Memorandum submitted by Greater Manchester
Police Authority
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1 In collating Greater Manchester Police Authority's
response to the questions posed by the Home Affairs select committee,
consideration has been given to the current governance system
in place throughout Greater Manchester. The response has taken
account of the benefits and drawbacks of proposals within the
Government's Green Paper "Policing in the 21st Century",
and how they could be practically applied.
1.2 Where the Authority considers government
proposals are unfeasible or present difficulties, the Authority
has sought to suggest constructive solutions or proposals to address
them and would welcome the opportunity for further discussion.
2. INTRODUCTION
2.1 The Greater Manchester city region has a
population of over 2,500,000 and is made up of 10 local authority
areas—Bolton, Bury, Manchester, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford,
Stockport, Tameside, Trafford and Wigan which between them comprise
215 council wards and 277 separate neighbourhood communities with
an estimated 95,000 businesses, over 10,000 voluntary organisations
and an estimated 100,000 students*. There are 12 police divisions
which are co-terminus with local authority areas with the exception
of Manchester which is split into three police divisions, South
Manchester, North Manchester and Metropolitan. * figures
provided by AGMA
2.2 Greater Manchester Police Authority has
19 Members. There are 10 Councillor Members appointed, one each
from the ten local authorities which make up the city region.
GMPA's nine Independent Members are local people appointed following
a recruitment process, based on Nolan principles. One of these
Members is also a serving magistrate.
2.3 A key element of Greater Manchester Police
Authority's vision is to work together with partners to build
safer and stronger communities in Greater Manchester. Partnership
working and collaboration are key to ensuring that modern policing
is effective. The reduction and detection of crime and anti-social
behaviour are clearly concerns for many public sector partners
and are not just the responsibility of the police service in isolation.
Following the revision of the Association of Greater Manchester
Authorities' (AGMA) constitution, a number of commissions were
established to ensure the effective delivery of the Greater Manchester
multi-area agreement. One of these commissions is focused on public
protection and its membership includes both local councillors
and criminal justice representatives. Greater Manchester Police
Authority is a key player within the Public Protection Commission
and the Chairman of the Authority chairs the leadership group,
which oversees the work of a chief officer group. For an example
of the unique structure and accountability arrangements in place,
please see Appendix, the AGMA Public Protection Commission case
study. The Authority would be keen to take advantage of any opportunity
to provide Committee Members with further information about the
work of the Public Protection Commission.
3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CHIEF CONSTABLES
AND ELECTED
POLICE AND
CRIME COMMISSIONERS
3.1 The proposals raise several governance issues
which focus on the juxtaposition between the direction and control
of policing sitting with Chief Constables, and the public responsibility
for delivery sitting with Police and Crime Commissioners. Whilst
the electoral mandate of the Commissioners gives them legitimacy,
it does not automatically furnish them with the power to meet
their statutory duties effectively. This has a particular resonance
when the reality of operational independence is taken into consideration.
If clear duties set in legislation are placed within the remit
of both the Police and Crime Commissioner and the Chief Constable,
it may remove any potential risk of infringement of powers or
responsibilities on the part of either role, creating an environment
of greater equity and clarity between the two parties.
3.2 The legitimacy of the Police and Crime Commissioners
may be further impeded by the lack of an appropriately skilled
support team to provide the necessary information and advice to
enable him/her to carry out the role effectively. No information
has been published about the funding arrangements of the Commissioners
and it is difficult to comment on how a Commissioner may be supported
in their role, whereas clearly a Chief Constable has a substantial
organisation at their disposal.
3.3 The coalition government proposals for elected
mayors in key cities, Manchester being one, has the potential
to confuse the accountability landscape further especially if,
as in London, it is supposed that the Mayor would automatically
slot into the role of the Police and Crime Commissioner, as the
individual has powers and responsibilities which extend beyond
policing. A potential clash of mandates looms, particularly in
Greater Manchester where having in a Mayor in Manchester could
disrupt the balance for the remaining nine local authorities which
make up the Greater Manchester city region.
3.4 For an area the size of Greater Manchester,
there could be criticism that the Police and Crime Commissioner
will be seen as remote from local communities' needs and priorities.
