Memorandum submitted by the Metropolitan
Police Authority
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
— Many of the building blocks required
to deliver the Government's plans for police reform are already
in place in London. (1.2)— In London, the Mayor must be
the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC), but with the power to
designate a nominated person to discharge the functions. Given
the scale of the mission in London, the PCC should be supported
by an advisory panel of non-executive "Assistant Commissioners".
(2.1)— The PCC must be the "body corporate" for
the police service, with the full range of powers and levers required
for driving performance and improvement. This must include the
ability to set priorities and strategies, holding the budget and
owing the assets. (2.2)
— The London Assembly should undertake
the Police and Crime Panel (PCP) scrutiny function. (1.2, 5.1)
— Both the PCC and the PCP will require
appropriately skilled staff to support them.
— There are risks associated with trying
to define "operational independence". Establishing a
shared understanding of "operational responsibility"
may be more helpful. (3.1, 3.2)
— Some targets are desirable, to ensure
that forces are steered to deliver across a range of targets and
to ensure that Government able to be satisfied that forces are
effective across a range of functions. Public access to timely
and meaningful data is key. (4.1, 4.2)
1. Introduction
1.1 This is a written submission to the Home
Affairs Select Committee Policing Inquiry from the Metropolitan
Police Authority (MPA), based on the MPA's response to the coalition
Government's plans for police reform, as set out in the paper
entitled "Policing in the 21st Century: reconnecting police
and the people".
1.2 London is in a different position from the
rest of country in terms of existing local government structures.
With fully functioning regional structures and an elected mayor
in place, London can quickly adopt the principles of directly
elected accountability for policing. The London Assembly provides
a ready-made scrutiny function, capable of ensuring open and transparent
accountability, and providing the necessary checks and balances
on the exercise of the Police and Crime Commissioner's (PCC) functions.
1.3 London is also different in that the Metropolitan
Police Service (MPS) has a range of national and international
responsibilities for which it will be necessary to put in place
accountability mechanisms.
1.4 The MPA regards it as important that the
principles of effective corporate governance and democratic accountability
should be consistently applied throughout the country. These principles
include: transparency, public accessibility of information, responsibility
for community safety and criminal justice, independent scrutiny,
value for money, management of risk, maintenance of probity and
public accountability to the electorate. The cost of governance
should not be seen as an overhead; governance is vital to manage
risk, maintain probity, transparency and accountability to the
electorate.
2. The relationship between Chief Constables and
elected Police and Crime Commissioners
2.1 In London, the Mayor should be the PCC,
with a power to designate a nominated person to discharge the
functions of this role. It is impracticable for the Mayor—with
his or her many other responsibilities—personally to discharge
all the responsibilities of the PCC. As the elected individual,
responsibility and accountability should nonetheless remain ultimately
with the Mayor. It is for consideration whether some functions,
possibly including the selection and dismissal of the MPS Commissioner,
should remain the responsibility of the Mayor, not to be delegated.
To provide democratic legitimacy, the individual designated by
the Mayor must be an elected politician and Assembly Members should
be eligible. It is for consideration whether there should be a
separate democratic process, or whether mayoral candidates might
be required to nominate a "running mate" to be designated
as the deputy PCC.
2.2 The MPA, in its short life, has made a significant
impact on the way in which the MPS has shaped its priorities and
conducted its business. It is important that the PCC in London,
as elsewhere, has at the very least the same powers that police
authorities currently possess, in order to ensure that they can
be equally, if not more, effective. To this end, the PCC must
be a legal entity with a range of powers and levers to guide and
steer performance of the service, including:
— Setting the priorities and performance
outcomes.
— Holding and controlling the budget.
— Owning the assets and contracts.
— Owning and controlling the estate.
— Employing police staff.
2.3 The PCC should have the capacity to delegate
as appropriate the functions and responsibilities which pertain
to him or her as the body corporate to the MPS Commissioner.
