Memorandum submitted by the Northumbria
Police Authority
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1 Northumbria Police Authority (NPA) understand
that the main focus of this paper is to strengthen accountability
for policing to local communities. Our main priority is the safety
of communities, and in responding to this consultation paper,
that is our overarching consideration.
1.2 An overview from NPA is that we:
— a shift in emphasis from bureaucratic
accountability to democratic accountability;
— the rebalancing of the tripartite relationship;
— the commitment to local people being
safe and feeling safe, having a real say in how their streets
are policed and holding police to account locally; and
— agree that there is too much central
control, and welcome local freedoms and flexibilities.
— we are extremely disappointed and have
serious concerns that directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners
(PCCs) are seen as the answer to giving local people a greater
influence in the shaping and delivery of police services.
1.3 In summary we consider that there already
is democratic accountability through Police Authorities. The Police
Authority has the responsibility to ensure the provision of an
efficient and effective police service across the whole of Northumbria,
and this diverse group of people allows the Police Authority to
operate in an independent, fair and balanced way. Proposals to
introduce PCCs have raised many concerns amongst our own members,
other police authorities, the APA and local authorities. Our concerns
are listed fully in paragraph 3.3.
1.4 NPA would particularly wish to highlight
these three significant points:
1.Key constitutional changes are proposed in this
consultation paper that have not been subject to assessment or
consideration in the same manner as the constitutional changes
made by the 1964 Police Act, which was informed by a Royal Commission.
2.Proposals are being made for a system that has
not been tried and tested in the United Kingdom through the operation
of a time limited scheme.
3.The paper makes no reference to a corporate legal
entity or statutory body that the PCC will work within and which
will hold the budget, act as employer, and own the real property
necessary for the Chief Constable to deliver an effective policing
service. It also fails to identify the fundamental requirement
of the Chief Executive and/or Monitoring Officer role, a key role
introduced as part of the 1994 act to ensure propriety in the
use of powers.
2. STRUCTURE
OF RESPONSE
2.1 This response:
(i)Provides information on our concerns about the
introduction of directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners.
(ii)Identifies key challenges of visibility and accountability
by:
— outlining how Northumbria currently works
to improve visibility; and
— identifying proposals to improve accountability
including two models that the government could pilot.
3. DIRECTLY ELECTED
POLICE AND
CRIME COMMISSIONERS
3.1 Members of Northumbria Police Authority
have also raised the following issues and concerns about the proposals:
Accountability and Democratic issues
— Conflict over local priorities—the
proposal will create two electoral mandates on community safety
issues, one for local councillors and the other for the PCC.
— Confusion for local people—the
distinction between the roles of PCCs and democratically elected
councillors, could become unclear.
— Loss of representation—members
with different backgrounds and a wide range of experience and
expertise currently contribute to decision making; this would
be lost.
— Difficulty in delivering localism—in
Northumbria one person would represent the views and concerns
of 1.6 million people.
— Partnership working could be damaged—introducing
a PPC could undermine local councillors in their role as advocates
for local people and communities and break the link between crime
and disorder and related services. It also risks destabilising
successful working relationships between councils and the police.
— Precept issues—removing councillor
involvement would reduce ability to resolve conflicts with local
authorities over precept setting.
— The Police and Crime Panel's role—there
appears to be no real influence for the panel, this would dilute
the checks and balances and reduce accountability, not increase
it.
— Transition arrangements are unclear—there
will be a void and lack of accountability and impact on the appointment
of PCC for the first year, as a budget and plan will already have
been agreed for 2012?
— Local Engagement—councillors represent
local areas and talk to local people on a daily basis, how will
one PCC ensure ongoing local engagement?
— Reputational risk—confidence and
accountability of policing could be damaged through a perceived
conflict or complicity between Chief Constable and Police and
Crime Commissioner.
— Long term planning compromised—there
would be little scope for long term planning, particularly from
a financial perspective; with elections every four years, this
could result in changes to policing direction.
