Joint memorandum submitted by Avon and
Somerset Police Authority and Avon and Somerset Constabulary
Avon and Somerset Constabulary is one of the
largest forces in England and Wales, policing a population of
almost 1.6 million people. The force area covers around 1,855
square miles, taking in virtually every kind of landscape, from
city centres, wild moors and busy holiday resorts, to vast commercial
and industrial complexes.
Avon and Somerset Police Authority is an independent
body of local people appointed to ensure an efficient and effective
police service. Our 17 members include nine councillor members,
appointed by the local councils and eight independent members
who are selected following a dedicated recruitment process.
TERMS OF
REFERENCE—OBJECTIVES
OF THE
INQUIRY
The impact of directly elected individuals on
policing in the 21st Century: Government's proposals and impact
on the prevention and reduction of crime and anti-social behaviour
and their practical implications. The submission will focus on:
— Relationship between Chief Constables
and elected Police and Crime Commissioners.
— Defining "operational independence".
— Extent to which there will still be a
need for national targets.
— Role of Police and Crime Panels.
SUBMISSION
Executive summary
1.1 This submission from Avon and Somerset
Police has been developed on the basis of extensive professional
experience, public and stakeholder consultation, recognised principles
of good practice, our local assessment of risk and the application
of reasoned logic.
1.2 We identify critical and inherent risks
in applying this general governance model to all forces in England
and Wales based on the scale of area diversity, the lack of a
geographic identity within some force areas and the varied and
politically complex government structures that exist within them.
1.3 We highlight potential for significant
tensions between Chief Constables, Policing and Crime Commissioners,
Policing and Crime Panels and other governance and scrutiny bodies
on account of:
— Potential for confused and competing
agendas and public and practitioner misconceptions regarding their
roles and responsibilities as a result of a fractured governance
model.
— An inability of a single commissioner
to identify and represent the diversity of Avon and Somerset's
urban and rural communities and their diverse needs.
— Reduced capacity for effective scrutiny
and engagement.
— Potential for politicisation of policing
and risk of critical policing areas being overshadowed by populist
or single-issue campaigns.
— The impact of potential governance tensions
on strategic and operational delivery and public confidence.
1.4 We feel that the parameters of operational
independence will be determined locally between Chief Constables
and Police and Crime Commissioners. We feel that these parameters
should be more clearly defined in order to minimise local tensions
and risk of misplaced authority. The role of the National Crime
Agency and the strong duty on Commissioners to collaborate also
compound potential risk of tension relating to the issue of operational
independence.
1.5 Whilst we welcome the Government's emphasis
on localism and removing bureaucratic accountability, we do not
support a national framework of prescriptive targets. We do however
support high level standards of compliance where necessary, appropriate
and in the public interest, and the facilitation of tools to enable
more effective benchmarking at a local level.
1.6 Policing and Crime Panels within the
proposed framework present a fractured model of accountability
with potential for competing agendas between governing bodies
and our well established PACT processes. Under current proposals,
we do not feel that Panels are afforded sufficient powers to be
truly effective in their role and would welcome their enhanced
role in community and stakeholder engagement.
1.7 Our submission also raises significant
concerns with regard to cost of delivery and implementation of
this revised governance framework, the timescales for implementation,
transitional arrangements and the failure to make full use of
existing knowledge and expertise in assessment, planning and consultation
processes.
Detailed comments
2.1 This submission details our local concerns
and inherent risks in adopting the directly elected commissioner
governance model in Avon and Somerset. It is based on extensive
professional experience, public and stakeholder consultation,
recognised principles of good practice, a local assessment of
risk and the application of reasoned logic.
2.2 As we support the agenda for increased
localism and democratic accountability, we highlight the critical
inherent risks in applying this untested governance model universally
to both major Metropolitan environments and more geographically
diverse and politically complex government structures in other
areas of the country. Avon and Somerset encompasses large rural
geographies (Exmoor), major urban areas (Bristol and Bath) and
significant market towns (Taunton, Bridgwater, Yeovil), where
population density in Bristol, for example, is 78 times that of
West Somerset.[34]
By the nature of their geography, these areas do not share the
defined sense of local identity that can be found in more Metropolitan
Force areas.
2.3 To meet the needs of our socially and
culturally diverse communities, our force area is also subject
to complex local government structures comprising one County Council,
four Unitary Authorities and 324 county councillors. By contrast,
our neighbouring forces, Wiltshire and Gloucestershire are subject
to more simplified unitary arrangements comprising only 98 and
62 councillors respectively.
Relationship between the Chief Constable and Policing
and Crime Commissioners
3.1 Through our extensive professional experience
of local arrangements and those in other forces, we can attest
that the relationship between Chief Constables and their governing
bodies can be a delicate one, requiring sensitivity, rationality
and clarity of communication. The proposal set out in the Police
Reform and Social Responsibility Bill presents a number of critical
vulnerabilities to the effectiveness of this relationship.