2.4 Given the scale of responsibilities in London,
overseeing a budget of £3.6 billion and a workforce of over
52,000, it is desirable that the PCC should have a non-executive
advisory board, to be named the Mayor's Police and Crime Commission,
to support him or her. Given the national and international policing
responsibilities of the MPS, the Home Secretary should consider
whether it would be appropriate to retain the right to make an
appointment to the Board. Appointments of "Assistant Commissioners
" to the Commission should be a matter for the Mayor, subject
to Nolan principles. Whilst again there should be no constraints
on eligibility, any Mayor would be well advised to make appointments
from those with appropriate expertise and to take the opportunity
to ensure representative diversity in the oversight of London's
policing, including members of other tiers of London Government.
This could include London Assembly members (who should then be
excluded from sitting on the Police and Crime Panel to avoid a
conflict of interest—experience to date has shown that it
is essential to separate post hoc scrutiny from executive decision-making).
2.5 As far as is possible, the business of the
Commission should be conducted openly and in public and should
be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, including the requirement
to publish all documents unless exempt, including meeting minutes,
under the publication scheme. Individuals or organisations should
retain the right to request information held by a public authority.
There would need to be systems in place to respond to these and
any requests made under the Data Protection Act.
2.6 The power structure within policing is complex
and whilst there are pitfalls in seeking to be too prescriptive
regarding such concepts as operational responsibility, it is necessary
to provide checks and balances in the shape of independent executive
control over police budgets and assets. Without the power to determine,
as a matter of last resort, where resources are directed, the
PCC's capacity to ensure that the democratic mandate upon which
he or she is elected can be adequately fulfilled will be constrained.
2.7 To ensure financial probity and the avoidance
of conflicts of interest the PCC will require statutory officers
(including a finance officer to fulfil the role of a s151 officer
under current local authority legislation) separate to those performing
similar roles within the GLA. He or she will also require the
capacity to manage audit, risk, and assurance independently of
the force. None of this need add to bureaucracy, and resource
neutrality could be achieved through increased cost effectiveness
resulting from the sharing of services. Under the proposed model
some of the staff currently working in finance and estate management
within the MPS might be deployed to work directly for the PCC.
There is also a case to be made for a proportion of the performance
analysis and research functions to be also be deployed directly
by the PCC.
2.8 In addition to the fundamental responsibilities
of the PCC to set priorities and to control the budget, there
are a number of functions that need to be discharged. The PCC
should be able to make recommendations to The Queen regarding
the appointment of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and Deputy
Commissioner, taking into account the representations of the Home
Secretary, and should have the power to dismiss the Commissioner.
There should also be a requirement in place for the PCC to approve
appointments made by the MPS Commissioner of Association of Police
Chief Officers (ACPO officers) and senior police staff.
2.9 An independent element in the regulation
of professional standards and conduct matters relating to ACPO
officers is a matter of principle and a PCC role within this should
be maintained. Linked to this is an argument for the PCC to have
control over the system to respond to complaints and concerns
about the quality of service throughout the police and it is our
view that the complaints function currently carried out within
the MPS should be transferred to the PCC. It is for consideration
whether a national framework should be put in place to support
and ensure quality of service across the country.
2.10 London is probably the most diverse city
in the world, presenting huge opportunities as well as some policing
challenges. The PCC should be given explicit duties to promote
equalities, not just in terms of ensuring that the MPS is representative
in its makeup, but also to make sure the policing response engages
with, and meets the needs of, all Londoners.
2.11 To fulfil national and international responsibilities,
the PCC should be a statutory member of any oversight board to
be established for the National Crime Agency, and the Bill should
enable the PCC to establish arrangements to oversee criminal justice
and community safety joint working in London. A statutory duty
should be placed upon the Mayor as PCC to make adequate arrangements
for counter-terrorism and protective services.
2.12 All of these roles and responsibilities
require support staff with specialist skills in, for example,
consultation with local people, planning, performance, finance,
risk management, communications and community engagement. Much
of this exists currently and would need to be maintained and managed
through the transition period so as not to lose the experience
and expertise built over many years.
2.13 We recommend that the legislation place
a duty on the MPS Commissioner to support the PCC in the discharge
of his or her statutory responsibilities. It should also confer
on the PCC a power of direction over the Commissioner in the event
that such support is not forthcoming. On a point of semantics,
we are extremely concerned that the new arrangements will create
significant confusion in the minds of Londoners about the respective
roles of the Mayor and the police.
