Public Expenditure - Health Committee Contents


Memorandum by Manchester Joint Health Unit, Manchester City Council (PEX 15)

  This memorandum has particular reference to the following area to be examined by the Inquiry:

  Resource Allocation within the NHS—what arrangements exist to "cushion" resource shifts implied by the allocation formulae?

SUMMARY

    (i) This memorandum analyses the pace of change (PoC) in financial allocations over the past decade to help inform future policy. It makes a case for a faster PoC in future and for the PoC to benefit from independent research and scrutiny.

    (ii) PoC refers to the rate at which NHS annual allocations to PCTs move towards their targets which represent their "fair share" of the national total.

    (iii) The PoC has been very slow generally over the past decade, with typically an approximately 20 year timescale to achieve future financial balance, despite the large increases in NHS funding in this period which gave the potential to have a faster PoC.

    (iv) The only exceptions to the slow PoC in the past decade were 2006-07 and 2007-08 when the Secretary of State received exceptional lobbying pressure from numerous organisations to speed up the PoC.

    (v) The PoC has been by far the most powerful element in the allocation process, damping down most of the changes implied by formula changes and data updates.

    (vi) The slowness of the PoC has generally been to the disadvantage of poor health PCTs.

    (vii) The maximum accumulated loss for any one PCT over the past seven years (where boundaries can be made consistent) is 6.4% or £213 million. Conversely the maximum gain is 21.2% or £445.3 million.

    (viii) The main regional gainer from the slow PoC is London which, for 2010-11 is 8.1% or £1 billion over fair share. The main loser is East Midlands which is 5.8% or £390 million under fair share.

    (ix) It is not clear whether the typical algorithm used to distribute the PoC to individual PCTs is optimal because of "cliff edges"' in the algorithm.

    (x) The PoC has not so far received the expert research and scrutiny which the allocation formulae have received.

    (xi) It would be logical for both PoC and the derivation of formulae to be the responsibility of the same body, utilising independent expert research and scrutiny. The proposed NHS Commissioning Board might fulfil this role.

    (xii) The points made in this paper are particularly important for future GP consortia when these bodies replace PCTs under White Paper proposals.

INTRODUCTION

    "The Government can have a profound influence on the shape and performance of local public services through... funding mechanisms.. "1

    The Marmot Review Economic Framework Report 2009 p 114.

    "However, many PCTs have not yet received their full needs-based allocations. The Government must move more quickly to ensure PCTs receive their real target allocations".2

  The House of Commons Health Select Committee Report on Health Inequalities 2009 Recommendation 9.

  1.  The pace of change refers to the rate at which the NHS annual financial allocations to PCTs move towards their targets which represent their "fair share" of the national cake. The targets are set using a range of national formulae covering the needs of the population due to age distribution and underlying health, as well as allowing for unavoidable wage and price differences.3 One half of PCTs are currently receiving allocations above their target, while the other half receive allocations below target. Under-target PCTs usually receive a larger than average year-on-year increase, and over-target PCTs usually receive a smaller than average one; by this means convergence (the attainment of target allocations by all PCTs) is approached gradually over a number of years. The Distance from Target (DFT) is expressed in money or as a percentage of the target.

  2.  This principle is of course perfectly sound practice to avoid financial instability to particular PCTs. However the devil is in the detail of the overall rate and the algorithm which is used to translate a given PoC rate into PCT allocations. Both of these issues have so far been decided in camera by the DH and ministers. The Advisory Committee on Resource Allocation (ACRA) has played no part, being responsible only for recommendations on the formulae leading to the theoretical financial "fair share". This is despite the fact that ACRA's remit does not specifically exclude PoC. 4, 5

  3.  The current process separates ACRA's recommendations on the formulae and resultant theoretical "target" allocations, from the DH and ministerial decision on the actual allocations (PoC), resulting in allocations which are informed only to a minor extent by ACRA's theory. This leads to the following problems:

    (i) There is no clear connection of method between the two stages; the first involves a judgment by a committee of experts based on outside research and scrutiny, while the second stage (PoC) is another judgment this time carried out in camera by the DH and ministers without any outside research or scrutiny.

    (ii) The second stage (PoC) involves a much more powerful formula than the first, effectively damping the great majority of any change implied in the recommendations of ACRA, and thus appearing to diminish the role of ACRA and not to take its recommendations seriously. (Details of the extent of damping are given later in this paper)

    (iii) This second stage (PoC) can be divided into two components—the overall rate of moving PCTs towards targets, and the algorithm used to determine the rate for individual PCTs. The overall rate is generally considered to be slow and this rate is contentious as in point (ii). In addition it is not clear that the algorithm is optimal since it is imposed each year without a background of research and scrutiny.

