Policing: Police and Crime Commissioners - Home Affairs Committee Contents


Joint memorandum submitted by Police Authorities of the North West

INTRODUCTION

  The police authorities in the North West work closely together on a number of collaborative arrangements and formal governance structures are now in place, through the North West Joint Committee, to oversee the collaboration between the five forces. The Chief Executives of the five authorities meet on a regular basis to discuss issues of common concern and share good practice. At a meeting held on 11 October, given the shared interest and concerns in the police reform proposals as currently worded, it was agreed that a joint response should be made to the Select Committee. The following response sets out the common areas of agreement between the five authorities.

  In general, all the authorities have significant concerns about the police reform proposals in terms of policing governance as they currently stand. There appears to be no strong evidence or business case to suggest that there is an overwhelming need, or indeed desire, for this new structure for policing governance. All five authorities are concerned that the proposals have been developed too quickly (the consultation period was for eight weeks during the summer holiday period, against the recommended 12 weeks), leaving little time to consult with the public and key stakeholders. There is no visibility concerning costs of the proposal, and it is understood that the cost of the elections alone will be in the region of £60 million. There are also concerns around the transitional arrangements and the lack of any real direction on how this will be undertaken.

  Above all, the real concern of all five authorities focuses around the lack of a robust model of policing governance, which appears to shift the tripartite arrangement very much in the favour of chief constables, and leaves the Police and Crime Commissioner exposed, supported only by a weak and powerless Police and Crime Panel.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  The key elements of this submission are:

    — Lack of support to the Commissioner due to a powerless Police and Crime Panel, leaving the Commissioner in a potentially exposed position in their relationship with the Chief Constable.

    — A strong belief that the corporate assets of the organisation should rest with the Commissioner.

    — Support the maintenance of the principle of operational independence but feel that actually defining what that means could present challenges.

    — Concern that policing will become politicised with the Commissioner trying to introduce undue pressure on the Chief Constable to support an electoral mandate.

    — Support the need for national standards to ensure forces operate on a "level playing field".

    — Support more local discretion for the setting of targets.

    — Support moves to reduce the bureaucratic burden of inspection regimes.

    — Significant concerns over the lack of any real power that is being proposed for the Police and Crime Panel.

    — Concern that the lack of any real support for the Commissioner by the Panel will leave the Commissioner with a workload which in practice will be not be viable.

    — The proposals as they stand result in more people scrutinising the Commissioner than the work of the force—which cannot be right.

    — Weakens the current tri-partite and introduces an over-bureaucratic and cumbersome "quad partite" structure of policing governance.

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE COMMITTEE

1.  The relationship between Chief Constables and elected Police and Crime Commissioners

  1.1  There is concern that as the proposals are currently drafted, conflict between the Commissioner and Chief Constable is likely. The model is susceptible to a clash of ideals or personalities, and with the lack of an effective supporting Panel, the Commissioner is liable to being exposed on decisions they take. There could also be added complications where cities decide to elect mayors—how would these work alongside Commissioners?

  1.2  Commissioners will have an electoral mandate, but it will not necessarily equip them with the powers to meet the promises made to the electorate. Without the necessary supporting mechanism which police authorities currently have, it is not clear how they will operate on an equal footing with Chief Constables who have significant staffing resources at their disposal.

  1.3  We believe that Commissioners must therefore be a body corporate, responsible for the budget, holding property and employing staff. Without these levers of power, it is not clear how the Commissioner will have the ability to influence how the Chief Constable operates. The Commissioner should also be responsible for recruiting the entire ACPO Chief Officer team, and not just the Chief Constable, as this is one of the main ways in which they will be able to influence local policing. (One of the authorities in the region believes this should be through involvement in the process rather than having responsibility for it). Above all, it is vital if the relationship is to avoid conflict that the two individuals are seen as equals in the policing environment.

2.  How will "operational independence" be defined

  2.1  To a great extent, operational independence is already in place in police authorities who have a structured scheme of delegation which clearly sets out where the responsibilities of forces and authorities lie. Generally, the current model of governance has worked well, and police authorities and Chief Constables have continued to find pragmatic ways of dealing with the issue of "operational independence". It is difficult to envisage how this could be further defined, although in the area of business management there could be a potential for discussions regarding what constitutes operational policing.