3.2 Firstly, the Bill presents a fractured
governance model, creating potential for confused and competing
agendas between the public, stakeholders, local councillors, Policing
and Crime Panels, Police and Crime Commissioners and Chief Constables.
3.3 Although inherent within the current
Police Authority framework, the risk of public or practitioner
misconceptions of their respective roles and responsibilities
within the proposed governance model are substantially multiplied.
This could include, for example, a public misconception that Commissioners
are responsible for directing Chief Constables, blurred lines
of accountability between Policing and Crime Panels and Chief
Constables and unintended compromises to operational accountability.
3.4 Through work with our communities, we
also foresee risk of local tensions and public disenchantment
in the proposed governance model resulting from the inability
of a single elected individual to represent Avon and Somerset's
extremely diverse communities. There is a strong likelihood that
the directly elected individual would be elected from Bristol
and consequently champion agendas driven from the urbanised perspective.
Current Police Authority arrangements incorporate elected representation
from all five authorities together and the expertise of independent
members. Our public consultation indicates that only 30% of residents
feel that a Police and Crime Commissioner will represent and identify
their needs, compared to 54% who feel they will not.
3.5 These risks are compounded by the much
documented potential for politicisation of policing, a concern
shared by both the APA and ACPO. Policing led by politicised,
extremist or populist single-issue campaigns present a significant
risk of destabilising relations between Chief Constables and Policing
and Crime Commissioners and diverting resources from areas of
evidenced risk, threat and need. In all likelihood, candidacy
for the position of PCC will be driven primarily by those with
party political resource to support their campaigns. Our public
consultation indicates overwhelming support for a commissioner
being an independent person (72%) as opposed to a politician (12%).
3.6 We feel that this risk, in particular,
could be mitigated by adhering to "principles of good governance"
set out in the Governance Standard for Public Services and evidence
of good practice in corporate governance models, which ensure
"separation of powers and responsibilities between chairman
and chief executive" and "collective responsibility
for leading, setting values and standards", and thus avoiding
the centralisation of power with any one individual.
3.7 In addition to these points, it is clear
that a single elected individual model will reduce local capacity
to maintain effective communication between our Force's governing
body and its officers and staff, communities, local authorities,
Children's Trusts and CSPs. We feel that the value of "soft
accountability" that occurs through contact with beat officers,
PCSOs and our communities as part of the current Police Authority
model should be neither lost nor overlooked. The perceived expectation
that members of the public will be able to contact their commissioner
and have their issues directly and instantly resolved also raises
local concerns given the issues of capacity and complexity detailed
above.
3.8 We urge the inquiry to consider these
potential "stress points" within the proposed governance
model and any consequential impact on strategic and operational
delivery or community and stakeholder perceptions would destabilise
public confidence in policing in the longer term.
Defining operational independence
4.1 Operational independence is not a specific
and absolute concept and as such, its parameters have been developed
and negotiated over time between our Chief Constable and Police
Authority. Our experience suggests that the limits of operational
independence under the proposed model would be determined independently
within forces based on the relationship between Chief Constables
and the Policing and Crime Commissioners. Whilst we welcome local
flexibility, we also appreciate the inherent risk of local tensions
resulting from misplaced authority or ineffective oversight and
scrutiny and would like to see the parameters of operational independence
more clearly defined.
4.2 The proposal, for example, states that
Policing and Crime Commissioners will have a "strong duty
to collaborate", which may conflict with delivery of an independent
localised agenda and raise tensions at a senior level regarding
the force's strategic direction and operational independence.
4.3 The issue is further complicated by
the role and remit of the National Crime Agency, which should
be more clearly defined, particularly given the assumption that
the NCA will be supported by resource and expertise at force level.
4.4 Other provisions of the Bill are directly
open to challenge in terms of the level of operational independence
afforded. We question the proposal that enables Chief Constables
to appoint their own senior officers, for example, and foresee
inherent risks in any appointments system that fails to ensure
formal, transparent and accountable procedures.
The need for national targets
5.1 We welcome the coalition government's
emphasis on localism and removing bureaucratic accountability
and feel that in this context, any national framework of prescriptive
targets would divert our force from delivering its strategic objectives
for the area. As indicated in Section 2, few single unifying agendas
bridge Avon and Somerset's socially, culturally and geographically
diverse communities, and it is unlikely that national targets
in this area would meet local need.
5.2 Although we do not support a framework
of prescriptive targets, we recognise the value of high level
standards of compliance in areas that are clearly in the public
interest. We also feel that our public have a right to know how
their force is delivering services efficiently and effectively
in comparison to other areas and support the development of tools
to improve local benchmarking.