  4.  Government is vulnerable to criticism in stage 2 more than in stage 1 because stage 1 uses recommendations from experts. The closed process of stage 2 can lead to cynicism within the NHS on the subject of financial allocations and reduction in confidence and satisfaction with the whole process. An example of this occurred after the 2003-04, 2004-05 and 2005-06 allocations when a number of organisations (The then Healthcare Commission,6 the Special Interest Group of Municipal Authorities, the North West Public Health Association, the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities, The Coalfield Communities Campaign, the Manchester Joint Health Unit and a number of individual PCTs) lobbied government over a long period when they felt that the PoC was far too slow and injurious to health inequalities.7 This pressure appeared to be an important factor in the speeding up of the PoC for 2006-07 and 2007-08 allocations.8 However subsequently the PoC has slowed down, being zero for 2008-09 and very slow for 2009-10 and 2010-11 even when the lower growth in those years is taken into account.

  5.  The remainder of this paper gives a more detailed description of the PoC in recent years to highlight the source of the above concerns and provide some evidence behind the main points of this paper—that the PoC has been inequitably slow and that expert research and scrutiny would be beneficial to PoC.

Analysis of recent PoC—Quantification of the rate—is it slow?

  6.  This section deals with the question of the overall rate of PoC, and gives details of the actual rate over the past 12 years using a variety of different measures. All information and data used for the analysis in this and later sections is that available on the website of the Dept of Health.9

Table 1

MEASURES OF POC RELATIVE TO OVERALL GROWTH (LAST TWO COLUMNS)


Year


No of trusts


Growth %

Minimum
increase %
Min as % of
Growth (the
lower the faster)
% of Overall
growth used
for PoC %
1999-20001006.60 5.4682.73.45
2000-01996.78 6.2191.62.47
2001-02998.91 8.2592.61.50
2002-039410.55 9.9394.12.14
2003-043048.76 8.3094.72.75
2004-053049.47 8.8893.82.22
2005-063049.14 8.5994.02.62
2006-073039.20 8.0587.54.41
2007-083039.40 8.0185.24.85
2008-091525.46 5.461000
2009-101525.50 5.2094.51.89
2010-111525.50 5.1493.52.47


Note There was no PoC for 2001-02 or 2008-09, but 2001-02 had a recurrent health inequalities adjustment which had a small effect on DFTs.


  7.  The last two columns give two different measures which are both relative to growth and show wide variation independent of the growth. The first measure—the minimum growth for any PCT as a percentage of the overall growth is an approximate measure of PoC because it's translation into PoC depends on the number of PCTs which are given the minimum. However this number has remained similar over the past because the algorithm for over-target PCTs has had a consistent cut-off point at +2% DFT above which all PCTs receive the minimum. The second measure is more precise—the percentage of the total growth which is actually used to move PCTs closer to target. It can be seen that this is a low percentage even in years of faster PoC.

  8.  1999-2000, 2006-07 and 2007-08 stand out as having a faster PoC than average. The last column is independent of both the growth and the minimum growth (assuming that the potential for re-distribution is directly proportional to growth) and therefore should be the better measure (strictly speaking perhaps real growth should be used rather than nominal growth but that would require estimates of NHS inflation which would be contentious). It is striking how small a portion of the growth actually contributes to re-distribution—even in the best of the last eight years it was less than 5%. In addition it varies considerably from year to year with the highest over three times the lowest.

  9.  The following graphs give the percentage distances from target for the complete range of PCTs before (opening DFT), and after (closing DFT) PoC. For 2009-10 the percentage of growth used for PoC was 1.89% (of the total growth of £4.4 billion) and the graph shows how small a difference this makes to the spread of DFTs. The only significant change is for the small number of very under target PCTs. Most PCTs under target are hardly affected by PoC and PCTs which are over target show a very small reduction in DFT.

Figure 1

EFFECT OF POC 2009-10


  10.  The second graph is for the year of highest PoC—2007-08 where a combination of higher percentage of growth (4.85% compared with 1.89% for 2009-10) together with higher growth (9.40% compared with 5.50%) leads to a much more significant PoC, though even here the great majority of under target PCTs do not get much closer to target and also strangely the most over-target PCT do not move much either in proportion to their very high DFTs. However the difference between the two graphs shows what can be achieved by using a larger but still modest percentage of growth.

