Supplementary memorandum submitted by
the Association of Police Authorities
Whilst not wishing to change or resubmit our
written and aural evidence, we are grateful for the opportunity
to provide the Committee with some factual information which will
hope to answer the questions they posed at the session on 19th.
This information was either too detailed for presentation at the
session or beyond the scope of our formal written submission.
Rt Hon Keith Vaz MP, Chair: How did the APA arrive
at a cost of £100 million for the introduction of PCCs?
POLICE GOVERNANCE
CHANGE PROGRAMME:
COST, BENEFITS,
RISKS, UNCERTAINTIES
A REPORT PREPARED
BY BOXWOOD
CONSULTANTS, SEPTEMBER
2010
— This report examined the relative costs
of a "do nothing" option—the current Police Authority
structure, a "minimum change" suggestion, and the Home
Office model (direct Election of a Police and Crime Commissioner
in each of 43 force areas). The summary figures assumed for each
of these possible scenarios are presented at the end of this briefing
at Appendix A.
FINDINGS
— The total cost differential between the
current structure and 43 DPC elections is £101 million. This
is in essence the removal of over 600 police from the front line.
— The Home Office's new proposed structure
will have a cost of £453 million—based on current assumptions
(These include the Home Office range of structure costs: £440
million-£574 million, and our calculation that the elections
for Commissioners will cost £1.47 per elector).
— The cost of the "do minimum"
suggestion is £417 million.
— The net present cost differential is:
£86 million (at 3.5% discount).
— The main differential costs between the
three alternative scenarios are:
— 4 yearly election £64 million.
— 4 yearly transition costs £12 million
(redundancy/recruit of team and chief/council tax changes).
— Policy and parliamentary £1 million
(Home Office team and Police Authority costs).
— Operational costs £24 million (complaints/uncharged
services/town hall meetings).
ASSUMPTIONS AND
EVIDENCE BASE
— Cost over the five years from 2011-12
to 2015-16 of the current Police Authority structure, as evidenced
from present costings is £352 million (only one election
in this period).
— Costings are predicated on a five year
period: 2011-16. This period was chosen because it includes one
election and the transition year.
— The first elections are taken as May
2012 (when 20% of areas have scheduled elections).
— Election Costs are assumed at £1.47
per elector (this reflects evidence presented by electoral registration
officers in Devon and Cornwall, West Sussex, Hampshire and the
assumptions of the Electoral Commission):
— Hampshire's estimate based on responses
from electoral officers throughout Hampshire was approximately
£2 million on a elector population of about 1.1m (spend of
£1.80 per elector).
— West Sussex estimate about £1.2
million spend (if the elections all occur in parallel with local
government elections) on an electorate of about 0.6 million (spend
of £2.00 per elector).
— Devon and Cornwall calculated £1.9
million on a police authority spend of £1.5 million and 1.0
million electorate (election spend of £1.90 per elector).
— The Electoral Commission report for 2008-09
is unclear on direct comparison but clearly states that preferential
voting systems will cost more than FPTP.
— Evidence from Scotland suggests that
using more complex voting procedures will increase the cost substantially.
— According to the Council concerned, the
most recent borough-wide election for a single individual in the
UK (for a Directly Elected Mayor of the London Borough of Tower
Hamlets) cost £4.11 per elector.
— The overall additional average cost of
a Directly Elected Police Commissioner, per elector (less registration)=
£3.02 less £1.55 (the cost of existing police authorities)
ie £1.47 per elector.
— UK electoral statistics 2009 (ONS) state
the electorate to be 40 million.
— 40 million electors x £1.47, divided
by the cost of an officer (£40,000) = 1,400 beat police officers.
— Other costs are taken as Salaries, Allowances,
Accommodation, Other Overheads, Transition (The Home Office, APA,
Authorities), Policy change costs, Legal costs of TUPE and changes
to contracts.
— Other potential cost risks include:
— Reissuing council tax bills.
— New legal costs of transferring contracts.
— Increased likelihood of sacking of the
Chief Constables and consequent payments.
— Political appointments of staff could
result in increased HR cost.
— Increased complaints and private office
costs.
— More communication and PR.
