Memorandum submitted by Kent Police Authority
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Kent Police Authority has examined the Government's
proposals for directly elected police commissioners, and has identified
a number of key concerns.
— Policing in the 21st Century has
been too hastily compiled, does not give any detail on these radical
proposals, and does not demonstrate that there is any public appetite
for these changes.— The inevitable low turnout would mean
a lack of legitimacy.
— The tripartite system will become unbalanced
and could favour Police Chiefs, and, at a national level, ACPO
could gain too many responsibilities.
— The proposed structure shows a Policing
and Crime Commissioner (PCC) holding the Force to account, who
will in turn be held to account by a Policing and Crime Panel
(PCP). This would be unnecessarily bureaucratic and lead to a
Commissioner fighting on two fronts.
— The level of engagement with partners,
proximity to the community and volume of work undertaken by KPA's
17 members cannot be maintained by a single individual, especially
at a very local level.
— The impact of politicising policing has
been given no consideration whatsoever.
— The problems that Ministers have identified
around bureaucracy and targets have been purely government-driven,
and could be solved by giving Authorities more powers and flexibilities.
— Whilst operational independence is sacrosanct,
there is a need to guard against Police Chiefs becoming unresponsive
to critical challenge.
— These proposals are uncosted, which is
surprising at a time of such dire economic straits, but as the
elections alone will cost in the region of £54 million, this
suggests that the country can ill-afford PCCs.
— The new proposed model will increase
bureaucracy, and the Commissioner and Policing and Crime Panel
will require far greater secretariat support.
— Introducing this more adversarial system
will inevitably lessen the amount of time the Commissioner can
dedicate to holding the force to account.
— PCPs would be at best marginal and ineffective,
and deciding upon the membership of this committee would also
be highly contentious.
— The inclusion of independent members
enhances the non-political nature of the authority, and brings
an additional breadth and depth of knowledge and experience of
the criminal justice system and that could not be matched by a
single elected representative.
INTRODUCTION
1. There are small number of key points
that ought to be highlighted right at the outset.
2. There are themes that run through our
response—risks around transition and politicisation, the
contribution of independent members and the impressive track record
of police authorities across the UK.
3. We think that Kent Police Authority (KPA)
is in a unique position in that one of its members also sits as
an MP on the Government benches in the House of Commons and is
also a Member of this Committee. It is a matter of public record
that this member is a strong supporter of the Government's proposals
for directly elected commissioners, and so this submission reflects
the views of the other sixteen KPA members.
4. We believe that the content of paper
itself betrays the haste in which it has been produced. Any coherent
argument for change would have examined the strengths and weaknesses
of the current system, proposing a range of models for consultation.
However, such a rational decision-making process has not been
followed. The paper instead provides only one solution to an ill-defined
concern. There are no costings of the proposal put forward by
the Government, and critically no identification of how it will
add value or improve people's experience of, and involvement with,
the police.
5. We believe it is highly dangerous for
the government to steam-roller through such ill-considered proposals
at a time when police forces are being asked to make substantial
budget cuts and will face significant upheaval. Whilst ministers
have stated they have the political mandate to deliver these proposals
and the will of the public behind them, in truth they have neither.
6. We have found, through our consultation
roadshows, that knowledge of the Government's plans concerning
police governance is extremely limited. Given that even in this
restricted pool, more than two thirds rejected the proposal for
a directly elected Commissioner, the Government cannot claim popular
support or a democratic mandate for their plans, at least in Kent.
An increase in publicity over the next 18 months may well increase
awareness, but this would be building demand as opposed to responding
to it. Evidence is such that the public do not want further elections—voter
turnout in two-tier areas like Kent is already low. Equally, the
proposal to introduce PCCs was only a manifesto commitment of
one of the two parties in the Coalition Government.
ELECTED COMMISSIONER
7. We have four central concerns about the
role of the Commissioner him/herself.