Figure 2

EFFECT OF POC 2007-08


  11.  It is difficult to estimate precisely the time in years to convergence because of the difficulty of estimating the rate at which very over-target PCTs will be brought to target as convergence approaches ie the pace of change will slow with time as fewer PCTs become much over-target. A crude starting point for year-on-year comparison is the reciprocal times 100 of the "reduction in mean DFT"'. (actual times will be greater than this for the reason above). This indicates that in most years the timescale to convergence is greater than 10 and up to 20+ years. In the exceptional years 2006-07 and 2007-08 the timescale reduced to around half this range. Since that time the status quo (and zero PoC for 2008-09) has re-asserted itself.

  12.  It is instructive to compare NHS and Local authority PoC. "Floor Damping" is the term used to describe the equivalent process to PoC for local authority allocations. Comparison with the local authority national settlement seems to confirm the slowness of NHS pace of change. For example comparative figures are available for the measurement in the penultimate column of table 1. This is the minimum growth accorded to the most over-target PCTs as a percentage of the average growth. The fastest NHS pace was in 2007-08 when this measure was 85.2%. For the same year the local authority settlement under formula grant for the group of authorities which have responsibility for Education and social services (which includes most urban authorities) had an equivalent measure of 72.2% 10, and this was at a time when the growth in local authority settlements (growth of 3.74% and floor of 2.7%) was much lower than NHS growth (9.40%). This pace would lead to convergence in just a few years compared with the usual NHS timescale of around 20 years.

  13.  Another difference with local authority allocations is that the there is a process of consultation between the Department of Communities and Local Government and individual local authorities on the rate of floor damping, prior to the setting of the floor level and the degree of damping.

Analysis of recent PoC -The PoC algorithm—is it optimal?

  14.  The algorithm determines how the portion of growth devoted to PoC is distributed between individual PCTs. Some criteria are set out for each allocation, though they are not usually comprehensive; they appear arbitrary and with policy rather than scientific justification. For illustration one graph of recent PoC algorithms are given—2009-10 which typifies principles used over the past decade. The latest allocations for 2009-10 and 2010-11 have the following criteria for PoC:

    (a) Average PCT growth is 5.5% for each year.

    (b) Minimum growth is 5.2% in 2009-10 and 5.1% in 2010-11.

    (c) No PCT will be more than 6.2% under target by the end of 2010-11.

    (d) No PCT will move further under target as a result of above average population growth in 2010-11.

Figure 3

POC FOR 2009-10


  15.  For positive DFTs the algorithm is similar to previous years with a turning point at 2% DFT (and a gradient of for the upper straighter part of about 0.2), though the turning point is now curved rather than a sharp point. For negative DFTs the algorithm is different from previous years—there is zero gradient up to -6% which might be considered unfair for PCTs between 0% and -6%, more so with increasing negative DFT. Then the steep rise from -6% up to -8% of gradient about 1.1 which tails off after -8% seemingly towards zero gradient via a curve. The cliff edges (or curved cliff edges) for negative DFTs introduce the possibility of the accusation of inequity in the treatment of PCTs. In addition any zero gradient also carries the same possibility—existing for both negative and positive DFT ranges.

POC AND HEALTH INEQUALITIES

  16.  The slowness of the PoC has been to the disadvantage of poor health PCTs and hence has worked against improving health inequalities. Figure 3 shows the relationship between % DFT and the rate of improvement in relative mortality for all PCTs in England. The significant downward slope indicates a general trend for mortality to improve slower as PCTs move further under target and vice versa.

  17.  The 62 Spearhead PCTs (those adjudged to have the worst health and deprivation in 1995-97) have been on average -£6.8 million (-1.7%) under target per year for the seven years 2003-04 to 2009-10. Excluding the 11 London Spearheads increases this figure to -£10.6 million (-2.9%). Although these average percentages under target seem modest, these amounts are the sort of size that would make large differences to the quantity and quality of public health and primary care interventions.

Figure 3

DFT AND MORTALITY IMPROVEMENT


The constraints on PoC—financial stability and adhering to the NHS operational frameworks—do they justify the slowness?

  18.  The reasons given for the "high floors" (DH term for the high minimum growth for PCTs which as explained above plays a crucial role in determining the PoC—the higher the minimum the slower the PoC) often relate to the ability of PCTs to carry out satisfactorily the items in the NHS operational framework or to the need to retain "financial stability". Both these generalisations are of course open to various interpretations. But both are very much the field of the professional NHS senior manager on the ground, or possibly the academic specialist in the management and economics of large public bodies or in health inequalities, but such people are not directly involved in the PoC decision. Two extreme examples set the scene for debate of this issue.

