Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill - Political and Constitutional Reform Committee Contents


Written evidence submitted by Richard Burden MP (PVSCB 31)

1.  INTRODUCTION

  1.1  I welcome the Committee's decision to scrutinise the government's proposals:

    —  to hold a national referendum on using the Alternative Vote (AV) system at general elections, to reduce the size of the House of Commons, and to equalise the size of parliamentary constituencies, and

    —  to establish fixed-term Parliaments of five years.

  1.2  This is a brief response to the Select Committee's call for evidence. I am the Chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Electoral Reform. However, I should emphasise that I am submitting this response in a personal capacity.

2.  SUMMARY

  2.1  In this response I argue that:

    —  the proposal for a referendum on the Alternative Vote should be supported;

    —  the proposals to reduce the number of MPs and the new method suggested to ensure compatibility of constituency sizes are not acceptable and need to be re-thought;

    —  the proposal for a referendum on AV should be in a separate Bill from the one dealing with the number of MPs and constituency sizes; and

    —  the introduction of fixed-term Parliaments is to be welcomed but that scrutiny of the government's plans is required.

3.  REFERENDUM ON THE ALTERNATIVE VOTE

  3.1  I believe that fundamental reform of the voting system for the House of Commons is long overdue. My own preference would be for a broadly proportional system which maintains the constituency link. I set out my views in a submission to the Jenkins Commission in the 1990s and they remain the same today.

  3.2  It should not be for politicians to decide the ways in which should be elected, but the public we are elected to serve. That is why I fully support the principle of a referendum.

  3.3  To facilitate voter choice, ideally I would have liked to see a referendum which first gave a straight "yes" or "no" on the principle of change. If this produced a "yes" vote, there could then be a further question or referendum on what kind of replacement system the electorate would like to see. This could allow voters to express preferences between different proportional systems and systems such as AV.

  3.4  However, the government has decided to go down a different route and my preference for a two stage referendum would not prevent me from supporting a single referendum if that is what is put before the House.

  3.5  Similarly, although my preference would be for a more proportional system than AV, I believe it is still very worthwhile to give voters the chance to choose between AV and the current system. Whether or not one supports greater proportionality in the relationship between votes cast and seats won in Parliament as a whole, it is still reasonable to give voters the chance to opt for a system which ensures that every candidate in a single member constituency should get 50% of the vote to be elected. Such a principle at constituency level is valid both in proportionally based systems and majoritarian ones.

  3.6. I therefore support the proposal for a referendum on AV.

4.  REDUCING THE NUMBER OF MPS AND EQUALISING PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES

  4.1  I do not support the government's plans to reduce the number of MPs or the way it is proposing to equalise parliamentary constituencies in a manner far more restrictive than the Boundary Commission tries to do in its regular reviews.

  4.2  Even after devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, Britain remains a highly centralised state with a great deal of power resting with the government in Whitehall. This—and the absence of a specifically regional tier of representation in England—means that MPs not only have to play a significant scrutiny role at national level, they also have to take on a role of champions for their localities or regions more prominently than is necessarily the case in other comparable countries. A growing body of evidence also suggests that the day-to-day casework role of MPs has grown significantly in recent years and continues to do so. These and other factors suggest that MPs are, if anything, trying to spread themselves too thinly to fulfil all their roles as effectively as they would like. The result is that very long working hours are regularly undertaken by MPs—in recesses as well as during times Parliament is sitting.

  4.3  Together, all this suggests that cutting the numbers of MPs in the way suggested by the government is unlikely to be in the interests of either democracy or the effectiveness of Parliament.

  4.4  The proposal to equalise constituency sizes in the way suggested by the government presents even more problems. Few would argue in principle that constituencies should be of broadly comparable sizes and the Boundary Commission tries to reflect this in its periodic reviews. However, effective democracy is not simply about counting electors. It also means recognising how MPs can actually effectively keep in touch with and represent their constituents. In this, the characteristics of different areas—including geographical size, community identities and a range of other factors—need to be taken into account alongside voter numbers. Although the government's revised proposals now recognise this to an extent, more scrutiny should be given to how far they have got it right.

  4.5  Even on the question of numbers, basing the new boundaries on numbers of electors registered is likely to discriminate against effective representation in areas with traditionally low registration rates. Deprived areas and areas with a large proportion of young residents are likely to be hit particularly hard. Taken together with the proposal to reduce the number of MPs overall, this could be a serious problem.

  4.6  These kinds of issues require serious debate and resolution before, not after, the Bill completes its parliamentary proceedings and changes should be made where necessary. However, even after the Bill becomes law it is important that sufficient time is given to draw up the proposed new boundaries, to consult widely on them and to make changes where necessary. The existing Boundary Commission procedures may be time consuming and a little cumbersome, but they at least allow the above to take place. The tight timescales in the new Bill will make this very difficult to achieve and the implication in the Bill that ministers, not the Commission, will be able to shape the final proposals to be put before Parliament is dangerous.

  4.7  Others may take a different view on the above observations. Indeed, it is even more likely that MPs may support parts of the Bill's provisions but reject others. For example, it is entirely possible that MPs may wish to vote for a referendum on AV and against the reduce and equalise proposal or vice versa. However, by the time the Bill reaches Third Reading there will be no opportunity to reflect this in their votes.

  4.8  Of course, many Bills involve more than one proposal on more than one subject and MPs have to make a judgement on the package as a whole at Third Reading. But different and distinct issues should only be included in the same Bill for a good reason. Where constitutional issues are concerned it is particularly important that Bills are not cobbled together for political convenience. When it comes to how people are able to choose the government, not simply which government to choose, elected representatives should be allowed to make informed and, if necessary, different decisions about different aspects of the electoral process that are distinct from one another.

  4.9  In this case there is no reason why an MP's view on an AV referendum should be forced to take second place to their views on the numbers of MPs and the new approach to equalising the size of constituencies, any more than the reverse should be the case. Put another way, there is no reason why these two proposals should be incorporated into one Bill. The government should present them in two separate Bills.

5.  FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS

  5.1  I principle, I am in favour of fixed-term Parliaments. The government's original proposals requiring a 55% majority to call a General Election were ill thought out and seemed to be motivated more by political expediency that either principle or effective democracy. The revised proposals look like they make more sense. However, I cannot claim to have looked at the new proposals in depth and I would certainly commend the Select committee on its decision to scrutinise the government's plans.

26 August 2010





 
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