Department for International Development Annual Report & Resource Accounts - International Development Committee Contents


Written evidence submitted by Bond

1.  DFID'S APPROACH TO ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AID AND THE ROLE OF DFID'S NEW AID WATCHDOG

1.1  From the perspective of assessing the effectiveness of aid delivered through UK NGOs, it is as yet unclear how the Coalition Government will examine this in practice. However, from the public statements and speeches made by Government Ministers since the election it is clear that the focus on results and effectiveness will be greatly increased in pursuit of providing the UK taxpayer with the best value for money, particularly in these straitened times.

1.2  Bond welcomes the Coalition Government's increased focus on the effectiveness of aid and, as signatories of the Paris Declaration and subsequent participants in the Accra Agenda for Action process, the Government's recognition of its obligations on effectiveness initiatives. Many civil society organisations (CSOs) are already reporting robustly on their work and both the sector and DFID need to draw on the experience of those who are doing this well to improve overall performance; indeed, Bond is leading an Effectiveness Programme to look at these very issues for NGOs. We would welcome a joint approach between DFID and CSOs to progress the effectiveness agenda and identify measurement methods that can capture some of the longer term and more complex outcomes of development work, as well as its wider impact.

1.3  We also welcome the opportunity to highlight some concerns regarding the way effectiveness is interpreted and implemented. As well as some areas where obvious outcomes can be measured, international development also involves complex, long-term processes that are not always measurable or straightforward to analyse, or to establish attribution or direct cause and effect. In the desire to demonstrate greater development impact it seems that DFID will look to increasingly fund NGO work that focuses on "measurable deliverables". This may provide immediate results in the short term. However, it could also mean less impact on the longer term, more complex processes of social, economic and political change that are known to affect poverty.

1.4  For example, the Civil Society Challenge Fund was originally established to fund UK NGOs partnering with Southern CSOs with the aim of building the capacity and expertise of Southern CSOs and their ability to engage in advocacy and decision-making processes at local and national level. The proposed new Poverty Impact Fund, however, takes a very different approach - it does not stipulate that applicants must partner with local organisations in the South; it focuses on delivering services, particularly in support of achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), rather than on tackling the social structures that prevent the poorest in society from accessing these services, even when they are available; and it does not promote more complex, longer-term goals around governance, holding to account, capacity building and rights. Thus, it takes a short-sighted view of the needs of poor people and does not incorporate an understanding of the broader systemic and political causes of poverty and marginalisation.

1.5  While supporting the MDGs and working to deliver quality services to those living in poverty are welcome and necessary initiatives, they should not be at the expense of longer-term, process-driven work that focuses on these systemic and political issues and which may take longer to deliver impact and change and may be inherently harder to measure in a quantitative fashion but which are nonetheless essential to ensure sustainable change for poor people. A focus on deliverables alone risks diminishing the support available to projects and programmes which enable poor and marginalised people to understand their rights and engage with the political system to realise them; this kind of work is crucial in ensuring equal access to education, employment, health, social protection and other services. The fact that the greatest impact of this kind of work may not be visible immediately should indicate that it provides greater value for money over the longer term, rather than being dismissed for not showing instant, tangible results.

1.6  Bond welcomes the Coalition Government's desire to undertake an appraisal of both the UK's multilateral and bilateral aid commitments and their subsequent effectiveness and the opportunity for UK civil society to feed into these. Bond has already fed into the DFID Multilateral Aid Review highlighting three areas that we believe should be the main basis for assessing multilaterals: the views of recipient countries; poverty reduction results; and democratic accountability and transparency. We also suggest that, when examining the evidence base for the review, particular attention is paid to views from recipient countries, and to independent assessments. To reiterate, both Bond and the wider NGO sector fully support an enhanced focus on aid effectiveness; this can only be a good thing for the developing world and we are glad to see the Coalition Government taking a leading role in pushing this agenda. However the process of aid scrutiny itself must also be effective and rigorous. Bond is concerned by the short consultation period and comparative lack of clarity on how multilateral aid will be assessed and how evidence will be used. We await the outcome of the Multilateral Aid Review with interest and will respond to the findings in time. We continue to work with the Government on the consultation on the Bilateral Aid Review.

