3 'Reduce and equalise'
57. The second part of the Bill would affect
the composition of the House, both the number of Members and the
constituencies they would represent.
58. Under the Parliamentary Constituencies Act
1986 the four Boundary Commissions for England, Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland are currently required to carry out reviews
of parliamentary constituency boundaries every eight to twelve
years.[84] Clause 8(3)
of the Bill would increase the frequency of reviews to every five
years, with the first review under the new rules to have reported
to Parliament by 1 October 2013.[85]
This would provide eighteen months for local constituency organisations
to reconstitute themselves, undertake a candidate selection process
and for that candidate to then canvass the constituency before
a general election on 7 May 2015.[86]
It would bring about more frequent change to constituency boundaries
than has hitherto been the case. It would also ensure that boundaries
were based on more up-to-date electoral information than has been
the case in the past.
59. Clause 9(1) of the Bill would replace Schedule
2 of the Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986. This Schedule
contains the rules under which the Boundary Commissions operate.
Number of seats
60. New Rule 1 in the Bill would reduce the number
of Members of the House of Commons from 650 to 600 for the next
general election. The number of Members in the House has fluctuated
since the turn of the twentieth century. At the same time, the
British population has risen from just over 38 million in 1901
(not including the south of Ireland), to just under 60 million
in 2001. In 1900 the number stood at 670 (including the south
of Ireland), increasing to 707 following the passing of the Representation
of the People Act in 1918.[87]
The secession of the Irish Free State in 1922, together with a
reduction in the number of Members for Northern Ireland, led to
a drop in numbers to 615,[88]
but the second half of the twentieth century overall has witnessed
a general rise in the number of constituencies - with intervening
fluctuations - for example, to reduce the number of Scottish seats
in the light of devolution - to 650 today. The rise has largely
been the result of the complex operation of the Rules for Redistribution
of Seats used by the Boundary Commissions, first set up in 1944,
which set no absolute cap on the number of seats in the House.[89]
61. The Conservative Party manifesto for the
May 2010 General Election contained a commitment to reduce the
size of the House of Commons by 10% to 585.[90]
The Liberal Democrat manifesto similarly had a commitment to reduce
the number of MPs by 150, although the reduction was contingent
upon the introduction of the single transferable vote electoral
system.[91] The coalition
agreement committed the Government to "the creation of fewer
and more equal sized constituencies."[92]
On 5 July 2010 the Deputy Prime Minister told the House of Commons
that the number of MPs would fall from 650 to 600, a reduction
of 7.7%.[93]
62. The proposed reduction has caused surprise
and concern among the contributors to our inquiry. Peter Facey
of Unlock Democracy told us:
I
do not know why, we have gone for 600 seats.
I would have preferred a debate about what the function of the
House of Commons should be and what the appropriate number of
MPs should be for that function and then have the debate about
the number of constituencies because that...I have a slight fear
that we have put the cart before the horse
[94]
63. Lewis Baston of Democratic Audit agreed:
"A decision about the number of MPs should proceed from an
analysis of the functional needs of Parliament, and the representative
role with constituents, rather than being arbitrarily imposed."[95]
The Hansard Society could find no rationale for the reduction
to 600 members noting that there was "real concern"
the number had been "plucked from thin air- 600 simply being
a neat number."[96]
Dr Stuart Wilks-Heeg called the reduction "arbitrary".[97]
Professor Ron Johnston rejected the notion that the Government
had decided to reduce the House to 600 because any further reduction
would disadvantage the Conservative party:
I am not quite sure how they would have worked that
out. It may be the case that they have done some clever simulations
and come up with that conclusion but I have not. It is believed
that the major gain from equalisation will be a reduction in the
bias that the Labour Party has in how the system operates because
in general Labour electorates are smaller than Conservative electorates
and whatever number you went down to that would be reduced to
some extent. It seems to me it would always be slightly in the
Conservative interest to reduce the number of seats and equalise.
It is equalising that really is the point of removing that Labour
advantage. As I understand it, reducing the number of MPs was
part of the response to the expenses scandal, "We're proving
to the country we can work harder with less money."[98]
Professor Justin Fisher agreed, calling the reduction
in MP numbers a "rather populist response to the expenses
scandal".[99]
64. The Hansard Society has expressed concerns
about the effect of reducing the number of Members of the House:
Prior to the emergence of these proposals there was
already concern about a mismatch between the scrutiny mission
of Parliament and its capacity to carry out that mission. The
Hansard Society therefore recommends that, before proceeding with
the reform, an audit of an MP's key roles and functions should
be performed to assess what impact, if any, the reduction in numbers
will have on key areas of activity: for example, on public bill
committee membership and workloads; on select committee activity
etc.[100]
65. The Hansard Society has also expressed doubt
as to whether a simple reduction in the number of Members would
result in financial savings, as suggested by the Deputy Prime
Minister (see below). Increasing the average size of constituencies
would lead to a rise in an individual Member's casework. Moreover,
a larger number of constituencies would cut across administrative
boundaries, requiring Members to engage with a greater number
of local stakeholders, for example local authorities, healthcare
trusts and education authorities: "Cumulatively this will
require more time and resources and will therefore have some cost
implications."[101]
66. The Deputy Prime Minister gave us the following
explanation of how the coalition government had arrived at the
specified reduction in the number of Members:
We took some of [the ideas in our manifestos] as
our starting point and decided that we needed some flexibility
to make sure we did not create totally unfeasible straight lines
on the map which made absolutely no sense. We have now settled
on 600 which is a 7.6% cut in the total number. A third of Members
already operate [with the constituency size] on which many other
Members will operate after the boundary review. In our judgment
[600] struck the right balance in making the change we wanted
to, cutting the cost of politics, making sure that votes were
of equal worth wherever they were in the country but also creating
a chamber of sufficient size both to represent constituents and
hold the executive to account.[102]
67. The reasons for the reduction focused on
the financial savings involved and comparisons with other national
legislatures.
We settled on 600 MPs, a relatively modest cut in
House numbers of just less than 8%, because it saves money-about
£12 million each year-and because we think it creates a House
that is sufficiently large to hold the Government to account while
enabling us all to do our jobs of representing our constituencies.
It also creates a sensible average number of constituents
76,000
that
we already know is manageable because there are already 218 seats
that are within 5% of that number. That is why we feel 600 is
about right.[103]
68. The House of Commons, at 650 Members, is
not much larger than the German Bundestag (622), the Italian Chamber
of Deputies (630) and the French National Assembly (577). Lewis
Baston, of Democratic Audit, has written that any international
comparison fails to take account of the unique nature of the United
Kingdom's political structure: "Most comparisons with other
countries with smaller lower houses and larger population miss
the points that the US and Germany, for instance, have federal
and state tiers of government, and the legislature in some countries
like the US and France does not supply the ministerial bench."[104]
In both the Bundestag and the French National Assembly, members
of the Government do not occupy seats as Members of Parliament.
