Examination of Witness (Questions 58-91)
PROFESSOR ROBERT
BLACKBURN
7 SEPTEMBER 2010
Q58 Chair: Welcome, Professor Blackburn.
I'm sorry that we have overrun by a couple of minutes, but we
can make that good if we get to 12 o'clock. I was remiss—Mr
Hunt and Mrs Laing put me right—so it might be helpful if
you just take a few minutes to introduce your remarks and your
paper to give a refresher to colleagues around the table.
Professor Blackburn: Thank you,
Chair, and thank you for inviting me to speak to you today.
In the written paper that I sent in advance,
I just gave a few thoughts. This is a fairly complex legal, constitutional
and political issue, and even now I am not sure that I have managed
to digest all the implications of the Bill as you yourselves are
in the process of doing.
The point I tried to make by historically looking
at the genesis of this Bill was that it is, I think, fairly clear
that it is driven by the political self-interest of the coalition
Government. They want to fix the lifetime of this Government—not
the Parliament, but the Government—and I explain that in
various ways. It is clear what the advantage is, both to the Conservative
Party leadership and the Liberal Democrat leadership, of fixing
this arrangement for five years. The Liberal Democrats want to
be sure that the Conservative leadership would not cut and run
in the same way that a minority Administration with an informal
pact with the Liberal Democrats in Parliament might—as in
1974, although there wasn't a pact then—without some assurance.
The other side of the coin, of course, is that the Conservatives
want some guarantee that the Liberal Democrats won't change their
mind.
This is particularly important in the present
financial climate whereby some fairly unpopular measures are going
to have to be taken, such as public expenditure cuts and raising
taxation. So it is to the advantage of the Government to help
to implement their financial programme and hopefully, from their
own point of view, come out the other side restoring some popularity
before they meet the electorate again.
That leads me to the conclusion that there is
a confusion of purpose behind this Bill between, on the one hand,
dealing with the immediate situation, or crisis, in the coalition
Government, and, on the other—this should be the main purpose
of the Bill—reforming the law relating to election timing.
I think it's a shame that they are not being dealt with in two
different processes; they very easily could be dealt with in two
separate processes.
I very briefly touched on the consequences of
the Bill, which I could say more about later. I have also put
forward what would probably be my own preference for a fixed-term
Parliament arrangement, but I hasten to add that I think that
there is no perfect model that can be taken for election timing.
There are a number of different schemes that would work, and perhaps
we will discuss those later.
If one took some of the conclusions from what
Dr Jack has just been saying, for example, you could adopt a much
more minimalist reform, which would solve some of the main mischiefs.
Perhaps I should also say that in approaching this Bill, as it
does have quite a lot of consequences and aspects to it, one obviously
needs to be clear about what you think its main purposes are.
What is it you are trying to achieve through this legislation
and what are the main mischiefs that you are trying to resolve?
There might not necessarily be consensus about that.
In my own view, the guiding principle or purpose
behind reform of election timing should be to do something about
curbing the excessive power that a Prime Minister has had over
the general election date. That is the main objective. There are
other things that would be desirable as well, such as ensuring
that the monarchy doesn't get drawn into politics, which would
be damagingto the institution itself, and could very well end
up with the result that one political party was seriously upset
about the outcome. Later on, we might look at some historical
episodes that show how that could arise again in the future. I
think that's all I should say for now.
Q59 Chair: On a point of history,
while of course there is a current political situation—as
there always is—and that has been a trigger, none the less
all parties at various points have been committed to fixed-terms.
I'm thinking back: the Labour Party was certainly committed to
that under its leader Neil Kinnock, and I know that on occasions
stuff has been approved through the policy-making process through
the Labour Party on a fixed-term Parliament. Of course there have
to be the right political circumstances for something like this
to happen, but none the less there's a long history of people
proposing changes in the relationship between the Executive and
the legislature, of which this is one part.
Professor Blackburn: I think that's
right. The idea of fixed-term Parliaments has slowly gathered
momentum over the last 20 years, and it is quite striking that
there does now seem to be a virtual consensus that something ought
to be done about election timing, and that the Prime Minister
has an excessive amount of power over the issue. But, of course,
the devil is in the detail of exactly how you draft a fixed-term
arrangement. So, yes, I absolutely agree with that.
Q60 Mrs Laing: Can we call on your
knowledge of similar legislatures in other countries to examine
the issue of the actual term of a fixed-term Parliament? In practice,
during the past 70 or 80 years, in normal times, Parliaments have
generally tended in this country to last for four years rather
than five, although of course there have been different arrangements.