— Change in the electoral franchise (eg
16 year olds voting).
Aiden Burley MP: The 2007 Casey Cabinet Office
review revealed that only 7% of the public knew about police authorities.
Why are the public so unaware of your members' existence?
This issue of a perceived lack of visibility
and accessibility, found four years ago, appears to be a key principle
behind the government's reform proposals. The APA would question
the government's perception of the level of public awareness on
the basis of many local surveys. To take just two examples:
— A local policing survey across the Northumbria
police authority area in 2010 revealed that 88% of residents were
aware of the authority.
— A 2010 public survey undertaken by police
authorities in Wales found that 97% of respondents had heard of
police authorities and 82% understood what a police authority
does.
Aiden Burley MP: Is the APA's proposed "alternative
model" for governance not simply the same police authority
system with the addition of a PCC?
— The APA has not proposed a like for like
or "one size fits all" model—it recognizes that
there are considerable differences between areas and believes
that it would be sensible for the Government's proposals to reflect
this variety.
THE INDEPENDENT
BASIS FOR
THE PRINCIPLES
BEHIND OUR
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE
MODELS
— The APA's alternative model is also built
on the findings of independent qualitative research carried out
by IPSOS MORI designed to explore public perceptions of police
governance structures, and more specifically who the public feel
should hold the Police to account.
— The research took place in four Police
Force regions across England and Wales during the week commencing
23 August 2010. One workshop took place in each of four Police
Force areas. Workshops were deliberative in nature and were designed
to allow participants to explore different options, including
those proposed in the "Policing in the 21st Century—Reconnecting
Police and the People"[1]
consultation paper.
— The full report from IPSOS MORI is attached
at Appendix B (not printed).
— This research revealed some public appetite
for a visible figurehead for police accountability, but opposition
to accountability being vested in just one individual.
— The research clearly showed that there
is a general desire for greater visibility in police accountability.
Participants felt a sense of reassurance in knowing the Police
were currently and would continue to be held to account, and as
such they wanted to be made more aware of any future model of
governance.
— This translated into a strong preference
for a visible and named figurehead for police accountability in
each area. Participants thought that this figurehead should not
only provide an element of visibility, but should also be a symbol
of transparency and independence.
— Indeed, the need for independence was
a particular focus for participants throughout discussions. Firstly,
there was strong feeling that the role of a figurehead could not
be carried out by someone with an obvious political allegiance.
Secondly, it was felt that the role of the Police themselves in
accountability needed to maintain a balance between ensuring their
experience and expertise is maximised, while not allowing them
to appear self-regulating in any sense. The role of the Chief
Constable was seen to be of great importance as providing a crucial
link between Police Forces and the individual or body holding
the Police to account.
— Despite participants having a strong
preference for a local "figurehead", only a minority
of participants wanted an individual who would be solely responsible
for holding the Police to account. The most common preferences
for where responsibility should fall were either through a structure
similar to that currently in place, or through a named-individual
plus a scrutiny panel. Participants favouring this latter option
envisaged that a scrutiny panel would work alongside a figurehead
in both an advisory and scrutiny role.
— Interestingly, the desire for visibility
and transparency did not necessarily translate into support for
greater democratic involvement. Factors, such as a preconceived
cynicism towards any Government devolving responsibility, and
a questioning of the knowledge base on which an electorate would
begin to decide who should take responsibility, made participants
question this. For example, concerns were raised about possible
divisive or corrupt candidates and as such there were calls for
stringent vetting processes should it be decided that elections
should take place. Participants also raised concerns about the
cost burden of a formal election process.
— There was also a general consensus that
those with relevant experience and expertise could be trusted
to make suitable appointments for commissioner or panel roles.
What mattered more to participants in terms
of lay involvement would include:
— being able to feedback their experiences
and opinions on crime in their local area to Police Officers through
regular meetings, which those holding the Police to account would
attend;
— making sure community members are in
some way represented on an advisory or scrutiny panel, possibly
through a process of election; and
— making sure the voices of key lay individuals
are included in decision-making. This included groups such as
victims of crime and young people.
