Constitutional implications of the Cabinet Manual - Political and Constitutional Reform Committee Contents


2  Purpose, status and consequences

8. The Cabinet Secretary's foreword to the draft states that the Cabinet Manual will be a "guide" to "the way in which government operates".[9] It is "primarily written to provide a guide for members of the Cabinet, other ministers and Civil Servants, but … also … to inform the public whom the Government serves … It is not intended to have any legal effect or set issues in stone".[10] The Foreword acknowledges that "Some areas of the Manual continue to be subject to public debate", but states that it "does not seek to resolve or move forward those debates, but is instead a factual description of the situation today. In other words, it will be a record of incremental changes rather than a driver of change".[11]

9. The Cabinet Secretary's stated intention is clear; but it does not necessarily follow that this is how the Cabinet Manual will be used in practice by those within and outside the Executive. It is a new development in the United Kingdom context, and its exact character and status are open to question and unexpected development.

10. In the following paragraphs we identify areas in which the Cabinet Manual risks straying beyond the limits described for it by the Cabinet Secretary, and examine the potential consequences of it doing so.

Who is it for?

11. The Cabinet Secretary told us that the Manual would be "a guide for Ministers and civil servants" but he added that "we also, by making it public, want to help in general education".[12]

12. The tone and content of the Cabinet Manual are not always obviously suited to its stated primary audience of "members of Cabinet, other Ministers and Civil Servants".[13] Rodney Brazier, Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Manchester, warns that "matters which might well be well known to the main audience must be spelled out so as to make sense to the interested citizen", and as a consequence "the scope and breadth of the paper is possibly wider than it would be if it were aimed only at those who work in Cabinet Government".[14] He also highlights that at times more basic detail is given than would be necessary if the document were purely aimed at the Executive:

    If this draft Cabinet Manual were conceived so as better to inform Ministers and civil servants only - that is, if interested citizens were not among its planned readership - then there would be areas where too much detailed information is given. I take chapter 1 (The Sovereign) by way of example. Why would all overworked Ministers and officials throughout Whitehall need or want to know the details concerning royal succession, coronations, arrangements in a Sovereign's absence or incapacity, or the Established Church?[15]

13. Dr Michael Pinto-Duschinsky told us that "this document is neither fish nor fowl and it is the worst of all worlds".[16] Dr Stuart Wilks-Heeg, Director of Democratic Audit, agreed:

    I do have concerns that a document, which on one level is meant to be written by the Executive for the Executive is supposed to also be a document that explains how government operates to the general public ... To my mind, that does not quite make sense.[17]

14. Certainly, there are some statements in the draft which are declaratory principles, more in keeping with a written constitution than a technical manual:

  • "The UK is a parliamentary democracy…"[18]
  • "General elections allow voters on the electoral roll to cast their ballot for a Member of Parliament to represent them in the House of Commons."[19]
  • "Members of the House of Commons are directly elected by universal suffrage of the adult population of the United Kingdom."[20]

15. Conversely, the paragraphs in the draft on NATO seem to contain information of relevance to very few Ministers or civil servants.[21]

16. The publication of the draft Cabinet Manual is a welcome signal of open government. The Manual will no doubt be a useful point of reference for Parliament, the electorate and those involved in public education on constitutional issues. It is notable that the New Zealand counterpart on which it is based is a more technical and well-referenced document.

Dealing with disagreement, ambiguity and complexity

17. The foreword to the draft states that:

    Some areas of the Manual continue to be subject to public debate. The Manual, however, does not seek to resolve or move forward those debates, but is instead a factual description of the situation today. In other words, it will be a record of incremental changes rather than a driver of change. [22]

18. The Cabinet Secretary told us, however, that "some judgment calls" had been taken in deciding how to record areas of uncertainty in the draft, and that the Manual will be "the Executive's interpretation".[23] This gives weight to an argument put to us by Dr Pinto Duschinsky that "it is inherently difficult if not impossible for a written document to list existing, often unwritten, rules, conventions and precedents without interpreting them in the process",[24] and on similar lines, by the Institute for Government: "where previous conventions had been tacit and implied, the mere fact of publication can be seen as seeking to lay down one viewpoint (primarily a Whitehall one)".[25] The Institute for Government suggest as a consequence that "publication of the Manual may have the constitutional consequence of hardening up and entrenching certain practices in the short-term, even when the intention is to permit discretion".[26]

19. The Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies, King's College London, provide a concrete example: "In stating that (para 30) 'Cabinet is the executive committee of the Privy Council' the Manual is once more making an unsupported assertion over which there is not a consensus".[27] A further three examples are cited by Richard Gordon QC.[28] The recommendation from the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution that the Manual should be "fully referenced throughout" would ensure at least that assertions were not unsupported.[29]

20. The Lords Constitution Committee has recommended that

    where no convention exists, or there is doubt as to its extent, this should be stated. As a description of the current constitutional position, it is better for the Manual to be open about areas of debate than to resort to potentially ambiguous wording in order to cloud the issue.[30]

We agree.

