, such as criminal damage, should
form part of the more general police undertaking to be tougher
on anti-social behaviour. Before considering whether or not to
incorporate low-powered air weapons into the firearms licensing
regime, the Government should continue to monitor closely the
impact of recent legislation, including the Crime and Security
Act 2010 on reducing air weapon offences. (Paragraph 133)
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