Memorandum submitted by Staffordshire
Police Authority
1. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
1.1 The Staffordshire Police Authority (SPA)
believes that the current proposals for Police and Crime Commissioners
(PCCs) require a great deal of further consideration before they
can be regarded as viable. There are constitutional, legal, operational
and financial issues which remain unaddressed.
1.2 These issues extend to the root of the
proposals, not only about the legal status and role of the PCCs,
their accountability and the apparent lack of any effective check
or balance for the enormous power and responsibility a PCC will
carry; but also about the deliverability of an entirely new structure
which will both cost more and carry the risk of reduced operational
effectiveness in some very vulnerable areas of policing.
1.3 We believe that the subject is so important
that the current haste of its pursuit is contrary to the best
interests of the provision of effective policing for our communities
in the future. It should not be proceeded with without better
public debate and the proper and measured consideration of firm
and well-thought through proposals, and costings, elements which
remain lacking in what has been put forward by the Home Secretary
at the present time.
1.4 The case for reform of policing governance
has not been made anywhere in the document and we would strongly
challenge the assertion that there is a need to reconnect the
Police with the people. The public are not crying out for reform
to the way the service is governed. In such austere times, the
emphasis should be on delivering the same (or more) with less,
and not using those finite resources on unnecessary and unproven
changes to governance structures.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 SPA has responded to the Home Secretary's
Consultation Paper "Policing in the 21st Century: connecting
Police and the People". SPA commented on the consultation
questions asked by the Home Office and, separately, on a wide
range of other matters not within the formal consultation questions
but which we felt were so fundamental or so significant that the
Home Secretary should be aware of them.
2.2 Those documents are already with the
Home Office and we ask the Committee to have regard to what we
said in those documents and to take them into account. Further
copies can be supplied if that would assist the Committee.
2.3 SPA is aware that the Association of
Police Authorities (APA) will be making a separate submission
to the Committee on behalf of all police authorities. We support
the concerns which the APA has expressed.
2.4 This submission responds first to the
four particular matters in which the Committee have expressed
interest as set out in the four bullet points in the web statement
of 15 September 2010, and then addresses some other issues of
concern.
3. THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN CHIEF
CONSTABLES AND
ELECTED POLICE
AND CRIME
COMMISSIONERS
3.1 PCCs will be directly elected by local
communities every four years. No matter how carefully the role
of the PCC is defined, a natural human trait will be for a PCC
to want to be seen to deliver on his/her promises made to the
electorate at the time of election. The "drive" behind
a PCC will surely to be do so ahead of any other dimension to
the role.
3.2 The Government's stated intention is
that PCCs will replace police authorities and have all the same
wide ranging roles and responsibilities (to which we return later).
Our fear is that in delivering visibility to local communities
and on his/her electoral promises, the PCC will prioritise what
can be seen by communities at the expense of the less visible
elements of policing such as protective services, which are just
as fundamental to community safety.
3.3 Chief Constables (CCs) will undoubtedly
continue to give proper attention and consideration to the protective
services dimensions of policing. Our concern is that—despite
the proposal to require the PCC to work with the CC to deliver
the protective services element, the protective services element
will be forced into a somewhat lesser role. Even if the Home Secretary
has reserve powers, they will presumably be a matter of last resort.
It seems to be a recipe for conflict where the directly elected
PCC naturally (and perhaps politically) wishes the CC to prioritise
visible local policing at the expense of protective services (eg
counter-terrorism, vulnerable people) and puts the CC under great
pressure to do so, to the detriment of the CC's wide-ranging other
duties and responsibilities. The absence of any effective powers
or teeth for the Policing and Crime Panels (PCP)s magnifies this
risk.
4. HOW WILL
OPERATIONAL INDEPENDENCE
BE DEFINED?
4.1 A cornerstone of the delivery of policing
in the UK has been the operational independence of Chief Constables.
The historic foundation for the role of the Police will already
be well-known to the Committee.
4.2 Our view is that that safeguard should
not lightly be compromised for short-term political expediency
and that CCs and Forces should retain unfettered operational independence
so that they are not constrained by anyone in relation to the
proper enforcement of the law.