The preferred structure looks on paper very
similar to that currently in place, with a collective of expert
panel members responsible for key decisions. However, what is
notable is the support for the inclusion of a figurehead who is
visible to the public.
— Alongside the preference for lay involvement
in the advisory and scrutiny panel, participants felt the inclusion
of experts was important. However, how this would look was not
so clear cut. Certainly, there was a strong resistance to the
involvement of politicians, and in some respects this translated
to local councillors, though opinions were mixed. Some participants
felt the inclusion of those from the business community would
be beneficial given the business and financial acumen they could
bring.
— The figurehead would exert any powers,
such as determining budgets or setting local priorities, through
a process of negotiation with the advisory panel and Chief Constable
of a force area.
— Finally, participants were on the whole
supportive of another layer of governance to oversee those holding
the police to account, and there was a feeling that Her Majesty's
Inspectorate of Constabulary would, as they currently do, be best
placed to do this.
— The full text of the APA's suggested
alternative models, as informed by MORI's work, is detailed below:
THE APA'S
PRINCIPLES FOR
ALTERNATIVE MODELS
As submitted to the Home Office consultation
"Policing in the 21st Century", September 2010.
The APA has developed a range of proposals relating
to the "form and functions" of the government's proposed
model.
1. Critical to the issue of tripartite rebalancing
is that budgets, audit, estates and other assets must remain within
the purview of the governance body and this will also avoid the
need for unnecessary expenditure relating to the transfer of contracts.
Reducing local accountability by allowing budgets to be held by
the Chief Constable instead of those who represent the public
is not only an abrogation of responsibility but also introduces
a complexity into the relationship that will only lead to confusion.
2. In addition, there are certain functions currently
under the direction and control of chief constables, which may
be more effective and independent if managed by the governance
body, for example, professional standards, performance analysis,
and information provision. This would appear logical in enabling
the PCC to fulfill their five key functions effectively, and would
not represent additional cost.
3. Where duties are placed on PCCs there is a
need for reciprocal duties to ensure the cooperation of the Chief
Constable.
4. We recommend that a detailed appeals process
is developed to ensure transparency to the public in the case
of Chief Constable dismissals.
5. Ensuring the correct balance and relationship
between the Commissioner and the PCP is fundamental in ensuring
that the balance between the Commissioner and the chief constable
is such that the PCC has sufficient power to undertake their five
primary functions. On the basis that consistency of function nationally
delivered through locally determined arrangements is paramount,
we offer two options below. These options are predicated on the
fact that good governance starts with a body corporate and that
appointments to governance bodies should be made on Nolan Principles.[2]
The directly elected PCC should serve
as head of the PCP with a requirement to carry the vote of the
panel on key issues rather than merely seeking its advice. We
would advise that these key issues are budget, policing plan and
appointment of Chief Constable. This would mitigate the risk of
vesting substantial public functions in a single individual.
Local authorities (joint committees
where appropriate) and the PCC working together would agree membership
of the Police and Crime Panel which the PCC would chair. The panel
would be comprised of both local councillors (in accordance with
political proportionality) and independent members, but the specific
details of the structure would be decided locally.
Enabling the PCC to appoint a deputy
and assistant commissioners within their office to create resilience,
ensure appropriate local representation and create a forum for
the exchange of ideas and advice. A separate Police and Crime
Panel would be selected (in accordance with political proportionality)
through local authorities. The PCP would provide the scrutiny
function of the Commissioner and act as a consultee in relation
to the five key functions of the Commissioner. If the PCP is to
truly act as an independent check on the PCC then the recruitment
and selection of individuals comprising the body should be independent
of the PCC.
In relation to elements of the procedural issues
surrounding elections and transition we would recommend the following:
6. It is proposed that the new arrangements are
fully costed and then assessed against the perceived benefits
of the proposals.
7. In order to reduce the costs of election of
PCCs they should be staggered so that they take place when the
majority of local elections take place in each force area.
8. The Government should consider the funding
mechanism required to ensure equality of opportunity amongst all
candidates.
9. As per serving members of the force becoming
independent members of police authorities, the same four year
moratorium on retiring police officers standing for election as
PCC should be introduced. Mechanisms are required to allow consideration
of the suitability of candidates for a post of this nature.
