The Community Care Grant - Public Accounts Committee Contents


2  Cost and quality of Grant administration

10. Under current administrative arrangements, the Agency's Decision Makers check each application form received with internal records to determine applicants' eligibility and priority for grants. The decision making process is largely paper-based and does not typically involve face to face contact with applicants. Decision Makers can contact individuals by telephone to ascertain whether they meet qualifying conditions or to seek further evidence or clarification, but the Agency does not monitor how frequently this is done.[15]

11. The White Paper on welfare reform published in November 2010 proposed devolving responsibility for scheme administration to local authorities. Local administration could result in financial savings by improving the targeting of support, although this might be offset by higher administrative costs from increasing the number of organisations involved. The Agency therefore needs to demonstrate that moving to local grant administration would be cost effective and that local authorities will be properly resourced to deliver the Grant.[16]

12. The quality of existing decision making under the scheme is a significant concern. A large proportion of cases are subject to review each year. The Agency processed 582,000 applications in 2008-09 and made an initial award in 252,000 cases. In that year, there were around 107,700 requests for the Agency to review its decision making, of which approximately 49% led to a change in the outcome of the application. Around 17,000 cases went to the further appeal stage conducted by the Independent Review Service, and 51% of those appeals resulted in a change to the original decision. In total, some 61,000 appeals against original decisions were successful: over 50% of the 107,700 requests for review.[17]

13. The two main types of errors made by Decision Makers are the failure to ask applicants the right questions and inadequate record keeping to back up the decisions taken. If Decision Makers do not ask appropriate questions or sufficiently challenge statements from applicants, potentially fraudulent claims may be accepted or genuine need ignored. Statistics provided by the Independent Review Service indicate that some Agency district offices are much more likely to make mistakes than others, as Figure 2 shows.
Figure 2: Percentage of errors made by each benefit district office in 2009-10
Budget Area Error rate (%) Budget Area Error rate (%)
Balham (West London)
77.8
Sunderland
45.3
Balham (London South)
77.6
Inverness
45.2
Balham (Central and East London)
74.2
Newcastle
44.1
Balham (North and North East London)
73.6
Springburn
43.6
Bristol
68.6
Milton Keynes 2
43.3
Perry Barr
62.2
Bradford
42.2
Llanelli
55.6
Nottingham
39.6
Norwich
53.9
Sheffield
38.8
Chorlton
51.5
Belle Vale
34.4
Milton Keynes 1
50.9
Stockton
31.3
Chesterfield
45.7
Basildon (Essex)
29.4
Newport
45.5
National
54.3
Source: Ev 20

Note: This table refers to 'important' errors. These are defined as errors occurring at one of the key stages of the decision making process which make the rationale for the decision incorrect. However, it is possible that a case could contain an important error without affecting the validity of the original decision.

14. Since 2009, the Agency has implemented a Quality Assurance Framework to check selected cases and provide guidance and training to staff, and an accreditation programme for Decision Makers. So far, these measures do not appear to have improved the quality of decision making; for example, the number of appeals to the Independent Review Service as a percentage of all grant applications actually increased in 2009-10 compared to 2008-09.[18] Given the recent introduction of these changes, it may take time for the impact on decision making quality to be seen.[19] In light of the Government's proposals to devolve grant administration to local authorities, the Department needs to provide assurances that training and quality measures will not be cut and to clarify how its quality improvement measures will apply to local administrators.

15. The failure to keep adequate records is extremely costly and undermines the rigour of the decision making process. The £17.1 million cost of administrative errors identified by the National Audit Office in 2008-09 represented over 12% of total Grant funds distributed. This contributed to the Comptroller and Auditor General qualifying his opinion on the Social Fund accounts that year. Some £15.7 million of the administrative error (92%) was attributed to missing files or inadequate documentation.

16. The Agency does not check how funds are used by people receiving grants. Grants are awarded to recipients so they can purchase items requested, but there is no obligation to keep receipts and no follow up visits to confirm whether the requested items were in fact purchased. A 2003-04 pilot of home visits to check claims found that 70% of initial awards were incorrect and 44% of customers had overstated their needs.[20] Despite the obvious need for checks indicated by these findings, the Agency has not implemented a programme of physical spot checks and does not monitor the extent of fraud and error by customers. The Agency has, however, begun a further pilot of home visits in the East Midlands and will amend the grant application form to stipulate that receipts may be required.[21]

17. The estimated £19 million cost of administering the scheme is very high. Administration costs are equivalent to 13% of the £141 million paid out in grants. Moreover, the £19 million figure may be an underestimate as it excludes direct costs of transferring cash to recipients, amortised IT costs and some overheads. The Agency accepts that the overall cost of administering the Grant is too high and has undertaken to conduct an end to end review of the grant administration process to identify where costs could be reduced.[22] The findings of this review, to be conducted in January 2011, will be useful for however long the scheme remains centrally administered. They could also be used in future to benchmark the costs of local authorities' administration of the Grant, once the Government's proposals to devolve scheme delivery are implemented.

18. Further savings could be made by purchasing frequently requested items centrally and providing goods directly to recipients. According to the Office of Government Commerce, savings of around £14 million a year could be generated by negotiating bulk discounts from central purchasing contracts.[23] This would also ensure that items purchased are of serviceable quality and could lessen the extent of fraud. The Independent Review Service supports this proposal, and believes that voluntary sector organisations would also be in favour.[24] Replacing cash awards with payment cards is another option for reducing fraud while maintaining the dignity of applicants. The Agency confirmed that it would explore both options to improve how goods are purchased under the scheme.[25]


15   Qq 31-33, 97-99, 109; C&AG's report, paras 7, 3.1 Back

16   C&AG's report, paras 16c, 3.12; Department for Work and Pensions, Universal Credit: Welfare that Works Back

17   Department for Work and Pensions, Annual Report on the Social Fund 2008/2009, Cm 7677, July 2009, Appendix 11 Back

18   Independent Review Service for the Social Fund, The Social Fund Commissioner's Annual Report 2008/2009 and 2009/2010; Q 101; C&AG's report, Figure 2 Back

19   Qq 12, 96-104, 108; Independent Review Service for the Social Fund, The Social Fund Commissioner's Annual Report 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 Back

20   C&AG's report, para 3.6 Back

21   Qq 92, 96, 111-13 Back

22   Qq 34, 80 Back

23   C&AG's report, para 4.13 Back

24   Qq 20 Back

25   Qq 92, 114 Back


 
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Prepared 16 December 2010