Written evidence submitted by Dr Michael
Pinto-Duschinsky (PVSCB 12)
1. This memorandum covers three topics:
— practical issues that need to be resolved
in order to ensure the fairness and efficiency of the proposed
AV referendum,
— arguments against the Alternative Vote,
and
— issues relating to the equalisation of
constituency electorates.
For the sake of brevity, the proposal for fixed
term parliaments will not be covered.
REFERENDUM PRACTICALITIES
Is May 2011 too early?
2. If the practical problems are to be fully
considered and resolved, it will be difficult to complete the
preparatory work needed to ensure an efficient and fair national
referendum and to permit adequate discussion on the floor of the
House of Commons in time for the proposed referendum date of May
2011.
Should a referendum coincide with an ordinary
election?
3. There are arguments of democratic principle
against holding a constitutional referendum on the same day as
a regular election.
What is the appropriate margin of approval for
a constitutional reform?
4. Equally, there is a strong argument for
requiring that fundamental constitutional reforms command more
than a simple majority. One need only to look at the high hurdles
imposed by the constitution of the United States for any amendment.
It is wholly reasonable to frame rules for the AV referendum in
a manner either that requires the approval of 40 percent of the
registered electorate or which ignores turnout but which, instead,
requires more than a narrow majority for change (perhaps 60% approval
by those casting a ballot).
Issues concerning referendum funding
5. The projected referendum on AV will be
the first national referendum to be held in the United Kingdom
since the enactment of regulations for referendums in the Political
Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (PPERA) of 2000.
The Act was passed in some hurry shortly before
the general election of 2001. It included provisions for spending
limits which went against the recommendations of the Fifth Report
of the Committee on Standards in Public Life as well as a number
of provisions whose difficulties were subsequently detailed to
the Treasury Select Committee of the House of Commons by the then
chair of the newly-created Electoral Commission, Sam Younger.
[2]
6. These are some of the questions that
need to be resolved:
(a) Under the terms of PPERA, spending by campaign
groups is restricted to £500,000. In view of inflation since
the passage of PPERA in 2000, does this limit (as well as the
other limits and subsidies set out in PPERA) need to be raised?
(b) Since multiple campaign groups may exist
on each side of the referendum question, how is the Electoral
Commission to determine whether groups are genuinely independent
of each other—and thus each entitled to spend up to the
limit of £500,000—or whether they are actually parts
of the same campaigning organisation artificially separated for
the purpose of each being able to spend up to £500,000 and
thus, effectively, evading the spending cap? (See Gay, 2009, footnote
10.) Unless there are clear rules to define what is an independent
campaigning group and what is merely a branch of a campaigning
organisation, the £500,000 spending cap will be a dead letter.
(c) The Electoral Commission has a responsibility
to appoint an umbrella organisation on each side of the referendum
question. This favoured organisation is exempt from the £500,000
spending cap and able, instead, to spend up to £5 million.
Moreover, it is entitled to state aid of up to £600,000 as
well as other privileges. As the former chair of the Electoral
Commission pointed out, this responsibility may place the Commission
in an awkward position (See Gay, 2009, footnote 9.) Should the
Committee give any guidance to the Commission as to how it should
make the choice of principal campaign organisation for the "Yes"
and for the "No" sides?
(d) There is the question of the length of the
period of time during which expenditure falls under the spending
limit. This is at least ten weeks and may be as much as six months.
(e) Since the spending caps do not apply to public
bodies (either within the UK or abroad), there arises the question
of fairness between statements and information provided by governmental
bodies (and by government ministers and spokespersons) on the
one hand and statements and information provided by non-governmental
groups. Arguably, government spokespersons should be in purdah
during the entire period during which the spending cap applies
to participating campaign bodies.
(f) Since some bodies devoted to electoral reform
(such as the Electoral Reform Society) exist on a permanent basis,
does PPERA satisfactorily define what constitutes a routine (non-campaign)
expenditure of such bodies and what must count as a campaign item
of spending? At what point does "academic" and "educational"
activity become a form of campaigning covered by PPERA? What forms
of activity are bodies with charitable status permitted to undertake?