10. We would urge consideration of delaying implementation
until 2014 which would at least allow for the anticipated reductions
in service to be implemented without the unnecessary disruption
of structural change during this period.
11. Effective arrangements for transition from
existing police authorities to Police and Crime Commissioners
is critical. If elections are held in May 2012 we would propose
that the new Commissioners do not fully take the helm until the
following budget and planning period.
12. The role of existing police authority staff
will be indispensable in ensuring effective transition. We are
concerned that police authorities risk losing experienced staff
at a local and national level leading up to proposed changes in
2012 and recommend that the Home Office make a statement of intent
in relation to protection of existing staff in the transition
process.
13. Strategic continuity is inherent in the current
system through the gradual rollover of membership of police authorities.
The potential stop/start transfer from one PCC to another would
undermine the investment needed around long-term planning identified
by HMIC and we recommend that continuity is ensured within the
proposed model.
14. The initially established Police and Crime
Panel should be comprised primarily of existing police authority
members to enable effective transition.
Rt Hon Keith Vaz MP: Has the South West implemented
plans for joint procurement of uniforms yet?
UPDATE ON
THE SOUTH
WEST COLLABORATION
PROGRAMME
— The uniforms issue, understandably the
focus of the Committees' attention, is best viewed as one aspect
of the South West Regional Collaboration Programme, overseen by
the Police Authorities Joint Committee (PAJC).
— Last year successful regional initiatives
on collaboration included cash savings on vehicles, telecommunications
and recruitment advertising and operational improvements in areas
such as counter-terrorism, covert policing, firearms, automatic
number plate recognition (ANPR) and kidnap and extortion. A Regional
Asset Recovery Team was fully established.
— The 2010-11 programme business plan focuses
on the adoption of a regional Serious Organised Crime Lead Force
model, steps towards regional ICT convergence and shared procurement
and the achievement of a common set of uniform and equipment by
2012.
— At its last meeting, PAJC commissioned
a feasibility study for moving to a single ICT Department for
the South West, linked to the national ISIS (Information Services
Improvement Strategy) programme.
— Corporate Services across the South West
have recently undergone a benchmarking exercise to consider how
best to move processes and structures in HR and Finance toward
the current lowest cost base. The PAJC will review progress towards
this in early in 2011.
— The next PAJC meeting (November) will
select an external supplier to assist four authorities to establish
an in-house shared service for procurement.
REALISED AND
PROJECTED SAVINGS
FROM THE
SOUTH WEST
COLLABORATION PROGRAMME
(FOR MORE
DETAILS, PLEASE
SEE THE
ATTACHED APPENDIX
C)
Cash savings achieved to date (these are mostly
ongoing year on year savings):
— Recruitment advertising £25,000
per annum.
— Telecoms Procurement £150,000 per
annum.
— Transport Procurement £147,000 per
annum.
— Uniform Procurement £10,000 per
annum.
Cash savings in the pipeline:
— Procurement shared service £5 million
per annum.
— Telephone SPOC Shared Service £250,000
per annum.
— Firearms Training Service c £10
million capital plus £150,000 per annum revenue.
UNIFORM AND
EQUIPMENT—PROGRESS
TOWARDS JOINT
PROCUREMENT
— Autumn 2008: The five Chief Constables
and Chairs in the region agreed in principle to move towards a
common standard of uniform and equipment. A detailed assessment
identified opportunities to rationalise specifications and reduce
variation.
— Throughout 2009: Practitioner workshops
held to identify the best options to improve interoperability
and provide value for money.
— May 2010: Recommended options for standardisation
of uniform by 2012 agreed.
— June 2010: The five Chief Constables
expressed their preference for a regional catalogue of items from
which each Force could choose its favoured option—effectively
a commonality of choice rather than a common uniform.
The five Chairs accepted that the use of a regional
catalogue represented a pragmatic way forward in the circumstances,
but were disappointed that after two years of work, it had not
been possible to embark on a more ambitious programme of standardisation.
This disappointment was a catalyst for introducing fundamental
changes to the governance arrangements underpinning future police
collaboration in the South West.
