Conclusions and recommendations
Principle and Process
1.
It is questionable whether a Prime Minister should be able to
use his position in government to give him and his party an electoral
advantage by choosing to hold the next general election to a schedule
that best suits him. We therefore acknowledge the principle behind
the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill. (Paragraph 1)
2. We expect to consider
the prerogative powers and Executive power more generally in the
course of our scrutiny of wider constitutional issues. (Paragraph
3)
3. While we understand
the political impetus for making swift progress in this area,
bills of such legal and constitutional sensitivity should be published
in draft for full pre-legislative scrutiny, rather than proceeded
with in haste. We intend to inquire very soon, in co-operation
with the Procedure Committee if possible, into how proper pre-legislative
scrutiny of such Bills can best be ensured in future, whether
through the House's Standing Orders or otherwise. (Paragraph 7)
The length of the fixed-term
4. The
current five-year maximum term was introduced with the expectation
that it would probably amount in practice to a four-year term.
(Paragraph 11)
5. Precedent gives
no clear answer as to whether Parliaments should last four years
or five. (Paragraph 13)
6. In the limited
period we have had to receive evidence, most of the opinion suggests
that it would be better for general elections to be held every
four years, rather than every five. This is an important point,
but not one that we would wish to see obstruct the passage of
the Bill through the House. We would, however, expect the Government
to explain more fully to the House the advantages and disadvantages
of four and five-year terms, and how it weighed these up in reaching
its decision on the length of the fixed term. (Paragraph 20)
7. In any case, there
is likely to be pressure to re-examine the timescales for elections
across the country—including general elections—in
the not too distant future. (Paragraph 21)
Premature ending of a fixed term
8. The
Government needs to respond to the concerns expressed by the Clerk
of the House of Commons about the potential impact of clause 2
of the Bill on parliamentary privilege. (Paragraph 29)
9. The purpose of
the Bill needs to be achieved without inviting the courts to question
aspects of the House's own procedures or the actions of the Speaker,
except where this is absolutely unavoidable and clearly justifiable.
(Paragraph 33)
10. Although a number
of our witnesses believe that the current drafting of the Bill
is already adequate to avoid unwarranted judicial challenge of
this kind, the House would be wise to consider whether the approach
suggested by the Clerk of the House could be made to work in practice
without significantly altering or diluting the purpose of the
Bill or opening the door to abuse by Government. His suggested
approach is that those parts of the Government's proposals relating
to proceedings in the House could be transplanted from the Bill
to the House's Standing Orders, and entrenched in Standing Orders
so that they could not be overturned by a simple majority. (Paragraph
34)
11. We recommend that
the Government and the House should consider whether a Parliament
following an early general election should last for only as long
as the remainder of the term of the previous Parliament, and whether
such a provision would make a super-majority for a dissolution
unnecessary. (Paragraph 39)
12. The problem that
some have identified with the existing situation is that general
elections can be timed to partisan advantage. There is a simple
and obvious solution to this problem, which deserves to be explored:
the Bill could provide that the only situation in which an early
general election could be called was where there was cross-party
agreement that this was desirable. This could be achieved by amending
clause 2 of the Bill to provide that an early general election
should take place only where the House agreed by a simple majority
to a motion in the name of the Prime Minister to this effect,
tabled with the agreement of the Leader of the Opposition, and
possibly also with the agreement of the leader of the third largest
party in the House. (Paragraph 41)
13. If the Bill was
to be amended in this way, it might avoid the need for separate
provision for an early general election where no government could
be formed that commanded the confidence of the House. This would
be a considerable advantage, because the consequences of the current
provisions for confidence motions contained in clause 2 (2) of
the Bill are uncertain. (Paragraphs 42-43)
14. We recommend that
there should be clarity, before the Bill enters its remaining
stages in the House, as to the circumstances in which a government
losing the confidence of the House could trigger an early general
election, and those circumstances, if any, in which it could not.
(Paragraph 45)
15. We will examine
as part of a future inquiry the possibility of the House formally
endorsing a new government, after a general election and in other
circumstances. (Paragraph 49)
16. We recommend that
the Government should explain why the Bill contains no formal
provision requiring a government to resign if it loses the confidence
of the House. (Paragraph 50)
Conclusion
17. We
acknowledge the Coalition's proposal that the current and future
Prime Ministers should no longer have the power to call general
elections at a time of their choosing, that general elections
should be held to a fixed schedule, and that departures from that
schedule should be rare, and decided by the House, not the Prime
Minister. We regret, however, the rushed timetable that the Government
has unnecessarily adopted for the Bill, and the incremental and
piecemeal approach to constitutional change that the Bill seems
to represent. We trust that the recommendations made in this Report
will provide a context for the detailed examination of the Bill
by the House at committee stage, if it decides to give the Bill
a second reading. (Paragraph 51)
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