Conclusions and recommendations
1. We
recommend that Police and Crime Commissioners are directed to
take the workload and the diversity of the community they are
representing into account when making support team arrangements.
(Paragraph 14)
2.
We recommend that consideration
be given to the importance of retaining experienced members of
staff in the team supporting the Police and Crime Commissioner
following the election of a new person to the post.
(Paragraph 17)
3. We endorse
the desire to reduce unnecessary bureaucracy in the police service,
but we emphasise that local record-keeping that enables people
to see what is happening in their neighbourhoods, and ideally
on their streets, will be crucial if local priority setting is
to be successful. This information must be made available to the
public on the internet. (Paragraph 19)
4. We recommend
that there should be no restrictions on who can stand for the
post of Police and Crime Commissioner beyond the criteria that
normally apply to standing for public office.
However, we consider that
there should be a cooling-off period of four years—one term
for a Police and Crime Commissioner—if a former senior officer
of the rank of Assistant Chief Constable or above decides to stand
as a Police and Crime Commissioner in the same area in which he
or she has served. This is because otherwise a former senior
officer could be in the position of scrutinising the effects of
decisions he or she had made while still in office. (Paragraph
26)
5. We recommend
that Police and Crime Commissioners be responsible for the budget,
staff, estate and other assets in their force area, and that they
have the same power to appoint and dismiss senior officers that
is currently held by Police Authorities. (Paragraph
38)
6. We recommend
that the concept of operational independence should continue to
apply in respect of the important work of the police in detection
and law enforcement, including arrest, but that the concept of
operational responsibility be developed and clarified in a memorandum
of understanding between the Home Secretary, Chief Constables
and Police and Crime Commissioners. It is important that arrangements
are made for parliamentary scrutiny of the terms of any such memorandum
and subsequently its impact on police work. The police and not
politicians must, as now, be solely responsible for individual
decisions with respect to arrest and investigation.
(Paragraph 45)
7. Bearing
in mind the findings of our sister Committee, the Justice Committee,
that most of the services that affect reoffending are outside
the ambit of the police and outside the scope of the criminal
justice system generally, we consider that it will be important
for each Police and Crime Commissioner to understand, support
and indeed drive the crime reduction work of local partnerships
and to ensure that they have the appropriate analytic capacity
and are held to account for their effectiveness in reducing crime
in their area. (Paragraph 49)
8. Our witnesses
agreed that there are some aspects of policing in relation to
which the Home Secretary would need to retain powers of intervention.
Mr Hogan-Howe, the former Chief Constable of Merseyside, outlined
three distinct areas. Firstly, he said that the Home Secretary
should have the power to intervene if there was "failing
or dishonest leadership". Secondly, he said that there was
a need for an overview in relation to "counter-terrorism
and serious organised crime". Thirdly, he referred to the
need for a view from the centre on procurement and capital investment
in order to achieve value for money. We
agree that the Home Secretary should have the power to intervene
in these circumstances. (Paragraph 51)
9. The Police
and Crime Commissioner should spearhead long overdue collaborative
procurement reforms. We expect that Police and Crime Commissioners
will want to join together to form a representative body. Such
a body should be used by Commissioners to facilitate collaboration
between forces. (Paragraph 54)
10. We see
merit in the suggestion that there be a set of national priorities
to which Police and Crime Commissioners should have regard when
setting local goals. (Paragraph 56)
11. We see
merit in using Police and Crime Panels as a means of providing
advice to Police and Crime Commissioners before final decisions
are made, as opposed to setting them up as a separate scrutiny
body with a separate support staff, examining decisions after
they are made, which we do not believe would be a good use of
public money. We recommend that Police and Crime Panels be comprised
primarily of elected representatives from county, unitary and
district councils in the force area—in particular portfolio
holders with appropriate responsibilities, and having regard to
the political balance—and of a significantly smaller number
of independent members. Ultimately, the Police and Crime Commissioner,
as the elected representative, must be able to make what decisions
he or she sees fit, but decisions made against the advice of Police
and Crime Panels must be recorded as such and these records must
be available to the public. (Paragraph
65)
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