3 Managing consultants' work
12. At the time of the hearing, 70% of government
contracts were let on the basis of how much time a consultant
works on a project, 29% were let on a fixed price, and just 1%
on an incentive basis.[33]
Departments have been unable to reduce the number of 'time and
materials' contracts because they do not adequately define the
output required and therefore are not in a position to let more
contracts on a fixed price or incentive basis.[34]
Letting contracts where you pay the consultant for just their
time creates an incentive to add complexity and to work inefficiently,
as the longer it takes a consultant to deliver a project, the
more money they can earn.[35]
13. We understand that there may also be negative
incentives through letting other types of contracts. For example,
under fixed price contracts consultants may use the minimum effort
required to deliver a project for the agreed fee. Under incentive
based contracts it may be difficult to attribute whether improvements
in performance were due to the consultant or the department as
in many instances consultants' work is within the context of the
wider department's projects and programmes.[36]
The Cabinet Office told us it was aiming to get a better balance
of the type of contracts let and acknowledged that there should
be a mixture of rate-card based consulting and performance related
contracts.[37]
14. Departments do not have a good grasp of their
spending on interims in particular. Three central government departments
did not know the cost of the interims they employed and 12 did
not know the seniority of interims that they did employ.[38]
The Cabinet Office explained that the poor understanding was partially
due to the lack of a consistent definition for an interim, and
that it had established the same definitions across all Departments.[39]
15. The overall finding from the NAO report was that
government was not achieving value for money from its use of consultants
and interims.[40] Some
departments are potentially using consultants when there is no
need to do so, as they have not checked whether they have in-house
staff with the relevant skills before opting to use consultants.[41]
Furthermore, although there were key performance indicators put
in place for departments to report on their performance in improving
the use of consultants, fewer than half of them reported back
using them.[42] The Cabinet
Office told us that due to an increase in centralisation, it now
had a greater ability to mandate departments to perform certain
actions, thus giving central government more authority to control
performance measurement.[43]
16. The Cabinet Office stated that it is difficult
to measure the value achieved from consultancy because government
can currently only measure the value of the inputs and not the
outputs.[44] We were
not convinced that it is impossible to measure whether government's
use of consultants and interims represents value for money. Whilst
it may be difficult to quantify the added value gained from a
consultant, there are ways to get a better understanding of the
benefits provided by consultants.[45]
For example, by regularly checking throughout the contract whether
the consultants are delivering what was specified, and by making
an assessment some time after the contract has been completed
of whether and how the consultants output was used.[46]
17. The NAO report found that departments are concerned
about the legality of sharing information on the past performance
of suppliers in order to inform future decisions on the appointment
of consultants.[47] The
Cabinet Office explained that European Union law prevented departments
from sharing information on how well or poorly suppliers have
performed for them[48],
creating a risk that poorly performing suppliers will be offered
repeat business across government.[49]
The Cabinet Office told us it has regular meetings to discuss
supplier performance across all departments and is building a
much better understanding of the performance of each of the companies
with whom government does business. It told us that by using this
information it had renegotiated contracts with major government
suppliers, saving £800 million.[50]
33 Qq 43 and 52: C&AG's Report, para 2.18 Back
34
Q 42: C&AG's Report, para 10 Back
35
Q 42 Back
36
Qq 28, 43, 52 Back
37
Qq 43 and 56 Back
38
Q 23: C&AG's Report, para 1.13 Back
39
Q 23 Back
40
Q 27: C&AG's Report, para 16 Back
41
Qq 33 and 71; C&AG's Report, para 2.10 Back
42
Q 35: C&AG's Report, para 2.4 Back
43
Qq 23 and 38 Back
44
Qq 27-29 Back
45
Q 96 Back
46
C&AG Report, para 10 and 15c Back
47
Q 93: C&AG Report, para 2.36 Back
48
Q 94 Back
49
Q 93 Back
50
Q 95 Back
|