Session 2010-11
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23 July 2010 Memoranda published by the Committee to date for the inquiry into Government proposals for voting and parliamentary reform
Memorandum from Rt Hon Denis MacShane MP (AV01) I hope your committee will come out decisively against AV which taken with the proposal to reduce the number of MPs means that citizens will have fewer representatives and rights in relationship to the centralised state system. Britain has no intermediary levels of government other than the Scottish and Welsh systems. There are no provincial, regional or state governments as in Australia, Canada, the US or most European countries. Citizens come straight to MPs with a host of problems as they have no other representatives to speak for them in terms of their relationship with the state. The idea that there should be fewer MPs serving ever-more citizens is a serious assault on democracy. If anything there may be a case for more MPs given that there is little possibility of bringing in more devolved levels of government. I would support 4-year fixed terms, the norm in America, Germany and other (not all) EU member states. On electoral reform the 1929-31 Labour government proposed AV but it was shot down in the Commons with Winston Churchill pointing out that the least popular candidate can overtake the most popular candidate on the basis of transfer votes from every other political faction that failed to win support. How ironic if the second or third preferences of BNP or UKIP voters decided who was elected as an MP. There is no perfect electoral system. Full PR gives the nightmare of Israel’s government but equally the relative stability of a Swedish administration. There was once a fashionable view that coalitions in and of themselves produce good government. Yet Britain’s electoral system has produced both good and bad governments. There are plenty of example of coalition governments being complete disasters. Italy and Germany today are hardly happy, well-governed nations under their respective coalition. AV has produced good, bad and sometimes terrible governments in Australia. The Guardian’s Martin Kettle points out that social democracy lacks a majority in most European countries. But ‘twas always thus. The last time the Danish Social Democrats had a majority was in 1909. In the 1950s and 1960s France, Italy and Germany were ruled by enduring centre-right dominated party coalitions. In Britain since 1945, Labour has ruled for 30 out of 65 years. This is as good if not a better record of longevity in power than all European left parties outside of Scandinavia and better than Australia or Ireland where electoral systems are closer to AV than Britain’s first past the post system. Of course your committee is not allowed to make its recommendations on the basis of party advantage. But if one of the key desired goals of democratic politics is a regular alternance of power then the evidence suggest that FPTP has delivered that better in the UK since 1945, than AV or other electoral systems used elsewhere. This suggests that electoral reform may not be the Koh-i-Nor of democratic politics. It is policy and, yes, personality that decide how people vote. This is not to argue that electoral reform should be resisted but to set the debate over AV or other systems of voting in a broader context as part of a wider programme of policy. 15 July 2010
Summary. This submission: (i) briefly explains AV and its various forms; (ii) recommends the Committee considers specifying in advance which type of AV is being proposed, and suggests that optional preferential voting is the better option; (iii) highlights issues in referendum law which may require attention prior to the referendum, notably the application of expenditure limits to the media; and (iv) alerts the committee to Australian experience of how shifting from first-past-the-post to AV may affect electors and campaign practices. These regulatory questions are not pressing prior to the referendum but would need to be faced if AV were to be legislated. Introduction 1 The Alternative Vote (AV) is a well established system of voting, most closely associated in modern times with Australia. It has been used for Australian national elections since 1919, and is employed in six out of eight State and Territory lower houses. Whilst it is not widely used elsewhere: • AV is not an Australian invention. It was developed by an American in the 19th century as a variant of the ‘single transferable vote’ (STV) which was developed in the UK and championed by the likes of John Stuart Mill. • AV has been on-and-off the UK policy agenda for a century. It was recommended by a Royal Commission on Electoral Reform in 1910, and proposals for AV were contained in a (Labour) government bill introduced in 1930. • AV is similar to, but cheaper than, runoff or second ballot elections, a la France (and for this reason was recommended by the royal commission in 1910 in preference to the second ballot). In the USA, reformers who support AV call it ‘instant runoff voting’. 2 The essence of either AV or STV is that the ballot enables the elector to rank candidates in order of preference. STV is employed in multi-member electorates: if a large number of members are to elected, it generates a form of proportional representation. AV is preferential voting in single-member constituencies. A sample Australian AV ballot can be found at: http://www.aec.gov.au/Voting/How_to_vote/Voting_HOR.htm In AV, if no candidate gains 50% of the ‘primary votes’ (aka ‘first preferences’) the ballots of the least favoured candidates are then scrutinised, and allocated according to their supporter’s second preferences. And so on until a majority winner emerges. 3 AV is thus majoritarian, not proportional. This is borne out by Australia’s long history of stable government, with a two-party system dominating its lower houses. AV’s main benefits over first-past-the-post are: (a) Increasing electoral choice. By being able to rank all candidates, electors have more choices. Supporters of minor parties are less likely to feel their ballot is wasted. Tactical voting and ‘vote-swapping’ should all but disappear. Party decisions to stand candidates will be less driven by tactical fears of ‘vote-splitting’. If electors feel their votes have more saliency, turnout may improve somewhat. (b) Increasing a sense of legitimacy in electoral outcomes. (Though some will feel AV emphasises an electoral choice between the least disfavoured rather than the most favoured). 4 AV will not disturb the UK’s three-party system, although depending on how electors’ preferences fluctuate and are expressed, it will probably enable the Liberal Democrats to improve their vote-to-seat share. In some ways AV may actually reinforce the ‘cartel’ nature of the major party system. We note ways in which AV emphasises the power of party machines, in paragraphs 17-20 below. What Type of AV? 5 A central issue for Parliament in framing the referendum is ‘which type of AV will be proposed?’ By this we mean, how many preferences will electors be required to express to cast a valid or formal ballot? (i) A minimum of one. This is known as optional-preferential voting (OPV). (ii) A full set of preferences – electors must rank all candidates on offer. (iii) Two. This is known as the supplementary or contingent vote. For reasons of principle and culture we recommend OPV. In any case it is desirable to concretise the debate so that the referendum not be conducted in the abstract, but the type of AV be specified. We will briefly ‘rank’ the three types. 6 OPV gives electors maximum choice. They do not need to choose between parties or candidates about whom they may have no preference or information. They do not have to make invidious choices between two extremist parties, or between parties they may see as undifferentiated. OPV probably best suits the UK’s system of voluntary voting. It is used today in lower house elections in New South Wales and Queensland. The downside of OPV is that its outcomes may seem less majoritarian than if full preferential voting were mandated. In a worst-case scenario, it can fall back into first-past-the-post (eg if most electors just plumped with ‘1’ on their ballot). There is room for a party which believes it would benefit through vote-splitting to encourage this by appealing to the electorate to ‘just vote ‘1’. 7 Full preferential voting forces electors, especially minor party supporters, ultimately to choose between the major parties. It is employed in Australian national elections and three States. It may be justified by reasoning that since someone must represent and govern for us, it is reasonable for Parliament to require us to choose between the major parties. However that approach fits better with the Australian system of compulsory voting than more liberal UK traditions. Parties may also prefer full preferential voting since it means their preference recommendations are more likely to be followed, by supporters unable or unwilling to differentiate all the options themselves. Mandating full preferential voting is likely to increase the number of wasted ballots, as some will make mistakes in numbering and others protest at being forced to rank candidates they cannot choose between. (Informal voting is likely to increase anyway, for reasons discussed in paragraphs 15-16 below.) 