    (i) Richmond and Twickenham PCT started at 23.8% (£48.9 million) over target (the highest over target) in 2009-10. The average growth for England was 5.50%. Richmond and Twickenham was awarded 5.20% or £13.3 million (the high minimum growth for any PCT). This brought the PCT marginally closer to target at 23.5% (£50.9 million) over target. A much faster PoC would have been possible if the minimum had been set at say 4.0% giving this PCT an increase of £10.2 million rather than £13.3 million, a reduction of £3.1 million or 1.2% in the total allocation of £267.4 million. Would such a reduction have caused financial instability in the PCT or made it unable to work within the operational framework, in the context that it was considered to be overfunded by around £50 million according to the latest set of fair-share formulae?

    Richmond and Twickenham enjoys very good health and an 18% excess in the number of GPs according to the latest weighted capitation figures. It has enjoyed a cumulative excess over fair share funding of 17.7% or £234.3 million over the past seven years.

    (ii) Halton & St Helens PCT started at 4.7% (£24.8 million) under target in 2009-10. The average growth for England was 5.50% and Halton & St Helens was awarded the same at 5.50% thus maintaining its position of 4.7% (£26.2 million)under target. If the minimum growth had reduced as in example (i) from 5.2% to say 4.0%, then a lot more resources would be available for redistribution under PoC and it is likely that Halton & St Helens would have reduced to at least -3.5% an increase of 1.2% or £6.5 million allocation. Halton & St Helens has some of the worst health in England and provides a key component of the failing national health inequalities target. It has a shortfall of 20% in the number of GPs according to the latest weighted capitation figures. It has suffered from a cumulative shortfall compared with fair share funding of -3.7% or -£115.4 million over the past seven years.

POC AND THE WHITE PAPER PROPOSALS

  19.  The recent White Paper12 proposes the replacement of PCTs by GP consortia as holders of the main NHS budget. This brings PoC into greater focus because, in order to give both GP consortia and their constituent GP practices the fairest start financially, it is important to use the next (and proposed to be the last) two PCT allocation years to move PCTs as close as possible to "fair share" target.

  20.  The White Paper proposes that a new body, the NHS Commissioning Board, will be responsible for resource allocation to GP consortia. This proposal presents an opportunity for both the derivation of formulae and PoC to come under the responsibility of the same body; that same body would also be in a position to commission expert independent research on both formulae and PoC.

CONCLUSION

  21.  This paper makes a case for a faster Pace of Change(PoC) in NHS financial allocations, and for the PoC to benefit from independent research and scrutiny and to be recommended or decided by the same body which recommends or decides on the formulae.

  Reasons given for this proposal include the following: PoC has in practice over the last twelve years been the most powerful aspect of the resource allocation process and therefore deserves research and scrutiny in the same way as the formulae; the setting of PoC represents a delicate balance between equity, reducing health inequalities and financial stability and thus requires a wide expertise including senior NHS managers and academics; It is not clear whether the PoC algorithms used in recent years represent the best way to allocate PoC to individual PCTs; the powerful damping effect of the PoC on PCT "fair shares" set by a committee other than ACRA as at present, may be seen as lack of faith in the formulae; the slowness of the PoC in recent years has been criticised by local and national organisations including the Health Select Committee and the former Healthcare Commission.

  Advantages of this policy are that allocations will have greater fairness, justification and general acceptability (while still remaining under the ultimate control of ministers). These advantages are particularly important for setting allocations for the proposed new GP consortia, and the proposed NHS Commissioning Board could provide the single body responsible for both formulae and PoC.

REFERENCES1  Epstein D, Smith P C An economic framework for analysing health inequalities in England; a report for the Economics Task Group of the Health Inequalities Commission (Marmot Review). Centre for Health Economics. University of York. June 2009 p 114. Available on the Marmot Review website at: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/gheg/marmotreview/Documents/tgs

2  House of Commons Health Committee. Health Inequalities. Third Report of session 2008-09. Vol 1. February 2009. Recommendation 9 p 123. Available on the parliament website at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmhealth/286/286.pdf

3  Dept of Health. Resource Allocation Weighted Capitation Formula. Sixth Ed. December 2008. Available on the Department of Health website at: http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_091849

4  Dept of Health. Report of the Advisory Committee on Resource Allocation. December 2008. Available on the Department of Health website at: http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_091483.pdf

