Appendix 1Government Response to
the Committee's Eighth Report of Session
2009-10
Goats and Tsars: Ministerial and other appointments
from outside Parliament
1. The appointment of people from outside
Parliament to be ministers via the House of Lords is not new,
but the scale of such appointments in recent years is. It raises
questions about why such appointments are being made and their
impact on government and Parliament. (Paragraph 14)
2. The reasons why a Prime Minister chooses
particular individuals to be ministers are complex. Over time
the number of prospective new ministers within a governing party
is likely to diminish. However, where a Prime Minister considers
himself short of prospective ministers in the House of Commons,
this is often because candidates are being sifted out because
of politics or personality rather than competence. It is likely
that some outside appointments are similarly driven by political
and personality considerations rather than a lack of options on
the government benches. (Paragraph 25)
3. Career politicians have an important place
in government. Despite this, government will be more effective
if people in ministerial roles come from a wide range of backgrounds
and experience. Appointment of people from outside parliament
is one route to achieve this. A greater willingness on the part
of Prime Ministers to appoint from a broader cross section of
their own parliamentary party would be another. (Paragraph 33)
4. There are circumstances in which an outside
appointee may have particular experience, skills or expertise
which are not readily available within the House of Commons. However,
outside appointments should not be a substitute for efforts to
make the House of Commons more diverse and representative, or
for using untapped talent that already exists. Some ministers
are clearly less competent than some of those in the House who
are not ministers. (Paragraph 36)
5. The use of the House of Lords to appoint
ministers from outside Parliament gives Prime Ministers potentially
presidential powers of appointment, without the checks and balances
that would apply in a presidential system. Such appointments can
be justified if they bring clear benefits to government, but they
should be exceptional. When making such an appointment a Prime
Minister should set out clearly to the House of Commons why the
appointment has been made from outside, under what terms and what
he or she expects the minister to achieve during their time in
government. Moreover, the appointment should be subject to scrutiny
by the House of Commons. This could involve a select committee
hearing and report. If the Committee was not satisfied with the
appointment it could recommend a debate and vote on the floor
of the House. (Paragraph 45)
6. So long as there is a predominately appointed
House of Lords, there will be members of the Government who are
not elected Members of Parliament. Since the 1960s this has tended
to be around 20% of the Government including a maximum of three
Cabinet Ministers. The inclusion in this group of a small number
of ministers appointed from outside Parliament does not threaten
the democratic legitimacy of the Government. Any substantial increase
in the overall number of ministers in the Lords, and any increase
at all in the number of Cabinet ministers, would do so. (Paragraph
50)
9. As with ministers from all backgrounds,
there have been both successes and failures among ministers appointed
from outside Parliament. There is no evidence to suggest that
such ministers are, as a group, less likely to be successful than
other ministers. (Paragraph 67)
The Government agrees that ministerial appointments
from outside the existing membership of the House of Commons or
the House of Lords should be exceptional. However, the Prime Minister's
primary concern when appointing to ministerial office is to ensure
that his Government is served by those who are most able to do
so. At times, this may mean that it is necessary to appoint somebody
who is not currently a member of either the House of Commons or
the House of Lords. Such appointments will be exceptional.
The Government believes that scrutiny by Parliament
of these ministerial appointments before they are made would undermine
the clear principle in the UK's system of government that ministerial
appointments are made by the Prime Minister. However, in performing
the duties of ministerial office, the minister will be subject
to detailed scrutiny by Parliament. For example, Select Committees
can be expected to examine the work of such appointees.
7. So long as there is an unelected second
chamber, there is a strong argument of principle that senior ministers
should be directly accountable to the democratically elected chamber
as a whole. However, there is a debate to be had about how this
can be achieved. We understand that the Procedure Committee is
investigating this issue and look forward to the House being given
the opportunity to debate any proposals that may emerge. Such
a move should not be used as a justification for appointing more
senior ministers via the House of Lords. The purpose of such a
change would be to assert the primacy of the Commons, not to undermine
it. (Paragraph 58)
8. Allowing ministers to present their policies
and answer questions in both chambers could have benefits for
both government and Parliament. It would allow government to ensure
that their policies were being presented in the most effective
way by the person best placed to debate them. It would ensure
that Ministers based in the House of Lords were fully accountable
to the primary, elected House and expose Secretaries of State
from the Commons to the very different style of scrutiny practised
in the House of Lords. It would also remove the need to appoint
Members of the Lords as ministers to ensure departmental representation
in both Houses. (Paragraph 61)
At this time there are no Secretaries of State in
the House of Lords.