8 Finally, although toyed with by the Plant Report of 1993, the two-choice supplementary vote is especially unappealing. It has been described as a ‘half-baked compromise’. It will not eliminate tactical voting: indeed an elector, given only one preference other than her primary one, is effectively asked to second guess which candidates will remain in the count. Unlike OPV it does not liberate or maximise electoral choice, but artificially restrains it. And unlike full preferential voting it does not ensure majoritarian outcomes. A form of optional two-choice or partial AV was included in the schedule to the 1930 Bill referred to above. The supplementary vote was experimented with in Queensland from 1892-1942, where it was known as the contingent vote. Referendum Law Issues 9 A couple of issues involving the conduct of the referendum under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA) need to be considered. One is that the Electoral Commission is required to publish its views on the intelligibility of the referendum question, yet the government does not appear to be required to accept that advice. It is vital that the referendum question be as simple as is reasonable whilst remaining descriptive, but above all that it not be tendentious. This may be an issue given that within the government – indeed within each of the major parties – there will be political divisions over the AV proposal. 10 A second issue concerns public financing of referendum campaigns. The Electoral Commission has a key role in designating two groups to spend public money, in effect on a ‘yes’ and ‘no’ campaign. This is an especially significant duty. In many ways the referendum is not really a straightforward battle between supporters of first-past-the-post and supporters of AV, since there are other voting systems that could have been proposed, notably proportional representation. When multiple choice is limited to binary alternatives, the status quo can have an undue and artificial advantage: for example supporters of first-past-the-post may make odd bedfellows with supporters of proportional representation, to defeat the ‘compromise’ option of AV. (Similarly, in the 1999 Australian Republican referendum monarchists and those seeking a directly elected President defeated the compromise option of a parliamentary appointed head of state in a two-way vote, even though a majority of Australians were republicans. Given that the UK referendum is really only an indicative vote, in principle it ought ask citizens to rank first-past-the-post, AV and proportional representation: but this of course would increase the complexity of the debate). 11 A third issue concerns the policing of expenditure limits. The official or designated campaigns can spend up to £5 million each; the parties have a similar limit, though due to vote shares in 2010, only the Conservatives are entitled to the full limit. Third parties are limited to £500 000. Curiously, unlike in the spending limits that apply to elections, the definition of referendum expenses does not expressly exclude ‘the publication of any matter relating to an election, other than an advertisement, in ... a newspaper or periodical’. On the contrary, the list of referendum expenses refers to ‘any material to which section 125 applies’: this includes any material which provides general information about the referendum, or puts any argument for or against any particular answer to the referendum question. The Act would thus appear to limit newspapers to ‘spending’ at most £500,000 each in providing information or in advocating one position or another during the referendum campaign period. Moreover, newspaper companies will be able to do so only if they comply with the registration or notification procedures necessary to be a permitted participant; otherwise they will only be able to spend up to £10,000. 12 It is not entirely clear whether the drafters of PPERA intended this result; although given the concentrated power of newspaper proprietors there is no reason in democratic theory why they should have unlimited rein to campaign when parties and other civic groups do not. Once this apparent oversight becomes known, there will no doubt be great pressure from the newspaper companies to change the law to their advantage. An alternative approach might be to amend the law the other way to apply the existing referendum rules in PPERA so that they apply also to general elections. Impacts of AV 13 In this final section, we sketch the key implications of AV from the Australian experience. We do this to inform the Committee and debate. However regulatory responses to these matters need not be faced until after the referendum, assuming AV is to be legislated in practice. The implications can be grouped into two sets of effects: (a) on electors (b) on parties. • Electors – complexity and votes wasted to informality 14 The key effect of AV on electors is in widening choice. However this benefit is not cost free. The downside of increased choice is the potential for confusion. Informal voting in the UK under first-past-the-post is almost negligible, ranking 146th out of 146th in a recent international survey: under AV, Australia ranks 46th, with informal voting of over 3 percent of turnout being common at national elections. Informality, in the Australian experience, tends to disproportionately disenfranchise electors in constituencies with lower levels of education or higher levels of non-English speakers, where rates of informality tend to be higher than the 3 per cent average. Compulsory voting in Australia probably accounts for about 1 per cent of that 3 per cent: a proportion unlikely to be encountered under voluntary voting in the UK. 15 Informality in the UK will be exacerbated anyway by the introduction of a new voting system on top of the plethora of other voting systems used in European and sub-national systems, and the possibility of another system being adopted for the upper house at Westminster. Again, Australian experience is instructive: when voting systems change, or when electors are faced with several different systems, informality increases. 16 We do not wish to overstate the informality problem. Compared to the sense of votes being wasted under AV, informality is a regulatory problem rather than an argument against AV per se. Education and ballot design is crucial in minimising such wasted votes; although it is far from a perfect panacea. The need to minimise disenfranchisement through informality however is another argument for OPV over full preferential voting – since requiring electors to rank all candidates on offer increases the likelihood of mistakes, especially if, as is likely under AV, more candidates take part. • Parties – campaign practices and preference deals 17 The least appreciated aspect of AV in the UK is its likely effect on campaign culture. The Australian experience is salutary. The key marginal seats, which decide the fates of governments, hinge on preference flows. Whilst AV expands electors’ choices, it also – somewhat paradoxically – also empowers the party machines. There is a long history of learning and interchange of staff between Australian and British parties (especially between the Labour Party and the Australian Labor Party, and the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party of Australia): it seems inevitable that Australian practices under AV may at least be trialled in the UK. 18 In Australia, preferences have become a crucial form of political ‘currency’ and are the subject of deal-making between the parties. A typical example, unfolding as we write, involves a deal between Australian Labor and the Australian Greens: http://www.smh.com.au/federal-election/greenslabor-preference-deal-20100718-10g33.html?autostart=1 Note that in Australia, a minor party typically looks to barter its lower house preference recommendations for a flow of preferences to it in the upper house, where it is more likely to be in the hunt for seats. This would be replicated if the UK moved to AV for the Commons and proportional representation through STV for the House of Lords. But even with just AV in the Commons, deals will surely arise since the UK is not a simple two-party system (like the US): including the nationalist parties and now the Greens, there are at least six parties seriously vying for seats across Britain alone, and parties will seek to trade their preference recommendations in seats where they are weak for preference recommendations in seats where they are competitive. 19 This deal-making can have upsides. Indeed one of the benefits of AV is that it forces the major parties, and especially the parties hoping to win government, to take more seriously the views of those inclined to support other parties. Preference deals can bring minor parties in from the cold: for instance a party like the Greens or UKIP may generate policy leverage if it has sufficient support in key marginals to affect the outcome. Such developments may challenge traditional UK political sensibilities and look too much like log-rolling. Outside nationalist politics the focus in the UK until now has been very much on the major parties alone. 