  2.2  Many of the decisions that police authorities take are, by their very nature, operational in that the consequence of those decisions have a significant impact on the way policing is delivered, or policing resources allocated. The right of Chief Constables to have direction and control of policing operations, however, is not disputed and the authorities are fully supportive that this principle should remain in place.

  2.3  With the very real prospect of introducing politics into governance arrangements for policing, a Commissioner may be able to take advantage of this and place undue pressure on a Chief Constable to ensure that their own political mandate is carried out. Commissioners can use the threat of dismissal if they are not satisfied with the professional judgement of the Chief Constable, which further supports the need for the corporate assets of the policing organisation to rest with the Commissioner to ensure a wider range of tools at their disposal.

  2.4  Chief Constables must be prepared to enter into collaboration to ensure that value for money is achieved, and to this end, be prepared to cede control over budgets and staffing to ensure better ways of joined up working. If this is included within the definition of operational control then it will help resist external pressures being brought to bear on what are clearly business efficiencies.

3.  The extent to which there will still be a need for national targets

  3.1  All the authorities are in agreement that there must still be an ability to benchmark ones own performance against other forces, including in areas such as staffing profiles, finance and resources. This will be helpful to enable Commissioners to challenge exiting services and practices.

  3.2  Although the use of a wide range of national targets is not supported, there may still be a need to set national targets for areas of policing which become a key area for concern, and it is therefore difficult to say that no targets should ever be set out the national level as the future demand on policing is unknown. There is clearly a need, however, for national standards to ensure that all forces continue to operate in a similar manner. The example of the National Crime Recording standard is useful here, without such common standards there will be increased scepticism amongst the public and stakeholders about the way crime is reported and subsequently recorded.

  3.3  It is inevitable that the public, or more likely, the press will judge the success or otherwise of the Commissioner on the performance of the force, even if they are not directly accountable for performance matters. The Government may find it difficult to scrap national targets which will be required to judge the relative performance of the force, and de facto, the Commissioner. Whilst the creation of league tables is unhealthy and can lead to inaccurate assumptions due to the different make up of force areas, implicit targets will still be in place if the iQuanta data continues to be used. Forces will still continue to collect a vast wealth of data which, even with the best intentions, will inevitably still be used by some bodies to create a performance hierarchy.

  3.4  The five authorities believe that the industry that has grown up around serving the myriad of inspection regimes must not be allowed to be re-created, and that forces should only be required to collect and collate data which they need for the successful management of their own policing.

4.  The role of the Police and Crime Panels

  4.1  All the authorities are unanimous in their concern for the way the Police and Crime Panel is currently constituted. It is clear that as it stands, the Panel will have no real power and will not be able to influence how the Commissioner operates. A better system may be to have the Commissioner reporting to the Panel, or a Board, where a full and frank dialogue can be undertaken on issues and that where the Panel has the power of veto if they do not agree with a proposed course of action. This is one of the real strengths of police authorities in that they arrive at decisions following a full discussion and scrutiny of the facts to hand.

  4.2  The Panel as it is currently constituted does not provide the appropriate level of checks and balances and will result in the Commissioner having too large a workload in which to operate effectively. All police authorities have at least 17 Members (Greater Manchester has 19), and Members are fully engaged in the community and in the force to ensure that they are fully informed on policing issues. A single individual, supported by a weak and powerless Panel, will leave that individual exposed when faced with the prospect of challenging the Chief Constable backed up by a significant level of resources.

  4.3  The Panel will in effect be scrutinising the actions of the Commissioner and not the Chief Constable, and will lead to the rather unusual situation where more people are scrutinising the Commissioner and their actions than the Chief Constable and the performance of the force—which surely should be the primary focus of this scrutiny and what the electorate would expect.

  4.4  The Panel model introduces a fourth element into policing governance, creating a "quadpartite", and with it also brings a further level of bureaucracy, and additional cost, resulting in a far more complex framework of governance, which is surely against the wishes of the Home Office and Government to reduce the democratic deficit?

5.  Recommendations

    (1) that the tri-partite arrangement for the governance of policing in England and Wales be retained and strengthened;

    (2) that the politicisation of policing be avoided;

    (3) that if the proposals are to proceed, a robust framework for governance be developed which has the appropriate level of checks and balances in place to continue to deliver effective scrutiny of policing; and

    (4) that the corporate assets of the policing organization remain with the governance body and not be removed to the Chief Constable.

October 2010





 
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