In some parts of the world, Australia, for example—I might
be wrong—there is a three-year term, although Australia
at the moment is an interesting example perhaps of how not to
construct a constitution, and how not to call an election for
political purposes. Is there a body of evidence of which we ought
to be aware that would suggest three, four or five years or some
other term of Parliament?
Professor Blackburn: My feeling
on that is, no, generally speaking. One can look around the world,
and there are 101 different ways of organising election timing.
I think one has to evaluate this proposal within our own indigenous
political and constitutional circumstances. I don't think there
is a lot to be gained by going around the world, shopping around
looking for the best scheme. The other thing is that you can hardly
find two schemes that are identical. They are all slightly different.
They all have slightly different nuances attached to them. Even
within the Commonwealth where there might be a Governor General,
the position of a Governor General is not the same as a monarch,
so the relative powers are slightly different. Some fixed-terms
relate to where there is a separation of powers, as in America
of course. But there are, as you suggested, three and, probably
most commonly, four-year terms. There are three-year terms in
Australia and New Zealand, as you say. There are some five-year
terms as well, such as in the National Assembly in France, but
they have a president and a different system of Government. It
is useful looking back on how long our own terms have been in
the last 100 years or so. While we can take an average—the
average does in fact come out almost exactly at four years—of
course, the range has fluctuated depending on particular circumstances.
Q61 Chair: But it would be true to
say, wouldn't it, that most western democracies have fixed-terms
for their legislature and their Executive?
Professor Blackburn: Yes. Most.
Quite a few systems have floating dates.
Q62 Chair: None the less, there are
provisions that are not normally used for extraordinary circumstances.
If the President of the United States is indisposed, there are
means by which—for example, in the Nixon presidency—handovers
can take place, but those are for extraordinary circumstances
rather than a way of getting round having a president for four
years or whatever.
Professor Blackburn: Absolutely,
and of course in our own system we have the extraordinary process
of a no confidence motion. There is no good reason why, in the
past, Parliament couldn't have served its full term, but it has
suited the Executive, particularly over the last 100 years, to
keep the machinery of Dissolution well-oiled by using it on every
occasion.
Q63 Simon Hart: Both my questions
have been answered, but I will think up a third one instead. We
are looking at a five-year fixed-term. In a paragraph, why should
we vote against that when the opportunity comes next week?
Professor Blackburn: A judgment
has to be made by yourselves as to what the right balance is between
giving a Government a sufficiently long period of time to carry
out their programme for office and, on the other hand, having
a mechanism for accountability and responsibility to the electorate.
My own feeling is that in this country five years is held to be
a very long time. If you think back to five-year terms in the
past, the last year of every one has been pretty awful. I think
everybody has felt, [odq]For God's sake let's have an election[cdq],
and usually it redounds badly on the Government as well.
Q64 Chair: Is that because it is
the last year, or because it is the fifth year? Won't there be
a last year in a four-year Parliament which would be pretty awful?
Professor Blackburn: There is
a combination of both. I am not so sure, actually, that—this
might confuse the issue—seven years isn't the time when
people start getting fed up and want a change.
Simon Hart: I thought that that applied
to marriage rather than Parliament.
Professor Blackburn: I think there
might be something in that.
Chair: Is this an evidence-based scientific
view, Professor Blackburn? Is this your opinion?—[Laughter.]
Professor Blackburn: All I am
saying is that this might explain why Governments tend to win
their second terms. If you look back at elections, it is the incumbency
that usually wins a general election—even more so under
a system where they can determine the election date themselves.
Q65 Simon Hart: I rather support
your view that it is not much good going round the world to try
and pick decent examples. We had a debate yesterday about whether
Papua New Guinea was a shining example of what was under discussion,
so it doesn't always work very well. Surely there must be some
examples we can call upon which help us come to a decision about
whether fixing the term, if you like, at the maximum—which
is what we are doing next week—is a more desirous route
than fixing it perhaps at what has tended to be the average, which
is four years.
Professor Blackburn: I am not
sure that you can. You can look at particular examples, but the
political equation will always be different. Relative size and
strength between the Government and the Opposition—all these
are variables. It really comes down to a question of how strong
you want Government to be and how strong you want the mechanism
for accountability to the electorate to be. Things would be different
if we had a separate Executive of course.
If we had a separate Executive, the arguments
for having much more frequent elections for Parliament would be
much stronger—the Chartists' idea of annual Parliaments
could even come into play. I have to say that I think that there
is some irony in the fact that one of the big issues that has
troubled the political class over the past few years—over
the past 10 years I think—is disengagement from politics.