20 The classic method of communicating a party’s preference recommendations is via ‘how-to-vote’ material: impressions of a ballot paper, ranked as the party suggests, distributed to electors through advertisements but most commonly as flyers distributed outside each polling station. Deal-making and how-to-vote material raises several regulatory issues: (i) Electoral education. It is important that electors realise that the ranking of candidates is entirely up to them. Party how-to-vote material is a guide only. Yet the media typically talks as if parties ‘directed’ or ‘allocated’ preferences. Parties do little to correct this misperception: it generally suits them to have a perception that their preference recommendations are decisive. (ii) Ethics and electoral bribery. Some deals, such as purchasing preference support, are corrupting. Policing such arrangements is difficult when they occur in private; simpatico parties also share resources innocently. The current Representation of the People Act would need amendment to extend the notion of vote-buying to preference deals. (iii) Misleading campaign practices. A routine and lamentable feature of Australian campaigns in recent decades involves major parties issuing ‘second preference’ material. This is not guidance to the major party’s supporters, but appeals to supporters of specific minor parties. Often, these appeals try to pass themselves off as if they came from the minor party: eg use of green paper and headings such as ‘Thinking of Voting Green?’ Attempts to use election day or post-election litigation and petitions to respond to such material is costly and untimely. How-to-vote material needs to be registered in advance and electoral authorities empowered to ban material that is not clearly authorised by its true party source. Even then, there have been cases of major party activists misleading voters orally and through their dress. (iv) Waste versus expression. Many Australians think the millions of how-to-vote flyers distributed at polling stations are a huge waste; yet to appear impartial, millions still politely accept flyers from every party. The freedom of political expression guaranteed under European law may militate against banning such flyers in the UK. The major parties in Australia will not ban them as they can man each polling station and it allows their activists to participate on polling day (UK party activists may be stretched, given they will also need to remain focused, on polling day, on last minute canvassing and encouraging turnout). Regulatory options in Australia have included: limiting the distribution of how-to-vote material close to polling stations with a cordon sanitaire, and displaying official posters in each polling station, showing each party’s preference recommendations. 18 July 2010 Memorandum from Professor Michael Thrasher (AV03) A short note on electoral bias: Elections fought under FPTP rules often result in outcomes that are disproportional. This often involves a ‘winner’s bonus’ whereby the largest party overall in terms of vote share receives a larger share of seats. FPTP often results in a small bonus for the second placed party also. It is those smaller parties whose votes are broadly rather than narrowly (in terms of geography) distributed that suffer most in the translation of votes into seats. Proportionality/disproportionality is not equivalent to electoral bias. Bias occurs when two (or more) parties that obtain similar levels of voter support nevertheless receive markedly different seat shares. There are a number of factors in any electoral outcome that combine together to explain the distribution of bias. In recent elections the bias has favoured the Labour party but this pattern is by no means fixed. There is a common misconception that periodic boundary reviews should remove electoral bias. This view is mistaken because such reviews are only concerned with one element that contributes towards bias, viz., unequal electorate size (malapportionment). Other elements are contributing towards overall bias. Apart from malapportionment these remaining elements are, vote distribution (geography); differential turnout (abstention); and the effects produced by competition from smaller parties. There are, in addition, the interaction effects that result from two or more of these components interacting with one another, for example, a party wins its seats in small electorate areas where abstention is also high. Using a new method for decomposing bias for three-party systems (Borisyuk, Johnston, Thrasher and Rallings) the following three Tables reveal the size and distribution of the separate bias components for the actual (Table 1) and estimated (Table 2) 2005 general election and finally the recent 2010 general election (Table 3). The total bias (positive and negative) for the three main parties is also shown. Table 1 shows the decomposition of electoral bias for the actual 2005 general election. Half of Labour’s 83 seat positive bias is a function of its effective vote distribution – effective in the sense that it does not accumulate excessively large numerical majorities and neither does it acquire a large share of votes in seats that it does not win. The rule, "win small, lose big" operates in FPTP systems for parties wishing to optimise vote distributions. Labour is also benefitting relative to its competitors from low turnout. It is also apparent that malapportionment although a significant contributing factor to Labour’s bias advantage in 2005 was responsible for only 11 of its 83 (13%) seat advantage. However, it is worth noting that the electoral component accounted for 12 seats of the Conservative 30 seat negative bias (40%). Table 1: Components of three-party bias for actual 2005 election results
Table 2 shows the decomposition of bias following the 5th Periodic Boundary Review. The overall bias advantage to Labour was reduced to 75 seats while the Conservative party benefitted overall. It is most important to note that the Review Process reduced the bias resulting from unequal electorates. Labour’s advantage fell from 11 to 4 seats; the Conservative disadvantage was halved (from -12 to -6). The review process assisted the Liberal Democrats in terms of electorate bias but a spillover effect was an increase in negative bias from a recalibration of its vote distribution. Arguably, if the Review had been able to equalise electorates to an even greater degree then the malapportionment component may have disappeared altogether. A crucial point is that the boundary review process takes no account of either turnout (abstention) or, formally speaking, the partisan nature of any constituency re-drawing that takes place. It is not, therefore, impacting directly upon the abstention or geography components. Table 2: Components of three-party bias for estimated election results (2005)
A major part of the criticism of the boundary review process is that the electorates that are used to calculate the new constituency boundaries are out of date by the time the review is completed and even more so by the time of the election fought on those new boundaries. If this criticism is substantiated then we should expect the electorate bias component to feature prominently in the distribution of bias following the 2010 general election result. Table 3 shows that the electorate bias component is indeed larger. In absolute terms there is a two seat greater advantage for Labour, an additional one seat disadvantage for the Conservatives while the two seat positive bias for the Liberal Democrats reduces to one seat. However, most bias is again contributed by the geography and abstention components. Table3: decomposition of bias (2010 general election) Labour Conservative Lib Dem Geography 31 35 -74 Electorate 6 -7 1 Abstention 13 -11 -6 Minor party 2 -2 -1 Net interactions 11 -3 4 Total bias 63 12 -76 More generally, the overall bias favouring Labour reduces to 63 seats and a negative bias for the Conservatives now becomes a positive one of 12 seats. The bias against the Liberal Democrats rises from -52 to -76 seats, reflecting the party’s vote and seat distributions in 2010. 20 July 2010 Memorandum from Richard Pond (AV04) Summary ● Fixed-term Parliaments should be four years in length, not five. ● If the Alternative Vote is introduced, the system should be reviewed within ten years with a view to offering a further referendum on whether a PR top-up list should be added. ● Consideration should be given to introducing a reformed voting system for English local council elections. ● The voting system for mayoral elections should be changed from Supplementary Vote to the Alternative Vote. ● The Government should consider changing the Scottish, Welsh, and London Assembly voting systems to AV+. ● Regardless of the referendum result, the voting system for European Parliament elections should be changed either to an open list system or to Single Transferable Vote (as is already used in Northern Ireland). The same is true of the list elements of the Scottish Parliamentary, Welsh Assembly, and London Assembly elections. ● Reducing the number of MPs is undesirable, as it will mean a larger average number of electors per MP and it will increase the executive's power over the Commons. ● Reform of constituency boundaries should take into account natural and historical boundaries. ● The European Parliamentary boundaries should be reformed so that European Parliamentary constituency electorates are much more equal in size – this means that Northern Ireland should elect two MEPs and not the current three. Fixed Term Parliaments 1. I strongly believe that the appropriate length of a fixed-term Parliament is four years and not five. 2. Four-year terms are much more in line with recent British tradition. The Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, Northern Ireland Assembly, London Assembly, and Mayor of London are all elected for four-year terms. Local councillors are also normally elected for four-year terms. 