Germany, as a federal republic, also has 16 state parliaments,
with more than 1,800 members between them.
69. Were a government in a country with a less
long-established democratic culture to use its control over the
legislature to remove 50 elected representatives from Parliament
without meaningful consultation, it might well be condemned
by British public and political opinion as tyrannical or arbitrary.
70. The Government proposes
to reduce the number of Members of the House from 650 to 600 at
a single stroke. This is a relatively modest reduction in numerical
terms (although it represents more than a quarter of the seats
in Wales), but it is unprecedented in recent British history:
the last comparable fall in the number of Members followed the
secession of the south of Ireland. The decision to make this reduction
has not been prefigured by any public consultation on the role
of a Member of Parliament, nor by any analysis of the impact of
the reduction on constituency casework. It has not been accompanied
by any compelling international comparisons, nor by any information
on what the Government proposes should be the size and role of
a reformed upper House. The reduction would, on current plans,
be made entirely from the backbenches, with no proposals to reduce
the number of Ministers or of others on the Government payroll
sitting and voting in the House, thus increasing the extent of
executive dominance of Parliament. The savings that the Government
claims, but has not proved, the reduction would lead to, would
make no discernible impact on the national deficit, amounting
as they do to around one millionth of the annual budget of the
National Health Service. There may be a case for reducing the
number of Members of the House to 600, but the Government has
not made it.
Equalisation of constituency electorates
THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS
71. Rule 2 as included in the Bill would provide
that equality of size would be the overriding requirement for
setting constituency boundaries. Except in named cases (Rule 6)
or where the constituency covers more than 13,000 sq km (Rule
4), a Boundary Commission would have scope to deviate from the
electoral quota by no more than 5%.[105]
This provision is a significant change from the current position
where Boundary Commissions have great discretion to take other
factors into account.[106]
72. Rule 5 would continue to allow the Boundary
Commissions to take these factors into account, but only within
the size constraint. The factors are:
- special geographical considerations,
including, in particular, the size, shape and accessibility of
a constituency;
- local government boundaries as they exist on
the most recent ordinary council-election day before the review
date;
- any local ties that would be broken by the changes;
- (in later reviews) the inconvenience attendant
on changes.
73. New Rule 3 states that constituencies cannot
cross national boundaries, although they will be able to cross
regional, county and other boundaries.
74. Unequal constituency size is a factor in
producing an effect called "electoral bias" where parties
receive significantly different numbers of seats in an election
despite having similar levels of voter support. In the last few
decades, electoral bias has favoured the Labour party, although
this has not always been the case. Professor Michael Thrasher,
who has examined the impact of bias on the 2005 and 2010 general
elections, has explained that equalisation of constituency size
would go only some way towards rectifying this bias:
There is a common misconception that periodic boundary
reviews should remove electoral bias. This view is mistaken because
such reviews are only concerned with one element that contributes
towards bias, viz., unequal electorate size (malapportionment).
Other elements are contributing towards overall bias. Apart
from malapportionment these remaining elements are, vote distribution
(geography); differential turnout (abstention); and the effects
produced by competition from smaller parties. There are, in addition,
the interaction effects that result from two or more of these
components interacting with one another, for example, a party
wins its seats in small electorate areas where abstention is also
high.[107]
75. Equalisation would be likely to have a party-political
impact, but calls for reform of the current rules have come from
conspicuously impartial sources as well as from political parties.
The Boundary Commission for England has called for a review of
the Rules for Redistribution on a number of occasions on the ground
that they are internally inconsistent.[108]
The Committee on Standards in Public Life considered electoral
boundary matters in its review of the Electoral Commission in
2007, calling in its report for a review of the rules, which,
it stated, needed to address the "progressive inequality
of electoral quotas, and increase in the size of the House of
Commons that appear inbuilt to the operation of the current rules".[109]
THE CURRENT SITUATION
76. Currently constituency electorates vary widely
from Na h-Eileanan an Iar with around 22,000 voters, to the Isle
of Wight with around 109,000 voters. These are outliers, however,
which do not reflect the more general picture:
Of the 533 English constituencies in the last review,
474 (88.9 per cent) were within 10 per cent of the English quota
and according to the Boundary Commission for England's latest
figures available there were still 429 within this range (80.5
per cent). Only 10 English seats outside a range of 15 per cent
were proposed (one over, nine under) and on 2010 electorates there
were 30 such seats (18 over, 12 under).[110]
77. A significant proportion of existing constituencies
already have electorates within the range likely to be required
by the Bill. Members representing these constituencies do so without
obvious significant practical difficulty. As the Deputy Prime
Minister told us:
People talk about this as if we are entering into
a completely new universe where people will represent constituencies
in a way that has never happened before. About one third of Members
here are already doing it. It seems to me that if that can be
done it can easily be extended to other places as well.[111]
Some constituencies would be significantly enlarged
as a result of the Government's proposed measures. Such enlargement
is likely to lead to consequential issues which we are not convinced
have been considered adequately by the Government.
CONSTITUENCIES CROSSING OTHER BOUNDARIES
78. Requiring all constituencies to be within
5% of the electoral quota would mean, however, the creation of
constituencies crossing regional and county boundaries, not least
in Cornwall and Devon. Keep Cornwall Whole, a cross-party group
campaigning against this aspect of the Bill, told us that creating
a constituency with a number of historical, political and geographical
identities would pose a serious challenge to the local MP, and
that "there is a severe risk that elements of it will go
under-represented or indeed unrepresented." They have stated
that loosening the equalisation requirement for constituencies
to within 10% of the electoral quota would mean avoiding the need
for a constituency to cross the Devon-Cornwall border. [112]
79. Another practical effect of the 5% equalisation
requirement is that many more constituencies than at present would
cross local authority boundaries. The numbers involved will vary
across the UK: Scotland is likely to see 15-20 (out of 50) cross-local
government border constituencies, Wales between 23 and 28 constituencies
(of 30), and in England, where 34 constituencies already cross
a London borough boundary, the commissions "expect to cross
boundaries to an even greater extent in a review carried out under
the terms of the Bill."[113]
The Secretaries to the English and Scottish Commissions, Bob Farrance
and Hugh Bucanan, told us they intend to take local authority
areas into account when designing constituencies. In Wales very
few constituencies will be able to follow local authority boundaries.[114]
80. A further practical consequence of the need
to cross local authority borders to achieve electoral parity is
the impact on holding elections. The Association of Electoral
Administrators observed that running the 2010 election had been
complicated by the number of constituencies straddling different
local authorities. The AEA asked "that legislators and the
Boundary Commissions consider the administrative impact of the
proposed new approach and seek to achieve, in as many cases as
possible, coterminosity with local government boundaries. Electoral
areas need to function as administrative entities as well as representative
ones."[115]
81. Another consequence of the 5% equalisation
requirement is that the boundary commissions will have to split
wards in order to achieve the required number of electors in each
constituency.[116]
The commissions have identified data below ward level which they
would be able to use in each country.[117]
Professor Ron Johnston told us that research suggested that political
activity declined when wards were divided:
when a ward was split [in Bristol] a lot of the ward
activitists drifted away. They had lost their rationale to represent
this place, this place no longer existed, it was in two parts
and political activity declined.[118]
PROSPECTS FOR ONGOING WIDE-SCALE
CHANGE
82. The equalisation requirement will also mean
significant changes to constituency boundaries in subsequent reviews,
because of changes in the electorate. Boundary reviews are conducted,
effectively, on a snapshot of the constituency population. A British
Academy report on the Bill has concluded:
population movements are considerable over
relatively short periods of time, and it is likely that within
five years a not-insignificant number of constituencies could
fall outwith the +/-5% size constraint in some parts of the country.