21. We think that the Manual should include "judgment calls" only where straightforward "factual description" is impracticable, and that it should do so sparingly. The Manual must, however, avoid presenting as unchallengeable fact a statement that the Government knows to be disputed.

22. Where there is the potential for disagreement or uncertainty, as there so often is on the meaning of unwritten constitutional conventions, it is important that the Cabinet Manual should signal the existence of this uncertainty. This would be of enormous assistance to those involved in seeking to interpret the text of the Manual and help to ensure consistency in interpretation, and thus transparency.

23. Dr Wilks-Heeg has drawn attention to the sometimes imprecise language used in the draft: "the Cabinet Manual is ... vague in so many places using lots of phrases like 'ordinarily' or 'normally' or 'as far as possible'".[31] The draft contains 47 instances of 'usually', 32 of 'normally', and three of 'as far as possible'.[32]

24. Iain McLean, Professor of Politics at the University of Oxford, also illustrates this point:

    At para. 56, "the Prime Minister is expected to tender the Government's resignation, unless circumstances allow him or her to opt instead to request dissolution". What circumstances are these? This is a key point, which should be clarified. I do not think that the [Manual] clarifies this point.[33]

25. Vague language—'usually this' and 'normally that'—probably indicates a shorthand way of avoiding long and detailed explanations of complex situations, but it risks limiting the Manual's usefulness as a practical tool, unless the Manual also makes clear where the more detailed explanations are available.

Improving usability

26. Two rather prosaic practical additions would improve the usability of the draft Cabinet Manual. One, as suggested by Professor Rodney Brazier, would be to include an index.[34] This seems to us consistent with a realistic idea of how the Cabinet Manual will be used: as a point of reference, rather than a book to be read from cover to cover.

27. The second suggestion is that the Cabinet Manual should mirror its New Zealand counterpart by opening each chapter with a list of sources of related information. This would be useful to the reader, and would also make clear from the outset that the Cabinet Manual is a starting point and reference guide, rather than the only source of information on the areas it covers. The lists should include not only published sources, but also relevant unpublished internal government guidance, except in those rare cases where the existence of this guidance would not be subject to disclosure under Freedom of Information principles.

28. An index should be added to the Cabinet Manual so that it can be more easily used as a point of reference. Sources of related information, both published and unpublished, should be listed at the beginning of each chapter to make clear to readers the range of other guidance that exists.

Sources and references

29. As set out in paragraph 5 of the draft Manual, constitutional matters have a number of sources, including statutes, legal precedents and conventions, which are defined in the draft as "rules of constitutional practice that are regarded as binding in operation but not in law".[35] The Institute for Government suggest that "there are subtle but important distinctions between laws, conventions and rules and it would be helpful if a clearer distinction were drawn between what is required by these three categories".[36] David Walker makes a similar point, writing that "the Manual does not distinguish hard from soft convention, as opposed to statute or fungible 'understandings'".[37]

30. It would not therefore be clear to Ministers and civil servants using the current draft which of its provisions they are bound by law to follow and which might be departed from should circumstances render this appropriate. This kind of distinction would also be of value to readers outside the Executive, and might help them to fine-tune their judgments on whether a Minister or civil servant has acted inappropriately when departing from guidance contained in the Manual. We agree with the House of Lords Constitution Committee that the Manual should "be fully referenced throughout".[38] This would also help to prevent the Manual from unintentionally taking a position on constitutional issues, as well as setting out for those using the Manual the basis for the advice it contains.

Precedent book

31. In holding a consultation on the draft Cabinet Manual, the government is inviting outsiders to comment on a text a large proportion of which is made up of constitutional conventions. These conventions in turn rely on precedents—events in the constitutional past of the UK—for their authority. Some of these precedents are widely known and publicly sourced, while others are not.