The role of Policing and Crime Panels
6.1 As noted in Section 3, we feel that
Policing and Crime Panels present a fractured model of accountability
that create further potential for local tensions within the governance
framework. In focusing scrutiny primarily on the Policing and
Crime Commissioner, panels risk losing sight of the central objective
(ensuring an effective and efficient police service) and expose
potential for competing agendas between governing bodies.[35]
Locally, there is also a clear risk that the role of PCPs will
conflict and duplicate outcomes already being achieved through
our well established PACT processes.
6.2 Current proposals also indicate that
Panels will not be afforded sufficient powers to ensure that outcomes
of their scrutiny are actioned. Panels will not possess the recommendation
powers that currently sit within existing local government structures,
for example, whilst any investigatory powers would be designated
to the IPCC and ACPO level officers.
6.3 We see an integral role for Policing
and Crime Panels in maintaining levels of community and stakeholder
engagement in matters of policing that have been developed via
existing Police Authority arrangements. The Authority's 17 members
are engaged at LSP, CSP and PACT levels, providing a vital mechanism
for identifying and responding to local needs. As representative
bodies, Panels will by their very nature have a more balanced
perception of community opinion than a single PCC, and we see
a stronger role for them in representing the public's views in
decision making than that proposed via the Bill.
Logistical Considerations
7.1 We would like to reiterate concerns
regarding the implementation cost of these proposals, which for
dedicated elections alone is likely to exceed £1 million
locally. We also raise concerns regarding the additional longer-term
cost of governance model that simultaneously increases (through
duplication) more complex bureaucratic processes.
7.2 The proposed timescales for implementation,
lack of robust evidence-led decision making and lack of clarity
with regard to planning and transitional arrangements raise significant
local concerns. We foresee a major risk of important expertise
and knowledge being lost and governance and accountability arrangements
being damaged in the longer term as a result of rushed implementation
processes and urge the government to take a pragmatic and carefully
considered approach to any transitional arrangements.
7.3 More specifically, we strongly recommend
that current governance arrangements remain in place for the next
two budget rounds to minimise tensions with any Policing and Crime
Commissioner's election campaign as the Police Authority retain
accountability for delivery and planning following the Comprehensive
Spending Review. In the short term, we also foresee potential
tensions between localist campaign agendas and the responsibility
of forces to deliver national policing requirements as we prepare
for the 2012 Olympics. We would like assurance that the governance
of local policing will not be unduly disrupted during this critical
risk period.
7.4 We also feel that all the planning and
consultation processes have focused on how to implement the proposed
model as opposed to any detailed assessment of what the most appropriate
model should be. In doing so, a wealth of knowledge, expertise
and experience has been substantially overlooked.
RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1 We urge the inquiry to take account
of what we feel to be critical risks to policing governance based
on the Directly Elected Commissioner model, and consider their
potential impact on strategic and operational delivery of policing
services and public confidence. More specifically, our recommendations
call for:
8.1.1 Flexibility in governance arrangements
at a local level to take account of geographic and demographic
diversity, the complexity of existing local governance structures
and build upon the enhanced localism agenda that underpins these
proposals.
8.1.2 A pilot or phased approach to implementation
across a variety forces ensuring that this untested model is workable,
lessons are learnt, good practice is shared and any longer term
damage to policing governance and public confidence is minimised.
8.1.3 More holistic review of local governance
arrangements to minimise duplication and conflicting agendas between
governing bodies, including PCCs, PCPs, CSPs and local scrutiny
and delivery arrangements such as PACT.
8.1.4 The parameters of "operational independence"
and the roles and responsibilities of Police and Crime Commissioners,
Police and Crime Panels and the National Crime Agency to be more
clearly defined[36]
and communicated to the public.
8.1.5 Measures to enable equality of opportunity
in campaigns and candidacy for PCC, and more specific safeguards
that minimise the risk of local policing becoming highly politicised
or driven purely by populist or single-issue agendas.
8.1.6 The abolition of prescriptive national
targets that do not serve the public interest or reflect local
priorities and objectives.
8.1.7 Enhanced powers for Policing and Crime
Panels to ensure that they have the capability and capacity to
hold Police and Crime Commissioners to account.
8.1.8 An enhanced role for Policing and Crime
Panels in community and stakeholder engagement to ensure that
the current networks and levels of "soft accountability"
are maintained.
8.1.9 The proposal and its implementation to
be fully costed and objectively assessed to ensure that reform
is necessary, potential benefits outweigh the identified risks
and cost and that the revised model of governance can demonstrate
improved value for money.
October 2010
34 Bristol has a population density of 38.44 persons
per hectare. West Somerset has a density of 0.49. CIPFA Finance
and General Estimates Statistics. Back
35
Noting "governance focused on the organisation's purpose"
as the primary "principle of good governance" set out
in the Governance Standard for Public Services (CPIFA, OPM, Joseph
Rowntree Foundation 2004). Back
36
Noting "clearly defined roles and functions" as one
of the core "principles of good governance" set out
in the Governance Standard for Public Services (CPIFA, OPM, Joseph
Rowntree Foundation 2004). Back
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