3. Of the 26 EU member-states other than the UK, nineteen elect their lower house (or only house, if unicameral) every four years, and only seven elect it every five years. (In some cases these are maximum terms rather than fixed terms.) In other words, almost three-quarters of these 26 states have quadrennial parliamentary elections. 4. Of other English-speaking nations, Canada, South Africa, India, and Pakistan have five-year terms, but Australia elects its lower house for three-year terms, New Zealand also for three years, and the US for two years. 5. Four years has increasingly become the normal interval between UK general elections. Four-fifths of Parliaments since 1945 have been less than five years in duration, and almost two-thirds have lasted four-and-a-half years or less. The average length of a Parliament since 1945 has been about three years and ten months, and even if the three short Parliaments (1950-51, 1964-66, 1974-1974) are excluded, the average is still only four years and four months. 6. Further, the above statistic to some extent understates the degree to which four years is considered the UK norm. Voters know that elections tend to be held at four-year intervals except when the governing party believes that it is about to lose power. Of the three full five-year Parliaments since 1945, all have been followed by a change of Government at the subsequent General Election, and so have all but one of those exceeding four and a half years in duration. 7. It is also perhaps worth noting that although the maximum length of a Parliament was seven years, the average length of a Parliament in the nineteenth century was four years – much as it is today. 8. It is evidently more democratic to hold elections more frequently, and while there may be both practical and principled arguments against excessively frequent elections (such as the annual Parliaments demanded by the Chartists), no democrat can consider four years to be any way excessive. The difference between four years and five should not be regarded as slight. The latter would obviously mean Parliaments some 25% longer than the former. 9. So in keeping with recent British practice and custom and the prevalent custom elsewhere in Europe, and to increase significantly the democratic accountability of MPs above what five-year terms could provide, four-year terms should be the legal limit. Electoral Reform for the Commons 10. The prospect of a referendum on the Alternative Vote is to be welcomed, although it is regrettable that the Government has not seen fit to offer electors a wider choice. Some of the other democracies that have considered electoral reform in recent years have either given voters a wider choice of systems (as in New Zealand, where five systems were offered in a 1992 referendum) or have offered voters a system that was decided beforehand by a citizens' assembly (as in British Columbia) rather than by the political elite. 11. Many electoral reformers in this country would obviously prefer to have the option of a proportional system. The Single Transferable Vote (STV) finds favour with the Liberal Democrats and the Electoral Reform Society, while some smaller parties and individuals favour the Additional Member System (AMS) or its variant, Alternative Vote Plus (AV+). 12. My own view is that AV+ is the best system and should be one of the options put to the electorate. It retains the advantages of single-member constituencies while giving a more proportional outcome than AV or FPTP. 13. In the absence of a commitment to give voters a wider choice of voting systems in the 2011 Referendum, the Government should agree to hold a review of the voting system within ten years of the introduction of AV+ (if the referendum should give an affirmative result). Following the review, a second referendum should be held, between 10 and 12 years after the first, offering the electorate the option of switching to an AV+ system by introducing top-up lists. 14. The top-up lists should use an open list or partially open list system. The top-up lists would probably be regionally based (as in European Parliament elections), although it would be equally satisfactory to have just three or four lists (one each for England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland). Consideration should be given to whether Northern Ireland should elect its MPs using STV instead, as already happens in British elections to the European Parliament. Further Electoral Reform 15. If the Alternative Vote is introduced, it will be unsustainable to continue using First Past The Post for local government elections. The Government should immediately begin planning the introduction of either Alternative Vote or Single Transferable Vote for English local elections (Single Transferable Vote is already used for Scottish local elections). A combination could be used: AV for single-member wards, STV for two-member or three-member wards. This should go ahead automatically if AV is agreed for the House of Commons. 16. The reverse, however, does not necessarily hold true. In other words, the introduction of either AV or STV to English local government must be seriously contemplated regardless of the referendum result. It will be noted, after all, that reformed voting systems are already in use for devolved assemblies, mayoral elections, European Parliament elections, Northern Irish local elections, and Scottish local elections 17. If AV is introduced for the Commons, it follows almost automatically that mayoral elections should henceforth be held under AV and not under the current Supplementary Vote system (a modified form of AV under which voters are limited to expressing a first and second preference only). 18. Particularly if the referendum results in the introduction of AV, urgent consideration must be given to changing the voting systems used for the election of the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, and London Assembly from the Additional Member System to the Alternative Vote Plus system – the difference being that under the latter system, preference-voting would be used in the constituency-based elections. 19. Regardless of whether AV is introduced for the Commons, the Government should change the voting system used for British elections to the European Parliament. The closed list system creates cynicism and is inimical to the British tradition. It should be replaced with open lists (as in Finland) or partially open lists (as in Sweden, for instance) or by a Single Transferable Vote system (already used for European Parliament elections in Northern Ireland as well as in the Irish Republic). Similarly, the list element of the AMS systems used in Scotland, Wales, and London should be replaced with an open or partially open list system, to increase democracy and accountability. Number of Members of Parliament 20. The Government proposes to reduce the number of MPs to 600. It should think again. The number of MPs was 615 even in 1922 (the first election after the creation of the Irish Free State). The UK population was then much smaller, and not all women were entitled to vote, so the number of voters per MP was substantially smaller than it is now. Many Members of Parliament already have substantial constituency workloads, and the Government now proposes that they should take on significantly larger numbers of constituents each. 21. The figure of 600 seems entirely arbitrary and has no advantage. Even in the midst of economic turmoil, one cannot seriously argue that the number of MPs (and thus the quality of our democracy) should be based on financial considerations, and anyone who seriously believed on principle that 650 was too many would surely think the same of 600. 22. It is also a concern that if there are fewer MPs, the payroll vote will be larger as a proportion of the total, so the power of the executive over Parliament will be increased. Reform of Constituency Boundaries 23. The Government proposes (with a few exceptions) to make the sizes of constituency electorates much more equal. In doing so it should not neglect the arguments for natural, historical or traditional boundaries. To ensure fairness, constituency size should be based on the number of eligible voters in each constituency, rather than on the number of those currently registered to vote. Reform of Constituency Boundaries – Further Implications 24. The Government has drawn attention to some of the discrepancies in the apparent worth of electors' votes that the current Commons boundaries cause. It should look now at the comparable situation that exists in terms of European Parliamentary constituencies. 25. Currently each European electoral region is required (under UK legislation, not EU rules) to have at least three members. So Northern Ireland is guaranteed three MEPs in apparent perpetuity. This needs to be changed as a priority, as it means that there are only 356,000 Northern Irish voters per MP, compared with 638,000 voters per MP in the London region, 662,000 voters per MP in Scotland, 560,000 in Wales, 648,000 in the North West, 658,000 in the South West, 648,000 in the North East, and so forth. It would be reasonable to give Northern Ireland two MEPs (which would still mean 535,000 voters per MEP, a more generous ratio than any other part of the UK). 20 July 2010
