The role and powers of the Prime Minister

Written evidence submitted by Dr Richard Heffernan, Reader in Government, The Open University

Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to the committee’s inquiry. Not wishing to expend more words than I have already, I have not responded to questions 6 and 6a.

1 Is there sufficient clarity as to the Prime Minister’s role and powers?

1a. Should the Prime Minister’s role and powers be codified in statute or otherwise?

The role of prime minister is largely determined by custom and convention and can sometimes be incrementally reformed by the whim of a powerful incumbent. It may be highly desirable to formalize the prime minister’s ‘job description’, but it would be a considerable challenge to do so. It would not be possible to do this by statute. Parliament and others should cast further light on the prime minister’s role and functions, but it would be extremely difficult, sadly, to codify the entirety of his or her powers.

2 How has the role of the Prime Minister changed in recent years?

2a. How has this process of change been brought about and controlled?

The notion that the prime minister is powerful and authoritative- that any party leader ought be powerful and authoritative- is now a central feature of British politics. Some suggested, when Tony Blair was at his strongest, that the power of the prime minister meant he or she had essentially become a president. This notion, presidentialization, usefully illuminates many functional changes in the prime minister’s political environment, but it ultimately misleads. It was forever undone by the confirmation in recent ministerial (and prime ministerial) memoirs that infighting between Blair and Gordon Brown meant Brown often prevented Blair from pursuing his chosen agenda. No US president, it need not be said, would have to tolerate such disloyalty from his clearly subordinate Treasury Secretary. The fact remains that prime ministers are more powerful that presidents; no US president, unlike the prime minister, can use a partisan majority to successfully lead their legislature; however no prime minister ever has the total control the US president has over his or her executive [1] .

The expansion in the role of prime minister owes much to the fact that political parties assume they must be built around their party leader and that this leader should be powerful and authoritative. This is largely a response to (1) the ongoing personalisation of politics which places party leaders ever more centre stage, something prompted by the pathologies of news media reportage and (2) the ongoing decline in the electorate’s ties to parties, something which makes parties ‘sell’ themselves by emphasising their leadership and the policy presented by that leadership. These- and other factors- have helped further root a leader-centric imperative within British politics. Parties have always had a pyramidal structure, but now more than ever they reflect a strict parliamentary hierarchy of leader, other senior leaders, frontbenchers and backbenchers. This has helped reinforce the long established centrality of the prime minister. It is now assumed he or she will be more than ‘primus inter pares’ and will have more authority, influence and power than any other governmental actor.

The prime minister, by virtue of occupying the office, is powerful by having automatic possession of the following institutional power resources:

· Being the legal head of the government, having the right of proposal and veto, to appoint and delegate responsibilities to ministers and departments through the use of Crown prerogatives, and having the right to be consulted, either directly or indirectly, about all significant matters relating to government policy;

· Helping set the policy agenda through leadership of the government, bilateral negotiations with individual ministers, management of the cabinet and cabinet committee system and exerting influence over the Whitehall apparatus;

· Heading up a de facto prime ministerial department in Downing Street and the Cabinet Office; and

· Being able, through his or her party and the news media, to set the government’s political agenda.

These resources make any prime minister, even when leading a coalition, a unique, powerful Whitehall actor. The prime minister will, however, be ‘predominant’, the ‘stronger or main element’ within the party, parliament and government, when he or she can make best use of these institutional power resources by possessing- and wisely making use of- the following personal power resources:

· Reputation, skill and ability;

· Association with actual or anticipated political success;

· Electoral popularity; and

· Having a high standing in his or her parliamentary party (less so the extra-parliamentary party) [2]

These resources empower the prime minister within both their party and government. Within parliament their ability to lead a partisan Commons majority considerably advantages them; within the government ministers, whatever their career trajectory, are more likely to work to or otherwise defer to a prime minister who is electorally popular and considered politically successful. This gives the prime minister a less fettered hand in the running of their government. Blair, in his pre 2003 heyday, possessed such power resources in abundance. He was, Brown’s ability to often stymie him in some (not all) policy areas notwithstanding, mostly predominant as a result. Of course, these prime ministerial personal resources are contingent and contextual. They come and go, are acquired and squandered, won and lost. The better resourced, the more powerful and predominant the prime minister; the poorer resourced, the less powerful and predominant.

The prime minister is, inevitably, always constrained by public and parliamentary opinion, the temporality of their power resources, the obligations of collegiality, and by limitations such as time, information and expertise; some prime ministers are more or less constrained than others. As Brown ensured, Blair’s prime ministerial predominance never became omnipotence. But, while all prime ministers are preeminent, most will also be predominant. Predominance, which owes much to the leader being electorally popular and to hold out the promise of political success, lies at the root of prime ministerial power and it contributes to the weakness of ministerial collegiality and parliamentary oversight.

3. What is the impact of coalition government on the role and powers of the Prime Minister?

A prime minister leading a coalition is, in both theory and practice, less authoritative than one leading a single party government. In the present prime minister’s case, the fourth institutional power resource listed above, the ability to use the party to set the political agenda, is qualified by his having to work alongside- necessarily sometimes to compromise with- the Liberal Democrat leader, Nick Clegg. The coalition, as happened in Churchill’s wartime coalition in 1940-45, has established- but has also now formalised- the position of deputy prime minister. This necessarily qualifies the power of the prime minister. Previously, under single party government, the position was- or was not- gifted by the prime minister to a ministerial colleague for party political considerations (for instance William Whitelaw, Michael Heseltine or John Prescott). There is a strong case, now it has again been formalised, for the deputy prime minister to be permanently established.

4. Are there sufficient checks and balances on the powers of the Prime Minister?

4a. If no, what additional or improved checks and balances are required?