NEW GOVERNANCE
STRUCTURE
— August 2010: Following a dialogue involving
the five Chairs and Chief Constables, the South West Police Authority
Joint Committee (PAJC) agreed to a radical overhaul of the arrangements
for overseeing the collaborative arrangements to facilitate swifter
and better informed decision-making.
— September 2010: Introduction of a Lead
Force model to strengthen accountability and the appointment of
a Programme Co-ordinator.
The Lead Force approach to the Programme means
that individual Chief Constables will now be held accountable
for specific work streams by project boards within their own Police
Authority. The Police Authorities' Joint Committee agreed that
six specific Tier 1 business areas will be progressed under the
allocated Lead Force model as follows:
Procurement—Devon and Cornwall
Learning and Development—Avon and Somerset
ICT convergence—Wiltshire
Corporate Services Transformation—Devon
and Cornwall
Forensics—Dorset
Transactional Processes—Gloucestershire
Aiden Burley MP: Authorities have control over
procurement now? How have they delivered savings?
Nicola Blackwood MP: How are authorities working
together now?
There are numerous independently-celebrated
examples of Police Authorities' best practice: Savings through
collaboration and cutting "back office" costs.
Drawn from Audit Commission and HMIC Reports
to 2010:
www.audit-commission.gov.uk/communitysafety/goodpractice/policeinspections/pages/default.aspx
http://www.hmic.gov.uk/Inspections/Pages/PoliceAuthorityInspections.aspx
1. SURREY: WHOLE
SYSTEM SERVICE
TRANSFORMATION
— The Authority has driven a whole systems
service programme, established in 2007, which identifies how the
force can achieve benefits through structural changes, the efficient
use of resources and automated technologies. This is expected
to save £92 million over five years.
— Surrey centralised its HR services reducing
78 posts including 50 police staff and 28 police officers saving
£1.5 million in 2009-10. It expects to make annual savings
of £2.2 million from 2010-11 or 1% of spending with total
savings of £5.7 million over five years. The centralised
service provides professional guidance and support complemented
by local business partners in basic command units (BCUs) and a
transactional service centre. Centralising meant the ratio of
HR staff to force establishment changed from 1:36 to 1:77. It
achieves 64% public confidence compared with a 61% average for
similar forces.
2. BEDFORDSHIRE
AND HERTFORDSHIRE:
COLLABORATION
— On Friday 22 October 2010 both Bedfordshire
and Hertfordshire Police Authorities gave the go-ahead for the
establishment of a joint Information and Communication Technology
(ICT) Department from December this year. They also agreed to
set up a joint Police Pensions Administration function from November
this year, in preparation for delivering the service across both
forces from April 2011.
— The phased implementation of the joint
ICT function will initially save the two forces a total of £350,000
per year. This will increase substantially as work progresses,
with savings in the region of £1.7 million a year expected
within five years.
— The joint Police Pensions Administration
function for the two forces will bring further efficiencies of
around £105,000 from the start of April 2011.
— These decisions follow the establishment
of a number of successful collaborative initiatives for the two
forces over recent years, including a joint Dog Unit, Firearms
Support Unit and Major Crime Unit.
3. GWENT POLICE
AUTHORITY: STAYING
AHEAD REVIEW
Gwent Police Authority's Staying Ahead review
is a wide-ranging and ambitious strategic review of policing in
Gwent. It aims to deliver high-quality services to the public
within the available resources.
— The Staying Ahead review incorporates
a new approach to policing in Gwent. It plans to provide efficiencies
as well as delivering better customer service with a community
based ethos. Its key priority is to enable the Force to meet the
challenges of providing future services in line with national
and local priorities.
— The Authority's projections in 2007-08
showed a budget shortfall of £14 million by 2010-11, representing
more than 12% of the net revenue expenditure. Because of the shortfall
it was clear the Authority and the Force had to carry out a major
budget savings exercise. The Authority implemented the Staying
Ahead review to help achieve this.
— The Staying Ahead review involves all
the Authority members in a change management programme affecting
the Force. The aim is make greater efficiencies and improve service
delivery to the public. The review also set out to reform the
structure of the Force, including revised roles for officers and
support staff.
