4 Remaining challenges
40. While the previous chapter examined claims
that CDC has had an inadequate impact on development, this chapter
assesses other concerns and criticisms made of CDC's current operations,
covering a broad range of issues ranging from their use of tax
havens to the levels of CDC's staff remuneration.
Implementation of CDC's Investment
Code
41. As part of its commitment to Corporate Social
Responsibility, CDC's Investment Code was developed in collaboration
with DFID and is designed to promote responsible business practices
in respect of environment, social and governance (ESG) matters.
CDC requires fund managers to operate in line with the Investment
Code. The fund managers are responsible for ensuring that portfolio
companies adhere to responsible business practices.[96]
42. Concerns have been raised about the quality
of CDC's Investment Code, its implementation and enforcement.
Oxfam stated that the Investment Code "leaves considerable
room for interpretation"[97]
and that it needs to be strengthened to make it more rigorous.[98]
CDC's business model, under which it funds others to invest rather
than investing itself, limits CDC's ability to ensure portfolio
companies are compliant. Although fund managers are responsible
for enforcing compliance, CDC acknowledges that these managers
"may not always be in a position to exercise control or influence
over their portfolio companies."[99]
Oxfam believes that CDC should require all portfolio companies
to comply with the Investment Code, if necessary by "ensuring
more than 20% ownership over all portfolio companies."[100]
43. However, others had a better opinion of the
Code. Tom Cairnes, the fund manager of Manocap, told us that CDC
had made a very valuable contribution before it had invested in
the fund to improving Manocap's internal processes "particularly
around ESG and governance and reporting."[101]
44. In practice, DFID and CDC recognise that
"not all companies in the difficult markets in which CDC
invests are likely to meet the business principles in full from
the outset."[102]
Instead of applying them as a barrier to investing, CDC
asks fund managers to ensure that companies have effective action
plans in place to achieve the necessary improvements in reasonable
time.[103] The minimum
standards required for a CDC-backed investment to be made are
unclear.
45. Witnesses claimed that there had been serious
failings in the implementation of the Code. We were told that
Emerging Capital Partners Africa Fund II and Ethos Fund, both
CDC-backed funds,[104]
both invested in Intercontinental and Oceanic Banks, which were
cited by Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission for
their alleged involvement in money laundering.[105]
Emerging Capital Partners also invested in Anvil Mining Ltd which
has been accused of involvement in serious human rights abuses
in the Democratic Republic of Congo.[106]
Anvil's role in the Kilwa massacre[107]
was under investigation by the Australian Federal Police when
CDC made their investment.[108]
46. There have been some changes to the way that
CDC monitors compliance with the Investment Code. CDC used to
rely wholly on assurance from fund managers that portfolio companies
adhere to the investment principles.[109]
This predominantly remains the case, but now some 'mid-point
fund evaluations' are conducted independently.[110]
Witnesses believed that CDC should adopt more rigorous monitoring
and due diligence procedures to improve CDC's oversight of its
investments.[111]
47. We acknowledge the difficulty
some companies have in complying with CDC's Investment Code during
initial stages and support the notion of encouraging improvement
in Environmental, Social and Governance standards. However, CDC's
Investment Code must set a clear baseline standard of compliance
for investments. We are concerned by the claims that some of
the funds in which CDC has invested have not met these standards.
We recommend that CDC ensure that thorough due diligence and
monitoring is conducted on all CDC-backed investments.
Measuring development impact
48. As we saw in the last chapter, CDC has been
criticised on the grounds that its impact on development is inadequate.
However, there is a consensus that "gaining a worthwhile
assessment of the impact of investment on economic development
and poverty reduction is inherently difficult."[112]
No standard group of indicators can comprehensively measure the
development impact of a diverse range of investments accurately.[113]
Factors that should be considered include job creation, capacity
to stimulate other private sector investment and tax revenues.
In isolation, however, these measurements are crude and overly
simplistic. It is especially difficult to categorise the indirect
impacts of investment, for instance the impacts of increased trade
from financing a road and the multiplier effects on an entire
economy, and to assess both the short-term and long-term impacts.
DFIs often report overall taxes paid by their portfolio companies
rather than incremental changes that are attributable to their
investment. This is also true of the way that some report on
employment.[114]
49. CDC began quantifying its development impact
in 2008 with its first annual Impact Report which set out, on
the basis of a model adapted from the International Finance Corporation's
Development Outcome Tracking System, its emerging evidence on
the impact of its post-2004 investment activities. Funds are evaluated
at the midpoint and at the end of the fund's life. In 2009, 17
of the 20 fund evaluations undertaken by CDC scored 'satisfactory'
or 'successful' on development outcomes. Three were scored 'below
expectations'.