— Increase in bureaucracy—with the
additional cost and administration of another electoral process
(cost estimates are at around £50 million) could this money
instead not be better spent improving service?
Politicisation/Populism issues
— Politicising of policing—with candidates
potentially coming from political backgrounds and representing
single issues, geographical areas or extreme views impartiality
could be compromised.
— Loss of localism—as the PCC position
will be salaried, this may attract candidates who do not live
in the area and will sever local ties and representation.
— Lack of governance structures—the
PCC role removes the committee structure which ensures good governance,
impartiality and objectivity in decision making.
Probity and administrative law issues
— Polarisation of power with one person—this
could create the risk of ineffective and impartial allocation
of resources.
— Removal of Chief Executive and Monitoring
Officer—where will these roles be taken up, there is no
specified equivalent.
4. KEY CHALLENGES—VISIBILITY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY
4.1 Making Police Authorities more visible
There is an argument that the role identified
for PCCs in the consultation document mirrors what police authorities
are actually doing now, albeit with the issue of a lack of profile.
As mentioned earlier, NPA welcomes the introduction of local freedoms
and flexibilities and would consider that this ability to set
genuine local priorities and deliver more localised policing plans
strengthens local understanding of their role. The ministerial
foreword to the paper states "over time the role of central
government grew. As the number of police forces fell, police authorities
took on bigger areas. They have since become remote and invisible,
without the capability and the mandate to insist on the priorities
of local people". Increased freedoms and flexibilities will
ensure that authorities have this capability.
Northumbria Police Authority commissioned a
survey in 2005 and asked local residents how much, if anything,
they knew about the police authority and its role. In 2005, 55%
knew about the NPA.
As a consequence NPA have worked hard, through
a range of activity, to increase our profile and ensure that more
local people understand our role.
This includes:
— Stakeholder events involving partners
from local authorities, voluntary and community sector, businesses,
religious groups and other key stakeholders.
— Participatory budgeting events enabling
local community and voluntary sector groups to bid for, vote for
and run local community safety initiatives focusing on increasing
trust and confidence. (NPA were recognised in the APA Innovation
Awards for this work).
— "On the road" meetings (full
authority meetings) are held across the authority area involving
local communities and schools, bringing decision making into local
communities.
— A "Trust Us" campaign to ensure
that local people understand the role and responsibility of the
authority and "How to get involved leaflets" are distributed
to libraries and public buildings across the authority area.
— Development of a Young People's Police
Authority, which mirrors the work of the full authority and links
with the existing youth assemblies in the authority area.
— Use of a grant pool to provide innovative
local community safety solutions through Community Safety Partnerships.
In a local policing survey in 2010, 88% of residents
knew about NPA.
4.2 Making police authorities more accountable
We should build on the success of our current
independent, fair and transparent model rather than radically
change the structure. A change to structure would potentially
lead to further confusion and actually detract from the overall
ambitions of the coalition government.
Currently elected councillors:
— bring democratic legitimacy and are answerable
to the community at large, as well as their own local area;
— are well known to their communities;
— represent and advocate for local people
over a range of services;
— have an awareness of local communities;
and
— provide a strong link between local authorities
and the police authority.
The independent members bring a wealth of different
experience and skills.
When discussing the potential appointment,
by the Home Secretary of Police Authority Chairmen in the Police
and Magistrates Court Bill 1994—Lord Callaghan argued that
"democracy does not just consist of electing a national parliament
once every five years. We all know that the strength of democracy
comprises a web of local institutions and local bodies made up
of people serving in different ways, not necessarily elected".
The current mix of democratically elected councillors
and independent members allows the police authority to have a
strategic overview and secure an effective and efficient police
service with a mandate from local communities. We suggest that
the key to improved local accountability, trust and confidence
is to further enhance the relationship between the local authority
and the police authority, which would otherwise be lost by the
appointment of a PCC.
To achieve this within the current structure
we suggest that:
— councillors retain the majority of seats
on the police authority; and
— the accountability and transparency of
police authorities to the electorate could be strengthened by
linking the democratic legitimacy of the councillors on the authority
to the "chair"—in other words, by requiring that
police authorities are chaired by an elected local authority member.
