Supplementary written evidence submitted
by the Centre for Public Scrutiny (L&CG8A)
1. Professor Tony Travers told us
that "blurred accountability suits both central and local
government". Do you agree?
Yes I do agree, so long as we are clear about who
in central and local government we are talking about ie decision-makers.
Blurred accountability does not help those whose responsibility
at central and local level it is to hold decision-makers to account.
This blurred accountability enables the government in particular
in the current financial climate to get away with what we might
characterise as the "centralisation of resources" and
the "localisation of blame". Reducing central regulation
is fine but whatever the systems of accountability (not the same
as regulation) we need to be clear who is accountable for what
and to whom.
- If so, would codification help to clarify
where accountability lies?
Yes if the issue we discussed at the Committee is
addressed - that greater consensus is developed across government
about the relative roles of local and central government and that
codification is not as per the status quo.
2. If there were to be greater clarity
about the responsibilities of local government, how would you
limit the extent of Ministerial accountability in these areas?
Ministers should be held to account where funding
is allocated to achieve clearly state national aims, priorities
and programmes. If central funding is allocated purely to achieve
resource equalisation ie to areas that cannot raise their own
resources through other income streams such as localised business
rates that in itself should not give Ministers extra influence
and therefore require them to be held to account for expenditure
for those funds. Even where funding streams are allocated in support
of government priorities voted by parliament, Ministerial accountability
should be limited to "what" not "how" ie for
the broad outcomes, not for prescribing the detail of how funding
is to be spent at local level.
3. In what circumstances, if any,
should a Minister be able to intervene in local services to protect
the citizen?
Ministerial interventions should be limited to services
for vulnerable children and adults and serious financial and governance
mismanagement where the local authority has shown itself incapable
of resolving its own performance despite support and other forms
of intervention short of Ministerial intervention. The form of
such intervention should be according to a clear terms of engagement
between central and local government, and part of an agreed framework
of self-regulation and improvement, which would make it clear
that the first line of responsibility for local service delivery
is the local authority as the body democratically elected and
closest to the citizens affected. In this we would endorse the
basic principles of the Local Government Group's proposals around
local self-regulation and improvement, although CfPS has argued
for a much stronger role for scrutiny. We would reject the form
of Ministerial intervention taken by Ed Balls when he intervened
directly in the employment and work of Haringey over its handling
of the Baby P tragedy, which raised serious questions about the
extent of Ministerial power in the internal affairs of local authorities
and was not based on any kind of agreement between central and
local government.
4. How should a local authority be
called to account for serious mismanagement, if central intervention
is to be avoided? Are periodic local elections enough?
We do not think that periodic elections are enough.
Mechanisms are needed to ensure accountability between elections.
Stronger local scrutiny is part of this picture (see below and
attached). Elsewhere CfPS have called for a "web of accountability"
which sees all the different forms of accountability working together
more effectively than in the past:
- through the ballot box
- through transparency and media investigation
- through customer complaints and forms of redress
- through internal performance and line management
- through inspection, regulation and audit
- through scrutiny
We have argued that accountability needs to go along
with transparency and involvement, which we describe as the three
pillars of a healthy democracy. This argument is set out in our
publication, Accountability Works (attached plus a summary document).
We are developing an Accountability Charter (draft
outline attached) which will enable organisations to work out
all their different accountabilities and to determine for themselves
(in consultation with their stakeholders) how they aim to be held
to account. We think this is an appropriately localist approach
to accountability as it puts responsibility at local level but
requires organisations to be transparent, inclusive and accountable
for their accountability. I would commend the Charter to the Committee.
- Are mechanisms needed at a local level to
resolve complaints about the organisation and management of local
services?
- Do decentralised services require decentralised
forms of democratic scrutiny?
Yes. Decentralised services require stronger decentralised
forms of democratic scrutiny. In our submission to the LGG on
self-regulation and improvement (attached) we argue for local
democratic scrutiny to have a clear power to trigger outside intervention
(which could include improvement support from within the sector,
as well as an additional inspection or audit outwith the scaled
back approach now envisaged). We see this working in the same
way as the current power for health scrutiny to refer a major
health service reconfiguration proposal to the Secretary of State,
which experience shows has been used responsibly by local scrutiny
functions.
In my oral evidence I also argued for closer working
arrangements between local and central democratic scrutiny functions,
as I believe that both have much to learn from each other and
could inform each other's work. Thus a select committee inquiry
into a particular topic could seek views and evidence more directly
from local overview and scrutiny functions. Joint evidence sessions
could take parliamentary scrutiny evidence sessions out beyond
Westminster into the local areas most affected by a particular
area under scrutiny and recommendations could then be made jointly
to the appropriate decision-maker according to where accountability
lies - locally or nationally.
5. How should, or could the role of
elected mayors affect democratic accountability?
Although the numbers of directly elected mayors are
limited, making comparisons and generalisations difficult, CfPS
research about the effectiveness of scrutiny functions in Mayoral
authorities does not reveal that they are necessarily more challenging
or difficult environments in which to ensure strong and effective
scrutiny. I should declare an interest in that my partner is an
elected Mayor, I was a councillor in a mayoral authority and I
am currently a government Commissioner for a mayoral authority
in intervention! I think having an elected Mayor puts democratic
accountability into sharper focus which is by and large a good
thing in terms of clarity of responsibility although this is obviously
sometimes uncomfortable.
In the mayoral authority currently in intervention,
some of its difficulties arise from the electoral arithmetic which
has meant that the Mayor can be voted down by the largest group
but that this group in turn does not have enough votes to secure
their alternative position in the major budget and policy decisions,
leaving the authority in constant danger of stalemate. Some of
its other problems predate the mayoral model and others can be
more ascribed to personalities and individuals than the fact that
one of them is a Mayor.
If elected mayors had more far reaching
powers, which arguably they should have by virtue of their stronger
local mandate, there would then be clearer grounds to argue for
stronger scrutiny mechanisms to hold them to account for their
decisions and the exercise of those powers
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