How can we promote greater popular participation in politics?
The irony in the proposal is that it makes elections less frequent.
Q66 Chair: We are not confusing media
participation in politics with grass-roots activism in politics,
are we? They may wish to have an election every year because it's
great fun and you can take strips off anybody.
Professor Blackburn: For most
people, the one occasion when they participate in the political
process is a general election. I say [odq]most people[cdq] because,
of course, the turnouts for other electoral processes are pretty
low. This is an incredibly important issue on which legislation
is being introduced. A general election really is the main political
event of our democracy; it determines not just the composition
of our representatives in Parliament, the legislature, but the
composition of the Executive—in one act. It is a really
important issue.
Q67 Sheila Gilmore: Having read a
lot of these papers, I wondered if, in fact, the difference between
the impact of having fixed-terms and not having fixed-terms is
slightly exaggerated, or whether it changes the mindset. For example,
there seem to be ways in which, certainly in some countries and
Governments, despite there being a fixed-term, elections can come
along relatively frequently or can be encouraged, in one way or
another, to happen. Equally, the politics of early elections—the
argument that the Prime Minister can use it as a lever over his
own party—still exists to some extent within the fixed-term
arrangement, but maybe in a slightly different way in Scotland.
In the current Scottish Parliament, it appears
that no one has wanted to trigger that kind of vote of confidence,
and, to some extent, that still gives the First Minister the power
to say, [odq]If you rock the boat, we'll have an election[cdq],
and people don't want that. Is this not more about the political
context than the legal one?
Professor Blackburn: I think that's
right. I don't think we should get too hung up on ensuring that
there isn't a general election within the fixed-term. General
elections aren't necessarily a bad thing. My own feeling is that
the Bill as drafted sets the threshold too high; the term is too
long and it is too difficult to have a Dissolution. Personally,
I'd prefer a more straightforward Bill that goes more with the
grain of our system of voting in the House of Commons, and that
is reflected in the alternative scheme that I put to you.
Q68 Sheila Gilmore: In terms of making
it simpler, do you therefore argue that even if it could be triggered
more easily, the political realities are that that will happen
only when there is a real need for it? The political parties themselves
don't necessarily want to defeat a Government just for the sake
of it. That has very much been the context in Scotland, certainly
in the three years since the previous Scottish Parliament election.
Arguably, the Government might have been overthrown, but no one
has wanted to do it.
Professor Blackburn: Absolutely,
I think that there is no tradition of manipulating the power of
Dissolution for party purposes in Scotland yet, whereas there
has been a tradition of that over here.
Q69 Tristram Hunt: The Committee
notes your advocacy of four rather than five years and your comments
about the political agenda behind the Bill. I just wanted to tease
out a couple of things, first, the very interesting idea that
this takes away what you call the facility, and what others might
call the prerogative, of the Prime Minister to make an appeal
to the people. So one goes from making something an issue of confidence—dissolving
a Parliament and having an election on an issue, be it a war or
a major piece of legislation—and moves towards referendum
politics. Can you tease out that idea?
Professor Blackburn: I think,
historically, the idea of an appeal to the people has been one
of the main justifications for the prerogative of Dissolution.
As you all know, it hastended not to be a very useful weapon for
the Prime Minister; it has tended to be counter-productive. Even
when there was an appeal to the people over the House of Lords
back in 1910, the Asquith majority went down. Of course, it also
backfired famously with Edward Heath in 1974. But yes, it is there,
and if there is some issue or principle on which a Prime Minister
specifically wants the backing of the people, it is a mechanism
for an issue of confidence: a vote of confidence in the Government
that they are doing a good job and that we trust them with this
particular issue. Removing it raises the whole issue of the desirability
of referendums. I have some reservations about referendums, but
if one was enthusiastic about them and thought people should be
consulted much more , we would have to go down the route of having
more referendums outside our Dissolution arrangement.
Q70 Tristram Hunt: The other element
you suggested is rather than reducing the power of the sovereign,
which it does in Dissolution affairs, it could heighten the power
of the monarch in terms of appointments during prolonged hung
Parliaments. How would that work?
Professor Blackburn: I think this
is an interesting issue. It was an interesting issue in the May
2010 general election as well. There is a bit of a story behind
all this, some of which has taken place behind closed doors. You
all know that in the past when there has been a hung Parliament,
it was dealt with slightly differently. With what happened in
1974, the convention was much clearer that the incumbent Prime
Minister had the first opportunity to form an Administration.
So Edward Heath entertained Jeremy Thorpe at 10 Downing Street
to have negotiations about that. The monarchy was in the background,
of course. You can look at other situations going back where the
monarchy has been quite heavily involved in Dissolution or Government
formation issues.