5  Bevan G Review of the Weighted Capitation Formula; a Report submitted to the Secretary of State for Health. July 2008. Available on the Department of Health website at: http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/documents/digitalasset/dh_093167.pdf

6  Healthcare Commission. State of Healthcare Report. July 2004.

7  Hacking J, Beggars Belief Health Service J 113; 5850: 28-31. April 2003.

8  Hacking J, The Slice is Right. Health Service J 115; 5962: 18-19. June 2005.

9  Dept of Health. Available on the Department of Health website at: http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Managingyourorganisation/Financeandplanning/Allocations/index.htm

10  Capaldi A Guide to Relative Needs formulae 2007/8. CIPFA/Rita Hale & Associates Ltd. 2008.

11  Department of Communities and Local Government. Methodology for Floor Damping in the 2008/9 Local Government Finance Settlement. December 2007. Available from the DCLG website at: http://www.local.communities.gov.uk/finance/0809/fdamp0809/paper.pdf

12  Department of Health. Equity and excellence: liberating the NHS. 2010. www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_117353

September 2010

APPENDIX

  The following table gives aggregated DFTs for seven years from 2003-04 to 2009-10. These result from changes in formula and data in conjunction with PoC policy over the past seven years. It shows a large range of financial imbalance between the extremes of Bassetlaw (6.4% under target) to Westminster (21.2 % over target) involving tens or hundreds of £ millions losses or gains over the period.

  2003-10 Aggregate Distance from Target (DFT) over seven years and mean % DFT for all PCTs in England in order of largest losses to largest gains.