1. This memorandum covers three topics: · practical issues that need to be resolved in order to ensure the fairness and efficiency of the proposed AV referendum, · arguments against the Alternative Vote, and · issues relating to the equalisation of constituency electorates. For the sake of brevity, the proposal for fixed term parliaments will not be covered. REFERENDUM PRACTICALITIES Is May 2011 too early? 2. If the practical problems are to be fully considered and resolved, it will be difficult to complete the preparatory work needed to ensure an efficient and fair national referendum and to permit adequate discussion on the floor of the House of Commons in time for the proposed referendum date of May 2011. Should a referendum coincide with an ordinary election? 3. There are arguments of democratic principle against holding a constitutional referendum on the same day as a regular election. What is the appropriate margin of approval for a constitutional reform? 4. Equally, there is a strong argument for requiring that fundamental constitutional reforms command more than a simple majority. One need only to look at the high hurdles imposed by the constitution of the United States for any amendment. It is wholly reasonable to frame rules for the AV referendum in a manner either that requires the approval of 40 percent of the registered electorate or which ignores turnout but which, instead, requires more than a narrow majority for change (perhaps 60 percent approval by those casting a ballot). Issues concerning referendum funding5. The projected referendum on AV will be the first national referendum to be held in the United Kingdom since the enactment of regulations for referendums in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (PPERA) of 2000. The Act was passed in some hurry shortly before the general election of 2001. It included provisions for spending limits which went against the recommendations of the Fifth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life as well as a number of provisions whose difficulties were subsequently detailed to the Treasury Select Committee of the House of Commons by the then chair of the newly-created Electoral Commission, Sam Younger. [2] 6. These are some of the questions that need to be resolved: a) Under the terms of PPERA, spending by campaign groups is restricted to £500,000. In view of inflation since the passage of PPERA in 2000, does this limit (as well as the other limits and subsidies set out in PPERA) need to be raised? b) Since multiple campaign groups may exist on each side of the referendum question, how is the Electoral Commission to determine whether groups are genuinely independent of each other – and thus each entitled to spend up to the limit of £500,000 – or whether they are actually parts of the same campaigning organisation artificially separated for the purpose of each being able to spend up to £500,000 and thus, effectively, evading the spending cap? (See Gay, 2009, footnote 10.) Unless there are clear rules to define what is an independent campaigning group and what is merely a branch of a campaigning organisation, the £500,000 spending cap will be a dead letter. c) The Electoral Commission has a responsibility to appoint an umbrella organisation on each side of the referendum question. This favoured organisation is exempt from the £500,000 spending cap and able, instead, to spend up to £5 million. Moreover, it is entitled to state aid of up to £600,000 as well as other privileges. As the former chair of the Electoral Commission pointed out, this responsibility may place the commission in an awkward position (See Gay, 2009, footnote 9.) Should the committee give any guidance to the commission as to how it should make the choice of principal campaign organisation for the "Yes" and for the "No" sides? d) There is the question of the length of the period of time during which expenditure falls under the spending limit. This is at least ten weeks and may be as much as six months. e) Since the spending caps do not apply to public bodies (either within the UK or abroad), there arises the question of fairness between statements and information provided by governmental bodies (and by government ministers and spokespersons) on the one hand and statements and information provided by non-governmental groups. Arguably, government spokespersons should be in purdah during the entire period during which the spending cap applies to participating campaign bodies. f) Since some bodies devoted to electoral reform (such as the Electoral Reform Society) exist on a permanent basis, does PPERA satisfactorily define what constitutes a routine (non-campaign) expenditure of such bodies and what must count as a campaign item of spending? At what point does "academic" and "educational" activity become a form of campaigning covered by PPERA? What forms of activity are bodies with charitable status permitted to undertake? g) The definitions of in-kind donations to a referendum campaign and of foreign donations arguably raise problems. For example, if a foreign politician sometimes receives payment for a speech, is any speech delivered for the purpose of supporting one side of the referendum argument to be considered as an in-kind donation and thus subject to the ban on foreign contributions? In other words, do the regulations effectively constitute a ban on campaign statements by foreign politicians and experts? h) As pointed out in Gay, 2009, the rules for reporting expenditure mean that it could become apparent that a campaign body had contravened the spending limits only months after the referendum. This adds weight to the position of the Committee on Standards in Public Life that such limits for referendum campaigns are uncalled for. If referendum campaign spending limits are to be retained, is there a case for requiring earlier disclosure of spending than that of PPERA? i) The Electoral Commission is entitled to issue neutral "educational" materials concerning the referendum question. In practice, it is hard to assure the neutrality of any such presentation. The materials produced in New Zealand when the issue of electoral reform was being discussed there demonstrate the dangers. The lists of "pro" and "anti" arguments were presented in a manner that betrayed the prejudices of those responsible for producing the educational materials. j) Since the arguments concerning AV involve both its immediate and the wider effects, there is room for disagreement about the scope of information provided as part of any "educational" programme of the Electoral Commission. In my opinion, the arguments against AV must include the indirect effects and dangers as well as the immediate ones. k) It is reasonable to question the neutrality of the Electoral Commission in view of the fact that its first chair, Sam Younger, took up the interim post of chief official of the pro-electoral reform campaign body, The Electoral Reform Society, some time after his term of office at the Electoral Commission came to an end. Likewise, the current chair of the Electoral Commission previously occupied a post which involved campaigning on behalf of electoral reform. l) It follows that a method of producing educational literature on the alternative Vote must be found that satisfies adherents of both the Yes and No sides. The current power and funding of pro-reform organisations 7. Apart from the practical difficulties of regulating campaign spending under the rules set out in PPERA, there is a separate question concerning the fairness of a referendum held as soon as May 2011. Electoral reform has been a topic of enthusiasm and careful organisation on the part of small but enthusiastic and well-funded pressure groups and think tanks. Similar organisations to defend the status quo have not been created and it will take the stimulus of a projected referendum to bring them into existence. This will create a grossly unequal playing field if the referendum date is rushed. 