If that constraint is to predominate then frequent redistributions
appear necessary.[119]
The report identified a number of consequences:
some MPs
could find that the constitution of
their constituencies changes considerably with great regularity
(or even that they are, in effect, abolished after only five years);
party organisers and electoral administrators would have to change
their arrangements very frequently; and electorates would be confused
by the frequent changes.[120]
83. Keep Cornwall Whole observed "that effective
constituency representation relies on a degree of constituency
stability as well as local links
5 yearly reviews focused
almost entirely on numbers would greatly weaken this."[121]
CONCLUSIONS ON EQUALISATION
84. Lewis Baston queried whether the Government
had made the case for an inflexible rule on electoral quotas during
boundary setting: "the rules are being replaced without any
attempt to form a consensus". Mr Baston noted the following
as questions that had not been satisfactorily resolved:
How much importance do the public really attach to
the government's definition of equality of size? Would people,
in their own constituency, prefer an equal sized seat that does
not correspond to the boundaries of their perceived community
and daily lives, or one that was perhaps a bit large but made
sense on the ground? How do people feel about not having the same
parliamentary boundaries from one election to the next?
Mr Baston concluded: "The government appears
not to have attempted to discover what people want from representation."[122]
85. Along with a number of other Labour Members
of Parliament,[123]
Rt Hon Paul Murphy MP, a former Secretary of State for Wales and
Northern Ireland, has written to us of his concerns about the
potential impact of equalisation:
The creation of very large constituencies, rigidly
defined by numbers, will destroy community-based constituencies
since it would appear that, to create such constituencies, local
ties, geography and tradition are likely to be ignored. This will
further distance MPs from their constituents and impact adversely
on the service that can be offered to members of the public. This
is especially alarming in areas such as the south Wales valleys,
where the very landscape necessitates careful consideration regarding
constituency boundaries, with historical north-south communities
in valleys separated by mountains. Until now, MPs have been able
to represent roughly distinct communities, something which these
proposals threaten.[124]
86. The Deputy Prime Minister told the House
of Commons that the equalisation requirement was being introduced
so that each vote carried the same weight. He told the House at
Second Reading:
To the people we serve it is patently obvious that
individuals' votes should carry the same weight, and if that means
reforming the rules for drawing boundaries, that is what we must
do.[125]
There is an argument, however, that the point of
a constituency-based system, rather than a system of proportional
representation, is to prioritise representation of the views of
local communities over absolute equality of votes for individuals.
It is important that the equalisation requirement is not drawn
so tightly, that new constituencies lack a sense of local identity
as a result.
87. The principle that people's
votes should carry an equal weight regardless of where they live
is one with which it is hard to argue. It is worth remembering,
however, that it is a principle that is most perfectly achieved
through proportional representation. One of the advantages of
a constituency-based system is that it allows local communities
to be effectively represented in the national Parliament. It is
essential that the Boundary Commissions should have sufficient
freedom to design constituencies that have meaning for the people
living in them and can be well represented by the Members elected
to them. The House should ensure that the new rules as proposed
by the Government would not draw the equalisation requirement
so tightly that new constituency boundaries would take insufficient
account of geographical considerations, local ties and local authority
boundaries.
88. We have not as a Committee
attempted to determine the precise level of variation from the
electoral quota that would be appropriate to achieve this goal:
this is a matter for further political argument. Before
the 2010 general election, the Conservative Official Opposition
tabled amendments to the Constitutional Reform and Governance
Bill which would have limited variation to 3.5% from the quota.[126]
Lewis Baston in his evidence suggests that 10% would be a more
appropriately flexible figure.[127]
89. The British Academy Working Group on the
Bill has observed that under
the Government's current proposals, however, the Boundary Commission
for Wales could find that it is significantly more limited in
practice in its scope for variation from the electoral quota than
the Boundary Commissions for England and Scotland.
This is because the number of registered voters in each part of
the United Kingdom will vary from the number of seats allocated
to that part by up to half of the quota for a single seat, because
of the need to allocate a whole number of seats to each of England,
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This will matter less in
parts of the country with larger numbers of constituencies. But
in Wales, which is likely to have only 30 seats, this discrepancy
could make a material difference, as a report from the British
Academy Policy Centre makes clear:
an even more severe burden of equality could fall
on Wales. Suppose that Wales's exact share of 598 is 29.49 and
it is rounded down to 29. Then its total electorate is 29.49 x
76,000 = 2,241,240 and its average constituency size is 2,241,240/29
= 77,284. This is about 1.7% larger than the UK quota. In effect,
the permitted deviation among constituencies in Wales would be
only 3.3% instead of the 5% target.[128]
90. The Bill already recognises that the Boundary
Commission for Northern Ireland may need some additional flexibility
as a result of this factor.[129]
We consider
it important that the four Boundary Commissions should operate
under the same constraints, and that each Commission should therefore
have the same degree of flexibility in practice as regards constituency
electorate size, to give them the same ability to take account
of other relevant factors when drawing up constituency boundaries.
Members of the Committee have therefore tabled an amendment to
the Bill which would give each part of the United Kingdom a very
slightly different electoral quota, to ensure that each of the
four Boundary Commissions should retain the ability to vary the
number of registered voters in a constituency by a full 5% in
either direction.