(g) The definitions of in-kind donations to a
referendum campaign and of foreign donations arguably raise problems.
For example, if a foreign politician sometimes receives payment
for a speech, is any speech delivered for the purpose of supporting
one side of the referendum argument to be considered as an in-kind
donation and thus subject to the ban on foreign contributions?
In other words, do the regulations effectively constitute a ban
on campaign statements by foreign politicians and experts?
(h) As pointed out in Gay, 2009, the rules for
reporting expenditure mean that it could become apparent that
a campaign body had contravened the spending limits only months
after the referendum. This adds weight to the position of the
Committee on Standards in Public Life that such limits for referendum
campaigns are uncalled for. If referendum campaign spending limits
are to be retained, is there a case for requiring earlier disclosure
of spending than that of PPERA?
(i) The Electoral Commission is entitled to issue
neutral "educational" materials concerning the referendum
question. In practice, it is hard to assure the neutrality of
any such presentation. The materials produced in New Zealand when
the issue of electoral reform was being discussed there demonstrate
the dangers. The lists of "pro" and "anti"
arguments were presented in a manner that betrayed the prejudices
of those responsible for producing the educational materials.
(j) Since the arguments concerning AV involve
both its immediate and the wider effects, there is room for disagreement
about the scope of information provided as part of any "educational"
programme of the Electoral Commission. In my opinion, the arguments
against AV must include the indirect effects and dangers as well
as the immediate ones.
(k) It is reasonable to question the neutrality
of the Electoral Commission in view of the fact that its first
chair, Sam Younger, took up the interim post of chief official
of the pro-electoral reform campaign body, The Electoral Reform
Society, some time after his term of office at the Electoral Commission
came to an end. Likewise, the current chair of the Electoral Commission
previously occupied a post which involved campaigning on behalf
of electoral reform.
(l) It follows that a method of producing educational
literature on the alternative Vote must be found that satisfies
adherents of both the Yes and No sides.
The current power and funding of pro-reform organisations
7. Apart from the practical difficulties
of regulating campaign spending under the rules set out in PPERA,
there is a separate question concerning the fairness of a referendum
held as soon as May 2011.
Electoral reform has been a topic of enthusiasm
and careful organisation on the part of small but enthusiastic
and well-funded pressure groups and think tanks. Similar organisations
to defend the status quo have not been created and it will take
the stimulus of a projected referendum to bring them into existence.
This will create a grossly unequal playing field
if the referendum date is rushed.
8. The campaign for electoral reform enjoys
a huge funding advantage for several rather surprising reasons:
(i) When the Communist Party of Great Britain
was dissolved its ample funds—Moscow gold—went to
a successor body, the "Democratic Left". This then became
the "New Politics Network" which, in turn morphed into
the campaign group "Unlock Democracy" following a merger
with Charter 88.
"Unlock Democracy" campaigns for electoral
reform with the benefit of over £2 million derived from its
Moscow gold which is held in the form of properties and other
assets. The secretary of the commercial company which controls
this money is also the director of "Unlock Democracy",
Peter Facey.
(ii) The Electoral Reform Society (ERS) has funds
which are still larger. Its wealth derives largely from its successful
commercial arms, Electoral Reform Services Limited, Membership
Engagement Services Limited and Xpress Software Solutions Limited.
In the financial year 2009, ERS and its subsidiaries had a turnover
of more than £21.8 million and reserves of £13.7 million.
(iii) The Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust Limited
is a political fund established by Joseph Rowntree in 1904. It
has been a mainstay of Liberal and Liberal Democrat politics and
of the electoral reform cause. At the end of 2009 its endowment
was £31.7 million and it gives about £1 million of grants
each year.
(iv) Other bodies with charitable status may
be expected to undertake activities which do not formally constitute
"campaigning" but which may nevertheless promote the
arguments for constitutional change.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST
THE ALTERNATIVE
VOTE
Did the scandal about MPs' expenses indicate a
demand for reform of the voting system?
9. The case for a referendum on the voting
system is based on the fallacy that the public outcry against
the expenses scandal of the last Parliament constituted a call
for political "reforms" that have nothing to do with
that scandal and which, in fact, would intensify the very problems
that led to the scandal.