32. It came to our attention during the course of this inquiry that the Government keeps a 'precedent book' containing the events upon which its operational understandings, its conventions, are based; but that the current 'precedent book' and a number of earlier editions remain classified.[39] Without the 'precedent book' being available in the public domain, it can be difficult for those outside the Executive to comment with authority upon those parts of the draft that involve conventions, yet it is this that the Government has asked us to do. We appreciate that the 'precedent book' may contain within it information that is personally sensitive, but believe there is a strong case for the publication, at the earliest practical time, of a redacted version of the 'precedent book', providing those outside the Executive with a more informed opportunity to judge whether constitutional conventions are accurately reflected in the draft. It would also make a more general contribution to public understanding of the British constitution as a whole.

Legal status

33. The foreword of the draft states that the Cabinet Manual "is not intended to have any legal effect".[40] This is clearly true in the sense that it has no statutory force and would not be directly enforceable in court. However, both Professor Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield and the Cabinet Secretary suggested that there were circumstances in which the Manual might be used in judicial review to establish "the normal expectations of proper process".[41] Richard Gordon QC argues that in one sense at least, the Manual could come to have legal status:

    if the Cabinet Manual comes to be used as a source of guidance but contains incorrect statements of law it could be the subject of declaratory relief by the Court … A possible trend here is that if judges become used to issuing declaratory relief about constitutional matters it may lead to greater judicial involvement in areas that have previously been regarded as 'off-limits'.

    If judges were to pronounce in this way on matters contained in the Cabinet Manual it would be hard to deny that, although not intended to have legal effect, the Manual was operating as a constitutional catalyst and, at least in that sense, possessed arguable legal status.[42]

34. It seems unlikely to us that the Cabinet Manual will feature extensively in court proceedings. However, in a constitution based on the rule of law judicial interpretation is always possible. This is simply a further reason for the Executive and Legislature to do all they can to ensure that the Manual is accurate, does not mislead and is subject to due process.

Consequences of publication: a life of its own?

35. The Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies write that "The Manual may prove to have greater significance than its authors appear to be claiming for it; and it may contribute to unintended change".[43] The Institute for Government suggest that "The mere act of publication may mean that the Manual will become a reference point against which future actions of ministers and the civil service will be judged".[44] On similar lines, the Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies state that "The Manual may be come to be used by those who attempt to justify or criticise the actions of actors within the executive, with claims being made about whether or not the Manual is being adhered to".[45] Professor Margaret Wilson told us that in New Zealand there could be consequences "in political terms or in media terms" of not following guidance in their Cabinet Manual.[46]

36. Even if it is not intended to be binding, the Cabinet Manual, when published, may set the expectations of the media, the public, and of politicians. Even it has no legal force, the political pressure created by publishing the Cabinet Manual to comply with its provisions may make it hard to depart from in practice. As Lord Hennessy told us "if it becomes part of the warp and the woof of everyday business it gives it a great salience; in practical terms it becomes very important".[47] This is problematic if those outside Government are judged on rules and conventions as set out in the Cabinet Manual, despite the fact that they have not agreed to them. This effect would also be particularly problematic if incorrect constitutional positions were included. For example the inclusion of the footnote to paragraph 49 which quotes the Leader of the Liberal Democrat Party expressing the view that following a general election "whichever party has won the most votes and the most seats, if not an overall majority, has the first right to seek to govern, either on its own or by reaching out to other parties" gives the impression that this is an accepted constitutional norm, which it very clearly is not (see section 5, below).[48] The foreword to the draft suggests that the Cabinet Manual is a document of limited ambition, which is not intended to "set issues in stone" or to "resolve or move forward" matters of public debate. Despite these intentions, there is scope for the constitutional impact of the Cabinet Manual to be greater than this. This becomes particularly true where the Cabinet Manual's content extends beyond matters that are purely for the Executive.

The role of Parliament

37. Part of the role of the sovereign United Kingdom Parliament is to hold the Executive to account. It is for Parliament, and not the Executive, to decide to what extent it is appropriate for it to become involved in matters of the Executive. The Cabinet Secretary states in his foreword to the draft that he expects "to invite Cabinet to endorse a revised version of the Cabinet Manual".[49] While the Cabinet Secretary also says that he "would welcome further comments in particular from ... the relevant committees of Parliament", the Manual itself refers to no further involvement from Parliament.[50] We expect nonetheless to engage in an ongoing dialogue with the Government about the Cabinet Manual and its contents. The Cabinet Secretary raised no objection to this in his oral evidence.[51]

38. We have heard different views on the extent to which parliamentary endorsement of the Manual is appropriate. Democratic Audit proposes that, given the importance of the Cabinet Manual, it should be "the subject of debate in Parliament and that ownership if the document should ultimately rest with Parliament".[52]

