Written evidence submitted by Professor
Steve Leach, De Montfort University, Professor Vivien Lowndes,
University of Nottingham and Dr Mark Roberts, De Montfort University
(L&CG 05)
Introduction
The three individuals submitting evidence all have
a long track record of research and consultancy in local government
issues. But none of us is a legal expert, nor have we experience
of drafting codifying documents of the type covered by the committee's
inquiry. In our evidence we therefore concentrate on topics which
we think should be addressed in a codifying document (subsequently
referred to as a Code) together with some suggestions how such
issues should be addressed.
Desirability of a codified settlement
We agree strongly that there is a need for a Code
setting out the relationship between central and local government.
We recognise that the existence of such a document would need
to be supported by changes in political and cultural behaviour,
and that laws and agreements do not necessarily create relationships.
However we are convinced that a Code would be a necessary (though
not sufficient) condition in clarifying central-local relationships,
and in particular, in avoiding the arbitrary (and politically
motivated) interventions and ill-considered changes in the structures
and processes of local government of which central governments
have, in the last few decades, been from time to time guilty.
The point is best illustrated by examples:
- The disconnected series of changes made by central
government in local government structure since 1974 - in particular
the abolition of the GLC and the metropolitan county councils
in 1986 and the ill-judged and inconsistent changes made in the
2006-08 period in local government structures in a range of shire
counties.
- The impact of changes made in the mode of finance
of local government - typically linked to political considerations
such as the perceived need to find an alternative to the community
change, which have led to abrupt and unsustainable changes in
the balance between locally-raised revenue and central government
grant in the finance of local government.
- Interventions by individual Secretaries of State
which serve to confuse the public perception of the powers and
responsibilities of central and local government. We might offer
as examples here the then Home Secretary's intervention in Humberside
Police Authority and suspension of their Chief Constable in 2004,
and the intervention by the then Secretary of State for Children,
Schools and Families in Haringey Council to 'remove' the Head
of Children's Services in 2008. (We emphasise here that we are
not making judgements on the 'rights and wrongs' of the actions
of particular individuals in these examples.)
As well as having potential for shaping central-local
relations in a positive sense, a Code would have real value in
preventing arbitrary actions of this nature.
What should the Code cover?
We think it important that the Code should address
the following topics:
- A clear statement of the principles underpinning
the Code
- A clear statement of the division of responsibilities
between central and local government, including the latter's
roles and functions
- A set of guidelines which recognise the need
for the recognition of central government's legitimate interests
in the policies and patterns of service provision of local
authorities and which develop means of safeguarding such interests,
in different circumstances.
- The balance between central and local financing
of local government's activities and the
ways in which the latter should be generated.
- The nature of local democratic arrangements
e.g. voting systems, frequency of elections modes of decision-making
etc.
- Territorial structure,
and the way in which changes in such structures should be introduced.
- The role of local authorities in the partnership
arrangements involved in local governance - what rights of
leadership, influence or scrutiny should be involved?
- Arrangements for multi-tier government,
in particular the relationship between central government, local
government and regional-level 'intermediary' bodies.
- The role of neighbourhood government and
ways in which the civic rights of individual citizens cam
be strengthened.
- The approach to central regulation of local
activity where appropriate, given the agreed principles, roles
and relationships.
We address these issues in turn, some in more detail
than others depending on our knowledge and experience.
Principles
We welcome the statement by the current Coalition
Government quoted in the 'Issues and Questions' papers which emphasises
the promotion of decentralisation and democratic engagement
and the promise of a radical devolution of power and greater
financial autonomy. In our view this stance is absolutely
appropriate if it is wished to create and sustain a healthy democracy
at the local level. It also provides a real opportunity to embed
such values in the form of a Code to ensure they survive future
changes in government or governmental attitudes. The creation
of a general power of competence is one important expression
of these values, and is a measure which we strongly support, and
which would bring Britain into line with many of our European
counterparts.
For similar reasons we support the formal ratification
of the European Charter of Local Self Government.
We also consider that the principle of subsidiarity
should be explicitly recognised and applied in the legal settlement.
This principle has implications not just for the allocation of
responsibilities to local authorities, but also for devolution
of responsibilities to the neighbourhood level. A final important
principle should be an explicit recognition of the community leadership
role of local authorities in any endeavour to improve the welfare/quality
of life of their inhabitants, given their status as the only local
democratically-elected multi-purpose governmental agencies that
exist at local level.