According to the Deputy Prime Minister (House
of Commons, 5 July), the demand is for "political renewal,
transferring power away from the Executive to empower Parliament,
and away from Parliament to empower people."
As will be demonstrated, a move away from the
first-past-the-post system of elections for the House of Commons
would remove from ordinary voters their core power—that
of removing an unpopular government from office by their votes
at a general election. (See £ 12.)
Words such as "renewal," "fairness,"
and "new politics" are unduly vague and tendentious.
The public anger against MPs was about what was widely seen as
the personal financial greed of many of them when it came to using
the system of allowances. The appropriate response was to deal
with that particular matter. It was not appropriate to deploy
dissatisfaction about sleaze and the opportunities presented by
the vagaries of electoral arithmetic in creating a hung parliament
in order to introduce pet schemes for dubious constitutional reforms.
The AV referendum is not mainly about AV
10. The issues at stake are far wider than
the technicalities of the Alternative Vote, a particular—albeit
unusual—voting system. They concern the foundations of democratic
government in the United Kingdom, which would be undermined by
the abandonment of the current system of elections to the House
of Commons.
I put forward some of these core arguments at
the time of the late Lord Jenkins's inaptly named Independent
Review of the Electoral System published in 1998. (See Note 1.)
AV as a step towards PR
11. First, it would be naive to imagine
that the ambitions of the main party in the House of Commons to
favour change in the electoral system—the Liberal Democrats—would
be satisfied by a change to AV. Although, as argued later, the
effects of AV are highly unpredictable, it would be likely to
benefit the Liberal Democrats and to make hung parliaments more
likely. In the event of a further hung parliament under AV, it
is highly likely that the Liberal Democrats would then demand
full PR as the condition for their participation in another coalition
government.
It is realistic to treat AV as the stepping-stone
to PR.
AV and PR would destroy "removal van democracy"
12. Second, it is vital to be clear about
the objectives of a general election. The choice of individual
constituency representatives is an important but secondary function
of a general election. Its principal role is to elect a government.
Or, to put it another way, the role of a general election is to
provide a direct means whereby ordinary voters are able to dismiss
a government that has outlived its popularity. "Throwing
the rascals out" is what democracy is all about.
Our existing voting system admittedly fails
to elect individual MPs in proportion to the number of votes gained
by each political party. But one essential thing it does very
well is to expel governments. This "removal van democracy"
is a method whereby a defeated premier is ejected from Number
10 Downing Street and the removers come for his or her belongings
very shortly afterwards.
By contrast, AV—and still more PR—make
it far harder for voters to dismiss a government. With a multiplication
of political parties, governments will be formed and dismissed
not by the voters but as a result of private deals between politicians.
These deals may be about sensible compromises about policy. They
also may be squalid bargains about patronage and the disposition
of the spoils of power.
For all its admitted statistical imperfections,
the Westminster Model delivers the essential feature of democracy:
the capacity of electors—not of cabals of politicians—to
hold a government to account. Once a premier feels that it may
be possible to escape the verdict of the electors by doing a post-election
deal, the quality of democracy is undermined.
Following electoral reform the third party would
virtually always be in office
13. Third, in a party system such as Britain's—with
two main political parties and a significant third party—elections
are likely to mean that the third party will be almost perpetually
in office. General elections will decide whether it is Liberal
Democrats and Conservatives or whether it is Liberal Democrats
and Labour. The Liberal Democrats will be almost immune from the
wrath of the electors for, even if they lose votes, they are still
likely to hold the balance of power.
We are used to a system which has discriminated
against the Third Party. But a new voting system that made it
virtually impossible to remove it from office would be worse.
Electoral reform would aid extremist political parties
14. Fourth, It is not only the third party
which benefits from proportionality. There are parties further
to the outer fringes of political life which may suddenly hold
the casting votes in the House of Commons. Parties representing
religious and national factions as well as the political extremes
would likely come into their own.