No. The power of the prime minister, for reasons I argued above, owes much to his or her informal, personal power resources. These enable him or her to make the most of their institutional powers. Such resources, which derive from the political environment, are largely beyond the direct control of parliament. No chief executive, parliamentary or presidential, predominant or less predominant, ever possesses a freehold on their position. A prime minister, unlike a president, does not even have the temporary leasehold on the premiership. Ultimately he or she has only ‘squatter’s rights’; they are able to remain prime minister for so long, but only for so long, as they can oblige their party to retain them as party leader (Thatcher; Blair), or have the electorate bestow their party- or, in the case of the present prime minister, the coalition parties- with a Commons majority (Callaghan; Major; Brown).

It is the prime minister’s personal and institutional power resources that enables him or her to enforce – and make most of- their aforementioned ‘squatter’s rights’. This is because partisan politics ensures there are presently numerous theoretical checks and balances on the prime minister, but far fewer practical ones. In theory the government’s Commons majority could unseat the prime minister at any time by a vote of no confidence; the cabinet or the parliamentary party could remove him or her at a moment’s notice. Of course this never happens. This is (even when, in the case of Gordon Brown, many Labour ministers and MPs wanted to remove him) because of the partisan disposition that animates British executive and legislative politics. It is hard, then, to see how more formal or improved checks and balances would make much practical difference to the prime minister’s power.

The present power of the prime minister results from a number of political factors. Foremost among these is the willingness of the majority (or largest) party in a single party (or coalition) government to empower the party leader as prime minister. Institutional reforms cannot easily resolve this problem. Only a set of radical changes in political culture- for example (1) the assertion by ministers of their existing individual rights and the collective rights of the cabinet or (2) the refusal of the prime minister’s parliamentary majority to endlessly prefer to supply and support the government rather than check and balance it- could significantly clip the prime minister’s wings in between elections. Until then informal checks and balances remain the major restriction on any prime minister’s powers. It will continue to fall to (1) the occasional individually powerful minister, (2) the serious possibility of a Commons defeat at the hands of rebel MPs, (3) the electorate, by threatening to evict the prime minister at some future date, and (4) the news media, by reporting (and occasionally inventing) political and personal failings and transgressions, to provide some form of ‘last ditch’ prime ministerial check and balance. It ought to additionally fall to most ministers and MPs, by using the powers they presently collectively have, perhaps by more often saying ‘no, prime minister’, to exert the more significant day to day check and balance.

Of course, as argued below, short of such a radical (and unlikely) reworking of Britain’s parliamentary culture, some of the prime minister’s role and powers could be made subject to formal parliamentary scrutiny and review. Having the prime minister be statutorily required to better engage with parliament, to have him or her formally account for their role, as well as explain their policy beyond the partisan point scoring of PMQs, would better hold accountable the prime minister, expand the purchase of parliament and empower the citizenry who elect the House of Commons.

4b. Is any further change required with regard to specific powers currently exercised under the royal prerogative, by transferring them to statute or otherwise?

Certain powers- especially of (1) ministerial appointment and, crucially, (2) of making changes to the machinery of government/ reorganizing departments- should be codified and made subject to parliamentary oversight. In the case of prime ministerial changes to the machinery of government asserting significant parliamentary control would be extremely useful. It would also be highly desirable for (3) the appointment of the prime minister to be subject to a formal recorded vote of the House of Commons at the beginning of each parliamentary session (or, should the party leader be changed in the middle of a parliamentary session, at that time too). This would impinge on the Sovereign’s present prerogative, but it would empower the House of Commons vis a vis the prime minister by formally demonstrating that he or she only serves at the behest of the Commons. The Sovereign could then appoint the prime minister once the Commons had nominated him or her. This could also, following a change of government at an election, have the agreeable effect of improving our hasty, improvised means of transition by extending the period of governmental handover by creating the temporary posts of acting prime minister (the outgoing one) and prime minister designate (the incoming one).

5. Is the Prime Minister sufficiently accountable personally to the electorate, to Parliament, and otherwise?

5a. If no, how should his accountability be improved?

The prime minister already has too big a political footprint. Elections are increasingly fought out between parties led by party leaders, so for parties to themselves significantly reduce the purchase of the individual party leader over their programme and campaign pitch would be an essential step in reducing- certainly help qualify- the prime minister’s power in government. Even if this would not significantly empower government backbenchers, it could significantly empower frontbenchers vis a vis the prime minister. This is not only unlikely to happen in the near future, but, as the party leader’s debates at the last election portend, the purchase of the party leader is likely to increase, not decrease in the future.

The accountability of the prime minister to parliament could be improved by taking the three steps set out in my answer to question 4b. Other reforms could improve the quality of parliamentary accountability. For instance (1) PMQ’s could be extended to an hour each week with MPs entitled to ask follow up questions and not confine themselves to their own particular question; and (2) the prime minister could be formally required to appear before the Liaison Committee three or four times per year and members of the committee could solicit and deploy questions from other MPs at these meetings.

7. Should the Prime Minister be directly elected by the British people?

No. It is the parliamentary system that grants the prime minister his or her power and it is only the Commons (and the cabinet) which can, largely though the prime minister’s own parliamentary party, exert some check and balance on that power. Would that the prime minister’s power and influence could be limited by separating his or her election from that of a empowered Commons which would then be infinitely more independent of a more presidentialised executive…….

Failing that, in order to assert their ultimate ‘ownership’ of him, the Commons ought formally elect the prime minister at the beginning of each parliamentary session (five times in a five year parliament), rather than have him or her ‘emerge’ following a general election or a leadership election.

25 February 2011