Impact of equalisation on the next general election
91. The imposition of equalisation would change
the boundaries of almost every constituency in the country, even
those currently within the target electorate. Bob Farrance, Secretary
to the Boundary Commission for England, told us: "The effect
of setting a parity target, as well as a reduction at the same
time, leads to the inevitability of widespread change across the
whole of the country."[130]
Robin Gray, a former Boundary Commissioner, agreed, predicting
"massive change" in constituency boundaries across the
UK.[131]
92. All four Boundary Commission secretaries
agreed that every constituency would be impacted by the change,
even those currently at or close to the quota: The review proposed
by the Government is not the redrawing of 650 existing constituencies,
but the creation of 600 completely new ones. The impact within
all parties will be immense and Parliamentary scrutiny of the
Government will inevitably take second place to time-consuming
internal disputes in the run up to the General Election. The proposals
seem likely to strengthen central party management, weaken local
party structures and activism, and destabilise individual Members
and prospective parliamentary candidates. The
review the Government is proposing will mean that every prospective
parliamentary candidate, current Members of the House included,
will not know until eighteen months before a general election
in 2015 what the boundaries will be of the constituency they intend
to contest, or if indeed they will have a constituency to contest.
It is also not clear whether political parties have the necessary
resources and resilience at a local level to adapt successfully
within this timeframe to contesting new constituencies across
the whole of the country.
Impact of 'reduce and equalise' on local politics
93. The proposals for reduction and equalisation
seem to have been brought forward with little or no consideration
of their potential impact on the ability of Members of Parliament
to fulfil their responsibilities to their constituents. The service
offered by Members will be placed under greater pressure. Constituencies
are already 25 per cent more populous than they were in 1950 and
there are now greater expectations on Members of Parliament in
terms of casework, yet the rules introduced by the new Independent
Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA) have seen a reduction
in budgets for Members' staff by 10 per cent. Members representing
poorer parts of the countrystatistically underrepresented
on the Government's bencheshave many more social problems
to deal with than previously. Some of these cases involve individuals
who do not have the right to vote in general elections. Following
a boundary review as proposed by the Government, more Members
would have a greater multiplicity of different public authorities
to deal with, as more parliamentary boundaries would have to be
drawn to cross local authority boundaries. In addition, Members
who are Ministers have executive responsibilities to fulfil as
well as those to Parliament and constituents, unlike in democracies
with a separation of powers. We
recommend that the Government and the Independent Parliamentary
Standards Authority should consider the impact of the proposals
on the ability of individual Members of Parliament to perform
their duties effectively when deciding upon individual Member
resource allocation.
94. The Government also seems to have given no
consideration to the impact of its policies on the structure of
local politics. Local party infrastructure is invariably sustained
by volunteers and small donations, and the identity of local parties
of all colours is founded on local communities. Where constituency
boundaries cross natural and local authority boundaries, this
will weaken local political identity. For the added stress of
boundary change to occur potentially every five years is likely
to further undermine local party organisation, and in turn strengthen
the already dominant position of the central party organisations
and leaderships. We recommend
that the Government should assess thoroughly the likely impact
of the provisions on party-political organisation, particularly
at a local level, and explain what steps it intends to take in
migitation before the Bill is sent to the House of Lords.
95. One possible way in which
the impact of the measures could be made less stark would be to
provide for a more gradual approach to the reduction in the number
of constituencies and to the equalisation of their size than the
current proposals intend, over a series of boundary reviews rather
than over a single review.
Preserved constituencies
96. The Bill explicitly exempts Orkney and Shetland
and Na h-Eileanan an Iar (the Western Isles) from the 5% rule.
The two constituencies currently have electorates of 33,085 and
21,780 respectively. The Deputy Prime Minister has told the House
that "in both those cases, geographical size and remoteness
make any change to the boundaries completely impractical."[132]
97. There have been calls for further exceptions,
for example from people on the Isle of Wight, who do not wish
a constituency to be formed made up of part of the island and
part of mainland England.[133]
The Hansard Society commented that the proposed exception to the
equalisation proposals "appears arbitrary
An obvious
additional candidate for an exemption, for example, is the Isle
of Wight."[134]
We have also received strong representations from other areas
including Cornwall and Wales.[135]
98. We acknowledge the grounds
for making exceptions from the electoral quota requirement for
the constituencies of Orkney and Shetland and Na h-Eileanan an
Iar on the grounds of practicality. This will mean, however, that
votes cast in these constituencies will have a proportionately
much greater weight than votes elsewhere in the United Kingdom.
99. The House may wish to consider
further exceptions for parts of the United Kingdom where it is
the wish of voters (expressed, for instance, through petitions)
to be under-represented in Parliament, for reasons of strong local
ties.
Accuracy and completeness of
the electoral roll
100. The first boundary review under the Bill
would be carried out using data from the December 2010 electoral
roll.[136]
101. The accuracy and completeness of this data
takes on a particular significance in light of the Bill, because
it would be the key determining factor in fixing constituency
boundaries for the next general election, rather than simply one
of many countervailing factors. As one of our witnesses, Dr Pinto-Duschinsky,
observed: "The entire project of equalising constituency
electorates depends on the existence of a reasonably accurate
way of determining the number of eligible voters in each ward."[137]
102. We have heard doubts as to whether this
is in fact the case. The Electoral Commission has estimated that
as many as 3.5 million eligible voters may be missing from the
register.[138] According
to the Electoral Commission, figures for electoral registration
in the United Kingdom stand at just over 91% of the electorate.
The Electoral Commission has stated that this level of registration
is comparable with international figures.[139]
103. Since 2004 Dr Roger Mortimore of Ipsos Mori
has led on a rolling programme of research into electoral registration
for the Electoral Commission.[140]
Dr Mortimore's research has examined people who are unregistered
and shown that the completeness of the register varies according
to location, age group, social class and ethnicity.[141]
In an analysis of the 2009 register across eight study areas,
the completeness of the register varied from 73% to 94%. Similarly,
the accuracy of the register (the proportion of the register entries
that correctly refer to people eligible to be registered) varied
from 77% to 91%. These findings mean that, in a constituency where
the register recorded only 73% of eligible voters, over 20,000
people would not be counted in the boundary review, meaning that
the total of those eligible to vote in the constituency could
vary from the proposed electoral quota of 76,000 by up to 27%.[142]
104. Dr Stuart Wilks-Heeg of Democratic Audit
told us that he had serious concerns over the completeness and
accuracy of the current electoral registers:
It is not clear that the electoral registers are
'fit for purpose' in undertaking radical changes to reduce and
equalise constituencies. Recent research into the completeness
and accuracy of the electoral registers highlights that there
has been a sharp fall in registration levels over the past decade,
and variations in under-registration appear to be growing.[143]
105. Dr Wilks-Heeg also expressed concerns over
the assumed relationship between the completeness and the accuracy
of the electoral register:
The [Electoral Commission's] research highlighted
that the rates of completeness of individual electoral registers
(the percentage of missing entries) tends to mirror the rates
of accuracy of those registers (the percentage of entries which
are redundant or false). It could be argued that this will mean
that inaccuracy will tend to counter-balance incompleteness, thereby
producing electoral registers which approximate quite well to
the total number of eligible electors
However, based on the
[Electoral Commission] research, I would argue that this assumption
is likely to be flawed.[144]
106. We asked both Dr Mortimore and Dr Wilks-Heeg
whether there were any measures that could be taken in order to
improve the accuracy and completeness of the register in time
for the December 2010 electoral roll. They agreed that little
could be done. Dr Wilks-Heeg told us: "It's too late [to
do anything]. We're in the middle of the annual canvass and some
local authorities are very advanced in that process already."[145]
However, Dr Wilks-Heeg told us that research showed that there
were:
"particular practices which Electoral Registration
Officers can follow, which if they all follow, virtually to the
letter, will maximise the annual canvass return, which is crucial,
which then in turn maximises the completeness and accuracy of
the registers.., it would seem that there are certain local authorities
where perhaps not all of [the Electoral Commission's] best practice
is being used, but that is certainly, in terms of future canvasses,
a key area to focus on."[146]
107. Dr Pinto-Duschinsky told us:
If we look at the register and the problems of the
register, we know roughly where the problem areas are. For example
in
inner London we have voter problems in certain conurbations, but
in those areas one of the problems is that [the local authorities]
do not spend money on follow-up canvassing
I imagine there
would be about 50 to 100 constituencies that are potentially problem
areas and
the Government [could require] them, as it is entitled
to do by law, to carry out a house-to-house, or other sufficient,
inquiry
[147]
108. We explored with witnesses whether the introduction
of individual voter registration or giving new powers to electoral
registration officers to mine other data sources would improve
the quality of the electoral register for future boundary reviews.