8. Firstly, the language in the paper concerning
the rebalancing of the tripartite system, and the "absolute"
protection of operational independence, could suggest that too
much power will reside with Chief Officers. This unbalanced relationship
could emasculate any PCC before they have begun their work. At
national level the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)
will have significant strategic and policy responsibilities and
will not only deliver but also accredit leadership development.
We are concerned that this is an unfettered power that may unbalance
national relationships in favour of a currently unaccountable
private company.
9. Secondly, the proposed structure shows
a PCC holding the Force to account, who will in turn be held to
account by a PCP. This would therefore suggest that a PCC will
be fighting on two fronts, and will need to divide their time
between these two tasks. Introducing this more adversarial system-
as opposed to the current situation where the KPA as individuals
and as a corporate body holds the force to account- will inevitably
lessen the amount of time the Commissioner can dedicate to holding
the force to account. There will therefore be a diminution in
both the amount and quality of time for examining the Force and
acting as its critical, challenging friend.
10. This leads to the third point, that
of capacity. At the current time, KPA has 17 members. They not
only sit on the four main committees, but each have a "Lead
Member" role covering topics as diverse as disability equalities,
risk management and civil contingencies. As well as these roles,
they are, in groups of three or four, charged with the oversight
of one of the six BCUs. It has not yet been explained how one
person would be able to carry out the work of 17, in such a large
and diverse county (Kent is 1,537 square miles, and in size it
ranks as the ninth largest county in England, and in population
as the sixth.) We do not believe that one person, acting alone,
would be able to cover either the volume of work, or be able to
cover the ground in Kent or any other force area and do justice
to the people they serve.
11. Fourthly, the Government may indeed
be right in identifying the power of the electoral mechanism for
effecting change. However, it may have underestimated the unintended
consequences of the electoral cycle and the impact of injecting
party politics into policing.
POLICE AUTHORITIES,
POLICE COMMISSIONERS
AND TARGETS
12. The Government's attempt to tackle the
overwhelming bureaucracy that has stifled the police service in
recent years is laudable. However, it is wrong to lay the blame
for this bureaucracy at the door of police authorities. If anything
it is national government that has created the raft of top-down
performance measures that have consistently constrained the service.
Removing police authorities as a solution to the problem of "bureaucratic
accountability" is based on a flawed argument. The issue
is that too much government intervention has prevented police
authorities from exercising sufficient power. And yet, despite
these real issues with the current system, a directly elected
PCC will not have a single additional duty than those which police
authorities have currently. If the government were serious about
the ability of a single individual to hold police forces to account,
they should give them enhanced powers to deliver on these duties
rebalance the tripartite at the local level.
OPERATIONAL INDEPENDENCE
13. With regard to the question of operational
independence, we recognise the Government's explicit intention
to provide an absolute guarantee on this issue and KPA is clear—no
credible argument can be marshalled to justify politicians (or
independent members) seeking to direct operations, investigations
and arrests. In this respect we see the direction and control
of the Chief Constable, together with an ultimate answerability
to the law as sacrosanct. However, there is a huge range of issues
where there is entirely legitimate public interest in police-related
decisions and where critical challenge and accountability are
vital. Examples would include, but are not limited to, the distribution
of resources between level one and level two activity, the allocation
of resources across a force's basic command unit (BCU) structure
and the definition and response policy for crime and elements
of ASB.
COSTINGS
14. Surprisingly, there are no costings
of the proposal put forward by the Government. In contrast, not
only has KPA ensured that policing in Kent is efficient and effective,
it has done so with a clear regard to the tax-payers' purse. Our
precept is the second lowest of all "shire" police authorities
and the cost of KPA is 0.5% of the total budget.
15. With regard to the elections themselves,
we are aware that the LGA has costed them at £54 million,
an enormous amount at a time of extensive cutbacks. Also, unless
the Government commits to both a general fund for candidates and
a cap on spending, only representatives of the main parties or
particularly wealthy individuals could stand. We also fear extremist
groups would exploit this opportunity.