Electoral reform would mean rule by a cartel of
professional politicians
15. Fifth, in much of the European continent,
systems of PR and coalition government have led to a system in
which party professionals have more in common with each other
than with their electoral supporters. This is the system of professionalised
"cartel" politics about which Professors Richard Katz
and Peter Mair have complained. Under PR, the success of politicians
in gaining election depends more on the position they are assigned
by party leaders on the list of party candidates than on their
appeal to the voters. We have seen this already in the United
Kingdom in party-list elections to the European Parliament. Under
the same systems, the funding of parties depends characteristically
on inter-party bargaining over the allocation of state funds.
A danger of the more to AV and thus towards
PR is that it would lead to the very insulation of political professionals
from the ordinary public which the Deputy Prime Minister has cited
as the core problem of our present-day politics.
The illusion that, under AV, all MPs would enjoy
the support of a majority of their electors
16. Sixth, under an AV system, the fact
that the voters express second, third and fourth preferences does
not mean that they "support" the candidates to whom
they assign these lower preferences. A candidate is not elected
until he or she wins an overall majority of votes casts—including
the redistributed votes of candidates with the smallest totals
of votes. But the winner cannot realistically be considered enjoy
the backing of electors who have offered lower preferences.
AV: an unusual system for legislative elections
17. Seventh, there are very few countries
in which members of the lower house of the legislature are elected
on the basis of AV. It is a system used for elections to the Australian
lower chamber, for Papua New Guinea and for Fiji. Among other
things, this means that there is little evidence for predicting
the effects of AV as applied to the party scene in the United
Kingdom.
AV and the Labour Party
18. Seventh, the effects of AV are very
hard to predict and could on some assumptions greatly damage the
Labour Party.
The most likely effect of AV would be to damage
the Conservatives, aid the Liberal Democrats and leave the Labour
Party almost unchanged. This is the calculation of the Electoral
Reform Society about the hypothetical results of the 2010 general
election under AV rules.
On the reasonable assumption that Liberal Democrats
would be the preferred second choice of Labour voters in Tory-held
seats, an increase in Liberal Democratic strength in the House
of Commons of some 20 seats would increase the likelihood of a
hung parliament.
However, there is an alternative scenario. Were
the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats enter into a formal
or informal pact to fight the next election under AV, this could
lead to a near wipeout of Labour. Of course, a Con-Lib Dem pact
would damage Labour even under the existing electoral system,
but not as much.
EQUALISATION OF
CONSTITUENCIES
One person, one vote, and one value: the basic
principle of electoral fairness
19. It is a basic principle of international
conventions concerning electoral democracy that the population
of different constituencies in countries with single-member constituencies
should be as equal as possible.
The rationale for equalisation is electoral
fairness: one person, one vote, and one value. Other considerations
must be very much subsidiary to this. The current variations in
electorates between the least and most populated constituencies
are unacceptably large by international standards. Thus, there
is a strong democratic rationale for equalisation of constituencies.
Should factors other than population size be taken
into account?
20. Other factors (geography, local government
units, etc) should be taken into consideration only if they have
no predictable effect on the balance between political parties
in the House of Commons or in extremely exceptional geographical
circumstances.
Thus, there should be a dispensation for smaller
electorates in geographically remote areas only if this does not
benefit or disadvantage any party.
21. If there is a special dispensation for
a very limited number of sparsely populated constituencies in
exceptionally remote areas, this should not affect lead to the
over-representation of any of the four countries of the United
Kingdom. (This follows a similar rule in Australia.)
22. If exceptions to the equal population
rule are permitted, the number of special cases needs to be minimal
because such exceptions make it hard for authorities responsible
for drawing up boundaries to achieve their central objective.
For example, it may be necessary to draw up boundaries for parliamentary
constituencies that cross county borders, though it will not be
necessary to cross borders between any of the four constituent
countries of the UK. However, a variation of 5% from the norm
will make it possible to draw up constituency boundaries which
do not involve splitting parts of the same local government ward
between different parliamentary constituencies.
23. The Government proposes to allow two
constituencies in Scotland to have unusually small electorates
on the ground of their remote geography (Orkney and Shetlands
and the Western Isles). It is open to question whether even these
two exceptions are necessary.
