Joint memorandum submitted by Police Authorities
of the North West
INTRODUCTION
The police authorities in the North West work
closely together on a number of collaborative arrangements and
formal governance structures are now in place, through the North
West Joint Committee, to oversee the collaboration between the
five forces. The Chief Executives of the five authorities meet
on a regular basis to discuss issues of common concern and share
good practice. At a meeting held on 11 October, given the shared
interest and concerns in the police reform proposals as currently
worded, it was agreed that a joint response should be made to
the Select Committee. The following response sets out the common
areas of agreement between the five authorities.
In general, all the authorities have significant
concerns about the police reform proposals in terms of policing
governance as they currently stand. There appears to be no strong
evidence or business case to suggest that there is an overwhelming
need, or indeed desire, for this new structure for policing governance.
All five authorities are concerned that the proposals have been
developed too quickly (the consultation period was for eight weeks
during the summer holiday period, against the recommended 12 weeks),
leaving little time to consult with the public and key stakeholders.
There is no visibility concerning costs of the proposal, and it
is understood that the cost of the elections alone will be in
the region of £60 million. There are also concerns around
the transitional arrangements and the lack of any real direction
on how this will be undertaken.
Above all, the real concern of all five authorities
focuses around the lack of a robust model of policing governance,
which appears to shift the tripartite arrangement very much in
the favour of chief constables, and leaves the Police and Crime
Commissioner exposed, supported only by a weak and powerless Police
and Crime Panel.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The key elements of this submission are:
— Lack of support to the Commissioner due
to a powerless Police and Crime Panel, leaving the Commissioner
in a potentially exposed position in their relationship with the
Chief Constable.
— A strong belief that the corporate assets
of the organisation should rest with the Commissioner.
— Support the maintenance of the principle
of operational independence but feel that actually defining what
that means could present challenges.
— Concern that policing will become politicised
with the Commissioner trying to introduce undue pressure on the
Chief Constable to support an electoral mandate.
— Support the need for national standards
to ensure forces operate on a "level playing field".
— Support more local discretion for the
setting of targets.
— Support moves to reduce the bureaucratic
burden of inspection regimes.
— Significant concerns over the lack of
any real power that is being proposed for the Police and Crime
Panel.
— Concern that the lack of any real support
for the Commissioner by the Panel will leave the Commissioner
with a workload which in practice will be not be viable.
— The proposals as they stand result in
more people scrutinising the Commissioner than the work of the
force—which cannot be right.
— Weakens the current tri-partite and introduces
an over-bureaucratic and cumbersome "quad partite" structure
of policing governance.
RESPONSE TO
QUESTIONS RAISED
BY THE
COMMITTEE
1. The relationship between Chief Constables
and elected Police and Crime Commissioners
1.1 There is concern that as the proposals
are currently drafted, conflict between the Commissioner and Chief
Constable is likely. The model is susceptible to a clash of ideals
or personalities, and with the lack of an effective supporting
Panel, the Commissioner is liable to being exposed on decisions
they take. There could also be added complications where cities
decide to elect mayors—how would these work alongside Commissioners?
1.2 Commissioners will have an electoral
mandate, but it will not necessarily equip them with the powers
to meet the promises made to the electorate. Without the necessary
supporting mechanism which police authorities currently have,
it is not clear how they will operate on an equal footing with
Chief Constables who have significant staffing resources at their
disposal.
1.3 We believe that Commissioners must therefore
be a body corporate, responsible for the budget, holding property
and employing staff. Without these levers of power, it is not
clear how the Commissioner will have the ability to influence
how the Chief Constable operates. The Commissioner should also
be responsible for recruiting the entire ACPO Chief Officer team,
and not just the Chief Constable, as this is one of the main ways
in which they will be able to influence local policing. (One of
the authorities in the region believes this should be through
involvement in the process rather than having responsibility for
it). Above all, it is vital if the relationship is to avoid conflict
that the two individuals are seen as equals in the policing environment.
2. How will "operational independence"
be defined
2.1 To a great extent, operational independence
is already in place in police authorities who have a structured
scheme of delegation which clearly sets out where the responsibilities
of forces and authorities lie. Generally, the current model of
governance has worked well, and police authorities and Chief Constables
have continued to find pragmatic ways of dealing with the issue
of "operational independence". It is difficult to envisage
how this could be further defined, although in the area of business
management there could be a potential for discussions regarding
what constitutes operational policing.