Dr Wilks-Heeg told us that individual registration would improve
the accuracy of the registers but have limited effect on their
completeness:
I think individual registration would clearly help
to make sure we remove ghost voters from the rolls
[regarding]
other ways in which we would need to clean up the registers, individual
registration probably only goes so far. What will be critical
is the extent to which electoral registration officers can access
other data sources and what data sources they do access
if
they access...addresses held by the DVLA
only certain people
have driving licences, that is only going to take you so far
in
terms of eliminating the problem of electors being registered
simultaneously in different places when they're not supposed to
be. Againas the legislation proposesyou would need
to supplement it with core [data], otherwise you simply can't
know whether you've got voters registered in multiple different
places
[148]
109. The national census will be taken on 27
March 2011, although data from it would almost certainly not be
available in time to influence the December 2011 electoral register.
Dr Mortimore told us that the census "is the best [thing]
that can be done, in terms of checking the register but it's going
to be a long way short of perfect because what you're comparing
it with is also short of perfect."[149]
Dr Wilks-Heeg thought that census data would "give us a unique
opportunity to look at the completeness and accuracy of the registers
in a far more thorough way than we usually can."[150]
110. During the Second Reading of the Bill the
Deputy Prime Minister told the House:
The [boundary] commissions will continue to use the
electoral register as the basis for their reviews. That has been
a feature of the system for decades, under Governments of all
shades. With registration in Great Britain at well over 90% and
in line with comparable countries, the register remains the best
basis for reviews
We are investigating a number of solutions,
including freeing up local authorities to use existing public
sector databases to identify people who are not registered, and
then actively encouraging them to register.[151]
111. On 15 September 2010 the Parliamentary Secretary
for the Cabinet Office told the House of Commons that the Government
planned to bring forward legislation to implement individual registration
in 2014.[152] He also
announced that the Government would be trialling:
data-matching during 2011-that is comparing the electoral
register with other public databases to find the people who are
eligible to vote but who are missing from the register
These
pilots will enable us to see how effective data-matching is and
to see which data sets are of most use in improving the accuracy
and completeness of the electoral register. If they are effective,
we will roll them out more widely across local authorities on
a permanent basis to help ensure that our register is as complete
as possible.[153]
112. The Parliamentary Secretary for the Cabinet
Office told us that census data would not be of assistance to
electoral registration officers in identifying who might have
failed to register to vote:
Census data is of population and does not look at
whether people are eligible to vote, and of course many people
who live in the UK are not citizens and are not eligible to vote
for various reasons
[in addition] Electoral Registration
Officers are able to access Census data and use it, but Census
data at the individual level that could be used to track whether
actual people exist
is not published at that level of detail,
but
aggregated. Therefore, with regard to electoral administrators
using it as a source to identify people who exist in an area and
who are not registered, they can look at overall number and make
some assumptions, but it does not really give them the detail
to drill down.[154]
Dr Wilks-Heeg's point was, however, slightly different:
his suggestion was that census data could help the Electoral Commission
and electoral registration officers to estimate more accurately
the extent to which registers were accurate and complete, rather
than that it could be used directly to identify those missing
from the registers.
113. If the first boundary review
under the Bill is to be completed in good time for a general election
in May 2015, as the Government wishes, there seems to be little
option but to use data from this year's electoral roll, to be
finalised in December 2010, as the basis for drawing up new constituency
boundaries. This data is certain to be incomplete and inaccurate,
and the extent to which this is the case will vary across the
country, potentially with political repercussions. It is for individual
Members to judge whether the flaws in this data are such as to
undermine the principle of equalisation that the Government claims
motivates its proposals.
114. For the longer term, given that many people
who fail to register to vote do so through no conscious choice
of their own, it would be
desirable to identify a system whereby those eligible to vote
could be automatically registered, and only removed from the register
at their request.
Public consultation on boundary
changes
115. The Bill would both abolish local inquiries
for proposed boundary changes, and give the Boundary Commissions
significantly less scope to make alterations to constituency boundaries
than has been the case up until now. This will affect significantly
how people can engage with the Commissions' proposed recommendations.
Until now, Boundary Commissions have been able to take account
of representations as they have seen fit. If, however, a representation
under a future review proposed a boundary change that would break
the rule on constituency equalisation, then, however strongly
felt that representation might be within the locality, a Boundary
Commission could not implement it, at least, not without making
other boundary changes elsewhere, which had not been part of its
original proposals.
116. Under the existing Parliamentary Constituencies
Act 1986, the Boundary Commissions are required to publish provisional
recommendations and the reasons for those recommendations in the
local media and in public areas such as town halls and libraries.[155]
Following publication there is a statutory period of public consultation
of four weeks.[156]
117. If the Boundary Commission receives objections
from more than 100 electors (including groups) or one from an
affected local authority, the Commission must hold a public inquiry
which is open to all regardless of whether they previously submitted
representations. Public inquiries have taken place in around half
of reviewed constituencies. The inquiries are led by independent
lawyers, usually QCs in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and
Sheriffs in Scotland[157]
When the inquiry concludes the relevant Commission then considers
the resulting report and maintains or revises the recommendations.[158]
Revised recommendations must then be published for consultation
as before, and may be subject to a further public inquiry, although
this rarely occurs in practice.