I suppose 1931 is the most famous example to
remind ourselves of where the monarchy played the leading role
in what happened. From 1929 to 1931 there was a minority Labour
Administration. There was the Wall Street Crash and the financial
crisis. The American bankers, J P Morgan, were threatening to
call in the loan that the British Government had with them unless
effectively public expenditure cuts were made and agreed by the
Cabinet. The Labour Cabinet could not agree on those cuts, so
Ramsay MacDonald went to see King George V and informed him about
all this. King George V returned from Balmoral, as I recall, in
the summer in a crisis mentality. Normally, what would have happened
in this type of situation is that either there would have been
a general election, or MacDonald would have resigned and Stanley
Baldwin, the Leader of the Conservative Party, would have taken
over. Baldwin was on a yacht in the Mediterranean or somewhere
and wasn't around. The King started brokering what should happen
in the circumstances, consulting Sir Herbert Simon, the Liberals
and so on. He more or less put together the National Government,
reappointing Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister with the Conservatives
joining in. Stanley Baldwin was quite happy to go along with that
because the National Government would be implementing unpopular
public expenditure cuts, yet there was a Labour figure fronting
them. The Labour Party, which knew absolutely nothing about the
negotiations, were outraged and expelled MacDonald, Philip Snowden
and a few others from the Labour Party. That was regarded by some
as a palace coup, but it just shows what can happen. The monarch
was playing a very leading role in Government formation.
Times have changed since then, but we should
not be lulled into a false sense of security by the fact that,
on the throne over the past 50 years, we have had a monarch who
has been an absolute model of constitutional propriety. She has
had absolutely no problems in suppressing her private views for
her public duties. In the future, different personalities will
be on the throne who will be more interventionist-minded. The
whole idea behind having an hereditary Head of State is that we
do not know what human nature will throw up. We need to have some
constitutional machinery to deal with the position of a Head of
State and, by the same token, to deal with exercising the royal
powers of Government formation and the appointment of a Prime
Minister.
Q71 Tristram Hunt: My final question
is about your own model for what should happen, the idea of the
permanent Parliament. An early election is followed by another
term of Parliament, which makes up the length of the Parliament
as it were. Have I got that right?
Professor Blackburn: I always
feel rather uneasy during the election campaign because there
is no Parliament in existence for about five weeks. There might
be an emergency, there could be a terrorist outrage or an environmental
disaster, and no Parliament would be in existence. Of course,
the Government still carries on. This might be seen as a small
matter, but it would be more logical if we were trying to construct
a good electoral and constitutional process, for Parliament to
be kept in continuous existence. Of course, it would go into recess
and adjourn during the election campaign, but it could be recalled
by the Speaker at any time if a national crisis or disaster had
to be dealt with.
You are a professional historian, so perhaps
I can digress. To answer the question in a slightly different
way, it helps to have an historical perspective when evaluating
the current system. The basis of our system of election timing
is the relationship between the Crown and Parliament. The Crown
is the ultimate authority in the state and, historically, Parliament
came into existence, was summoned and dissolved as the personal
creature of the Crown. As a result of the 17th century constitutional
conflicts, Parliament was very concerned with its existence and,
during the written constitutions in the interregnum—fascinating
documents to look at—there was great concern with making
sure that Parliament was summoned.
Particularly as a result of King Charles II
and his extraordinary long period of 17 years without convening
a Parliament, the Triennial Act came into existence so that a
Parliament should be summoned within three years and last for
no longer than three years. There was then the Septennial Act
in 1716. In the 20th century, as we moved into the modern era,
the rather archaic system of election timing has been manipulated
by the Prime Minister. We must remind ourselves that, in the 19th
century, Parliaments were expected to last their full term. If
we look at 19th century constitutional texts, there was an idea
that Parliament could be dissolved only in certain constitutional
situations, such as if there was a conflict between both Houses,
a Representation of the People Act had just been passed, or if
there was a division in the Cabinet.
In the 20th century, all those conventions disappeared
and we have just been left with a naked power of a Prime Minister
being able to manipulate the power of Dissolution for some advantage
in the electoral outcome. That is also seen to some extent in
the way in which the public announcement of the general election
is made, which has evolved interestingly—going back to Dr
Jack's point about Standing Orders. In the first half of the 20th
century, the Prime Minister usually announced a general election
in the House of Commons. That was normally accompanied by a motion
being put forward to give precedence to Government business for
the remainder of the Session. Asquith, Baldwin and MacDonald all
did this.