2.2 Many of the decisions that police authorities
take are, by their very nature, operational in that the consequence
of those decisions have a significant impact on the way policing
is delivered, or policing resources allocated. The right of Chief
Constables to have direction and control of policing operations,
however, is not disputed and the authorities are fully supportive
that this principle should remain in place.
2.3 With the very real prospect of introducing
politics into governance arrangements for policing, a Commissioner
may be able to take advantage of this and place undue pressure
on a Chief Constable to ensure that their own political mandate
is carried out. Commissioners can use the threat of dismissal
if they are not satisfied with the professional judgement of the
Chief Constable, which further supports the need for the corporate
assets of the policing organisation to rest with the Commissioner
to ensure a wider range of tools at their disposal.
2.4 Chief Constables must be prepared to
enter into collaboration to ensure that value for money is achieved,
and to this end, be prepared to cede control over budgets and
staffing to ensure better ways of joined up working. If this is
included within the definition of operational control then it
will help resist external pressures being brought to bear on what
are clearly business efficiencies.
3. The extent to which there will still be
a need for national targets
3.1 All the authorities are in agreement
that there must still be an ability to benchmark ones own performance
against other forces, including in areas such as staffing profiles,
finance and resources. This will be helpful to enable Commissioners
to challenge exiting services and practices.
3.2 Although the use of a wide range of
national targets is not supported, there may still be a need to
set national targets for areas of policing which become a key
area for concern, and it is therefore difficult to say that no
targets should ever be set out the national level as the future
demand on policing is unknown. There is clearly a need, however,
for national standards to ensure that all forces continue to operate
in a similar manner. The example of the National Crime Recording
standard is useful here, without such common standards there will
be increased scepticism amongst the public and stakeholders about
the way crime is reported and subsequently recorded.
3.3 It is inevitable that the public, or
more likely, the press will judge the success or otherwise of
the Commissioner on the performance of the force, even if they
are not directly accountable for performance matters. The Government
may find it difficult to scrap national targets which will be
required to judge the relative performance of the force, and de
facto, the Commissioner. Whilst the creation of league tables
is unhealthy and can lead to inaccurate assumptions due to the
different make up of force areas, implicit targets will still
be in place if the iQuanta data continues to be used. Forces will
still continue to collect a vast wealth of data which, even with
the best intentions, will inevitably still be used by some bodies
to create a performance hierarchy.
3.4 The five authorities believe that the
industry that has grown up around serving the myriad of inspection
regimes must not be allowed to be re-created, and that forces
should only be required to collect and collate data which they
need for the successful management of their own policing.
4. The role of the Police and Crime Panels
4.1 All the authorities are unanimous in
their concern for the way the Police and Crime Panel is currently
constituted. It is clear that as it stands, the Panel will have
no real power and will not be able to influence how the Commissioner
operates. A better system may be to have the Commissioner reporting
to the Panel, or a Board, where a full and frank dialogue can
be undertaken on issues and that where the Panel has the power
of veto if they do not agree with a proposed course of action.
This is one of the real strengths of police authorities in that
they arrive at decisions following a full discussion and scrutiny
of the facts to hand.
4.2 The Panel as it is currently constituted
does not provide the appropriate level of checks and balances
and will result in the Commissioner having too large a workload
in which to operate effectively. All police authorities have at
least 17 Members (Greater Manchester has 19), and Members are
fully engaged in the community and in the force to ensure that
they are fully informed on policing issues. A single individual,
supported by a weak and powerless Panel, will leave that individual
exposed when faced with the prospect of challenging the Chief
Constable backed up by a significant level of resources.
4.3 The Panel will in effect be scrutinising
the actions of the Commissioner and not the Chief Constable, and
will lead to the rather unusual situation where more people are
scrutinising the Commissioner and their actions than the Chief
Constable and the performance of the force—which surely
should be the primary focus of this scrutiny and what the electorate
would expect.
4.4 The Panel model introduces a fourth
element into policing governance, creating a "quadpartite",
and with it also brings a further level of bureaucracy, and additional
cost, resulting in a far more complex framework of governance,
which is surely against the wishes of the Home Office and Government
to reduce the democratic deficit?
5. Recommendations
(1) that the tri-partite arrangement for the
governance of policing in England and Wales be retained and strengthened;
(2) that the politicisation of policing be avoided;
(3) that if the proposals are to proceed, a robust
framework for governance be developed which has the appropriate
level of checks and balances in place to continue to deliver effective
scrutiny of policing; and
(4) that the corporate assets of the policing
organization remain with the governance body and not be removed
to the Chief Constable.
October 2010
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