Written evidence submitted by Professor
Dawn Oliver, UCL (FTPB 02)
1. THE OBJECTIONS
TO THE
PRESENT SYSTEM:
The present system enables the Prime Minister
to choose a date for the general election before the expiry of
the five years since the previous election.
— The PM may therefore choose a date when
s/he considers the governing party has the best chance of winning
or that particular other parties have the worst chance of winning.
— It is not fair on the other parties or
on voters to give the incumbent this advantage.
— It is contrary to any idea that constitutional
arrangements, particularly for elections, should be neutral as
between parties and their supporters.
There is always a risk that parties and their
leaders will assume that their function is to exercise their powers
and functions in the interests of their members and voters.
— This is contrary to the general constitutional
principle that government is there to serve the general public
interest and not the interests of particular sectors of society,
whether parties and their members, or religious, racial, sex,
class or other interests.
— This risk is illustrated by the way in
which David Cameron criticised Gordon Brown when he became PM
in 2007 for bottling out of calling an election that year, when
he should have criticised Brown for even considering calling an
election at a time that would maximise the chances of his party
winning and of the other parties doing badly.
In my view our constitutional arrangements should
be designed to guard against the natural tendencies of parties
and others to promote their own interests rather than general
interests.
2. THE ONLY
ARGUMENTS I CAN
THINK OF
IN FAVOUR
OF THE
PRESENT ARRANGEMENT
ARE
— that enabling the incumbent to remain
in power by choosing the date of the election means continuity
of policy—which may be a good thing, but may not be—and
— that fixed terms and the detailed provisions
that go with them are worse for the public interest than the present
arrangements.
3. THUS THE
PROPOSED NEW
ARRANGEMENTS FOR
FIXED TERM
PARLIAMENTS NEED
TO BE
CONSIDERED AGAINST
THE CRITERIA
WHETHER THEY
WOULD BE
WORSE FOR
THE GENERAL
INTEREST THAN
THE STATUS
QUO.
— In principle I am in favour of fixed
term Parliaments.
— I would prefer the term to be of four
years than five. Most elections in recent years have been held
about four years after the previous one.
— On the other hand I recognise that an
election campaign would in effect start about a year before an
election is expected and if the term were four years an election
campaign would start only after the government had been three
years in power.
— Long election campaigns are not in my
view in the public interest because they put pressure on the government
to adopt policies in their own short term interests in winning
the election rather than in the longer term interests of the general
public as they see them.
— Election campaigns also involve the parties
seeking to undermine trust in other parties and this is not normally
in the public interest unless, of course, the other parties do
not deserve trust—ie are untrustworthy. But it is not in
the public interest that constitutional arrangements provide incentives
and possible rewards to unfounded accusations of untrustworthiness.
— One way of reducing these incentives
is to lengthen the periods between election campaigns.
— Under current arrangements when elections
could be called at any time after about two years since the previous
election such incentives exist and are damaging to public trust.
4. I ACCEPT THAT
IT MAY
BE IN
THE PUBLIC
INTEREST FOR
AN ELECTION
TO TAKE
PLACE BEFORE
THE EXPIRY
OF THE
FIVE YEAR
FIXED TERM
IN CERTAIN
SITUATIONS.
— For instance, if no person is able to
form a government that can get its business through parliament.
— The normal way in which this is determined
is if a motion of no confidence is passed.
— However if that were the only way in
which a government could be brought down and an early election
called, measures would have to be in place to prevent the government
itself engineering a loss of a vote of confidence at a time of
its choosing.
— One way of preventing government from
taking advantage in this way would be for the newly elected parliament
to be dissolved at the date the original parliament would have
been dissolved, so that the only advantage of an early election
to the incumbent would be the possibility of a larger majority,
and the only advantage to opposition parties who hope to win a
majority would be forming a government for the remainder of the
term, which might be a short period.
— When a motion of no confidence is passed
by the Commons it may be possible for another person to form a
government which either has a majority, or which will be supported
or not brought down by one or more other parties even though they
are not parties to a coalition.
— If this is the case, then it ought to
be permissible for another possible Prime Minister to have the
chance to form a new government even after a vote of no confidence
in the existing government has been passed.
— The principle at stake here is that it
is in the public interest that there should be a government of
the UK that can get its business done. It is against the public
interest for there to be no effective government of the country.
5. WITH THESE
BASIC PRINCIPLES
IN MIND,
I CONSIDER THE
ARRANGEMENTS FOR
EARLY DISSOLUTION
THAT ARE
SET OUT
IN THE
FIXED TERM
PARLIAMENTS BILL.
— I do not consider the requirement for
a two thirds majority under clause 2(1) to be appropriate.
— It may very well be the case that a government
cannot command the support of a majority in the House of Commons
or cannot rely on sufficient members abstaining on a vote to enable
it to get its measures through, but that there is less than a
two thirds majority against it (ie such a government, though lacking
a majority, may have the support of more than one third of the
members of the House).
— In that case either another member of
the Commons should have the opportunity to form a government,
or an early election may be in the public interest so that a new
government is formed and government can be carried on.
— But the two thirds majority requirement
for an early dissolution would make an early election impossible.
— Clause 2(2) would permit the incumbent
government to have a `vote of no confidence' (censure motion)
passed by its own supporters in order to secure an early dissolution.
That would be contrary to the principle of neutrality.
6. I THEREFORE PROPOSE
THAT:
1. An early election may only be called if -
a. a vote of no confidence in HM government
has been passed in the House of Commons on a motion put forward
by, say, 20 members of the Opposition party, and
b. no other person has been able to form
a government within ten days of the vote of no confidence.
2. If an election is held after the vote of
no confidence, the newly elected Parliament should then serve
only for the rest of the term of the dissolved one.
9 August 2010
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