2.14 Although combining the roles of Mayor of
London and Police and Crime Commissioner is both logical and attractive,
it does dilute the efficacy of the ultimate safeguard of the ballot
box in judging the success or failure of the PCC given that will
not be the only factor on which the electorate will decide to
vote. Nonetheless it is a powerful motivator for the incumbent
to demonstrate how well he or she has performed in setting strategic
direction and holding the MPS Commissioner to account.
3. How "operational independence" will
be defined
3.1 What constitutes "operational policing"
has never been defined by Parliament and there are potential risks
in doing so. As per paragraph 2.13, the PCC should have a power
of direction over the Commissioner if co-operation is not forthcoming.
3.2 There will be areas where the aspirations
of the PCC may overlap with the operational independence of the
force. For example, the style of policing at demonstrations such
as that at G20 in London could be considered an operational matter,
but something that the PCC, operating in the interests of the
public would feel a duty to influence. Consideration could be
given to the notion of "operational responsibility"
outlined in the report of the Independent Commission on Policing
for Northern Ireland, published in 1999 (see chapter 6 of their
report).
4. The extent to which there will still be a need
for national targets
4.1 We suggest that forces must be steered to
deliver effectively across the range of policing functions and
not just those considered priorities by communities. Whilst an
array of output targets, such as sanction detection rates, can
be counterproductive, we suggest that some targets driving key
outcomes and to allow the Government to be satisfied that forces
are effective across the range of functions are required.
4.2 We agree that local data must also be made
available to the public to enable them to assess the performance
of their force, PCC and panel. Relevant diversity data should
also be collated and monitored to ensure equality of access and
the development of appropriately targeted services. This is also
particularly important in the context of London's diverse communities
and their historical experiences and understanding of policing
and community safety by different groups.
4.3 Data provision and transparency should be
a wider responsibility shared between the PCCs and community safety
partnerships (CSPs). In London, for example, we have worked with
CSPs to improve public accountability by integrating CSPs into
the borough community police engagement group structure, so that
community safety information (data and information on local initiatives)
is regularly provided to local people through an open forum and
the community safety team are held to account for the services
they provide.
5. The role of Police and Crime Panels
5.1 In London, scrutiny of the performance and
decision-making of the PCC should be conducted by a panel of the
London Assembly, the Police and Crime Panel for London.
5.2 This panel should have appropriate powers
and resources to enable it to fulfil its scrutiny role; that is,
the Assembly's existing and agreed new powers in relation to the
Mayor's budget, strategies, staff and information should also
apply to the London Police and Crime Commissioner. The Assembly
should be empowered to summons information, the London Police
and Crime Commissioner and senior officers from the MPS and other
relevant bodies in London such as the City of London Police, and
should receive papers sent to the London Police and Crime Commissioner.
The Assembly would expect to refer matters to internal audit for
investigation where appropriate, to confirm appointments to the
Commission and to report the PCC to the Local Government Ombudsman
for any alleged misconduct (not to the IPCC as envisaged in the
consultation paper). The Assembly would also need appropriate
resources to support its scrutiny function, including specialist
audit and finance expertise.
5.3 In the current statutory structure, the
MPA is subject to the Members Code of Conduct and is required
to have a standards committee with various statutory functions
which include promoting and maintaining high standards of conduct
by the members and co-opted members of the authority, and assisting
members and co-opted members of the authority to observe the authority's
code of conduct. We consider it vital that the PCC and PCP should
be included in any new standards regime, whether that has a statutory
or voluntary basis. Consideration needs to be given the role of
the PCC and the role of the Mayor and any possible conflicts of
interest, as well as the PCP. To ensure probity in standards and
governance issues, a key role will be that of monitoring officer.
5.4 The Assembly scrutiny arrangements have
already provided evidence that robust public scrutiny can be effective.
Making that panel a statutory consultee on the strategic priorities
and giving it a power to hold confirmatory hearings for appointees
to the Mayor's Police and Crime Commission would provide extra
safeguards against potential abuse of the PCC's position.
October 2010
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