50. CDC only analyses its development impact
at fund level, but not beyond this i.e. the impact of individual
investee companies. CDC assesses fund investments on four indicatorsfinancial;
economic; Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) performance;
and private sector development.[115]
The fund investment is graded on the basis of these four indicators.
The aggregate grading is problematic as it could mask extremely
poor aspects of ESG performance if a fund performed well financially.[116]
In 2009, seven of the 20 development impact evaluations were
conducted by an independent assessor, Steward Redqueen (formerly
Triple Value), a specialist in investment evaluation. In 2010,
50% of fund evaluations were conducted independently.[117]
This should ensure that CDC's evaluation process is robust. It
will also provide an external benchmark for comparison against
CDC's internal evaluations.
51. According to Dr Sarah Bracking of Manchester
University other DFIs including Norfund, DEG and FMO have superior
development impact criteria to CDC.[118]
According to Helios, CDC could improve its measurement of "key
tangible development indicators."[119]
Witnesses called for the establishment of more detailed indicators
relating to development impact and poverty alleviation.[120]
They argued that CDC should report its achievements against these
indicators and report on its development impact.[121]
52. We welcome the increased
independent evaluation of CDC's development impact. CDC should
establish more comprehensive indicators relating to development
impact, poverty reduction and employment generation (including
whether the jobs are permanent, the wages paid, whether any jobs
were lost due to restructuring before an investment was made etc.)
CDC should monitor these indicators and report on them.
Transparency
53. Many have called for CDC to be more transparent
in order to enhance its accountability and facilitate public oversight.[122]
Richard Brooks of Private Eye told us that currently there is
a "vacuum of accountability."[123]
Save the Children UK claim that it is not possible for a member
of the UK public or a citizen of the country of investment to
see a list of companies which have had CDC-backed investment.[124]
Christian Aid stated that it was imperative that CDC's
structure and investment model facilitated transparency, especially
with regard to its tax payments and those of investee companies,
and if they did not they should be changed.[125]
The Public Accounts Committee recommended that CDC should use
its influence over fund managers to increase transparency around
reporting on fund plans and performance.[126]
54. We were informed that, currently, CDC gave
too much weight to commercial interests and too little to public
disclosure.[127] According
to The One Foundation, in order for CDC to successfully achieve
its development mandate it "must [...] become a global champion
of transparency."[128]
Transparency
is essential to enabling the public to hold CDC, a Government-owned
company, to account. We acknowledge that commercial sensitivities
exist but recommend that much more rigorous requirements are placed
upon CDC to ensure that its investment decisions, development
impact and the tax payments of their fund managers are as transparent
as possible. In its response to this report, DFID should indicate
how it plans to do this.
Use of tax havens
55. CDC invests in funds which pay a variety
of taxes in the countries in which they operate. In some cases
their profits are recognised in countries widely regarded as tax
havens. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) recognises these countries and has divided them into three
categories, a 'white list', for those that had substantially implemented
internationally agreed-upon tax standards, a 'grey list' for those
that had committed to the tax standards but had not yet implemented
them and a 'black list' for those that had not yet committed to
the standards.[129]
56. CDC's use of tax havens has been heavily
criticised, especially by NGOs, for depriving developing countries
of much-needed tax revenues, avoiding capital gains tax, exacerbating
governance problems, facilitating corruption and reducing transparency.[130]
Richard Brooks from Private Eye informed us of the case
of Mineral Deposits Ltd in Senegal, in which Actis is the largest
shareholder. The company only paid £20,000 in tax in 2008
and 2009 and rid itself of £6 million in tax charges by recording
its profit in Mauritius.[131]
57. Using the IMF list of tax havens for 2007,
Dr Bracking and colleagues classified the domicile of CDC's funds
(excluding subsidiaries) in 2010. The totals revealed that 144
were domiciled in 'secrecy jurisdictions'[132]80%
of all CDC's investments by number.[133]
The academics conducted research into the tax losses for
developing countries due to domicile of companies in secrecy jurisdictions.
They estimated that for 29 companies in which Norfund invested,
the "tax losses for developing countries because of domicile
in secrecy jurisdictions has been calculated for 2008 at over
(gross) $14.6 million."[134]
The tax loss to developing countries from the use of tax havens
for the entire European DFI portfolio was estimated, by the same
academics, to be over EUR430 million a year on average over the
last five years.[135]
58. Nonetheless, CDC claim that investing in
funds domiciled in offshore financial centres "is the most
efficient way of pooling capital for investment in businesses
in the developing world"[136]
and is necessary in order to co-invest alongside the private sector.
