Memorandum submitted Cumbria Police Authority
Cumbria Police Authority is the body charged
with the provision of an efficient and effective police service
for Cumbria. The Police Authority welcomes the opportunity to
submit written comments to the Select Committee. We have already
commented on the Home Office consultation paper "Policing
in the 21st Century: Reconnecting Police and the People",
though it was disappointing that consultees were only been allowed
eight weeks to respond to these important proposals rather than
the twelve weeks recommended by the Cabinet Office. The fact that
the Select Committee is giving the proposals detailed scrutiny
is particularly appreciated.
We support the vision of achieving a free, fair
and responsible society and the aspiration to move control away
from central government to people and communities. The Police
Authority also welcomes the proposed reduction of bureaucratic
burden on forces and a return to "common sense" policing,
more local autonomy and the removal of central direction. It also
acknowledges the need to seek further efficiencies and welcomes
the proposed relaxation in barriers to collaboration.
We would support the removal of national targets
but would hope that at least some national standards can be retained
for benchmarking assessments.
However, the Police Authority is concerned that
now is not the right time for such radical changes to the governance
of policing, given the current financial position and sustained
falls in crime. This is especially so as there is no evidence
that the public want to see changes to the governance arrangements
for policing. Nor is there evidence that the proposed introduction
of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) will either strengthen
local accountability arrangements or reduce costs. However, the
Government's right to propose change is acknowledged.
The Police Authority Is also adamant that no
national reform programme should be at the expense of local service
delivery.
The relationship between Chief Constables and
elected Police and Crime Commissioners
1. There is real concern that, as currently
drafted, the proposals will either lead the relationship between
the PCC and Chief Constable being either too "cosy"
or confrontational. The latter is most likely, though both are
undesirable. The current system with 17 Member authorities dilutes
the potential for conflict between the Chief Constable and Chair.
2. The Police Authority is concerned that
one individual cannot effectively represent the half million people
living in England's second largest geographic county. Neither
would it be practical to actively engage with them. It is difficult
to see how a single person can actively engage at the partnership
level and make a valued contribution—a task that is difficult
for an existing body of 17 people. How will one individual ensure
that they represent the views of the entire population of such
a large area as Cumbria and not just those from their immediate
area? There is also concern that PCC elections might be particularly
vulnerable to being hijacked by single issue politics rather than
a mature, wider consideration of policing issues as is clearly
the Government's intention. The election of a single issue candidate
might be greater if the turnout for PCC elections is low. It is
also possible that the election the election of the PCC could
be used by the electorate as a referendum on the policies on the
government of the day rather than considering the merits and policies
of the local candidates.
3. The issue of elections is important as
the PCCs greatest asset in terms of their relationship with the
Chief Constable will be their electoral mandate. It is vital,
therefore, that they have legitimacy across the whole of the police
force area. This has to considered in the context of current constituencies
in terms of number of electors and geographic area for other elected
representatives in England and Wales.
4. PCCs need to be equipped with adequate
powers—as opposed to duties—to enable them to fulfill
their statutory roles and their electoral mandate. These powers
should be augmented with control over finance, strategic direction
and the police estate. This is essential to ensure that there
is balance with the role of Chief Constable, who should retain
full operational independence and provide the PCC with the necessary
leverage to fulfill their statutory functions.
5. It is suggested that the Government should
consider placing a duty on Chief Constable's to co-operate with
the PCC in fulfilling the statutory and electoral mandate. This
could be supplemented by a limited power of direction in those
instances when the Chief Constable does not co-operate. This would
serve to give the PCC with a course of action that would fall
short of resorting to seek the dismissal of the Chief Constable.
The current experience of police authorities is that having the
power to set strategic priorities does not automatically lead
to them being delivered by the force. While acknowledging the
Chief Constable's operational independence there will need to
be clarity over who has precedence given that the PCC will have
a democratic mandate.
6. It is appropriate that the PCC appoints
the Chief Constable. However, some safeguards need to be built
into the process to ensure that the PCC does not abuse their position
in making appointments—this is particularly important in
the light of concerns expressed earlier about the possible election
of a single issue candidate. It would be appropriate for the PCC
to have a role in the appointment of all ACPO officers and ACPO
equivalent staff.
7. In striving to increase accountability
and transparency the Government may wish to consider giving responsibility
for dealing with complaints to the PCC. The public are likely
to see the PCC as the person to whom complaints about policing
should be addressed and it would approve accountability, transparency
and increase confidence if the PCC has responsibility for handling
complaints. It is important that complaints are seen to be handled
in a fair and objective way: something which could be achieved
by removing this activity from police forces.
8. It is important that the role of PCC
and Chief Constable are seen as equal.
How "operational independence" will
be defined
9. Essentially "operational independence"
is already in place in police authorities who have a structured
scheme of delegation which clearly sets out where the responsibilities
of forces and authorities lie. Generally, the current model of
governance has worked well, and police authorities and Chief Constables
have found pragmatic ways of dealing with the issue of "operational
independence". It is difficult to envisage how this could
be further defined, although in the area of business management
there could be a potential for discussions regarding what constitutes
operational policing.
10. Police authorities generally restrict
themselves to strategic matters, though the strategic decisions
they make may impinge on the delivery of policing. However, with
PCCs having an electoral mandate there may be a much stronger
temptation for them to seek to stray into operational areas, especially
if the delivery of key election promises is at stake. This likely
to be the main source of the potential conflict referred to above.
Ultimately the PCC has the power to dismiss the Chief Constable
and the development of a mediation process to prevent recourse
to that situation might usefully be explored.
The extent to which there will still be a need
for national targets
11. Any national standards become de-facto
targets. We would welcome guidance on minimum standards—which
are helpful in benchmarking performance—but caution against
the setting of statutory standards. If forces all collected data
in a standard way then there would be no need for expensive central
collation of information, but the information would still be available
for reliable benchmarking. Accurate benchmarking information will
be important for PCCs to enable them to hold the Chief Constable
to account.
12. We would like to see HMIC, as the primary
inspection body reducing their need for the creation of audit
trails solely to satisfy their inspection and audit regime. Revision
and updating of inspection criteria for HMIC and the various other
agencies who inspect police forces so that they do not push authorities
and forces to set targets and collect a raft of data but look
beyond this at how the force is performing and is held to account.
13. Forces should only be collecting data
that enables them to conduct their business. Any data provision
or requests for information should be balanced against this test.
The role of the Police and Crime Panels
14. The Police and Crime Panel (PCP), as
currently envisaged, is not strong enough to adequately scrutinise
the PCC. It would also be beneficial if it had a role in supporting
the PCC.
15. It is pleasing that the Government is
proposing drawing its membership from local authorities in the
force area and retaining independent members. This is due to their
ability to represent the interests of the large geographic areas
and to draw on the varied expertise of independent members which
has proved so valuable in police authorities.
16. It may be appropriate to provide the
PCP with clear roles in regards to equality and standards to ensure
that the PCC complies with all the necessary legislation in these
key areas. It is not clear who will provide the necessary support
to the PCP. They will require the same expertise and support as
the PCC if they are to have an adequate understanding the financial
and policing information they are scrutinising.
17. Finally, there is an irony in having
a panel of people, the PCP, to scrutinise the PCC but only one
person, the PCC, to scrutinise the Chief Constable. Surely, if
there is a case for a body of people to scrutinise the PCC then
the same case could be made for the scrutiny and governance of
the Chief Constable. Perhaps there is a case for retaining police
authorities after all?
October 2010
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