8. The campaign for electoral reform enjoys a huge funding advantage for several rather surprising reasons: i. When the Communist Party of Great Britain was dissolved its ample funds – Moscow gold – went to a successor body, the "Democratic Left". This then became the "New Politics Network" which, in turn morphed into the campaign group "Unlock Democracy" following a merger with Charter 88. "Unlock Democracy" campaigns for electoral reform with the benefit of over £2 million derived from its Moscow gold which is held in the form of properties and other assets. The secretary of the commercial company which controls this money is also the director of "Unlock Democracy", Peter Facey. ii. The Electoral Reform Society (ERS) has funds which are still larger. Its wealth derives largely from its successful commercial arms, Electoral Reform Services Limited, Membership Engagement Services Limited and Xpress Software Solutions Limited. In the financial year 2009, ERS and its subsidiaries had a turnover of more than £21.8 million and reserves of £13.7 million. iii. The Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust Limited is a political fund established by Joseph Rowntree in 1904. It has been a mainstay of Liberal and Liberal democrat politics and of the electoral reform cause. At the end of 2009 its endowment was £31.7 million and it gives about £1 million of grants each year. iv. Other bodies with charitable status may be expected to undertake activities which do not formally constitute "campaigning" but which may nevertheless promote the arguments for constitutional change. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ALTERNATIVE VOTE Did the scandal about MPs’ expenses indicate a demand for reform of the voting system? 9. The case for a referendum on the voting system is based on the fallacy that the public outcry against the expenses scandal of the last Parliament constituted a call for political "reforms" that have nothing to do with that scandal and which, in fact, would intensify the very problems that led to the scandal. According to the Deputy Prime Minister (House of Commons, 5 July), the demand is for "political renewal, transferring power away from the Executive to empower Parliament, and away from Parliament to empower people." As will be demonstrated, a move away from the first-past-the-post system of elections for the House of Commons would remove from ordinary voters their core power – that of removing an unpopular government from office by their votes at a general election. (See # 12.) Words such as "renewal," "fairness," and "new politics" are unduly vague and tendentious. The public anger against MPs was about what was widely seen as the personal financial greed of many of them when it came to using the system of allowances. The appropriate response was to deal with that particular matter. It was not appropriate to deploy dissatisfaction about sleaze and the opportunities presented by the vagaries of electoral arithmetic in creating a hung parliament in order to introduce pet schemes for dubious constitutional reforms. The AV referendum is not mainly about AV10. The issues at stake are far wider than the technicalities of the Alternative Vote, a particular – albeit unusual – voting system. They concern the foundations of democratic government in the United Kingdom, which would be undermined by the abandonment of the current system of elections to the House of Commons. I put forward some of these core arguments at the time of the late Lord Jenkins’s inaptly named Independent Review of the Electoral System published in 1998. (See Note 1.) AV as a step towards PR11. First, it would be naïve to imagine that the ambitions of the main party in the House of Commons to favour change in the electoral system – the Liberal Democrats – would be satisfied by a change to AV. Although, as argued later, the effects of AV are highly unpredictable, it would be likely to benefit the Liberal Democrats and to make hung parliaments more likely. In the event of a further hung parliament under AV, it is highly likely that the Liberal Democrats would then demand full PR as the condition for their participation in another coalition government. It is realistic to treat AV as the stepping-stone to PR. AV and PR would destroy "removal van democracy"12. Second, it is vital to be clear about the objectives of a general election. The choice of individual constituency representatives is an important but secondary function of a general election. Its principal role is to elect a government. Or, to put it another way, the role of a general election is to provide a direct means whereby ordinary voters are able to dismiss a government that has outlived its popularity. "Throwing the rascals out" is what democracy is all about Our existing voting system admittedly fails to elect individual MPs in proportion to the number of votes gained by each political party. But one essential thing it does very well is to expel governments. This "removal van democracy" is a method whereby a defeated premier is ejected from Number 10 Downing Street and the removers come for his or her belongings very shortly afterwards. By contrast, AV – and still more PR – make it far harder for voters to dismiss a government. With a multiplication of political parties, governments will be formed and dismissed not by the voters but as a result of private deals between politicians. These deals may be about sensible compromises about policy. They also may be squalid bargains about patronage and the disposition of the spoils of power. For all its admitted statistical imperfections, the Westminster Model delivers the essential feature of democracy: the capacity of electors – not of cabals of politicians – to hold a government to account. Once a premier feels that it may be possible to escape the verdict of the electors by doing a post-election deal, the quality of democracy is undermined. Following electoral reform the third party would virtually always be in office 13. Third, in a party system such as Britain’s – with two main political parties and a significant third party – elections are likely to mean that the third party will be almost perpetually in office. General elections will decide whether it is Liberal Democrats and Conservatives or whether it is Liberal Democrats and Labour. The Liberal Democrats will be almost immune from the wrath of the electors for, even if they lose votes, they are still likely to hold the balance of power. We are used to a system which has discriminated against the Third Party. But a new voting system that made it virtually impossible to remove it from office would be worse. Electoral reform would aid extremist political parties14. Fourth, It is not only the third party which benefits from proportionality. There are parties further to the outer fringes of political life which may suddenly hold the casting votes in the House of Commons. Parties representing religious and national factions as well as the political extremes would likely come into their own. Electoral reform would mean rule by a cartel of professional politicians 15. Fifth, in much of the European continent, systems of PR and coalition government have led to a system in which party professionals have more in common with each other than with their electoral supporters. This is the system of professionalised "cartel" politics about which Professors Richard Katz and Peter Mair have complained. Under PR, the success of politicians in gaining election depends more on the position they are assigned by party leaders on the list of party candidates than on their appeal to the voters. We have seen this already in the United Kingdom in party-list elections to the European Parliament. Under the same systems, the funding of parties depends characteristically on inter-party bargaining over the allocation of state funds. A danger of the more to AV and thus towards PR is that it would lead to the very insulation of political professionals from the ordinary public which the Deputy Prime Minister has cited as the core problem of our present-day politics. The illusion that, under AV, all MPs would enjoy the support of a majority of their electors 16. Sixth, under an AV system, the fact that the voters express second, third and fourth preferences does not mean that they "support" the candidates to whom they assign these lower preferences. A candidate is not elected until he or she wins an overall majority of votes casts – including the redistributed votes of candidates with the smallest totals of votes. But the winner cannot realistically be considered enjoy the backing of electors who have offered lower preferences. AV: an unusual system for legislative elections17. Seventh, there are very few countries in which members of the lower house of the legislature are elected on the basis of AV. It is a system used for elections to the Australian lower chamber, for Papua New Guinea and for Fiji. Among other things, this means that there is little evidence for predicting the effects of AV as applied to the party scene in the United Kingdom. AV and the Labour Party18. Seventh, the effects of AV are very hard to predict and could on some assumptions greatly damage the Labour Party. The most likely effect of AV would be to damage the Conservatives, aid the Liberal Democrats and leave the Labour Party almost unchanged. This is the calculation of the Electoral Reform Society about the hypothetical results of the 2010 general election under AV rules. On the reasonable assumption that Liberal Democrats would be the preferred second choice of Labour voters in Tory-held seats, an increase in Liberal Democratic strength in the House of Commons of some 20 seats would increase the likelihood of a hung parliament. However, there is an alternative scenario. Were the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats enter into a formal or informal pact to fight the next election under AV, this could lead to a near wipeout of Labour. Of course, a Con-LibDem pact would damage Labour even under the existing electoral system, but not as much. EQUALISATION OF CONSTITUENCIES One person, one vote, and one value: the basic principle of electoral fairness 19. It is a basic principle of international conventions concerning electoral democracy that the population of different constituencies in countries with single-member constituencies should be as equal as possible. The rationale for equalisation is electoral fairness: one person, one vote, and one value. Other considerations must be very much subsidiary to this. The current variations in electorates between the least and most populated constituencies are unacceptably large by international standards. Thus, there is a strong democratic rationale for equalisation of constituencies. Should factors other than population size be taken into account? 