This has the potential to create tension within the already strong
governance arrangements that are in place through AGMA, and which
has a proven track record for effective collaborative decision
making. The relationship between a Police and Crime Commissioner
and local councillors (who are already democratically elected)
will need to be considered as there is potential for this clash
of mandates to strain relationships and be counter productive
to the efficient and effective delivery of policing services.
3.5 In elaborating the above point about the
potential clash of mandates further, it is vital that the implications
of Police and Crime Commissioners for those police forces with
national and/or regional remits are considered. For example Greater
Manchester Police leads on counter terrorism for the North West
Region and a Police and Crime Commissioner would potentially have
access to regional resources yet people in those areas in the
North West outside Greater Manchester have not voted for that
individual and this breaks the principle of "direct democracy".
4. OPERATIONAL INDEPENDENCE
4.1 Operational independence is already in place
in policing and each police authority has a scheme of delegation
which makes clear where responsibilities lie between the Authority
and the Force. Over many years the operational independence of
Chief Constables has been a source of many disputes between police
authorities and forces as there is a potential for it to be used
to block public accountability and governance. The establishment
of Police and Crime Commissioners will in no way improve this
and as currently described, operational independence is more likely
to be a source of increased tension. The effectiveness of any
police governance model will be hampered if Chief Constables receive
the power to own and make decisions on all resources, as to potentially
put all power and assets in the hands of the Chief Constable would
effectively render the Police and Crime Commissioner impotent.
The strength of current police authorities is that they have strategic
decision making powers over the budget and property, with Chief
Constables being the expert on the delivery of policing services.
GMPA supports the right of Chief Constables to have direction
and control of operations but would advise against extending their
powers further.
4.2 Conversely, if clarity with regard to operational
independence is not provided for in the new arrangements, a Police
and Crime Commissioner may be able to take advantage of this and
place undue pressure on a Chief Constable to make decisions on
operational matters that are influenced by political concerns
rather than for the most efficient or effective service delivery
reason. This is pertinent because the Police and Crime Commissioners
could use the threat of dismissal to influence the Chief Constable's
professional judgement, particularly as any other powers the Police
and Crime Commissioner may have at their disposal are limited
and any power there is, is concentrated in just one individual
rather than distributed across a corporate body.
5. NATIONAL TARGETS
5.1 It would not be helpful to keep national
targets. Experience tells us that central controls can create
bureaucracy. It would be more productive to have a streamlined
inspection process focussed on improvement and that considers
critical issues, allowing assessment using "real time"
information rather than historic data.
5.2 Performance data collated via iQuanta automatically
links most similar forces with implicit targets. This could allow
for performance monitoring over time.
5.3 National targets would automatically result
in the comparisons and league tables which are commonly not representative
of actual performance and lack the necessary contextual information
to enable appropriate interpretation. Creating league tables of
forces and Police and Crime Commissioners when areas are completely
different in terms of environment, population, levels and types
of crime and anti-social behaviour, can result in the public making
judgements on information that is effectively incomparable.
5.4 The development of further additional benchmarking
information would be helpful to challenge existing services and
practices, but that being said it should always have a health
warning to prevent such information from being used as targets.
6. POLICE AND
CRIME PANELS
6.1 The thinking around this proposal is currently
underdeveloped. As presented currently, it is unlikely that the
Police and Crime Panels will impact on the prevention and reduction
of crime and anti-social behaviour as they are effectively powerless.
They have no legitimate jurisdiction over the actions of the Chief
Constable and therefore will be unable to have an impact on performance.
Rather, their somewhat limited power lies over the Police and
Crime Commissioner who does not have responsibility for reducing
crime. The Panel can only call in the Commissioner and not the
Chief Constable if performance of the police is poor. Four years
is a long time for communities to wait to change a poorly performing
Police and Crime Commissioner.
6.2 If the panels were to be reconstructed as
an informative body for the Police and Crime Commissioner providing
community information, and a reality check as such, this would
allow for a more informed dialogue between the Police and Crime
Commissioner and the Chief Constable to take place and go some
way to providing a check and balance against the Police and Crime
Commissioner having a personal or extremist agenda.
6.3 The Police and Crime Panels could be further
strengthened if they are developed as a corporate policing board
and given powers of veto and the authority to make decisions (particularly
around policing priorities and precept levels), rather than giving
power to an individual. This would allow for a collaborative and
dispersed model of governance.