Ministers have a duty to Parliament to account, and
to be held to account, for the policies, decisions and action
of their departments and agencies regardless of which House they
sit in. They do this in a number of ways. In the House in which
they sit, ministers answer questions, make statements and participate
in debates. Ministers give evidence to Select Committees of both
Houses and respond to letters from Members of both Houses.
There is also a risk that the burden on ministers
of having additional duties in the other House might compromise
their ability to participate fully in the work of the House in
which they sit.
10. We have previously recommended that government
should pay more attention to the professional development of ministers.
There would be particular advantages to doing so where a minister
does not have prior experience of politics or Parliament. (Paragraph
69)
The Government agrees that it is important that ministers
can learn about how to be effective in their new roles.
11. Former ministers bring valuable experience
to the work of Parliament. However, we do not believe this is
a sufficient reason to allow ministers appointed from outside
Parliament via the House of Lords to retain their seats after
they leave government, especially when then is no requirement
on them to be active members of the House. (Paragraph 78)
12. We support moves to allow peers to resign
and recommend that the Ministerial Code require ministers who
were appointed to the House of Lords in order to take up their
duties to resign from that House upon their departure from government.
Those former ministers who wished to remain active members of
the House of Lords could seek reappointment through the party
nomination process or, if they could convince it of their independence
from party politics, the House of Lords Appointments Commission.
(Paragraph 79)
13. The giving of titles for life to ministers
who may only be in government for a short time will, rightly or
wrongly, raise the suspicion of patronage. We have previously
recommended that the honour of a peerage should be separated from
a place in the legislature. We continue to hold this view and
believe it is especially relevant where an individual is made
a Member of the House of Lords in order to take up ministerial
duties. On ceasing to be a minister, such a person should be required
to relinquish the title too. (Paragraph 81)
The Government has established a cross-party Committee
to bring forward proposals for a wholly or mainly elected second
chamber to replace the House of Lords. The arrangements for appointment
to and resignation from the House of Lords, including in the case
of ministers, over the period before it is possible to implement
an elected second chamber, will need to be considered as part
of that process. The Leader of the House of Lords has also established
a cross-party working group under the chairmanship of Lord Hunt
of the Wirral to consider options for allowing members of the
House of Lords to leave the House permanently.
14. We agree that in principle the Prime
Minister should be responsible for propriety checks on ministers.
However, making an individual a Member of the Lords to take up
ministerial office means that they also become a life-long member
of the legislature. So long as this situation holds we believe
that the House of Lords Appointments Commission should be allowed
to vet ministerial appointees for propriety in the same way as
for any other working peer. (Paragraph 84)
Following the recent General Election, for the first
time the House of Lords Appointments Commission vetted ministerial
appointees prior to their appointment against the same criteria
of propriety that it uses for all peerages. It is intended that
this practice will continue.
15. Appointing a small number of junior ministers
directly, without requiring them to be Members of either House,
would resolve some of the problems resulting from appointment
via the House of Lords. It would also provide a mechanism to place
clear limits on the number of ministers that could be appointed
in this way and their role. Whilst not completely without precedent,
this would be a considerable constitutional innovation. It is
an idea that deserves further consideration. (Paragraph 90)
16. What is clear is that this whole issue
of the external appointment of ministers needs to be considered
in the round. It is not appropriate for moves in this direction
to take place in isolation from a consideration of the wider constitutional
implications. (Paragraph 91)
The Government agrees that the issue of external
appointment of ministers should only be considered as part of
its wider constitutional agenda.
17. At present there is little transparency
concerning the informal and ad hoc appointments made by government
to lead on, review or promote particular policies. Job titles
are often uninformative, appointment processes informal and the
work undertaken opaque and not clearly linked to results. The
allegation that some of these posts might have been created for
the sake of a press notice may be unfair, but it is difficult
to refute without greater transparency. (Paragraph 101)
18. We recommend that the Cabinet Office
continue to maintain a list of such appointments and that guidelines
should be issued to clarify how far 'tsars' speak for themselves
or for the Government. Where 'tsars' do not speak for the Government
they should be able to express their own views freely. (Paragraph
102)
19. We further recommend that each department
produce, in its Departmental Annual Report, a brief account of
the work undertaken by such appointees during the year and the
support from officials they have received. Finally, we recommend
that upon appointing such an individual the appointing minister
should write to the Chairman of the relevant select committee
giving details of what will be expected from the appointee, their
responsibilities and the support they will receive from the department.
(Paragraph 103)
The Government does not support the Committee's recommendations
at this time but does seek to ensure that such appointments are
announced publicly, and Select Committees can be expected to examine
their work.
|