BUREAUCRACY AND
ENGAGEMENT
16. Given the Government's focus on reducing
bureaucracy it is also surprising that these proposals, far from
reducing bureaucracy, actually increase it. The proposed model
could be accurately described as elements of the current model,
with the addition of an elected PCC (at considerable cost and
bureaucracy) and the change in function of the "authority"
to a PCP that scrutinises the acts of a Commissioner rather than
the force. It seems that the Government has failed to follow even
their own rationale for change when developing these proposals.
Indeed, if a PCC is meant to be directly accountable to the people,
why do we need a crime and scrutiny panel at all? If non directly-elected
bodies do not have the legitimacy to hold someone to account,
perhaps we should have elections to this panel too?
17. We have already expressed our concerns
at the cost of the elections, and that any individual would not
have the capacity to carry out the duties that an authority currently
performs. In addition to this, any Commissioner would, in practice,
require an enlarged secretariat to cope with the amount of work
that is currently distributed between 17 members. KPA currently
has a very small and lean secretariat. We believe that this would
need to at least double in size, if not more, to cope with the
demands of a PCC (as well as the work with the PCP). The PCP itself
would necessitate some form of support, and together, replicated
across the country, this could add hundreds of people to the payroll
and cost significant sums.
18. Whilst accepting that police authorities
do suffer from a lack of visibility, they are certainly not remote
from the public and the claim that authorities are "without
the capability or mandate to insist on the priorities of local
people" is patently false. Kent Police Authority KPA regularly
consults with the public of Kent, and through its 17 strong membership
is able to listen to the needs of the local community. This level
of engagement simply cannot be maintained by a single individual.
Whilst an elected commissioner might represent the priorities
of the electorate at the time of election, over a four-year term
they will struggle to emulate the ongoing and continuous level
of engagement and sensitivity to local demands demonstrated by
police authorities. They will not have the time or capacity to
effectively engage at a local level and represent the nuances
and subtleties of different communities in a dynamic policing
and political context.
POLICING AND
CRIME PANELS
19. At the moment, the accountability structures
are defined through the tripartite system. The addition of a body
which would be holding a PCC to account, who was in turn holding
the police to account, is an additional and unwelcome bureaucratic
encumbrance, and entirely at odds with the current system's simplicity
and effectiveness.
20. The Authority is concerned at the lack
of detail, even at this early stage, for the Policing and Crime
Panels. There have been suggestions that this could act as an
Overview and Scrutiny committee. This may work, given that the
Authority currently draws the majority of its members from local
authorities who are therefore experienced in sitting on these
committees. There have also been suggestions that any such panel
could be comprised of the community safety portfolio holders of
the various councils in the area.
21. However, members of the Authority feel
that, however comprised, a PCP would be at best marginal and ineffective,
and at worst simply another layer of bureaucracy of the kind the
government states it wishes to avoid.
22. The membership of this committee would
also be highly contentious. How (or by whom?) it would be selected
would need careful consideration. If it were only portfolio holders,
then this would mean in some areas—Kent being one—there
would only be representatives of one party sitting on the panel.
In addition, they would be ostensibly exercising overview and
scrutiny functions over a PCC, potentially from the same party.
One of the major strengths of the current arrangements of the
Authority is that it is fully representative of the various communities,
thereby avoiding any "tyranny of the majority" which
in part helps to ensure that governance and oversight of the police
is apolitical. The other issue is that the authority strongly
believes the inclusion of independent members brings an additional
breadth and depth of knowledge and experience of the criminal
justice system, corporate governance, public administration and
financial strategy that simply could not be matched by combining
solely elected representatives on any supporting Panel. The authority
believes that the inclusion of independent members, in the current
and future models, is vital. In fact it would be churlish not
to acknowledge the role of independent members and they role they
have played in improving policing since 1995.
October 2010
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