Since the second world war, Standing Orders
have been changed to give automatic precedence to Government business,
so in the wash-up period, as it were, the Government have automatic
precedence anyway. So things were replaced by the Prime Minister
just putting out a press release and MPs feeling somewhat disgruntled
that they were hearing the news of their own demise in the same
way as everybody else, through the media. More recently, John
Major turned the public announcement into a photo opportunity
in 1992 outside No. 10 Downing street, and in 2001 Tony Blair
took that one stage further to a photo opportunity in a schoolroom—if
you remember—in south London.
It is useful, I think, to have a historical
perspective on this whole scheme of arrangement, and it would
be better really, in an ideal world, to start again and not be
starting from the point of view of having the royal prerogative
controlling the summoning and Dissolution of Parliament. But you
are talking here, I think, about a written or codified constitution.
The idea of a permanent Parliament would work best in that arrangement.
The German Bundestag has a system not dissimilar to this, whereby
it is kept in more or less permanent existence, but there are
fixed periods between the election dates.
Q72 Chair: So the Government continue
come what may, whereas Parliament is unstable in that it finishes
and restarts again, really at the behest of the Executive. So,
you're suggesting that Parliament should have a degree of continuity
and stability, punctuated by only general elections—that
it has a life of its own.
Professor Blackburn: Absolutely.
A point I make in my written evidence also, is that there are
much wider issues to consider. In looking at constitutional reform
more generally and being joined up, where does reform of the House
of Lords fit into this electoral cycle? If you have a permanent
Parliament, it makes it much easier to set up a system of elections
in the second Chamber. I think that will probably emerge as the
preferred option, whereby there is rotating membership or elections
at different times, so that you do not have a new House being
elected all at the same time.
Q73 Mrs Laing: I was going to come
on to another subject, but just to continue this idea about the
permanent Parliament, you have prompted me to consider the other
side of a Member of Parliament's duties, and that is our pastoral
duties in our constituencies. You rightly said that Government
goes on and there is no possibility for scrutiny or holding to
account because there is no Parliament here in the House of Commons,
but, of course, Members of Parliament have pastoral duties towards
their constituents. It is a strange situation that for a month
or more, a Member of Parliament has to say to constituents, [odq]I'm
not your Member of Parliament. I hope I might be in another few
weeks, but I'm not just now.[cdq] If one is dealing with a difficult
personal case for someone, of course you don't stop doing it because
there is a general election. If somebody is in difficulties, you
keep helping them. Have you considered that side of a permanent
Parliament?
Professor Blackburn: No, I haven't.
I think it's a very good point. I think that you should continue
with your constituency duties at the same time as electioneering.
Q74 Mrs Laing: Thank you. On to the
other matter, which is the balance of power between the legislature
and the Executive, the Deputy Prime Minister has said, on the
record several times, that he believes that the proposals he has
put forward in this Bill effectively [odq]strengthen the power
of the House[cdq]. Do they, in fact, strengthen the power of the
House, given that, at present, on a simple majority of Members
of Parliament, the Government can be defeated on a vote of confidence,
and that will no longer be the case? Does that strengthen the
position of the House?
Professor Blackburn: I'm not sure
that it does. I feel that I need to still reflect upon all the
implications of the Bill regarding that. My feeling is that it
certainly curtails the power of the Prime Minister to control
the election date, so it does something to place some limitation
on the power of the Executive. I'm not sure about the extent to
which it enhances the power of the House of Commons.
Q75 Mr Chope: Does it enhance the
power of the House of Commons at all?
Professor Blackburn: I am not
sure that it does. Of course, one has to take into account the
influence of the party Whips and the extent to which party Back
Benchers will follow the wishes of party leaders.
Q76 Mr Chope: May I ask you the question
I raised earlier with Dr Jack about what's happening with this
Bill? Parliament's already begun and we are now legislating to
have this Parliament with a fixed date. In Scotland, there were
proposals for a fixed-term Parliament, which were then legislated
on, and then that applied to subsequent Parliaments. Are you aware
of any precedent whereby a Parliament has decided, after it has
already been elected, to change the terms of engagement?
Professor Blackburn: I heard you
ask that question. I am afraid that my knowledge of foreign legislatures
doesn't extend to a specific example of that, although I could
go back and try and consult my reference books to find out. I
would imagine that there are quite a few examples of that happening.
Of course, the British Parliament extended its own life in the
Septennial Act, so I would not be surprised if there were examples.
I don't think this is an extraordinary thing to do.
Q77 Mr Chope: What about the idea
that the Bill could be amended to have fixed-terms of seven years?