118. Clause 10 of the Bill would amend sections
5 and 6 of the 1986 Act by explicitly prohibiting the holding
of public inquiries into proposed boundary changes. Following
the publication of provisional recommendations, the Bill would,
however, extend the consultation process from four to twelve weeks.
The Bill would also give the Boundary Commissions greater discretion
over the format in which they publicise their provisional recommendations,
repealing the requirement for them to be published in a local
newspaper.[159]
119. Because of the more rigid mathematical approach
the Bill requires to defining constituency boundaries, the general
approach taken by each Boundary Commission could make a substantial
difference to the provisional recommendations it can make, and
the scope for changing those recommendations without revisiting
its general approach. Members of the Committee have therefore
tabled an amendment which would require the Boundary Commissions
to hold a one-off short consultation on the way in which they
intend to approach the division of England, Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland into constituencies, before the 2011-13 review
takes place. It would allow people to give views on the extent
to which, for example, county boundaries should be crossed, the
extent to which ward sub-division might be desirable, and where
wards are to be sub-divided, the kinds of sub-divisions to be
used. We ask the House
to consider whether our proposal would increase the perceived
legitimacy of the Boundary Commissions' decisions, and reduce
the likelihood of local frustration and the possibility of legal
challenge to the Commissions' recommendations.
120. Public inquiries prolong the time taken
for boundary reviews considerably. The process has also been criticised
for being dominated by political parties seeking to protect a
majority or weaken that of an opponent. The Boundary Commissions
told us: "The Commissions' experience is that, while local
inquiries have served a useful function, many of those attending
have a specific party political affiliation which significantly
determines their evidence"[160]
and Professor Ron Johnston observed:
although you occasionally get the case where a local
community will come forward and say, "You're breaking our
local community", they are doing it in a non-political way
- it happens - and very occasionally an individual will come up
with some very interesting things to say, but the public inquiries
are dominated by the political parties and they are using the
rules obviously for promoting their electoral gain.[161]
121. Professor Johnston also told us that many
public inquiries had little impact on the Boundary Commissions'
final recommendations: "Public inquiries often have no impact.
Of the public inquiries last time half of them made no change
and a lot of them only very, very minor change, one ward moved
from one constituency to another or whatever."[162]
122. Despite these reservations, many of our
witnesses believed public inquiries serve a useful function. Lewis
Baston of Democratic Audit, while acknowledging that proceedings
can "sometimes become political theatre", told us:
The public inquiry, at its best, can be a forum for
testing the strength of arguments for the provisional recommendations
and alternative schemes under the Rules, and how they correspond
with other (possibly less self-interested) representations from
the public. Assistant Commissioners often take pains to discount
self-interested pleading and ascertain which plan best fits the
constraints and the realities on the ground
In terms of gaining
consent and a sense of ownership of the proposals in the locality,
the level of scrutiny of the broad pattern and local detail gained
from a public inquiry is sometimes indispensable.[163]
123. Robin Gray, a former Boundary Commissioner,
while agreeing with Professor Johnston that public inquires had
limited impact on the final report, believed public inquiries
enhanced the legitimacy of boundary changes for the public as
they provided assurance that the "issues have been looked
at, debated and an independent [lawyer] has come to a view
"
and could produce "very good inputs from community groups
and the odd individual. It is unusual but you do sometimes [get
them] and that is quite important." Mr Gray also told us
that the inquiries "reassure" the Commissions:
It is quite helpful to be reassured by hearing [the]
evidence pored over, the cross-questioning between the main participants
and so on, so that
when we are looking at the Assistant Commissioner's
report and making up our minds, [we] can say, "Ah, yes, we
did more or less get it right", or, and in one or two cases
we
can actually reject the Assistant Commissioner's recommendations
and either stay with our original recommendations or alter them
slightly because when we look at the transcripts of the inquiry
and the evidence we think we need to do something slightly different.[164]
124. The equalisation requirement together with
the reduction in the number of Members of Parliament will mean
that constituencies will cross county boundaries for the first
time, as well as geographical and historic features. Professor
Johnston, who generally welcomed the abolition of public inquiries,
told us that the recommendations on which they made the greatest
impact were when there were new constituencies being formed:
places where public inquiries had a big impact from
what the Commission initially proposed to the final solution was
where either a seat was being added to a county or being taken
away and then everything was up for grabs and, not surprisingly,
there was much more fighting over it. That is an argument against
me because that is an argument for having public inquiries this
time because you are drawing a totally new map with new constituencies
and nearly everything will be different. In general terms the
experience over the last three or four inquiries has been that
public inquiries have been fine involving people but in the end
it is really about the politicians seeking to gain their own advantage.
This time you are going to have much more where the local people
are going to be concerned because suddenly the pattern of representation
is going to be very different from what they have been used to
for a long time.[165]
125. Hugh Buchanan, Secretary to the Boundary
Commission for Scotland, told us it was unclear what the impact
of the Bill's provisions on the public's response to consultation
would be: "One of the great unknowns of a review under this
Bill is what the public engagement will be. One of the challenges
for ourselves will be in trying to encourage people to understand
what the law allows us to do and doesn't allow us to do. So I
think the Commissions will wantas far as they can within
the lawto reflect communities wherever they can, but clearly
that discretion is reduced from the current position."[166]
Mr Buchanan also noted that political parties are vital to ensuring
the public are both engaged and informed.[167]
The Hansard Society expressed concern that the limits on consultation
as result of the equalisation requirements and reduction in the
number of MPs could result in voter disengagement: "Our research
into the legislative process demonstrates that a singularly damaging
aspect of consultation is that government too often gives the
public the impression through the process that 'all options are
open - even when it is obvious that the Government has a clear
direction in mind'".[168]
126. A possible outcome of the proposed consultation
process is legal challenge, by political parties or local cross-party
or apolitical campaign groups such as Keep Cornwall Whole. The
decisions of the Boundary Commissions are potentially subject
to judicial review. Robin Gray told us that he thought "that
what [the proposed consultation procee] could lead to is more
judicial review. We were only subject to one judicial review [in
the last boundary review] right at the end of the process in West
Yorkshire. I can see that in this sort of situation you could
end up with a lot of people around the country applying for judicial
review."[169]
Professor Ron Johnston agreed: "I can well see people using
[judicial review] as a [means to] address the issues that they
think they are not able to address because they are not having
public inquiries."[170]
127. The Deputy Prime Minister told the House
of Commons at the Second Reading of the Bill that the reasons
for abolishing public inquiries were primarily to do with the
amount of time they take, as well as the dominance of them by
political parties:
By having more frequent boundary reviews-one every
five years-constituencies will be kept more up to date, reflecting
changes in where people live. In order to make that possible,
we are changing the consultation process. Consultation is, of
course, vital, but as leading academics concluded in a report
published just last week, local inquiries have become "the
playthings" of political parties and have had, in practice,
little impact on the commissions' final recommendations, so we
will abolish local inquiries. Instead, we will triple the time
that people have to make representations to the commissions to
have their say-from one month to three months.[171]
128. The report referred to by the Deputy Prime
Minister was the British Academy report co-authored by Professor
Johnston which concluded that "most" inquiries have
been "dominated" by political parties. As we note above,
Professor Johnston told us that this boundary review is likely
to see much more engagement with the consultation process by apolitical
individuals and groups as, in many cases, long-standing constituency
boundaries will be dissolved.