39. In contrast, Professor Wilson said of the New Zealand Cabinet Manual that for it to be endorsed by Parliament "would give it a status beyond which it has".[53] Professor Robert Hazell, Director of the Constitution Unit at University College London, told us on similar lines:

    I don't think it does need to be formally approved by Parliament. This is ultimately a document of the Executive. It has submitted it for public consultation and for scrutiny by a parliamentary Committee, but at the end of the day it is the Executive's document.[54]

The House of Lords Constitution Committee has also concluded that the Manual should not be formally approved by Parliament, stating that they "are strongly opposed to any suggestion that the Cabinet Manual be formally approved by Parliament or by any of its committees".[55] We disagree, because we believe the Manual is or could become the kind of document which requires a strong form of accountability to Parliament, or at least to the elected House.

40. Whether or not the Cabinet Manual should be open to amendment and decision by Parliament depends in our view on what the Cabinet Manual is or might become. If it is simply a document by the Executive, about the Executive and for the Executive, then for Parliament to decide on its content would give it a status it should not have. As the Constitution Committee has put it:

    The Manual is an official guide primarily for ministers and civil servants and has some value as a reference work and in illuminating the operation of government. It is, and should be, no more than that.[56]

41. The Manual, however, seems in part to be intended as—or might become, whatever the intention—the basis for a shared understanding beyond the Executive of important parts of the United Kingdom's previously uncodified constitution. Parliamentary intervention would be entirely appropriate in such circumstances. An official document, approved by the Cabinet, will have a status unlike that of existing academic texts on the same subject. We intend to monitor closely how the Cabinet Manual develops, and how it is used both within and beyond Government during the life of this Parliament.

42. Whatever the status of the Cabinet Manual as a document, it covers ground which is significant enough to merit regular debate in the House. We therefore propose that, soon after the Cabinet Manual is finalised, the House should have the opportunity to debate it as a whole and should seek the Government's assurance that such a debate should become an annual fixture in the parliamentary calendar. Alternatively, the debate could occur twice during the course of a five-year Parliament - the first debate within 30 months of the start of a fixed term five-year Parliament, and the second debate within 30 months of the election concluding the Parliament. Before each one, the Government should publish a list of changes made to the Manual since the previous debate. The Government should publish a list of changes made to the Manual during the preceding year to inform this debate. As the Manual is largely about the conduct of the Executive, we would expect this debate to take place in Government time.

43. It would go against the spirit of discussion between Government and Parliament so far if the Government were to resist this proposal, but, were it to do so, we would consider approaching the Backbench Business Committee.


9   Draft Cabinet Manual, Foreword Back

10   As above Back

11   As above Back

12   Q79 Back

13   Draft Cabinet Manual, Foreword Back

14   Ev w1, para 4 Back

15   Ev w1para 17. See also Ev w14, para 19 [Institute for Government] Back

16   Q59 Back

17   Q60 Back

18   Draft Cabinet Manual, para 1 Back

19   Draft Cabinet Manual, para 38 Back

20   Draft Cabinet Manual, para 186 Back

21   Draft Cabinet Manual, paras 323-327 Back

22   Draft Cabinet Manual, Foreword Back

23   Q103 Back

24   Ev 58 para 6 Back

25   Ev w14, para 13 Back

26   Ev w13, para 8 Back

27   Ev w10, para 58 Back

28   Ev w19, paras 37-47 Back

29   HL Paper 107 (see also para 30 of this Report) Back

30   HL Paper 107, para 52 Back

31   Q60 Back

32   'Ordinarily' does not in fact appear. Back

33   Ev 40, para 20 Back

34   Ev w4, para 18 Back

35   Draft Cabinet Manual, para 5 Back

36   Ev w14, para 11 Back

37   Ev 51, para 1.1 Back

38   HL Paper 107 Back

39   Q4 [Lord Hennessy] Back

40   Draft Cabinet Manual, Foreword Back

41   Q31, Q123. Back

42   Ev w16, para 5 Back

43   Ev w6, para 3 Back

44   Ev w13, para 7 Back

45   Ev w7, para 21 Back

46   Constitutional Lessons from New Zealand, HC747-i, Q34 Back

47   Q18 Back

48   Draft Cabinet Manual, para 49 Back

49   Draft Cabinet Manual, Foreword Back

50   As above Back

51   As above Back

52   Ev 55 para 10 Back

53   Constitutional Lessons from New Zealand, HC747-i, Q29 Back

54   Q7 Back

55   HL Paper 107, para 40 Back

56   HL Paper 107, para 41 Back


 
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© Parliamentary copyright 2011
Prepared 29 March 2011