Roles, Functions and Responsibilities
Drawing on the above principles, it should be possible
to develop a meaningful statement about the roles, functions and
responsibilities of central and local government respectively
(e.g. in relation to service provision regulation promotional
activities and Community leadership). Indeed it is essential
to do so if issues of finance, structure and democratic arrangements
are to be addressed on a consistent basis. What should be avoided
is the simplistic use of terminology such as 'partnership', 'agency'
or 'local autonomy' to characterise the relationship and to use
as a basis for more detailed specification of roles. The reality
is that the relationship is too complex to be characterised by
any of these vague and over-used terms, as we discuss in the next
section.
Safeguarding Central Government's Legitimate Interest
in Local Affairs
A number of different service or policy categories
can be identified, each implying a different relationship between
central and local government:
- Services/policy areas for which the centre retains
full responsibility (e.g. defence).
- Services/policy areas for which the centre allocates
part of the policy implementation role to local authorities (e.g.
housing benefit, civil defence), and local government, in effect,
plays an 'agency' role. (Primary/secondary education has moved
progressively closer to this model, and needs to be dealt with
constitutionally on these terms - unless major policy changes
are proposed).
- Services/policy areas which are allocated to
local authorities, either as a statutory requirement (refuse collection/disposal)
or on a permissive basis (local arts and cultural activities
(including museums)).
- Service/policy areas where responsibility is
shared. The local authority is allowed wider scope of autonomy
but is required to achieve certain goals or targets (e.g. reducing
Co2 emissions, promoting community cohesion).
- Service/policy areas where the centre wants to
influence local authorities to take action (e.g. economic
development, civic engagement).
- Service/policy areas where the centre wants to
ensure that local authorities (as community leaders) have influence
on local partner agencies (e.g. PCTs), for instance through powers
of scrutiny, calling to account.
We acknowledge that it would be difficult for a document
such as a Code to specify in detail how these six different types
of relationship should be structured. However, we think it is
important that these differences are recognised because they have
important implications for other constitutional elements (e.g.
allocation of finance). There may be a case for a schedule of
agreements, attached to the formal Code to set out how these different
forms of central-local relationship should be managed, in more
detail than would be possible in the Code itself.
Finance
We are not experts in local government finance.
However we are clear about the principles which should underpin
the allocation of finding responsibilities. The key principle
should be that the centre funds those local activities where it
has a legitimate interest, for example:
a) Services where local authorities act as de
facto agents (in whole)
b) Services which local authorities are required
to provide (in a prescribed form, or on the basis of 'minimum
standards')
c) Services which are primarily the responsibility
of local authorities, but where the centre wishes to specify certain
policy/service objectives (and measures for assessing their achievement)
(this could be a case for partial funding)
All other policy/service areas should be financed
by the raising of local resources (e.g. council tax, local income
tax etc). Policy areas where the centre wished to encourage activity
(e.g. aspects of climate change, economic development) should
be financed, in principle, by specific (ring-fenced) grants.
We recognise that there would be considerable difficulty
in allocating financial responsibility for (c) (and to a lesser
extent (b)). Some kind of formula would be required which recognises
differences in local authority size, demography, level of need
etc. While negotiation would inevitably prove complex, the broad
outcome of moving in this direction would be a major switch for
centrally-provided grant to locally-raised finance, a move which
would reflect and strengthen the principles of subsidiarity and
maximum local autonomy.
Democratic arrangements
The Code would need to address the respective roles
of central and local government in deciding different features
of local democratic arrangements, for example:
a) Voting system (first-past-the-post, AV, or
a variant of PR)
b) Frequency of local election
c) Definition of wards/divisions
d) System of decision-making (elected mayors,
committee systems, etc)
Although there is room for debate about the respective
roles in relation to each of these features, on balance we consider
that: (a) and (b) should be matters for central decision (in consultation
with the LGA and other interested bodies); (d) should be left
wholly to the discretion of local authorities; whilst (c) should
operate as at present, with local authorities submitting proposals
to the Electoral Commission.
Territorial structures
There are major inconsistencies in the local government
structure across Great Britain and in particular England, resulting
from piecemeal and often ill-thought-out changes introduced since
1974. There are likely to be inconsistencies between the roles
specified for local authorities and their capacity to undertake
them efficiently and effectively (e.g. City of Leicester and Rutland
are both local authorities, but one is almost 10 times the size
of the other in terms of population).
In principle, there is a strong case for a major
independent review to make recommendations for a local government
structure which could best deliver the roles specified in the
new Code. In the longer term, such a review is essential and
should be undertaken by a properly constituted independent body
such as a Royal Commission. However, in the shorter term, such
a review would probably be impractical in the current climate
and an unwelcome source of insecurity. What is essential is that
the Code prevents central government from the arbitrary and often
politically-inspired reorganisations it has initiated since 1974.
The Code should establish a formal process for any future territorial
review of local government structures.