129. The legitimacy of the next boundary review
in the eyes of the public is likely to be strongly influenced
by their ability to participate effectively. A representation
to change the boundaries of one constituency could well require
further changes to other constituencies to keep each constituency
within 5% of the electoral quota. It would therefore be difficult
or impossible to make informed representations without access
to detailed information on the number of electors within sub-ward
divisions of constituencies across the relevant region and possibly
beyond.
130. Members of the Committee
have therefore tabled an amendment, which is intended to improve
the quality of the consultation. This amendment would allow people
to make representations to the Boundary Commissions on proposed
constituencies other than the one in which they live and to provide
for information on the number of electors within sub-ward divisions
of constituencies to be made available on a nationwide basis.
We commend the amendment to the House.
131. The Boundary Commissions noted the retention
of their power to appoint an Assistant Commissioner to provide
independent scrutiny of representations, commenting: "It
may be that a Commission may still find it useful to ask an Assistant
Commissioner to assess and evaluate written evidence submitted
to the Commission."[172]
This would appear to be an answer to the apparent concern expressed
elsewhere in their submission that: "Local inquiries, chaired
by a person skilled in dealing with and assessing evidence, are
a useful process for forming a judgement on the arguments presented.
That task will now fall to the Commissions, and will take time
to carry out thoroughly."[173]
Professor Ron Johnston also noted that the use of Assistant Commissioners
avoided the impression that a boundary commission was "judge
and jury in its own case".[174]
132. We welcome the retention
of the Boundary Commissions' power to appoint an independent Assistant
Commissioner to consider written representations. The changes
in the consultation process are likely to lead to written representations
that are longer and more complex. Appointing an Assistant Commissioner
will allow the Boundary Commissions to obtain independent, expert
advice which will enhance the transparency and legitimacy of the
process while giving them flexibility in their resourcing.
133. The prohibition on public inquiries means
that representations must be written, although this is not stated
in the Bill.[175] The
Boundary Commissions told us: "The Bill does not specify
the means of making representations. We believe it should specify
written representations, to allow full and fair assessment of
all representations."[176]
134. The House may wish to consider
whether the Bill should be amended so that it makes clear that
only written representations will be received by the Boundary
Commissions, subject to the requirements of the Disability Discrimination
Act 1995. The abolition of public inquiries is a hugely significant
change in the process of boundary setting. Clarity in the changes
to that process is vital if the consultation process is to be
meaningful and so enhance the legitimacy of the Boundary Commissions'
decisions.
Executive power
135. Finally, we wish to bring the House's attention
to two provisions in the Bill which would preserve or increase
the power of the Government over Parliament in a way that we consider
to be unwarranted.
SECRETARY OF STATE'S POWER TO AMEND
THE BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS' RECOMMENDATIONS
136. Clause 8(6) of the Bill preserves the right
of the Secretary of State to implement a Boundary Commission's
report with "modifications". Boundary reviews can have
highly party-political impacts, particularly in parts of the country
where the votes between the parties are finely balanced. More
than 90 Members were elected in 2010 with majorities of less than
5% of the votes cast.[177]
A number of witnesses told us that the majority of public inquiries
were instigated by political parties. Professor Ron Johnston of
the University of Bristol, observed that "the public inquiries
are dominated by the political parties and they are using the
rules obviously for promoting their electoral gain". The
Boundary Commissions told us:
The Commissions' experience is that while local inquiries
have served a useful function, many of those attending have a
specific party political affiliation which significantly determines
their evidence
In practice, the main participants at inquiries
have been representatives of political parties and local authorities.[178]
137. As the Explanatory Notes to the Bill state:
The Commissions are independent, non-political and
totally impartial bodies. They emphasise very strongly that the
results of previous elections do not and should not enter their
considerations when they are deciding their recommendations. Nor
do the Commissions consider the effects of their recommendations
on future voting patterns.[179]
138. We asked the Minister why it was appropriate
for the Secretary of State to retain the power to implement Boundary
Commission reports with modifications. He explained:
There is a very strong convention that Ministers
lay the Order in Council putting in place the recommendations
of the boundary commissions without changing them. [the power
to modify is]...to deal with the situation where Boundary Commissioners
lay their reports and it turns out that there are errors or mistakes
in them and there would be no other way of correcting them...It
is not the intention of any Minister to make changes, and the
wording is not a change in legislationit just carries forward
existing law. Ministers intend to be bound by the existing convention
that the Boundary Commissioners lay their reports...and the Order
in Council that Ministers lay before Parliament absolutely reflects
them, on the same basis as in the past.[180]
139. Notwithstanding the Government's
commitment to use the power to make modifications when implementing
the reports of the Boundary Commissions only in response to mistakes
that can be corrected in no other way, we believe that the power
of the Executive to depart from the recommendations of an independent
statutory body should have clear statutory limits to prevent abuse
for partisan advantage. We
recommend that the House should consider amending clause 8(6)
to limit the Secretary of State's power to modify the implementation
of a Boundary Commission's recommendations only to situations
where this is with the agreement of the Boundary Commission in
question. Members of the Committee have tabled an amendment to
this effect, and we commend it to the House.
SIZE OF THE 'PAYROLL VOTE' IN THE
HOUSE
140. The House of Commons Disqualification Act
1975 limits the number of Government Ministers who can sit and
vote in the House of Commons to 95.[181]
The number of Parliamentary Private Secretaries and the size of
the Opposition front bench are based in effect on the size of
the Government. If there were no proportionate reduction in the
number of Ministers in a House of 600 Members, this would be very
likely to mean that all 50 of the Members removed from the House
would be backbenchers. On the face of it, therefore, reducing
the size of the House would amount to reducing that part of the
House involved in scrutiny of the Executive.