20. Other factors (geography, local government units, etc) should be taken into consideration only if they have no predictable effect on the balance between political parties in the House of Commons or in extremely exceptional geographical circumstances. Thus, there should be a dispensation for smaller electorates in geographically remote areas only if this does not benefit or disadvantage any party. 21. If there is a special dispensation for a very limited number of sparsely populated constituencies in exceptionally remote areas, this should not affect lead to the over-representation of any of the four countries of the United Kingdom. (This follows a similar rule in Australia.) 22. If exceptions to the equal population rule are permitted, the number of special cases needs to be minimal because such exceptions make it hard for authorities responsible for drawing up boundaries to achieve their central objective. For example, it may be necessary to draw up boundaries for parliamentary constituencies that cross county borders, though it will not be necessary to cross borders between any of the four constituent countries of the UK. However, a variation of 5 percent from the norm will make it possible to draw up constituency boundaries which do not involve splitting parts of the same local government ward between different parliamentary constituencies. 23. The Government proposes to allow two constituencies in Scotland to have unusually small electorates on the ground of their remote geography (Orkney and Shetlands and the Western Isles). It is open to question whether even these two exceptions are necessary. These constituencies are not nearly as far-flung as those routinely found in Australia, for example. Given the ease of flying between remote areas and the development of telecommunications and computers, the difficulty of servicing constituents in the more remote rural areas should not be exaggerated. At any rate, there is no case, in my opinion, for adding to the list of constituencies permitted to have exceptionally small electorates since the patterns of party support in these constituencies is not typical and a dispensation for such constituencies produces unfairness between political parties. Is the system of boundary commissions viable? 24. One of the main reasons why constituency electorates vary more in the UK than in many other democracies is the current system of boundary commissions which operate under the terms of the Constituency Boundaries Act 1986. Boundary reviews not only take place less frequently in the UK than in most other democracies, also the boundary revision process is far more cumbersome. It typically takes some six years for new boundaries to be decided. By the time they are finally introduced they tend to be out of date already in areas with relatively rapid movement of population. 25. The timetable for the revision of boundaries proposed by the Government is based on the premise that the boundary commissions will do their work more rapidly than is their wont and that, because of this, the current, outdated method of altering boundaries may be retained. This is unwise and unnecessary. 26. Even if there is no slippage in the timetable announced by the government, the new boundaries will not be ready until 2013. This will leave relatively little time for he reorganisation of constituency party organisations and for the selection of parliamentary candidates. The delay will cause uncertainty and concern to sitting MPs. The case for a new system of revising boundaries on the Australian model [3] 27. Both in Australia and New Zealand a boundary review is completed in under a year, rather than the British six years. It is recommended that there be a detailed investigation of the Australian system over the recess and that provisions for a change to this system be included in the Second Reading of the bill. Ideally, the Second Reading should not take place until, say, November or December to permit this review and a review of the referendum financing rules to take place first. 28. The Australian system is based on two principles: first, population size is the predominant criterion of boundaries; second, an independent, expert panel takes decisions about boundaries. 29. Under the Australian system political parties, local authorities and individuals are given several opportunities to submit comments and objections. But the time allowed for such comments is limited at each stage of the boundary review process. Support of political scientists for abandoning the current system of boundary commissions 30. There is widespread agreement among political scientists close to different political parties that the current UK system of reviewing constituency boundaries is cumbersome, unduly slow and simply unnecessary. The numerous local inquiries characteristically have little impact on decisions about boundaries. A group of experts is currently working under the auspices of the British Academy on technical issues relating to boundary changes. It is expected to report in September following a study of the Australian system. Changes to the Constituency Boundaries Act 1986 and a move to the Australian system probably would make it possible to finalise the new boundaries by 2012 – a year earlier than the currently projected date. A further summary of the Australian system is given in the Appendix. How are the numbers of eligible electors in each ward to be determined? 31. The entire project of equalising constituency electorates depends on the existence of a reasonably accurate way of determining the number of eligible voters in each ward. The former Lord Chancellor, Jack Straw, complained on 5 July 2010 in the House of Commons that the proposed method of determining the number of eligible electors is defective because it will rely on the results of the annual electoral registration exercise. [4] Since members of relatively deprived, urban communities – predominantly Labour voters – have a known tendency to fail to register, the system will underestimate the eligible populations in areas where these communities predominate. If registered electors are the basis for decisions about constituency boundaries, then deprived urban constituencies will be under-represented in the House of Commons since no allowance will have been made for non-registered electors in the boundary review process. This is an important objection deserving of serious discussion. 32. Three questions arise: · Does reliance on the number of registered electors in drawing up constituency boundaries lead to the under-representation of deprived, urban areas where failure to register is rife? · If so, is it practical to improve registration in these areas in the coming months? [5] · If it is not practical to improve electoral registration, is there a satisfactory alternative way to determine the number of eligible electors in each ward? Problems of voter registration as a measure of population: incompleteness versus inaccuracy 33. The concerns expressed by Jack Straw about the large number of eligible voters who do not bother to register fail to take account of a second problem – the presence on electoral registers of names of electors who are no longer eligible because they have moved or died or for other reasons. If the number of ineligible names included on the register roughly equals the number of eligible voters omitted from the register, then the size of the registered electorate will reflect reality after all. Of course, it is dangerous to assume that the two kinds of registration error actually cancel each other in every part of the country. There is a sore shortage of evidence about the number of names wrongly included on electoral registers ("redundant" or "incorrect" names). After the Census of 2001, the Electoral Commission omitted to arrange for a study of the number of names incorrectly included on the registers. Such studies had been carried out after earlier Censuses. The Electoral Commission has, however, arranged for a limited number of pilot studies of different parts of the UK. The results were published in March 2010. Though they give only rough information, these pilot studies suggest that areas where the proportion of eligible voters who fail to register is particularly high are the same areas where the proportion of ineligible names retained on the register also is especially high. On the basis of admittedly incomplete data, it seems that the problem of under-registration in deprived urban areas and in places where young people live in rented