Professor Blackburn: Yes, if later
on Parliament wants to change the scheme of arrangement, it can
certainly do so.
Q78 Mr Chope: You are saying in your
paper that you would be in favour of just a simple majority being
sufficient to trigger a general election and a Dissolution?
Professor Blackburn: Yes.
Q79 Mr Chope: That appeals to me,
simplistically. How would that work in a hung Parliament?
Professor Blackburn: The scheme
of arrangement I had in mind was that the Prime Minister would
not be able to call a general election in the same way that Harold
Wilson did in 1974, unless other non-governing party Members supported
the resolution. So the Prime Minister couldn't call a snap election
just to try and gain a majority. Otherwise the scheme would work
as at present but curtail the length of the Parliament following
an early Dissolution as outlined in my written evidence. What
I suggest in my scheme was that you could have a constructive
motion of no confidence, whereby you could actually present the
alternative Prime Minister, as well.
Q80 Chair: On the question that a
number of colleagues have raised about the balance between Executive
and legislature, it may be that the legislature per se
hasn't got a paragraph where it says, [odq]And this is really
strengthening Parliament[cdq], but I would have thought that defining
a prime ministerial power for the first time ever legitimately
inhibits the Executive to an extent, and therefore, in the balance
of things, Parliament in that equation is slightly stronger. Would
that be true?
Professor Blackburn: Yes. I think
that's probably right. In my paper, I pointed out that the reform
removes not only the tactical advantage of a Prime Minister, but
what I call a sort of penal power that a Prime Minister has over
his colleagues by threatening a Dissolution if they don't support
him. To that extent also I think it extends the power of his parliamentary
colleagues.
Q81 Chair: We always tend to look
for the things that might go wrong if there's any change, and
we're a bit cautious. The Clerk produced a very good paper outlining
some of the potential difficulties, but we've asked him to go
away—I don't know if you were in the room at the time—and
also mention one or two of the positive things. Obviously, having
a full five-year session to implement a programme is not only
useful for the Executive. In terms of scrutiny, having five years'
worth of Select Committees and elected members and Chairs who
would be able to set out a programme for five years so that perhaps
we would not need to rush a couple of very important Bills on
to the Floor on virtually day one, but have a measured programme
over five years, are just some of the possible advantages for
the legislature in conducting its business more effectively. Are
there others that spring to mind, or do you accept that they are
in fact useful advantages of a fixed-term?
Professor Blackburn: As I said
earlier, I think that there is a balance to be struck. There are
arguments for five years, particularly in terms of planning. If
that can also be combined with a culture—
Chair: Sorry, I've confused the issue
by talking about a five-year term. What are the advantages of
fixed-terms, which could be four or five years?
Professor Blackburn: Well, I think
the advantage is also one of planning. I will be interested to
see if the super-majority procedure goes through. That would make
it very difficult for the Prime Minister to call a Dissolution
himself. If there was just a simple majority, which is what I
have suggested that I would prefer, I would hope that that would
be accompanied by some new culture or some expectation that a
Prime Minister won't call snap elections for no good reason.
Q82 Chair: Finally, do you know of
any other western democracy that has initiated a written constitution
and said, [odq]We think the Prime Minister should have the power
to decide when the legislature meets and when elections take place[cdq]?
Professor Blackburn: No.
Mrs Laing: There's a surprise.
Q83 Mr Turner: I have two questions.
First, you said that, in the 19th century, there were particular
reasons for which you could call an election, and otherwise not,
I assume. In the 20th century, almost the reverse has apparently
been true. When did it change?
Professor Blackburn: It was a
gradual process. There is a similar debate that there used to
be a convention—it was thought, anyway; perhaps it was theory
and not so much practice—that it was very much a Cabinet
decision, a collegiate decision. But, as Lloyd George promoted
a much more Executive-minded, president-orientated chief executive—a
stronger form of government—perhaps it went with the requirement
in the early part of the 20th century that we needed a stronger
Executive, because we were running a much larger enterprise with
the welfare state, the interventionist state, not to mention dealing
with the huge war effort between 1914 and 1918. I think that all
those tendencies somehow elevated his position, and that they
elevated his position vis-a"-vis his Cabinet colleagues.
So I think that the control over the power of Dissolution has
gone hand in hand with the whole process or transition from Cabinet
government to prime ministerial government that has taken place
over the course of the 20th century.
Q84 Mr Turner: Secondly, we are rather
talking as if everyone had a break when they had an election,
but in the United States there is no such thing. There are four-yearly
periods for the President, but two-yearly ones for the Congressmen
and six-yearly, broken into three and therefore two-yearly for
a third, for Senate. Why should we not have such a system here?