141. In March 2010 the House of Commons Public
Administration Committee considered the impact of the steady increase
in ministerial positions since 1900, despite the end of Empire,
the introduction of privatisation and the devolution of powers
to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The Committee concluded
that the "payroll vote" "harmed" Parliament
and recommended limiting the proportion of Ministers able to sit
in the House to 15%, including unpaid and unofficial posts.[182]
142. The Hansard Society has made the link between
a reduction in the number of Members and the power of the Executive:
Unless a move to reduce the number of MPs is accompanied
by a parallel commitment to reduce the size of the Government's
payroll vote, it will merely enhance the executive at the expense
of the legislature by reinforcing the power of the frontbench
in proportion to the overall size of the House of Commons.[183]
143. In evidence to us and to the House the Deputy
Prime Minister asserted that the reduction in the number of MPs
would create "a House that is sufficiently large to hold
the Government to account". Mr Clegg did not accept that
a reduction in the number of Members required a reduction in the
number of ministers:
If we arrive at a parliament that is 600 rather than
650 we have the current number of ministers but in the next parliament
a subsequent government should have an open mind about whether
the number should be reduced
The cuts we propose will not
take place this side of the next general election
if there
is a link [between the number of MPs and the number of ministers]
then that link
should be made in the number of ministers
when the change occurs. It has not occurred yet.[184]
144. Mr Harper told us that reducing the number
of ministers in the House of Commons was not a "very simple
mathematical question" because shrinking the size of the
ministerial bench in the elected house without shrinking the size
of the executive overall could mean that more ministers would
sit in the upper House instead. He assured us "we will have
a serious look at that issue and I think that the Prime Minister
and the Government will have to take a view about the size of
the Government as a whole."[185]
145. It is self-evident that
a reduction in the number of Members of Parliament will increase
the dominance of the Executive over Parliament if the number of
Ministers sitting and voting in the House is not correspondingly
reduced. This is a matter of constitutional importance that goes
to the heart of the relationship between the Executive and the
House. That the Government claims that no progress can be made
on this issue because no conclusion has yet been reached on the
overall size and nature of government is ironic at best and hypocritical
at worst, given the Government's readiness to reduce at haste
the number of Members in one House without consideration of the
number of Members there should be in the other. Members of the
Committee have put their names to an amendment to link the size
of the House with the number of Ministers allowed to sit and vote
in it, and we commend this amendment strongly to the House.
84 Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, s 3(2) as
amended by Boundary Commissions Act 1992 Back
85
Clause 3(2) Back
86
Clause 1(3) of the Fixed Term Parliament Bill proposes that elections
to the UK Parliament be held every five years Back
87
House of Commons Library Research paper 10/55, Oonagh Gay and
Isobel White p 27 Back
88
Ibid. Back
89
Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, Sch. 2 Back
90
Invitation to Join the Government of Britain, The Conservative
Party Manifesto 2010, p 67 Back
91
Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010 p 88 Back
92
The Coalition: Our programme for Government p 27 Back
93
HC Deb 5 July 2010, c 24 Back
94
Q 44 Back
95
Ev 86 Back
96
The Hansard Society (VPR 05, para. 14) Back
97
Q 214 Back
98
Q 94 Back
99
Q 116 Back
100
The Hansard Society (VPR 05, para. 15) Back
101
The Hansard Society (VPR 05, para. 17) Back
102
HC 358- i (2010-11), Q 62 Back
103
HC Deb 6 September 2010, c 39 Back
104
Ev 86 Back
105
Clause 9(1) Back
106
Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, Sch 2, Rule 5 Back
107
Ev 115 Back
108
See for example, chapter 6 of the Fifth Periodical Report, Cm
7032 Back
109
Committee on Standards in Public Life Eleventh Report of Session
2007-08, Review of the Electoral Commission, Cm 7006, p47 Back
110
Ev 94 Back
111
HC 358-i (2010-11), Q 51 Back
112
Ev 92 Back
113
Ev 94 Back
114
Ev 94 Back
115
Association of Electoral Administrators (VPR 06, para. 6.4) Back
116
Ev 94 Back
117
Ibid Back
118
Q 107 Back
119
Drawing a new constituency map for the United Kingdom British
Academy Policy Centre, ed Ron Johnston et al (September 2010) Back
120
Drawing a new constituency map for the United Kingdom British
Academy Policy Centre, ed Ron Johnston et al (September 2010) Back
121
Ev 92 Back
122
Ev 86 Back
123
Ev 138 onwards Back
124
Ev 141 Back
125
HC Deb 6 September 2010, c 35 Back
126
New Clause 99 (Committee of the Whole House) Back
127
Ev 86 Back
128
Drawing a New Constituency Map for the United Kingdom,
p 41 Back
129
New Rule 7 Back
130
Q 151 Back
131
Q 58 Back
132
HC Deb 6 September 2010, c 37 Back
133
HC Deb 6 September 2010, c 73 Back
134
The Hansard Society (VPR 05, para. 9) Back
135
Ev 92 Back
136
HC Deb 6 September 2010, c 34 Back
137
Q 46 Back
138
Understanding Electoral Registration: The extent and nature
of non-registration in Britain, The Electoral Commission (August
2005) Back
139
Ibid. Back
140
Details of the research can be found at VPR 04 Back
141
All publications in the rolling programme including Understanding
Electoral Registration, Mortimore et al, (2006)and Population
change, turnout and the elections, Mortimore at al,(2005)can
be found at www.ipsos-mori.com Back
142
Clause 9(1) Back
143
Ev 102 Back
144
Ibid. Back
145
Q 200 Back
146
Ibid Back
147
Q 46 Back
148
Q 211 Back
149
Q 214 Back
150
Q 214 Back
151
HC Deb 6 September 2010, c 40 Back
152
HC Deb 15 September 2010, c 884 Back
153
HC Deb 15 September 2010, c 885 Back
154
Q 324 Back
155
Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, s 5(1) and (2) Back
156
Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, s 5(2)(b) Back
157
There is no statutory procedure although the boundary commissions
issue guidance. Back
158
Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, s 5(3) Back
159
Clause 10(1) Back
160
Ev 94 Back
161
Q 63 Back
162
Ibid Back
163
Ev 86 Back
164
Q 63 Back
165
Q 62 Back
166
Q 163 Back
167
Q 187 Back
168
The Hansard Society (VPR 05, para. 10) Back
169
Q 66 Back
170
Q 67 Back
171
HC Deb, 6 September 2010, c 38 Back
172
Ev 94 Back
173
Ibid Back
174
Q 65 Back
175
Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, new s 5(1)(b) Back
176
Ev 94 Back
177
For example, Glenda Jackson, MP for Hampstead and Kilburn has
a majority of 42 Back
178
Ev 94 Back
179
Explanatory Notes to the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies
Bill para 18 Back
180
Q 367 Back
181
House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975, s 2(1) Back
182
Public Administration Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2009-10,
Too Many Ministers?, HC 457 Back
183
The Hansard Society (VPR 05, para. 16) Back
184
HC 358-i (2010-11) Q 63 Back
185
Q 384 Back
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