Alternatively Northumbria Police Authority would
like to propose that there are two possible models that could
be considered as part of the consultation process. Both would
increase visibility, strengthen local accountability and the tri-partite
arrangement and ensure that local people are safe and feel safe.
The models are outlined below and attached at
Appendix A.
Model 1—Independent Police Board (Northumbria
Police Authority would be happy to pilot this model.)
Local councilors and independent members setting
the strategic direction for policing, with local priorities and
budgets, and holding police to account for performance.
Model 2—Directly Elected Police and
Crime Commissioner with Board of Commissioners
Directly elected Police and Crime Commissioner
supported by a "cabinet" style Board of Commissioners
with local councillors appointed by the Joint Committee, and independent
members to add diversity and a range of experience.
October 2010
Appendix A
MODEL 1
INDEPENDENT POLICE BOARD
PURPOSE OF
MODEL
— Reconnects police and the people.—
Emphasis on democratic not bureaucratic accountability.
— Strengthens the tri-partite arrangement.
— Commits to local people being safe and
feeling safe, having a say in policing and holding police to account
locally.
DEFINITION
"Independent Police Board"—sets
strategic direction for policing, with local priorities, budgets
and holds police to account for performance.
STRUCTURE OF
INDEPENDENT POLICE
BOARD
— Chair of Police Board (a local councillor)
takes the title "Police and Crime Commissioner".
— A statutory requirement would ensure
that the selection of Police and Crime Commissioner would be made
by members of the Independent Police Board.
— Councillor and independent members are
"Assistant Police and Crime Commissioners".
FUNCTION
— Strategic-sets local priorities and budgets
and holds police force to account and actively promotes the role
and impact of the board within communities.
DELIVERS IMPROVEMENTS
— Local people reassured of independence
from police forces.
— Increased visibility as communities can
easily identify and understand "job titles".
— Capacity for everyday/ongoing local engagement
with communities.
— Local communities confident that key
decisions are objective and subject to scrutiny.
— Democratic accountability/mandate through
local councillor representation.
— Collective not individual responsibility
for strategic decisions.
— Wide range of perspectives in decision
making with independent/councillor membership.
— Robust long term planning with continuity
of experience.
— Strong relationships with local councils.
— Supported by a corporate legal entity
ensuring propriety of use of power.
— Strengthens the tri-partite arrangement.
MODEL 2
DIRECTLY ELECTED COMMISSIONER WITH BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS
PURPOSE OF
MODEL
— Reconnects police and the people.—
Emphasis on democratic not bureaucratic accountability.
— Strengthens the tri-partite arrangement.
— Commits to local people being safe and
feeling safe, having a say in policing and holding police to account
locally.
DEFINITION
A directly elected Police and Crime Commissioner
supported by a "cabinet" style Board of Assistant Commissioners
with co-decision powers on strategy, budgets and precept, performance
issues. Local councillors appointed by the Joint Committee and
independent members adding diversity and range of experience.
STRUCTURE DIRECTLY
ELECTED POLICE
AND CRIME
COMMISSIONER
— Directly elected commissioner, supported
by a Board of Commissioners.
— Board structure to be a majority of local
councillors (appointed on a proportional basis by the joint committee)
and appointed/co-opted independent members/magistrates.
FUNCTION
— Strategic-sets local priorities and budgets
and holds police force to account.
DELIVERS IMPROVEMENTS
— Direct democratic accountability/mandate
through directly elected commissioner.
— Local people aware of independence from
police forces.
— Increased visibility as communities vote
for commissioner.
— Capacity for everyday/ongoing local engagement
with communities by board.
— Collective not individual responsibility
for strategic decisions.
— Local communities confident that key
decisions are objective and subject to scrutiny.
— Wide range of perspectives in decision
making with independent/councillor membership.
— Robust long term planning with continuity
of experience.
— Retains relationships with local councils.
— Supported by a corporate legal entity
ensuring propriety of use of power.
— Strong tri-partite arrangement.
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