These constituencies are not nearly as far-flung
as those routinely found in Australia, for example. Given the
ease of flying between remote areas and the development of telecommunications
and computers, the difficulty of servicing constituents in the
more remote rural areas should not be exaggerated.
At any rate, there is no case, in my opinion,
for adding to the list of constituencies permitted to have exceptionally
small electorates since the patterns of party support in these
constituencies is not typical and a dispensation for such constituencies
produces unfairness between political parties.
Is the system of boundary commissions viable?
24. One of the main reasons why constituency
electorates vary more in the UK than in many other democracies
is the current system of boundary commissions which operate under
the terms of the Constituency Boundaries Act 1986. Boundary reviews
not only take place less frequently in the UK than in most other
democracies, also the boundary revision process is far more cumbersome.
It typically takes some six years for new boundaries to be decided.
By the time they are finally introduced they tend to be out of
date already in areas with relatively rapid movement of population.
25. The timetable for the revision of boundaries
proposed by the Government is based on the premise that the boundary
commissions will do their work more rapidly than is their wont
and that, because of this, the current, outdated method of altering
boundaries may be retained. This is unwise and unnecessary.
26. Even if there is no slippage in the
timetable announced by the government, the new boundaries will
not be ready until 2013. This will leave relatively little time
for he reorganisation of constituency party organisations and
for the selection of parliamentary candidates. The delay will
cause uncertainty and concern to sitting MPs.
The case for a new system of revising boundaries
on the Australian model [3]
27. Both in Australia and New Zealand a
boundary review is completed in under a year, rather than the
British six years. It is recommended that there be a detailed
investigation of the Australian system over the recess and that
provisions for a change to this system be included in the Second
Reading of the bill. Ideally, the Second Reading should not take
place until, say, November or December to permit this review and
a review of the referendum financing rules to take place first.
28. The Australian system is based on two
principles: first, population size is the predominant criterion
of boundaries; second, an independent, expert panel takes decisions
about boundaries.
29. Under the Australian system political
parties, local authorities and individuals are given several opportunities
to submit comments and objections. But the time allowed for such
comments is limited at each stage of the boundary review process.
Support of political scientists for abandoning
the current system of boundary commissions
30. There is widespread agreement among
political scientists close to different political parties that
the current UK system of reviewing constituency boundaries is
cumbersome, unduly slow and simply unnecessary. The numerous local
inquiries characteristically have little impact on decisions about
boundaries.
A group of experts is currently working under
the auspices of the British Academy on technical issues relating
to boundary changes. It is expected to report in September following
a study of the Australian system.
Changes to the Constituency Boundaries Act 1986
and a move to the Australian system probably would make it possible
to finalise the new boundaries by 2012—a year earlier than
the currently projected date.
A further summary of the Australian system is
given in the Appendix.
How are the numbers of eligible electors in each
ward to be determined?
31. The entire project of equalising constituency
electorates depends on the existence of a reasonably accurate
way of determining the number of eligible voters in each ward.
The former Lord Chancellor, Jack Straw, complained on 5 July 2010
in the House of Commons that the proposed method of determining
the number of eligible electors is defective because it will rely
on the results of the annual electoral registration exercise.
[4]
Since members of relatively deprived, urban
communities—predominantly Labour voters—have a known
tendency to fail to register, the system will underestimate the
eligible populations in areas where these communities predominate.
If registered electors are the basis for decisions about constituency
boundaries, then deprived urban constituencies will be under-represented
in the House of Commons since no allowance will have been made
for non-registered electors in the boundary review process.
This is an important objection deserving of
serious discussion.
32. Three questions arise:
— Does reliance on the number of registered
electors in drawing up constituency boundaries lead to the under-representation
of deprived, urban areas where failure to register is rife?
— If so, is it practical to improve registration
in these areas in the coming months? [5]
— If it is not practical to improve electoral
registration, is there a satisfactory alternative way to determine
the number of eligible electors in each ward?
Problems of voter registration as a measure of
population: incompleteness versus inaccuracy
33. The concerns expressed by Jack Straw
about the large number of eligible voters who do not bother to
register fail to take account of a second problem—the presence
on electoral registers of names of electors who are no longer
eligible because they have moved or died or for other reasons.