4.3 As soon as any change is made to the
triumvirate relationship created under the Police Act 1996 which
affects or undermines operational independence, there is a risk
that CCs or Forces will become increasingly subject to political
and other influences.
4.4 We would urge the Committee to make
the strongest representations about safeguarding the current position
rather than bringing the office of constable (whether chief or
any other rank) under some form of political or
quasi political influence or control. There is a
huge difference between accountability (which is right and proper)
and control or influence, which in relation to operational independence,
are not.
4.5 As an Authority, we would advocate that
operational independence should also mean that the CC and Force
remain unconstrained by, for example, the suggested addition of
a new corporate legal status for the CC in a way which enables
the CC/Force to own property, enter into contracts in their own
name and so on. Operational independence means leaving the office
holder to fulfil the functions for which that independence is
conferred, uncompromised by administrative and other burdens creating
the potential for conflict of interest.
5. THE EXTENT
TO WHICH
THERE REMAINS
A NEED
FOR NATIONAL
TARGETS
5.1 The need to remove the overbearing and
over-prescriptive targets imposed by the Home Office in the past
is supported—provided it actually happens and is not replaced
by, as the Paper puts it, "targets in disguise". This
promise has been made before but did not actually happen when
the last Home Secretary promised a reduction in centrally-imposed
data requirements or targets through APACS, as the Home Office
then required forces to provide the same information anyway "for
national recording purposes". Unless there is a much clearer
and definitive commitment by the Home Secretary and the Home Office
and HMIC to reduce the panoply of targets currently imposed on
PAs and CCs, it is unlikely to happen in the way proposed.
5.2 Phrases in the Consultation Paper such
as "Ensuring data is still available to local people"
and "Value for Money Profiles that provide rich comparative
data" also suggest that until we know what data is still
to be required by the Home Secretary for this purpose, the promise
of "cutting bureaucracy imposed by Whitehall" will remain
unfulfilled.
5.3 Government will continue to want consistent
data at national level to support Government obligations to account
to Parliament and the "people" for policing performance
viewed nationally (for example the British Crime Survey). It is
not possible yet to know whether the promised reduction in data
assembly requirements and centrally-prescribed targets will actually
be meaningful, but it is accepted that a small number of national
indicators will be essential to Government's needs.
5.4 Our fear is that the Home Secretary,
the Home Office, HMIC and external auditors will (despite promises
to the contrary) all want to use even a small number of national
indicators (and more if the data was collected) as an overarching
performance measurement tool for comparing Forces and PAs (or
PCCs). This effectively restores a hierarchy of "back door"
targets ((eg) "you must strive to be in the top quartile
nationally|") which are both unnecessary and which fail to
recognise the local variances, characteristics, nuances and problems
of different areas
5.5 Forces should have the freedom to maintain
the data they believe to be necessary to inform their communities
about their performance, how well (or otherwise) they are performing,
delivering best value and to show that they have taken communities'
views into account in how they plan to deliver—and do deliver.
Setting targets and monitoring performance at local level remains
a priority element of the work of a PA (or PCC) and should clearly
continue to be so. They should not be superimposed with additional
targets by Government or its agencies.
5.6 Local accountability would be better
served if the functions of the PA or PCC were not forcibly overlaid
by nationally-driven targets or data-collection obligations, unless
clearly and publicly justified by a Government which publicly
accepts that the additional burden is of their creation.
6. THE ROLE
OF THE
POLICE AND
CRIME PANELS
6.1 The principle of retaining the knowledge
and skills of independent members is welcome as is the continuance
of links to local councils through councillor involvement in actively
scrutinising the PCCs.
6.2 The Consultation Paper is silent about
what legal status the PCPs will have, what duties and powers they
will have, how they will be constituted and how they will be supported.
If PCPs are to be anything more than a token nod in the direction
of making PCCs accountable somewhere, PCPs will also have to be
appointed through some form of democratically accountable process.
