Memorandum submitted by Surrey Police
Authority
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Government's plans for elected Police and
Crime Commissioners represent a radical and far-reaching departure
from current accountability arrangements. Surrey Police Authority
welcomes the Home Affairs Select Committee's decision to examine
a policy which has been characterised by its rapid development
and its lack of substantial detail.
Our submission to the Committee's inquiry highlights
some of the areas of uncertainty that, in our view, must be addressed
if the new model is to succeed. These include:
— How previously unwritten rules around
operational independence will be redefined by the new relationship
between Commissioner and Chief Constable.
— The potential for conflict. Who gets the
last word? How do we resolve an impasse without damaging policing?
— The role and influence of political parties
in the new model.
— The public view of national targets and
national data.
— The role of central government and HMIC
in the new accountability landscape.
— Are non-mandatory national priorities
a better solution than national targets?
— Police and Crime Panels—a missed
opportunity?
— Public expectations for police accountability.
How the Panel could add value.
We look forward to the Committee's deliberations
on the subject with great interest and would be pleased to assist
further if required.
Surrey Police Authority is an independent body
made up of local people. Its job is to make sure that Surrey is
policed in an effective and efficient way that meets the needs
of the community. It does so by consulting with the public, setting
the budget and strategic direction for Surrey Police and holding
the Chief Constable to account for the force's performance. It
has been praised by HMIC and the Audit Commission, who commented:
"The Chair and members of the Police Authority, and the staff
it employs, are highly capable and the Authority gives clear direction
to the Force. The Authority is well organised and has been influentiawl
in improving policing on Surrey. Its good financial planning and
strong record in making savings is helping the Force fact the
current tough financial climate."
1. Surrey Police Authority welcomes the
decision of the Home Affairs Select Committee to launch an inquiry
into proposals for Police and Crime Commissioners.
2. We have no argument with the desire to
improve local control over policing. Surrey Police Authority has
never been afraid to challenge central control when it has jeopardised
the level and the manner of policing that local residents tell
us they want. This "Surrey Public First" approach—and
the support we have received for it locally—is well documented.
3. We are not alone in being concerned about
the lack of detail surrounding these new proposals for enhanced
local accountability and the haste in which they are being put
into effect.
4. We have not seen evidence to support
the decision to make the specific changes being proposed. Nor
has there been a convincing case to illustrate how they will significantly
improve policing.
5. The most obvious pitfalls are already
being highlighted by Police Authorities, Chief Constables and
other interested parties. Many have questioned the wisdom of introducing
an elaborate and expensive new accountability model at a time
where a significant reduction in the policing budget seems likely.
Some worry about the overt politicisation of policing. Others
have pointed to voter apathy as a concern.
6. Police Authorities' concerns about these
changes have been simplistically and unfairly portrayed as an
attempt to maintain a cosy old order. Surrey Police Authority
rejects that criticism. Hurried and poorly conceived policy could
inflict significant damage on local policing. We are keen to play
a constructive role in developing policing for the 21st century
and have made our willingness to offer assistance and comment
clear to the Policing Minister.
THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN CHIEF
CONSTABLES AND
ELECTED POLICE
AND CRIME
COMMISSIONERS
HOW "OPERATIONAL
INDEPENDENCE" WILL
BE DEFINED
7. The relationship between Chief Constables
and Commissioners will vary from case to case. In some areas it
will work well, in some it will not. In general terms, it is likely
that this relationship will be much more personality-driven than
with current Police Authorities. Where Chief Constables' and Commissioners'
agendas and objectives are the same, and the political will matches
professional opinion, this kind of relationship may be very constructive.
However, where agendas and objectives differ the relationship
may become fractious and threaten to undermine policing.
What is operational independence?
8. The Committee is right to highlight operational
independence as an issue that will come into question under the
new plans.
9. The operational independence of the police
has never been fully defined. There is however an unwritten consensus
that has evolved between police authorities and forces that accepts
the Chief Constable's right to direct day-to-day activities and
prevents anyone from pressuring the Chief Constable to arrest
a certain person or police a certain issue in a particular way.
To date, operational independence has not included setting the
general direction, targets or budget of a police force, which
has been the remit of the Police Authority. In our view, this
is a sensible and tested balance. It protects policing from politicisation;
gives latitude for responsive, proportionate policing; and presents
appropriate challenges to the Chief Constable.
Potential flashpoints
10. There is greater potential for conflict
and impasse within the new model. Will it be the Commissioner's
right to be able to insist on a course of action, even if this
is contrary to the advice of the Chief Constable? Will it be the
right of Chief Constables to resist such pressure if, in their
view, it jeopardises public safety?
11. To illustrate a possible situation where
conflict could arise, a Police Commissioner may run an election
campaign that promises a substantial increase in the numbers of
police officers "on the beat". A Chief Constable may
argue that, in order to provide a comprehensive and resilient
policing service (including protective services, anti-terrorism,
roads policing, serious crime investigation, protecting vulnerable
people etc), the force will be unable to meet the Commissioner's
campaign promise.
12. With the elected Commissioner under
pressure to honour their manifesto pledges, the relationship between
the political and the professional may, in this kind of circumstance,
become adversarial—a battle of wills, and a test of whether
a popular mandate trumps operational independence.