1.7  Regarding the new aid watchdog, it is as yet unclear what the process will be for establishing this new entity. Although Bond supports efforts to increase transparency and effectiveness in aid, ensuring greater value for money for the UK taxpayer and increased accountability to aid beneficiaries in the South, the methods to achieve these must take into account existing mechanisms to hold DFID to account on its spending and performance, such as the National Audit Office, Public Accounts Committee and the International Development Committee itself.

1.8  It is essential that the new aid watchdog works together with these existing bodies to ensure the greatest efficiency and effectiveness in monitoring DFID performance and spending on aid. Perhaps a distinguishing feature of the new aid watchdog could be its inclusion of a balanced representation of development actors, including input from the South, development practitioners, academics, NGOs, faith groups and civil society as well as the private sector and individuals from public life? We ask particularly that individuals who are involved in the watchdog and have decision-making powers are drawn from those with a robust understanding of the complexities of international development work.

1.9  Bond welcomes the commitments made by the Secretary of State for international development to make information on all DFID programmes readily available online and elsewhere. We would also welcome evidence that DFID were conforming to the strict standards of transparency they expect from their aid programmes and grant recipients in the establishment of this new aid watchdog. Specifically, we would welcome transparency in decision-making processes on the set up and staffing of the watchdog, as well as consultation with a range of actors, including UK and Southern civil society, on the constitution, remit and make up of the watchdog.

2.  REDUCTION IN DFID'S ADMINISTRATION COSTS

2.1  With DFID's budget rising to meet the 2013 target of 0.7%, it is vital that DFID staffing levels rise commensurately in order to manage this increased budget and programming responsibility. However, it appears that DFID staff are subject to the same efficiency saving targets as other UK Government departments and Bond would like to raise concerns about the impact that reduced staff numbers managing a rising budget is having on DFID's ability to manage its programmes and relationships successfully. Delivering high quality, effective, efficient and accountable development work that delivers value for money for the UK taxpayer requires experienced and expert staff in sufficient numbers and Bond is concerned that continuing pressure on DFID to reduce its administration costs and headcount is detrimental to working effectively.

2.2  Bond refers the IDC to the UK Aid Network's submission to this inquiry for more detailed evidence on this matter.

2.3  See point 3 below for information on the impact of reducing administration costs regarding DFID's grant-making practices.

3.  DFID'S USE OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CONSULTANTS AND WHETHER REDUCING THIS EXPENSE COULD BE AN APPROPRIATE TARGET FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT

3.1  The use of technical assistance and consultants in the programme delivery context, particularly as a cost-saving measure, is of concern to Bond and relates to the need to consider value for money in a broader sense.

3.2  Ongoing civil service reforms have focused on lowering the headcount in all government departments, leading DFID to employ consultants as fund managers for various funds targeting UK civil society organisations and NGOs[20]. This trend means that learning and valuable experience in grant management is held outside of DFID and is effectively lost to the institution. As one of the purposes of DFID's funding of NGOs is to support the development of new approaches that can be documented, learned from and scaled up into larger DFID programmes, this loss of learning is critical. It also impacts on DFID's ability to consolidate learning about the practices of good grant-making to NGOs and interrupts the process of continuous learning and improvement and impinges on grant recipients' ability to link their funding relationship with DFID with policy and programme dialogue.

3.3  Good grant-making requires staff with the relevant expertise and experience, as well as access to policy, evaluation and programme staff input. Bond believes DFID's own staff are often best placed to manage funds for NGOs, ensure that grant recipients are effective development actors whose programmes represent value for money for the UK taxpayer and that recipients are able to conform to rigorous standards of transparency and accountability. Although Bond would welcome a transparent assessment of the comparative financial costs of employing consultancy firms on a £ for £ basis, Bond would also welcome more focus on the non-financial costs associated with using consultants for grant management, in terms of the loss of learning and links with other parts of DFID, as well as the increasing difficulty in maintaining strong dialogue in the grant-making relationship.



20   The Civil Society Challenge Fund and the Additional Support to Civil Society Fund are currently managed by Triple Line. The Governance and Transparency Fund is managed by KPMG with support from Triple Line. Back


 
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