If the number of ineligible names included on
the register roughly equals the number of eligible voters omitted
from the register, then the size of the registered electorate
will reflect reality after all.
Of course, it is dangerous to assume that the
two kinds of registration error actually cancel each other in
every part of the country. There is a sore shortage of evidence
about the number of names wrongly included on electoral registers
("redundant" or "incorrect" names).
After the Census of 2001, the Electoral Commission
omitted to arrange for a study of the number of names incorrectly
included on the registers. Such studies had been carried out after
earlier Censuses.
The Electoral Commission has, however, arranged
for a limited number of pilot studies of different parts of the
UK. The results were published in March 2010.
Though they give only rough information, these
pilot studies suggest that areas where the proportion of eligible
voters who fail to register is particularly high are the same
areas where the proportion of ineligible names retained on the
register also is especially high.
On the basis of admittedly incomplete data,
it seems that the problem of under-registration in deprived urban
areas and in places where young people live in rented accommodation
and move frequently does not lead to a very large minimisation
of the eligible population.
Will individual registration make the electoral
rolls better indicators of population size?
34. While there are weighty arguments for
the introduction of individual voter registration in place of
the existing system of household registration, this will not eliminate
the problems that have been outlined and could make them worse.
Remedies for the possible problems of using the
electoral register as the measure of voting population
35. Although the problems involved in using
the electoral rolls as the basis for decisions about the number
of eligible voters in each ward are considerably smaller than
claimed by Jack Straw, every care should be taken to ensure that
boundaries are drawn on the basis of the best possible sources
of information about population size.
36. Provided that such care is taken, and
provided that other sources of information about population size
apart from the electoral registers are considered, the difficulties
of assessing population in each ward should not be permitted to
destroy the case for equalisation of constituencies. After all,
there currently exist some blatant inequalities that need to be
removed and it is reasonable to expect their removal within the
course of the current parliament.
Recommendations concerning the measure of numbers
of eligible voters per ward
37. Three possible solutions should be considered:
(1) There should be special efforts by the Ministry
of Justice to ensure that electoral registration is carried out
efficiently, especially in areas known to have high rates of under-registration.
Ways to promote efficiency are outlined in Note 5.
(2) If the speedier Australian method of boundary
redistribution is to be introduced, it may be possible to base
the new boundaries on the results of the registration exercise
of 2011-12. This will give more time to plan ways of making the
electoral registration process more efficient.
(3) Alternative sources of information about
population size should be considered. In Australia, the quarterly
population estimates produced by the country's statistical office
are used. It is worth investigating whether a similar method is
available in the United Kingdom and whether it would be more reliable
than data derived from the electoral rolls.
38. Concerning the third option in 37, there
are technical objections to using population estimates since these
estimated appear to be less readily available in the UK than in
Australia.
Population estimates are revised each year after
the decennial Census by adjusting for births and deaths as well
as estimated internal and international migration. However, such
estimates become less reliable the longer the time after the previous
Census. Moreover, population estimates are not available at ward
level. Additional input would be required from local authorities
to derive up-to-date estimates for the population of wards (which
will be the building blocks for the proposed boundary reviews).
More accurate information about the population
of each ward will become available after the results of the next
Census have been calculated. But statistics for ward populations
will not be available until well into 2013. This would be dangerously
late if the aim is to complete the equalisation of constituencies
during the term of this parliament.
Thus, the first two options in 37 are probably
the best way forward.
21 July 2010
APPENDIX
THE AUSTRALIAN SYSTEM OF BOUNDARY REDISTRIBUTION
1. The starting point is the absolute rule
that the allocation of seats to each state and territory is based
solely on population: no ifs and buts.
This makes it possible to fix the quota of seats
for each state and territory rapidly and automatically.
2. Redistricting takes place every seven
years. However, if there are large population changes before that
(the definitions of which are included in the Act), redistribution
takes places earlier. In practice, the seven-year period almost
always applies.
3. The commissioners have full powers over
the redistribution but there are several periods of public consultation.