— So far the review has produced an increase
in efficiency savings and the operational resources used. The
savings achieved have enabled the Authority to reduce the Protective
Services gap by £2 million without increasing resources.
The Authority has reviewed and realigned its committee structures
to ensure it has suitable arrangements in place to manage its
new policing vision.
— The Authority has systematic processes
in place for assessing and measuring the benefits of the Staying
Ahead review. There has been a 22% increase in the resources deployed
on neighbourhood policing and an increased allocation to roads
policing. The Authority expects efficiency savings of £14.4
million between 2009 and 2013, approximately £3.1 million
above its efficiency and productivity target.
— The authority is also an established
user of collaborative arrangements provided by Value Wales. The
authority continues to benefit from the work of the South West
and Wales Regional Procurement Group. It has also collaborated
with other partners including Newport Transport, Chepstow Town
Council, the Forestry Commission and Coleg Gwent.
We hope that this submission fulfils the Committee's
specific request for further information, and should be delighted
to provide any additional details or clarification requested at
any time.
October 2010
APPENDIX A
THE COSTS OF CHANGE: POLICE GOVERNANCE, 2011-16
Option 1 Do nothing
| Option 2 Do minimum |
Option 3 HO White Paper approach
|
| £'000 |
| £'000 | | £'000
|
| Democratic representations—members allowances
| £46,312 | Democratic representations—members allowances
| £46,312 | Democratic representations—members allowances
| £46,647 |
Democratic representation other costs (eg travel and subsidence, recruitment, training and consultation)
| 22,030 | Democratic representation other costs (eg travel and subsidence, recruitment, training and consultation)
| 22,030 | Democratic representation other costs (eg travel and subsidence, recruitment, training and consultation)
| 22,030 |
Police Authority Support costs—staff
| 138,456 | Police Authority Support costs—staff
| 138,456 | Police Authority Support costs—staff
| 136,096 |
Police Authority external support costs (eg audit, legal, premises, supplies and services)
| 71,741 | Police Authority external support costs (eg audit, legal, premises, supplies and services)
| 71,741 | Police Authority external support costs (eg audit, legal, premises, supplies and services)
| 71,741 |
Other staff costs (eg treasury management)
| 4,635 | Other staff costs (eg treasury management)
| 4,635 | Other staff costs (eg treasury management)
| 15,891 |
Other non staff costs (eg external audit, subscriptions, publications)
| 68,568 | Other non staff costs (eg external audit, subscriptions, publications)
| 68,568 | Other non staff costs (eg external audit, subscriptions, publications)
| 84,117 |
Election Costs | 0 |
Election Costs | 63,568 | Election Costs
| 63,858 |
Transition costs | 0 |
ransition costs | 0 | Transition costs
| 12,175 |
Policy and Parliamentary | 0
| Policy and Parliamentary | 927
| Policy and Parliamentary | 927
|
Total costs | 351,742 |
| 416,527 | |
453,481 |
APPENDIX C ITEM 3D SWPAJC 6 AUGUST 2010—COSTS
AND BENEFITS LOG
SOUTH WEST
POLICE—REGIONAL
COLLABORATION PROGRAMME—ONGOING
FINANCIAL SUMMARY
1. Financing the Overall Project
(All Forces) | Actual
| Actual | Budget
| Budget | Budget
| |
| Prev Yrs | 2009-10
| 2010-11 | 2011-12
| 2012-13 | Total
|
| £ | £
| £ | £
| £ | £