6.3 The Consultation Paper includes no reference
as to the formation or composition of the PCPs. There is a strong
case—if PCCs are really to absorb the whole range of duties
and responsibilities of PAs into a single individual—for
the PCPs to comprise members drawn from the relevant local authorities
alongside independent members to form an effective scrutiny body,
and "check and balance" to the PCC, and to be given
"teeth" to do so. This of course looks like a PA in
its current form.
6.4 If PCPs have no meaningful legal powers,
they are effectively toothless and will not be any kind of "check
and balance" to the apparently unfettered powers of the individual
PCC. The apparent power of a PCP to require a referendum on a
proposed precept seems so unlikely (on cost, timing, political
and practicality grounds as well as other constitutional aspects)
as to be almost unworkable and thus probably of no real value.
6.5 If PCPs are to have no meaningful powers
the Committee may want to question why they are being created
at all. The skills, knowledge and influence of PA members could
have been a valuable asset to an incoming PCP to scrutinise PCCs
to better effect, but only if they have meaningful powers.
6.6 There remains, however, room for debate
about the need for an a-political body to counteract the probability
that the PCP will be a political nominee and thus have a political
agenda, (again, see below).
7. THE CONSTITUTIONAL
STATUS OF
PCCS
7.1 The current PCP proposals seem an assault
on the constitutional bastion of democratic accountability in
one of the most vulnerable areas of public life. Whilst directly
elected PCCs will legally have to be a corporation sole, we can
think of no comparable office-holder exercising legal powers and
responsibilities in a non-personal capacity who cannot be removed
from office between elections through a democratically-based process.
A Secretary ofState can be removed by a decision of the relevant
House—a Bishop can be removed by the General Synod—but
a PCC can apparently only be removed for serious misconduct and
then only with the involvement of the IPCC which is neither elected
nor democratically accountable.
7.2 The constitutional checks and balances
democratically constraining the PCCs between elections are fundamentally
deficient. The powers available to the PCPs must be far more rigorous
and include the power of removal even if constrained by robust
criteria to prevent abuse.
8. WILL PCCS
ADDRESS THE
DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT?
8.1 The widely-acknowledged low turnout
for local elections is also acknowledged to carry the risk—sometimes
realised—of single-issue and/or minority extremist candidates
getting elected. The spectre has been raised in many quarters
of the BNP or EDL reaching the PCC role through the ballot box,
which could be a total embarrassment for Forces given the task
of policing their activities.
8.2 The cost of elections if not timed in
with local elections would be a major burden on the public purse
and ill-considered in the context of national financial hardships.
If the elections of PCCs are to be truly open to "candidates
from a wide range of backgrounds" (and thus presumably out
of the sole grasp of the major political parties), then funding
from the national purse for all candidates, to support this objective
would be a further burden.
8.3 If costs are to be reduced, it is likely
to leave the election of PCCs within the political party arena
which in turn leaves open the strong possibility that the election
of a PCC halfway through the Parliamentary term could produce
a PCC from a different political party than the Government. Is
this what Government desire for an officer-holder with such unfettered
and unaccountable powers?
8.4 The SPA area of Staffordshire and Stoke
on Trent is covered by 17 PA members. With a population of 1.2
million, and an area of 1085 square miles, members cannot always
fulfil the representational expectations of the communities of
the PA's area. One individual cannot effectively represent a million
plus people and actively engage with them. How can one individual
actively engage at partnership level across such a large and diversely
populated geographical constituency and make a valued and valuable
contribution?
9. WOULD THERE
BE A
BETTER WAY
IF THE
OPTION OF
SIMPLY IMPROVING
WHAT WE
HAVE NOW
IS UNACCEPTABLE
TO GOVERNMENT?
9.1 In our view, the answer is "yes".
A directly-elected Chair of a PA—using the template of the
precedent of directly-elected Mayors from local authorities in
the Local Government Act 2000—would enable the legal status
of the PA as a legal body to be retained, but would ensure that
its Chair had direct accountability to the electorate without
the extreme unfettered position of the PCC in the current proposals.
9.2 The record of directly- elected Mayors
has been mixed. However, the tradition of PAs has been largely
a-political (unlike local authorities) and a directly-elected
Chair and PA with its current membership may well be more effective
and resilient in facing the many challenges that face policing
in the coming years.
October 2010
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