Partnership arrangements
Local authorities have long ceased to be self-sufficient
entities. Although the Code should have the effect of strengthening
the degree of local autonomy, and the scope of local decision-making,
the reality is that the current emphasis on partnership working
and 'local governance' is likely to continue. In this context
the key issue which the Code needs to address is how the lead
role of local authorities in partnership arrangements is to be
expressed, and what levers are available to exercise it. The
scrutiny powers which currently exist in relation to health authorities
and several other local agencies are one such expression and councils
are now taking back responsibilities for economic development
and public health.
But, if local authorities are to be genuine 'community
leaders', their capacity to do so needs to be further strengthened.
The priority here is the development of appropriate skills and
capacities, not just in local authorities but in a wide range
of local 'partners', and among local politicians as well as professionals.
But a new Code can assist by entrenching the principle of local
authority 'community leadership', and enabling genuinely innovative
partnership working through greater financial autonomy for local
government. Partnerships need to operate at different levels
to be effective - whether via regional coordination (on economic
matters) or neighbourhood-level community engagement. As discussed
in the following sections, the Code needs to situate the roles
and responsibilities of local government within a multi-level
system.
Regional government
The role and structure of regional government is
currently in a state of flux, and hence it would be difficult
for the Code to address it directly. However , should central
government wish to introduce some form of regional government
which had an impact on the roles, functions and responsibilities
of local authorities, it should not be able to do so in an arbitrary
fashion (as in recent local government reorganisations). This
is a matter of principle, whatever proposals come forward in the
future for the regional level. A clause should be included in
the Code which made the introduction of any such proposal subject
to detailed consultation with the LGA, with the possibility of
a referendum on options.
In the current circumstances, there would be value
in re-designing the role of the government's regional offices,
so that they are more genuine regional instruments of mutual learning
for both the centre and local authorities. For instance, some
regional office staff could be employed by local government, rather
than by central government departments as is the case at present.
Further use of secondments from local government could also assist
in shifting the role of regional offices towards supporting, rather
than policing, localism. Given the abolition of the Audit Commission,
regional offices could also put more 'meat' on their support for
localism by taking on aspects of 'soft' regulation previously
undertaken by the Commission (e.g. the generation and sharing
of 'good practice', support for innovation).
Neighbourhood government
If subsidiarity is to be guiding principle of the
Code (as indeed it should be), it would be important to recognise
that subsidiarity does not just refer to the allocation of responsibility
between central and local government. It has implications too
for the allocation of responsibilities between counties and districts
(in a two-tier system); and between town/parish councils and local
authorities; and between local authorities and sub-units (such
as neighbourhoods, community teams or area offices within them).
The recognition of this aspect of subsidiarity is particularly
important in the light of the current emphasis on localism and
the 'Big Society'. Neighbourhood level arrangements are central
to both stimulating and unlocking sources of social capital in
the furtherance of policy objectives (including the co-production
of services, mutualism, self-help, and citizen engagement in decision-making).
The Code should require all councils to develop and
introduce a 'scheme of devolution' (often building on existing
set-ups), as was the case when unitary councils were introduced
in Wales. The effectiveness of such schemes could be addressed,
in circumstances where there were concerns, by the external audit
process.
Regulation
We welcome the way in which the current government
has recognised and responded to the over-elaborate system of central
regulation of local services and functions. Any slimmed-down
regulatory system that is developed should focus on services where
there is a legitimate central government interest (see p. 3) and
upon local authorities where there is objective evidence of poor
performance. An enhanced role for regional offices in light-touch
regulation has already been suggested above (see p. 6).
Conclusion
We agree strongly that there is a need for a Code
setting out the relationship between central and local government.
We have argued that the Code should:
- Clarify central-local relationships and prevent
arbitrary and politically motivated interventions in the structures
and processes of local government.
- Endorse the general principle of subsidiarity,
and commit to the devolution of power to local government, including
greater financial autonomy.
- Incorporate the formal ratification of the European
Charter of Local Self Government.
- Specify and protect the roles and responsibilities
of local government.
- Identify and safeguard central government's legitimate
interest in local affairs.
- Develop a model for central-local relationships
in the case of shared responsibilities.
- Enable a major switch from centrally-provided
grant to locally-raised revenues.
- Establish a process for any future territorial
review of local government structures.
- Entrench the principle of local government 'community
leadership', with particular reference to local partnerships.
- Establish a process for consulting with local
government in relation to the future development of regional tiers
of government.
- Require local authorities to introduce a 'scheme
of devolution' to provide neighbourhood level arrangements, in
accordance with the subsidiarity principle.
- Establish a light-touch regulatory system via
regional offices, relating to those services in which central
government has a legitimate interest.
2 December 2010
| 