After all, when I lived in Oxfordshire, it had a four-yearly term,
but Oxford City Council had three separate years for each ward.
Why aren't we thinking of those?
Professor Blackburn: You mean
different terms for the two Houses, or—
Mr Turner: No, I was thinking that, let's
say, a fifth of the House of Commons shall retire each year.
Professor Blackburn: That's quite
a radical proposal. It would have a major impact on Government
formation; you may find that the Government suddenly lost their
majority. It would lead to a fairly unstable form of government
perhaps, but, so be it, if Parliament should be the determining
factor in these matters. Such a system would, again, throw the
whole process of Government formation into high relief. Linking
it back to the question earlier—which I didn't entirely
answer—in 2010 the Cabinet Office took a lead in facilitating
the inter-party negotiations. There had been a draft Cabinet Manual
prepared by the Cabinet Secretary that came into operation, and
the previous conventions were slightly modified. I think that
that did have a subtle impact on the outcome of the negotiations,
but we can only conjecture upon it.
One interesting psychological change was that
10 Downing Street was no longer the forum for negotiations, it
was the Cabinet Office. That might be a good thing. Exactly who
is going to be brokering this very important decision as to who
is to be Prime Minister and which inter-party negotiations or
which combination is going to prevail? It needs to be thought
about very carefully. Is it going to be the Cabinet Secretary
or the monarch? Do you revert to the incumbent Prime Minister
playing a key role or should the Speaker play an enhanced role?
Those factors need to be thought about very carefully. Similarly,
note the idea of a confirmatory vote, which is attached to the
no confidence procedure in the Bill. As I said in my written evidence,
I think that this is going to give rise to the query, [odq]If
you have a confirmatory vote then, should there be a confirmatory
vote in the House of Commons when a new Prime Minister is appointed
every time?[cdq] That would be the key issue to come out of what
you have suggested.
Q85 Nick Boles: Why are you so opposed
to the super majority? Surely, the point is to stop—given
that we have this merging of the Executive and Parliament in our
system—a Prime Minister who has won a majority at the previous
election of the House of Commons from whipping a Dissolution motion.
That is a good thing. What is wrong with it?
Professor Blackburn: I am not
so opposed to it; I am a pragmatist, and I am just stating my
preference. I am instinctively concerned about introducing a super
majority. This is an unprecedented procedure. We haven't had this
before. In what other circumstances might it be used? It would
be a precedent for later on perhaps. I think a simple majority
does the trick, and it goes with the grain of our parliamentary
tradition in which our culture works at the moment. It means that
if the House of Commons thinks that there should be a general
election, there should be a general election. An election is not
an unwelcome prospect, why should you make it so difficult? Taking
away the power of the Prime Minister to control the election debate
unilaterally and arbitrarily, and making it subject to the House
of Commons—thereby having to carry his colleagues with him
and a majority in the House in a minority Government or coalition
situations—would be my preferred way forward.
Q86 Nick Boles: Are you not then
denying that there is any value in distinguishing between constitutional
matters, which should require more than the level of support of
normal matters of Government business? Certainly, is it not the
case that most countries in the world feel that there should be
greater protection for constitutional measures, so that they cannot
be changed by the whim of a Prime Minister who happens to have
a majority of five?
Professor Blackburn: Yes, but
you are talking about special procedures to change the constitution.
Q87 Nick Boles: Isn't moving an election
forward for no reason, when your Government are perfectly functioning
and capable, not a constitutional change?
Professor Blackburn: I see them
as different. I think this is a political decision. I don't think
general elections are necessarily unwelcome. If there is a majority
feeling in the House that there should be a general election for
a good reason—
Nick Boles: Like we could increase our
majority.
Professor Blackburn: The Prime
Minister is going to have to come down to the House, and give
the reasons and articulate why he wants a general election. If
the Opposition think he is just cutting and running because he
is ahead in public opinion polls, they will say that. The electorate
can then decide whether they think the Prime Minister has behaved
properly, or has brought an election unnecessarily in advance
and should suffer the consequences. I think there is a cultural
aspect to it as well.
Nick Boles: An unnecessarily conservative
view.
Q88 Chair: I think the cultural aspect
is very important. Again, because we have 100 years of history
behind us of Prime Ministers doing this, we are looking at it
from the point of view of how the Prime Minister could wangle
his way around a fixed-term, which is an open and clear commitment
from the current Administration. Culturally, however, it would
be viewed with great disdain if someone wanted to manipulate the
system that the House had agreed, which I think was in manifestos—I
am not too sure about that—and which has become the way
we do things. People would cry foul if other people sought to
play around with the rules. You would move to a different cultural
view of what the political norm was. Have I got that right?