CDC states that it only invests through OECD's 'white list' offshore
financial centres, with the exception of one fund from the mid-1990s
for the Pacific Region which is domiciled in Vanuatu, currently
on the OECD's 'grey list.'[137]
Whilst most DFIs do not have restrictions on the use of
tax havens by the funds and companies they support, since 2009
three DFIsNorfund (the Norwegian DFI), Swedfund (the Swedish
DFI) and Proparco (the French DFI)have been operating under
stricter restrictions on their use of secrecy jurisdictions.[138]
The Secretary of State observed that Norfund's more stringent
rules had "restricted its ability to attract third-party
funding, and also in some circumstances restricted its ability
to invest in Africa."[139]
59. Changes are, however, being considered.
The 2009 DFID White Paper affirms that, "we all suffer from
weak financial regulation, the financial impact of imbalances
in trade, and the action of tax havens."[140]
The Secretary of State said that the Treasury was carefully
examining this issue.
60. The domicile of companies
and funds in tax havens is a complex area which demands further
investigation and we stress the importance of HM Treasury addressing
this issue. Once established, CDC should follow standards of
best practice. By doing so, CDC could raise standards across
all DFIs. The tax payments made by CDC's fund managers and investee
companies should be transparent. They should be published annually
on a country-by-country basis.
Remuneration
61. The remuneration paid to CDC's executive
directors has attracted much criticism. The remuneration framework
is agreed with DFID and is benchmarked against the lowest quartile
of the 'fund of funds' industry. The Chief Executive's base salary
was £225,000 for 2010.[141]
Like all CDC employees, the CEO is eligible for his basic salary,
an annual bonus and the returns from the long-term incentive plan
(LTIP). Firm-wide the average bonus paid for 2009 performance
was 47.5% of salary.[142]
CDC claim to pay the necessary rate to recruit experts in this
field.[143] About
40% of the annual bonus is contingent on development impact.[144]
The NAO underlined the advantages of linking remuneration to
performance measures which had the potential to align staff behaviour
with DFID's objectives.[145]
62. However, many believe that CDC salaries are
unnecessarily high and too closely aligned with the financial
performance of funds. Jubilee Debt Campaign referred to the high
pay levels as "scandalous."[146]
The Committee received evidence that there would be individuals
with appropriate expertise who would be willing to work for a
unique organisation like CDC for far less money,[147]
and this opinion was shared by the Secretary of State.[148]
On the other hand, CDC claimed that this would not prove possible
in practice.[149]
Remuneration
should be linked to performance but we are concerned that current
pay rates within CDC are above what is necessary to recruit and
retain the appropriate staff.
The remuneration
framework needs to be redesigned to provide more incentives to
CDC's staff to increase CDC's development impact, instead of focusing
too heavily on financial returns. CDC should, as the Secretary
of State proposed, examine the possibility of recruiting experienced
staff that might be willing to work in a development organisation
at lower pay rates.
Actis
63. Actis Capital LLP was split out of CDC in
2004, as a commercially-orientated fund manager. It took over
CDC's overseas offices and the majority of CDC's staff, including
all those in overseas locations. Actis is a limited liability
partnership (LLP), owned 60% by its partners and an employee share
trust, and 40% by the Secretary of State for International Development.
The 60% shareholding in Actis was sold for just £373,000;
by May 2010 Actis had $4.8 billion of funds under management.[150]
64. The Secretary of State told us that the taxpayer
was also entitled to 80% of the profits but had not received any
money from Actis, despite its significant financial success and
the fact that 44% of its capital came from CDC.[151]
The Secretary of State explained that no profits have been declared
because Actis has set up its own charitable division.[152]
He said that he was "amazed and surprised at the way the
management of Actis have so enthusiastically exploited the taxpayer's
position."[153]
Alistair Boyd, Former CDC Deputy CEO, and Bowen Wells, Chair
of the International Development Select Committee 1997-2001, believed
that it was logical to sell DFID's shareholding in Actis and for
the proceeds to be made available to the new CDC.[154]
The Secretary of State agreed that there is no strategic reason
to retain the shareholding.[155]
We were
astonished to discover that following the sale of Actis for just
£373,000 the taxpayer had not received any return despite
being entitled to 80% of the company's profits. We recommend
that DFID's shareholding in Actis should be sold, but care must
be taken to achieve the maximum value. The capital received from
the sale could be reinvested into CDC.
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In October 2004, Anvil Mining Limited was linked to a counter-offensive
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in Katanga Province, DRC, which resulted in more than 70 civilian
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