|
| Regional Budget: | |
| | | |
|
| Income | |
| | | |
|
| from Govt grant | 500,000
| | 0 | 0 |
0 | 500,000 |
| from NPIA | 0 | 5,877
| 72,000 | 66,000 | 0
| 143,877 |
| from Police Authorities | 392,000
| 201,361 | 150,000 | TBA
| TBA | 743,361 |
| Total | 892,000
| 207,238 | 222,000
| 66,000 | 0 |
1,387,238 |
Expenditure |
| | | |
| |
| staff | 495,572 |
329,981 | 325,000 | 66,000
| | |
| other | 69,402 |
51,057 | 50,000 |
| | |
| Total | 564,974
| 381,038 | 375,000
| 66,000 | 0 |
1,387,012 |
Balance Carried Forward |
327,026 | 153,226 |
226 | 226 | 226
| |
Resources "given" |
| | | |
| |
| eg seconded staff | 250,000
| 185,000 | 110,000 |
| | 545,000 |
| |
| | | |
|
2. Impact of Individual Programme Strands
Est Reg | |
| | Expenditure (Dr) or Savings (Cr)
|
| Investment | |
| | | |
| | |
| | | Prev Yrs
| 2010-11 | 2011-12 | 2012-13
| 2013-14 | 2014-15 |
| £ |
| £ | £ | £
| £ | £ | £
|
| Area of Service/Project | |
| | |
| | | |
A. Approved Savings-Generating Projects
| | | Cr |
Cr | Cr | Cr | Cr
| Cr |
| 1 Recruitment Advertising |
0 | | 24,669 |
24,669 | 24,669 | 24,669
| 24,669 | 24,669 |
| 2 Telecoms Procurement | 0
| | 42,279 | 66,164
| 66,164 | 66,164 | 66,164
| 66,164 |
| 3 Transport Procurement | 0
| | 147,000 | 147,000
| 147,000 | 147,000 | 147,000
| 147,000 |
| 4 Uniform Procurement | 0
| | 0 | 30,000
| 30,000 | 30,000 | 30,000
| 30,000 |
| 5 Identity Access Management |
| | 62,500 |
| | | |
|
| 6 Firearms Facility | 0
| PFI | | |
| | 46,225 |
184,900 |
Total Savings | 0
| | 276,448 | 267,833
| 267,833 | 267,833
| 314,058 | 452,733
|
B. Grant Receipts Secured by Programme
| | | Cr |
| | |
| |
| 1 ANPR | |
| 402,825 | |
| | | |
| 2 Mobile Information |
| | 5,814,843 |
| | | |
|
Total Grants Secured to Date |
| | 6,217,668
| | | |
| |
C. Approved Capacity-Building Projects—Additional Costs Absorbed by Protective Service
| | Dr | Dr |
Dr | Dr | Dr |
| Dr | | |
| | | |
| |
| 1 Regional Asset Recovery Team |
0 | Worst case if no grant | 0
| 1,100,000 | 1,100,000 | 1,100,000
| 1,100,000 | 1,100,000 |
| 2 Serious and Organised Crime |
177,000 | Net of "one-off" grant
| 0 | 542,000 | 542,000
| 542,000 | 542,000 | 542,000
|
| 3 Special Branch | TBC
| Revenue neutral | 0 | 0
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
0 |
| 4 Major Crime Team | TBC
| Revenue neutral | 0 | 0
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
0 |
| 5 Covert Operations | 75,000
| | 0 | 180,000
| 180,000 | 180,000 | 180,000
| 180,000 |
Total Approved Capacity-Building Projects
| 252,000 | | 0
| 1,822,000 | 1,822,000
| 1,822,000 | 1,822,000
| 1,822,000 |
D. Pipeline Projects—Awaiting approval
| | | Cr |
Cr | Cr | Cr | Cr
| Cr |
| 1 Uniform and Equipment | 0
| Next phase | | 1,200
| 2,400 | 2,400 | 2,400
| 2,400 |
| 2 Procurement Shared Service |
1,060,000 | | |
| 261,000 | 1,551,000
| 2,968,000 | 3,000,000 |
| 3 Firearms Licensing—Fees
| 0 | If fee approved by Home Office
| | 1,118,000 | 1,118,000
| 1,118,000 |
| 1,118,000 | |
| | | |
| | |
| 4 Firearms Licensing—Automation
| 600,000 | |
| | 275,000 | 275,000
| 275,000 | 275,000 |
Total Pipeline Projects—Awaiting approval
| 1,660,000 | | 0
| 1,200 | 1,656,400
| 2,946,400 | 4,363,400
| 4,395,400 |
| |
| | | |
| | |
1
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/consultations/policing-21st-century/ Back
2
The six principles of the Independent Commission on Good Governance
in Public Services can be found at http://www.cipfa.org.uk/pt/download/governance_standard.pdf Back
|