  (Spearheads are the 62 PCTs judged to have the worst health and deprivation in 1995-97) Minus indicates loss, otherwise figures are gains.
SpearheadPCT 2003-102003-10
= sDFT Total
£million
DFT %
Overall
Bassetlaw PCT-62.7 -6.4
SKnowsley PCT-114.5 -6.4
North East Essex PCT -168.4-6.0
SBarking and Dagenham PCT -103.5-5.9
Telford and Wrekin PCT -80.5-5.8
SBarnsley PCT-226.8 -5.3
North Somerset PCT -83.6-5.1
SSandwell PCT-152.0 -4.9
SWolverhampton City PCT -111.6-4.6
SLeicester City PCT -129.4-4.6
SBlackburn with Darwen PCT -68.4-4.5
Luton Teaching PCT-72.5 -4.4
SStockton-on-Tees Teaching -71.0-4.3
Great Yarmouth and Waveney PCT -88.5-4.2
SOldham PCT-90.6 -4.1
Torbay Care Trust-53.0 -3.9
SWakefield District PCT -123.6-3.8
SLiverpool PCT-201.5 -3.8
SCounty Durham PCT-196.0 -3.8
SDoncaster PCT-108.3 -3.7
SHalton and St Helens PCT -115.4-3.7
Herefordshire PCT-54.7 -3.7
SLincolnshire PCT-213.5 -3.6
SCoventry Teaching PCT -106.3-3.5
Bedfordshire PCT-108.2 -3.4
SBolton PCT-85.7 -3.4
SAshton, Leigh and Wigan PCT -97.9-3.3
SNewham PCT-97.1 -3.3
SStoke on Trent PCT -85.2-3.3
SWalsall Teaching PCT -79.7-3.2
Norfolk PCT-193.2 -3.2
SMiddlesbrough PCT-46.2 -3.2
Derby City PCT-72.8 -3.1
SRotherham PCT-72.5 -3.1
STower Hamlets PCT-75.3 -3.0
Medway Teaching PCT -64.8-2.9
SNorthamptonshire PCT -160.0-2.9
SDerbyshire County PCT -176.2-2.9
SHartlepool PCT-27.1 -2.9
Cornwall and Isles of Scilly PCT -132.0-2.8
SSouth Staffordshire PCT -129.4-2.8
SManchester PCT-143.4 -2.7
Dudley PCT-72.8 -2.7
SBirmingham East and North PCT -104.8-2.7
Milton Keynes PCT-47.0 -2.6
Southampton City PCT -55.8-2.6
Mid Essex PCT-68.2 -2.6
Somerset PCT-107.5 -2.5
SNottingham City PCT -68.4-2.4
SBury PCT-39.0 -2.4
South West Essex PCT -81.0-2.4
Peterborough PCT-31.9 -2.3
SSouth Tyneside PCT -37.0-2.3
SBlackpool PCT-35.4 -2.3
SNottinghamshire County PCT -125.9-2.3
SHeywood, Middleton and Rochdale PCT -47.3-2.3
Worcestershire PCT-97.6 -2.2
SHeart of Birmingham Teaching PCT -62.9-2.1
Isle of Wight Healthcare PCT -28.5-2.1
North Lincolnshire PCT -28.1-2.1
SEast Lancashire PCT -70.0-1.9
Suffolk PCT-87.8 -1.9
Leicestershire County and Rutland PCT -89.0-1.9
STameside and Glossop PCT -33.8-1.5
SCity and Hackney Teaching PCT -39.7-1.5
SRedcar and Cleveland PCT -19.9-1.5
South East Essex PCT -41.1-1.4
SHull PCT-37.5 -1.4
Shropshire County PCT -32.9-1.4
SBradford and Airedale PCT -58.1-1.3
East and North Hertfordshire PCT -54.1-1.3
SNorth East Lincolnshire PCT -18.2-1.2
SGateshead PCT-24.7 -1.2
Eastern and Coastal Kent PCT -70.2-1.1
SNorth Tyneside PCT -17.3-0.9
East Riding of Yorkshire PCT -17.0-0.7
Portsmouth City Teaching PCT -10.9-0.7
Warwickshire PCT-25.7 -0.6
Kirklees PCT-19.3 -0.6
SNorthumberland Care Trust -15.9-0.6
North Lancashire PCT -16.6 -0.6
SWarrington PCT-8.8 -0.5
SSunderland Teaching PCT 15.1-0.5
Plymouth Teaching PCT -11.5-0.5
Swindon PCT-5.0 -0.3
North Staffordshire PCT -4.1-0.2
SCumbria PCT-5.2 -0.1
SCentral Lancashire PCT -1.2-0.0
Dorset PCT-1.0 -0.0
SSalford PCT0.3 0.0
Waltham Forest PCT1.2 0.1
Havering PCT2.5 0.1
Devon PCT11.5 0.2
Enfield PCT7.6 0.3
SWirral PCT10.5 0.3
West Kent PCT24.8 0.5
SHaringey Teaching PCT 11.60.5
South Gloucestershire PCT 8.70.5
North Yorkshire and York PCT 34.00.6
SSouth Birmingham PCT 19.00.6
Redbridge PCT13.2 0.7
Cambridgeshire PCT29.8 0.7
Solihull PCT11.9 0.7
Western Cheshire PCT 17.70.8
Wiltshire PCT30.0 0.9
Bexley Care Trust16.1 0.9
Buckinghamshire PCT 33.60.9
Sefton PCT25.2 0.9
Berkshire West PCT37.3 1.1
Gloucestershire PCT 53.21.2
Hastings and Rother PCT 23.01.4
Bournemouth and Poole PCT 39.01.4
Bristol PCT49.4 1.4
Hampshire PCT150.2 1.6
Central and Eastern Cheshire PCT 56.71.6
Bath and North East Somerset PCT 24.01.7
Calderdale PCT29.9 1.7
Stockport PCT42.5 1.8
Brighton and Hove City PCT 44.41.8
West Essex PCT43.5 2.0
Leeds PCT135.9 2.1
Croydon PCT64.5 2.2
Oxfordshire PCT105.1 2.3
Berkshire East PCT69.5 2.4
Sheffield PCT134.5 2.7
West Sussex PCT179.6 2.8
SNewcastle PCT77.1 3.0
East Sussex Downs and Weald PCT 85.63.0
SGreenwich Teaching PCT 74.43.2
Brent Teaching PCT93.2 3.4
SSouthwark PCT91.4 3.4
Hounslow PCT76.4 3.8
West Hertfordshire PCT 189.04.5
Hillingdon PCT99.6 4.9
Darlington PCT44.0 4.9
Bromley PCT129.2 5.2
Trafford PCT103.4 5.7
Ealing PCT188.7 6.5
Sutton and Merton PCT 200.66.6
Harrow PCT112.2 6.8
Barnet PCT209.7 7.6
Surrey PCT640.9 8.0
Camden PCT206.3 8.8
SIslington PCT208.3 9.7
SLewisham PCT248.9 9.9
SHammersmith and Fulham PCT 172.810.3
Kingston PCT135.2 10.6
SLambeth PCT324.2 11.1
Kensington and Chelsea PCT 227.813.4
Wandsworth PCT322.2 13.5
Richmond and Twickenham PCT 234.317.7
Westminster PCT445.3 21.2






 
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