Constitutional Implications of the Cabinet Manual - Political and Constitutional Reform Committee Contents


Supplementary written evidence submitted by Professor Robert Hazell, The Constitution Unit, University College London

When giving evidence on 13 January 2011, I failed to do justice to two points.

PARLIAMENT'S ROLE IN GOVERNMENT FORMATION

There seemed to be a wish that the House of Commons had held its first sitting very soon after the 6 May election in order to influence the negotiations between the political parties. This would simply not be realistic.

I know of no parliament which plays such a role:

¾  It takes several days for members to be sworn in, and the Speaker to be elected.

¾  Negotiations cannot be conducted on the floor of the House.

¾  Even in countries (eg Scotland) which have an investiture vote, where the parliament formally elects or nominates the first minister, that vote takes place after the conclusion of negotiations between the parties.

The impracticality of the proposal can be judged by asking: if the House of Commons had sat on 10 or 11 May, what would it have done? It could only have adjourned to enable the political parties to continue their negotiations, and to await the outcome. But if the concern lying behind the Committee's questions was that members felt excluded from the negotiations, the remedy lies not in Parliament, but in the internal democracy of their own political parties. As the recent books by Rob Wilson and David Laws both show, Liberal Democrat MPs were extensively consulted during the negotiations; Conservative MPs to some extent; Labour MPs hardly at all.

OWNERSHIP OF THE CABINET MANUAL

I was repeatedly pressed on whether Parliament should claim a right to approve the contents of the Manual. Parliament has every right to scrutinise the Manual, and I have no doubt that Cabinet Office will take any comments very seriously. But that is not the same as a right of approval, or veto. Most of the Manual consists of discrete pieces of executive guidance which are now being brought together, but which have long existed without parliamentary approval. These include:

The Ministerial Code

A Guide to Cabinet and Cabinet Committee Business.
Civil Service Code.
Directory of Civil Service Guidance, vols 1-2.
Executive Agencies: A Guide for Departments.
Public Bodies: A Guide for Departments.
The Judge Over Your Shoulder.
General Election Guidance 2005.
Guide to Parliamentary Business.
Guide to Making Legislation.
Freedom of Information Guidelines.
Devolution Guidance.

The Civil Service Code is now statutory and must be laid before Parliament, since the civil service was put on a statutory footing in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. But it is not subject to parliamentary approval in the form of positive or negative resolution. It is only subject to minimum requirements that civil servants must be able to serve administrations of any political complexion, and must do so in accordance with the civil service values of integrity and honesty, objectivity and impartiality.

Another argument advanced for parliamentary approval of the Cabinet Manual was that it refers to relations between the government and Parliament. But the fact that the Manual refers to the Executive's relations with other bodies does not imply that it requires the consent of those other bodies, whether Parliament, the judiciary or anyone else. On this logic, given what is said in chapter 9 on Europe and international institutions, the Manual should require the consent of the EU, NATO, WTO etc etc.

This is a question which it would be worth exploring further in the evidence session with Professor Margaret Wilson, a distinguished parliamentarian who was herself Speaker of the New Zealand House of Representatives.

16 January 2011


 
previous page contents next page


© Parliamentary copyright 2011
Prepared 29 March 2011