Commissioning - Health Committee Contents


Written evidence from Professor Martin Roland (COM 129)

  Professor Martin Roland, General Practitioner and Professor of Health Services Research, University of Cambridge. Oral evidence to be given 16 November.

  1.  The history of primary care led commissioning in the NHS is not encouraging. GPs took slowly to the introduction of fundholding in 1991. A few enthusiasts improved care for their patients, but overall, the effect was modest. Inequalities in care increased and GPs were not strategic in their purchasing decisions. The limited initial scope of fundholding was extended in 1995 under a scheme called "total purchasing", but that model didn't really get going before it was abolished by the incoming Labour government in 1998. Primary care trusts proved to be risk averse, bureaucratic, and ineffective commissioners, which led the government to revert to giving GPs notional budgets under "practice based commissioning" in 2004. The effects were again patchy, with GPs slow to get involved and with mixed levels of enthusiasm. By 2009, substantial numbers were engaged and starting to show some success in improving services. Despite that, practice based commissioning was described by the government's own primary care tsar as "a corpse not fit for resuscitation".

  2.  Despite this discouraging experience, the idea persists that GPs hold the key to effective purchasing of high quality care for their patients. Current proposals to form GP commissioning groups will give them the biggest challenge of a generation—with 75% of the NHS budget under the control of GP practices. The risks of the scheme have been well rehearsed: GPs don't want to hold budgets, they haven't got the skills, they will need extensive management support, and multiple purchasers will cause contracting chaos especially in big cities. In order for GP Commissioning to be successful in its new guise, a number of things are needed.

  3.  The first is for a sufficient number of GP leaders. Not all GPs have to be actively involved in commissioning, but substantial numbers do. Their motivation has to be to improve care for patients. The Royal College of General Practitioners sets out the values that define the profession—high quality technical care, personal care, continuity of care, and a commitment to individual patients that makes being a GP a profession rather than just a job. The College will be providing advice and support to GPs in their commissioning roles. This will be very important at a time when support will also be offered by private corporations who may not share these values. Management support for commissioning will be a significant challenge as the commissioning reforms are being brought during a period when the NHS plans a 45% reduction in management costs.

  4.  GPs face a number of potential conflicts of interest. Of these the most important is that GPs may have a financial incentive not to refer patients even when they believe that they would benefit clinically from a specialist opinion. The second is that GPs as both commissioners and providers may be able to commission care from themselves or from provider organisations in which they have a financial interest. These conflicts of interest will be easier to manage if GPs can neither make substantial personal profits from commissioning nor put their practices at risk of major financial loss.

  5.  The formula that government decides to use to distribute budgets to GP commissioning groups has the potential to cause major instability. An untested resource allocation formula (the Carr Hill formula) was introduced with the 2004 GP contract and had to be rapidly replaced as the sole basis for resource allocation because it produced large and unexpected changes to practice budgets. If the government pilots nothing else, it must pilot a range of resource allocation formulas before giving commissioning groups their budgets.

  6.  Commissioning groups will also have to learn how to manage risk, either through arrangements that limit the cost to their budget of individual patients, or by insuring, or by pooling risk. They must make certain that patients with complex or expensive needs can register easily with a GP and receive the care they need.

  7.  GPs should generally form large geographically defined groupings. This will reduce the turmoil that multiple small purchasers will create, will allow them to be more effective commissioners, and will help integration with community and local authority services. However, they will need smaller subgroups for quality improvement and clinical audit to be effective. One size will not fit all the functions required of a commissioning group. GPs must also develop close relationships with hospital specialists and social care providers: purchasers and providers must work together to deliver the integrated care that their increasingly elderly populations need.

  8.  In developing and commissioning pathways of care, GP commissioning groups will need to develop and maintain close links with local specialists. This is essential to provide the integrated care that the increasingly elderly population needs. There is concern that the policy of allowing "any wiling provider" to bid for services may prevent GPs developing close links with specialists. Monitor must establish rules for tendering which do not stand in the way of GPs and specialists planning coordinated care for their populations of patients.

  9.  Government must be encouraged to have the patience to see these reforms through. Major health service reforms cause years of disruption and it may take four or five years just to get back to where we are now. Research should inform changes along the way, but two full parliaments will be needed to know whether the latest commissioning experiment has been successful.

November 2010





 
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