Appendix
AGMA PUBLIC PROTECTION COMMISSION
CONTEXT: THE
ASSOCIATION OF
GREATER MANCHESTER
AUTHORITIES
The Association of Greater Manchester (AGMA)
has a new, devolved status as a combined authority which marks
the culmination of more than 20 years successful and productive
collaborative working across the city region's ten districts:
Bolton, Bury, Manchester, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Stockport,
Tameside, Trafford and Wigan—the Greater Manchester City
region.
The AGMA Executive Board is made up of the leaders
and chief executives from each of the 10 Greater Manchester districts
and it meets on a monthly basis. This Board is the monitoring
mechanism for all the seven AGMA Commissions which consist of
representatives from the public, private and third sectors. Each
of these commissions is charged with developing and overseeing
work in a key strategic area of business. These areas of business
are: the new economy, health, planning and housing, environment,
transport, public protection, capacity building and collaboration.
The AGMA scrutiny pool receives updates from
each of the AGMA commissions either bi-annually, or by exception
where any issues of concern have been referred from the AGMA Executive
Board. Membership of the scrutiny pool is made up of elected representatives
from each of the local councils across Greater Manchester. This
not only guarantees a structure with integrity, but also ensures
that checks and balances are in place in order that the right
local issues and risks are identified and addressed.
BACKGROUND
The role of the AGMA Public Protection Commission
is to provide direction and a cohesive partnership approach to
issues which affect the community safety of the city region. Traditionally,
the police service has been perceived as the organisation solely
responsible for dealing with crime related issues, however, there
is now an increased emphasis on partnership working to provide
a safer community for all. A safer city region is likely to be
more sustainable with the economic vibrancy aspired to by AGMA.
The Public Protection Commission has been developed with this
in mind.
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP
The Public Protection Commission is made up
of both elected and non-elected members. The non-elected members
were selected using Nolan principles on the basis of a competency
and knowledge gap analysis. This ensures that the membership covers
a wide range of knowledge and expertise, from a range of partnership
organisations including the probation trust, the prison service,
local universities, the voluntary sector and witness and victim
support. Although not a prerequisite, the chairman of Greater
Manchester Police Authority is the current chair of the Commission.
PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT
AND GOVERNANCE
The Public Protection Commission focuses its
work on achieving aims and priorities which have been identified
as having specific relevance to the city region and which have
been established both via consultation with key partners and through
analysis and research. Both community consultation and dialogue
with elected members is fed into the prioritisation process. The
resulting strategic aims (see attached diagram) of the commission
are:
Strategic Aim 1: To protect our communities
from terrorism, disasters and organised crime.
Strategic Aim 2: To ensure excellence
in crime and disorder reduction and community safety.
Strategic Aim 3: To transform our service
delivery to ensure services that best meet our communities' needs
and maximise our partnership delivery.
One of the key roles for the Commission is also
to act as a governance mechanism and the commission holds Greater
Manchester Against Crime (GMAC) to account. GMAC is a central
analytical resource for community safety agencies across the city
region. This resource identifies community safety partnership
priorities through a detailed strategic assessment, encourages
consistency in excellent practice in community safety and seeks
opportunities for shared services and collaboration. GMAC will
be expected to deliver the evidence base requirements of the commission
under Strategic Aims 2 and 3 and this work has been structured
into four priority themes which are:
— Serious Violent Crime with a focus on
domestic violence.
— Serious Acquisitive Crime with a focus
on burglary dwelling.
— Tackle the crime, disorder and anti-social
behaviour issues of greatest importance in each locality, increasing
public confidence in the local agencies involved in dealing with
these issues.
— Reduce Re-offending through the improved
management of offenders.
The Public Protection Commission has also identified
the economic downturn, alcohol and mental health as the cross
cutting drivers for greater focus. The Commission is also aiming
to tackle the critical challenges under Strategic Aim 1 through
the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum and the Preventing Violent
Extremism Board.
CONCLUSION
The AGMA Public Protection Commission ensures
that community safety is a partnership responsibility which is
truly shared; rather than being seen as the remit of a single
agency—the police service. This is due to the active and
committed involvement and support from other key partners for
the work of the Commission eg fire and rescue, the probation service,
other local authority chief executives etc. In addition, both
the Chief Constable and the police authority Chief Executive support
the Members of the Commission and through the involvement of elected
members in every element of the Commission's work, local accountability
to the public can be demonstrated effectively and transparently.
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