accommodation and move frequently does not lead to a very large minimisation of the eligible population. Will individual registration make the electoral rolls better indicators of population size? 34. While there are weighty arguments for the introduction of individual voter registration in place of the existing system of household registration, this will not eliminate the problems that have been outlined and could make them worse. Remedies for the possible problems of using the electoral register as the measure of voting population 35. Although the problems involved in using the electoral rolls as the basis for decisions about the number of eligible voters in each ward are considerably smaller than claimed by Jack Straw, every care should be taken to ensure that boundaries are drawn on the basis of the best possible sources of information about population size. 36. Provided that such care is taken, and provided that other sources of information about population size apart from the electoral registers are considered, the difficulties of assessing population in each ward should not be permitted to destroy the case for equalisation of constituencies. After all, there currently exist some blatant inequalities that need to be removed and it is reasonable to expect their removal within the course of the current parliament. Recommendations concerning the measure of numbers of eligible voters per ward 37. Three possible solutions should be considered: (1) There should be special efforts by the Ministry of Justice to ensure that electoral registration is carried out efficiently, especially in areas known to have high rates of under-registration. Ways to promote efficiency are outlined in Note 5. (2) If the speedier Australian method of boundary redistribution is to be introduced, it may be possible to base the new boundaries on the results of the registration exercise of 2011-12. This will give more time to plan ways of making the electoral registration process more efficient. (3) Alternative sources of information about population size should be considered. In Australia, the quarterly population estimates produced by the country’s statistical office are used. It is worth investigating whether a similar method is available in the United Kingdom and whether it would be more reliable than data derived from the electoral rolls. 38. Concerning the third option in #37, there are technical objections to using population estimates since these estimated appear to be less readily available in the UK than in Australia. Population estimates are revised each year after the decennial Census by adjusting for births and deaths as well as estimated internal and international migration. However, such estimates become less reliable the longer the time after the previous Census. Moreover, population estimates are not available at ward level. Additional input would be required from local authorities to derive up-to-date estimates for the population of wards (which will be the building blocks for the proposed boundary reviews). More accurate information about the population of each ward will become available after the results of the next Census have been calculated. But statistics for ward populations will not be available until well into 2013. This would be dangerously late if the aim is to complete the equalisation of constituencies during the term of this parliament. Thus, the first two options in #37 are probably the best way forward.
APPENDIX THE AUSTRALIAN SYSTEM OF BOUNDARY REDISTRIBUTION 1. The starting point is the absolute rule that the allocation of seats to each state and territory is based solely on population: no ifs and buts. This makes it possible to fix the quota of seats for each state and territory rapidly and automatically. 2. Redistricting takes place every seven years. However, if there are large population changes before that (the definitions of which are included in the Act), redistribution takes places earlier. In practice, the seven-year period almost always applies. 3. The commissioners have full powers over the redistribution but there are several periods of public consultation. However, the time allowed for each stage of consultation is limited. 4. It has become a part of the political culture that the number of electors is the predominant factor, though the representation of communities and towns also is taken into account. When the population numbers make it necessary, say, to split a town into separate constituencies, the commissioners take care to explain publicly the reasons for doing so. 5. Australia far exceeds the UK when it comes to sparse populations. However, the post-1983 system which hardly takes account of population density works far better than the previous system which over-represented rural areas: that system led to unfairness between parties (with the over-representation of the Agrarian Party) and even to corruption – for example in Queensland. 6. The system is simple to administer. A redistribution is undertaken by a committee consisting of the Electoral Commissioner, the Australian Electoral Officer for the State concerned, the State Surveyor-General and the State Auditor-General. 7. Timetable: (1) As soon as possible after the redistribution process commences, the Electoral Commissioner invites public suggestions on the redistribution which must be lodged within 30 days. (2) A further period of 14 days is allowed for comments on the suggestions lodged. The Redistribution Committee then divides the State or Territory into divisions and publishes its proposed redistribution. (3) A period of 28 days is allowed after publication of the proposed redistribution for written objections. (4) A further period of 14 days is provided for comments on the objections lodged. (5) These objections are considered by an augmented Electoral Commission consisting of the four members of the Redistribution Committee and the two part-time members of the Electoral Commission. 8. Use of population projections At the time of the redistribution the number of electors in the divisions may vary up to 10 percent from the 'quota' or average divisional figure but at a point 3.5 years after the expected completion of the redistribution, the figures should not vary from the average projected quota by more or less than 3.5 percent. Thus the most rapidly growing divisions are generally started with enrolments below the quota while those that are losing population are started above the quota. The Parliament has no power to reject or amend the final determination of the augmented Electoral Commission. See www.aec.gov.au/Electorates/Redistributions/Overview.htm NOTES 1. Dr Michael Pinto-Duschinsky is a member of the boards of directors of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (Washington DC), IFES Limited (London), and president of the International Political Science Association’s research committee on Political Finance and Political Corruption. From 1967-2008, he taught and researched on elections at Merton College, Oxford, Pembroke College, Oxford, and Brunel University. He is the author of "Send the rascals packing: Defects of proportional representation and the virtues of the Westminster model." Representation (36) No 2, 1999, 117-26. and of other writings on electoral systems and electoral administration. In 1995, he was an adviser to the Electoral Assistance Division of the United Nations and to the Foreign & Commonwealth Office on the Constitutional Review Commission for Fiji – one of the few countries with an AV system. He has been a consultant to the Home Office on voter registration, to the UK Electoral Commission, and the Committee on Standards in Public Life. He has advised governments and public bodies in over 25 countries on aspects of constitutional and electoral reform as well as international organisations such as the Commonwealth Secretariat, World Bank, Council of Europe, European Union, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.2. See Oonagh Gay (2009). "Referendum on electoral reform." 14 December. www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-05142.pdf, p. 3, and evidence by Sam Younger to the Treasury Select Committee, 18 March 2003, HC 187-II, Session 2002-3, Q 1327, www.parliament.uk/pa/cm/select/cmtreasy/187/3031805.htm. 3. Michael Maley of the Australian Electoral Commission gave valuable information and advice. 4. I am grateful to Dr Stuart Wilks-Heeg for his input on the current problems of electoral registration, a matter on which he recently has conducted research for the Electoral Commission. However, the views expressed are mine as is responsibility for any factual errors. 5. If the future boundaries on drawn on the basis of the annual electoral registration exercise of 2010-11, speedy action will be needed to ensure that the registration authorities within the relevant local government authorities carry out the door-to-door canvass of properties from which electoral registration forms have not been returned. The willingness of these authorities to commissioning this canvassing is likely to depend partly on the extent to which they are instructed to do so by the Ministry of Justice and partly on the budgets for canvassing allocated by local authorities. |
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| ©Parliamentary copyright | Prepared 26th July 2010 |