13. How this kind of conflict would be resolved
is uncertain. Stress testing based on potential conflict scenarios
may help to identify potential flash-points and establish how
the impact of serious and irreconcilable disagreement might be
managed within the new accountability structures.
Decision making frameworks
14. We believe that the public must have
a say on strategic policing priorities beyond the elections themselves
and recommend that the mechanisms used by Police Authorities to
set strategic plans be continued by Commissioners. The Chief Constable
should propose a three year strategy, policing priorities and
targets based on his or her professional, operational outlook.
It should then be for the Commissioner to ensure that this plan
takes into account public opinion and budget considerations. Commissioners
and Chief Constables should be required to make their decisions
(and provide evidence to support them) in the public domain.
The role of political parties
15. There is another new relationship that
will arise from the creation of Police and Crime Commissioners
which also merits consideration. Recent comments by the Policing
Minister suggest that there will be no support provided to independent
members of the public who would like to stand as a candidate for
Commissioner. This leaves the way clear for political parties
to dominate these elections by virtue of their experience in campaigning
and their substantial resources. Members of the public without
a mainstream political alignment will struggle to compete against
organisations built and funded expressly to win elections.
16. Should mainstream political party candidates
come to dominate as the evidence suggests they might, it follows
that we should assess the future role and influence of political
party headquarters in policing. What influence might party officials
have over Commissioners—and thus Chief Constables—across
the country?
THE EXTENT
TO WHICH
THERE WILL
STILL BE
A NEED
FOR NATIONAL
TARGETS
The public and the national picture
17. A survey of 1,854 randomly selected
residents conducted by Surrey Police Authority in late 2008/early
2009 indicated limited public enthusiasm for national targets.
Commissioners will be in the business of popularity and this evidence
suggests that adherence to national targets will by no means win
votes. Of far greater importance is tackling local issues.
18. However, we must also consider whether
communities would continue to need national data for comparative
purposes. On one hand, such national comparisons necessitate the
collection of a substantial amount of data which must then be
audited to ensure validity. On the other hand, local people may
accept this bureaucratic burden if it helps them to understand
whether the performance of their Commissioner, Chief Constable
& police force is good, average or below average relative
to other areas.
Where next for central government?
19. This is not the first time that a Home
Secretary has pledged to loosen their grip over policing. It is
perhaps the most ambitious attempt however. It seems logical that
a Police & Crime Commissioner, directly elected to run local
policing, will have a far stronger mandate to control local policing
and set targets than the Home Secretary. This would fundamentally
re-cast—and arguably diminish—the role of the Home
Secretary.
20. We would therefore be interested to
learn how the office of Home Secretary is to adapt to the new
model of police accountability.
21. We also seek more clarity on the role
of HMIC and its powers in the new model.
National priorities?
22. If central direction is to continue,
it may be better to have national priorities rather than national
targets and to place a duty on Commissioners (and Chief Constables)
to give consideration to those priorities when setting their local
strategies and targets. This would need underpinning by an accurate
and audited national set of performance data in order to assess
the extent of problems and compare areas.
23. To give a practical example of how this
might work: the Home Secretary might identify knife crime as a
national priority which all Commissioners and Chief Constables
must give consideration to in their planning processes. Where
a force has low levels of knife crime and it is not a public concern,
it would be justifiable not to set a local target which could
in fact unduly increase fear of crime. On the other hand, where
there is a high level of knife crime, the Home Secretary may expect
to see the Commissioner setting a local target for addressing
the problem.
THE ROLE
OF THE
POLICE AND
CRIME PANELS
Missed opportunity?
24. We believe that the limited role for
Police and Crime Panels set out in the Policing in the 21st Century
document represents a missed opportunity. Research with around
2,500 Surrey residents carried out over the summer indicates that
85% of respondents felt that the responsibility of overseeing
the police and holding the Chief Constable to account should be
held by a group of people. Just 8% felt that this responsibility
should belong in the hands of an individual.
25. However, under the terms set out in
the Government's proposals, rather than supporting the Commissioner
in making the right decisions for local people and providing the
checks and balances that come with making decisions as a group,
this Panel would simply add a layer of toothless bureaucracy.
Where the Panel could add real value
26. It would be a far better reflection
of public demand if this Panel was to have real power and to work
with the Commissioner—to be able to scrutinise before decisions
are made, not afterwards. This would encourage better decision-making
and provide more robust accountability.
27. A more influential Panel would also
assist with the workload of a Commissioner, ensuring that decisions
are made with due care in balancing the interests of local people
and policing needs. By having a Panel working with the PCC, this
would also avoid the potential for duplication of having to have
two sets of supporting staff and potentially calling the police
force into account twice for the same issue.
28. We are aware that by strengthening the
Police and Crime panels to support the PCC this will effectively
lead to a Police Authority with an elected Chair. However, we
feel that this would be a less disruptive way of providing a police
accountability mechanism that reflects what the public actually
want. There would be a democratically elected figurehead for people
to identify with. There would also be the balance of views and
additional scrutiny that Police Authorities provide.
29. In all of these proposals there has
been an assumption that Police Authorities do a bad job or are
not accountable. In fact a number of Police Authorities have been
inspected in the last couple of years and none were found to be
doing a "poor" job. Most were found to be performing
to acceptable levels and a handful—including Surrey—performing
well. By capturing and building on the best practice of those
performing well whilst improving visibility with an elected element
of the Authority, police governance could genuinely be improved.
October 2010
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