However, the time allowed for each stage of consultation is limited.
4. It has become a part of the political
culture that the number of electors is the predominant factor,
though the representation of communities and towns also is taken
into account. When the population numbers make it necessary, say,
to split a town into separate constituencies, the commissioners
take care to explain publicly the reasons for doing so.
5. Australia far exceeds the UK when it
comes to sparse populations. However, the post-1983 system which
hardly takes account of population density works far better than
the previous system which over-represented rural areas: that system
led to unfairness between parties (with the over-representation
of the Agrarian Party) and even to corruption—for example
in Queensland.
6. The system is simple to administer.
A redistribution is undertaken by a committee
consisting of the Electoral Commissioner, the Australian Electoral
Officer for the State concerned, the State Surveyor-General and
the State Auditor-General.
7. Timetable:
(1) As soon as possible after the redistribution
process commences, the Electoral Commissioner invites public suggestions
on the redistribution which must be lodged within 30 days.
(2) A further period of 14 days is allowed for
comments on the suggestions lodged. The Redistribution Committee
then divides the State or Territory into divisions and publishes
its proposed redistribution.
(3) A period of 28 days is allowed after publication
of the proposed redistribution for written objections.
(4) A further period of 14 days is provided for
comments on the objections lodged.
(5) These objections are considered by an augmented
Electoral Commission consisting of the four members of the Redistribution
Committee and the two part-time members of the Electoral Commission.
8. Use of population projections
At the time of the redistribution the number
of electors in the divisions may vary up to 10% from the "quota"
or average divisional figure but at a point 3.5 years after the
expected completion of the redistribution, the figures should
not vary from the average projected quota by more or less than
3.5%. Thus the most rapidly growing divisions are generally started
with enrolments below the quota while those that are losing population
are started above the quota.
The Parliament has no power to reject or amend
the final determination of the augmented Electoral Commission.
See www.aec.gov.au/Electorates/Redistributions/Overview.htm
NOTES1. Dr Michael
Pinto-Duschinsky is a member of the boards of directors of the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (Washington DC),
IFES Limited (London), and president of the International Political
Science Association's research committee on Political Finance
and Political Corruption. From 1967-2008, he taught and researched
on elections at Merton College, Oxford, Pembroke College, Oxford,
and Brunel University. He is the author of "Send the rascals
packing: Defects of proportional representation and the virtues
of the Westminster model." Representation (36) No 2, 1999,
117-26. and of other writings on electoral systems and electoral
administration. In 1995, he was an adviser to the Electoral Assistance
Division of the United Nations and to the Foreign & Commonwealth
Office on the Constitutional Review Commission for Fiji—one
of the few countries with an AV system. He has been a consultant
to the Home Office on voter registration, to the UK Electoral
Commission, and the Committee on Standards in Public Life. He
has advised governments and public bodies in over 25 countries
on aspects of constitutional and electoral reform as well as international
organisations such as the Commonwealth Secretariat, World Bank,
Council of Europe, European Union, and the Organisation for Security
and Cooperation in Europe.
2. See Oonagh Gay (2009). "Referendum on
electoral reform." 14 December. www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-05142.pdf,
p. 3, and evidence by Sam Younger to the Treasury Select Committee,
18 March 2003, HC 187-II, Session 2002-03, Q 1327, www.parliament.uk/pa/cm/select/cmtreasy/187/3031805.htm.
3. Michael Maley of the Australian Electoral
Commission gave valuable information and advice.
4. I am grateful to Dr Stuart Wilks-Heeg for
his input on the current problems of electoral registration, a
matter on which he recently has conducted research for the Electoral
Commission. However, the views expressed are mine as is responsibility
for any factual errors.
5. If the future boundaries on drawn on the basis
of the annual electoral registration exercise of 2010-11, speedy
action will be needed to ensure that the registration authorities
within the relevant local government authorities carry out the
door-to-door canvass of properties from which electoral registration
forms have not been returned. The willingness of these authorities
to commissioning this canvassing is likely to depend partly on
the extent to which they are instructed to do so by the Ministry
of Justice and partly on the budgets for canvassing allocated
by local authorities.
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