Professor Blackburn: I would anticipate
that to be the case. In your discussion with Dr Jack, I think
it came out that any system can be manipulated by the Executive.
I can foresee that the no confidence mechanism could be manipulated
by getting someone else to table a motion and it succeeding through
abstentions or whatever, and then possibly even manipulating the
power of Prorogation to put off an alternative Government being
confirmed within the 14-day period. Anyone who is manipulating
a system as blatantly as that would suffer the consequences eventually.
I hope that the new legislation will, possibly with amendments,
bring in a new constitutional hygiene, as it were, into the whole
process related to general election timing.
Q89 Mr Chope: You mentioned earlier
the possible interaction of the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill with
an elected second Chamber. Do you think the fact that we haven't
yet got a draft Bill for the second Chamber, but we're being expected
to vote on this without being able to look at the two together,
is a disadvantage? Would it not be much better to be able to look
at the whole of this issue at one time? Are there not implications
with, depending on what was to happen to the other Chamber, having
a mid-term election—for want of a better expression—which
would give the other Chamber a massive majority against what would
be the elected Government in this Chamber?
Professor Blackburn: Yes. All
my academic colleagues and I think, [odq]For heaven's sake, what
is going on with reform of the House of Lords? How long will it
be put off for?[cdq] Again, there is obviously some party-political
interests about the whole business. Yes, this reform needs to
be dealt with in conjunction with the other part of the legislature.
I can see that in practical terms it is difficult to get through
some constitutional reforms, and perhaps they sometimes need to
be driven through to get one change done. However I think we've
reached the stage, particularly after the wide number of constitutional
reforms taking place over the last 12 years or so, at which a
much more joined-up approach to constitutional reform is necessary.
That may require some co-operation between Select Committees to
take a coherent view of what's going on and join up the different
parts of the constitutional structure. The idea of a codified
constitution as advocated by some would be not so much a radical
reforming measure, but a means by which to bring some stability
and coherence to the way forward.
Q90 Sheila Gilmore: I have a couple
of questions about what you said. Would you think that in fact,
by creating fixed-term Parliaments for Scotland and the Welsh
Assembly, it has created a culture change and an expectation that
it would be exceptional? I would like your comment on that.
One of the practical issues that has arisen
out of the particular suggestion for five years—I know it
doesn't happen every time—has been the fact that immediately,
the first time that we have this new situation, we have a conjuncture
of the Scottish and Welsh elections, unless something is done
to move them apart. That is something that people feel quite strongly
about, particularly in Scotland. The fear is that the politics
in the Scottish Parliament will be subsumed in this. An effort
to keep them quite separate might be valuable.
Professor Blackburn: I agree.
I think the success of the devolved Assemblies has had a subtle
impact on the political culture generally within the country,
and has some effect down here as well. I was struck, during the
1997 election that brought Alex Salmond to power, by the fact
that when the Scottish National party got just one more seat than
the Labour Party, everyone simply assumed that Alex Salmond was
going to be First Minister. I wondered later on whether that had
some impact on the outcome of the 2010 election, whereby there
was a much stronger expectation that David Cameron, because he
had got more seats, would be Prime Minister and whether that influenced
Nick Clegg himself. I think that there is an organic interplay
between the cultures between the different legislative assemblies.
Q91 Chair: If there are no more questions
from colleagues, would Professor Blackburn like to have a minute
to conclude?
Professor Blackburn: I would like
to wish you well in your scrutiny of the Bill. Like Dr Jack, I
would like to have seen this in a draft Bill. I think it is very
difficult for you to perform your job of reporting to the House
with such extraordinary short notice. I think this is a major
reform that requires some gestation period, thinking through all
its implications very carefully and separating out the different
objects that are being desired. There are a few issues that we
have not mentioned today, which I think need to be tidied up.
If elections are going to be in May, how will that affect the
annual parliamentary cycle? Are we always going to have a long
period between May and November the following year, and a short
final session? You are going to have to readjust that. The Bill
seems to also settle the argument that has been running for some
time about whether general elections should be at the weekend
as part of promoting greater participation and greater turnout
in elections. It seems to have been decided that it has to be
Thursday.
There are a lot of little and large consequences
of the Bill, and I wish you well in your scrutiny. Thank you for
inviting me.
Chair: Professor Blackburn, thank you
very much indeed. Thank you, colleagues.
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