Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1. In
a lecture delivered last December, the then Chief of the Defence
Staff (CDS), Sir Jock Stirrup, drew particular attention to the
fact that, in his view, the UK has "lost an institutionalised
capacity for, and culture of, strategic thought" (Paragraph
6)
2. The implications
of the CDS's judgement should be worrying for the whole of government
and his concern is one of the main reasons for our inquiry. (Paragraph
7)
Defining Strategy
3. Strategy
is about dealing with uncertainty, complexity and the dynamic.
It is not a plan or a paper. In modern politics it is about ensuring
that the whole of government identifies and acts effectively upon
the national interest.
(Paragraph 11)
4. Strategy is not
policy, but is the means of effecting it. (Paragraph 12)
5. The historical
connotations of 'Grand Strategy' could prove to be a hindrance
because the term is associated with Empire and in some quarters
is seen as hubristic. Nonetheless the term has proved to be a
useful means by which this inquiry has been able to explore the
concept of an overarching process; a concept intrinsic to good
governance. This process today can better be described as 'National
Strategy' and we have therefore adopted this term as the title
for our report. (Paragraph 16)
Do we need a National Strategy?
6. We
recognise many of the factors for change that the Foreign Secretary
outlined in his speech but the ways and means by which these could
be met remain unclear. (Paragraph 19)
7. Plotting the UK's
path through these uncertain times needs clear, deep and sustained
strategic thinking which adapts to changes in our strategic environment.
It needs to be articulated constantly and updated regularly. If
the UK is to navigate its way successfully through the networked
world, and to "lift its eyes to the wider strategic needs
of this country", we need a National Strategy. It must be
well founded, coherent and responsive to events as they occur
as well also capable of anticipating opportunities. As things
stand there is little idea of what the UK's national interest
is, and therefore what our strategic purpose should be.
(Paragraph 30)
Capacity to make strategy
8. The
overwhelming view from our witnesses was that the UK is not good
at making National Strategy and there is little sense of a national
direction or purpose. (Paragraph 32)
9. The new Government's
aspiration to think strategically is most welcome, but we have
yet to see how this marks any significant improvement in qualitative
strategic thinking from its immediate predecessors. Apart from
the creation of the NSC, which we go on to discuss below, we have
found little evidence of sustained strategic thinking or a clear
mechanism for analysis and assessment. This leads to a culture
of fire-fighting rather than long-term planning. (Paragraph 39)
10. This leads us
to the profoundly disturbing conclusion that an understanding
of National Strategy and an appreciation of why it is important
has indeed largely been lost. As a consequence, strategic thinking
has atrophied. We have failed to maintain the education of strategic
thinkers, both in academia and in governmental institutions. The
UK lacks a body of knowledge on strategy. Our processes for making
strategy have become weakened and the ability of the military
and the Civil Service to identify those people who are able to
operate and think at the strategic level is poor. (Paragraph
40)
Strategic leadership
11. It
is therefore essential for ministers to invest time and energy
into strategy making. It is the demand from ministers for strategic
appraisals which will create the "strategic appetite"
within departments and Whitehall more generally for better and
soundly based strategic analysis. In turn this will promote the
culture of strategic thinking we have identified as necessary.
(Paragraph 45)
12. There is a second
and equally important element about strategy: the need to ensure
democratic legitimacy and to recognise the political limits of
what strategy and our national interests can achieve. (Paragraph
46)
13. Elected representatives
are best placed to articulate an understanding of what the electorate
will find acceptable. (Paragraph 47)
Where should strategy reside
14. We
understand the logic of the Foreign Secretary's aspiration, and
we welcome his drive to create more coherence across government.
We strongly disagree with the idea that any single department,
even FCO, can drive the National Strategy. For intuitive strategic
thinking to flourish; for it to be effectively harnessed, and
for coherent National Strategy to be made and implemented, requires
the establishment of specific mechanisms with the appropriate
authority. (Paragraph 51)
A role for the NSC
15. The
creation of the NSC has been broadly welcomed by all those from
whom we took evidence. However from the perspective of National
Strategy, the NSC is only a start. (Paragraph 53)
16. The functioning
of National Strategy requires a proper deliberative forum with
access to proper analysis and assessment. As a decision-making
body the Cabinet is best suited to discussing and approving options.
We recommend that a senior committee, such as the NSC, should
have the task of developing those options relating to strategy.
The Government should expand the remit of the NSC and of the National
Security Adviser to take on a central coordinating role for National
Strategy. (Paragraph 54)
17. Moreover, we recommend
that the Foreign Secretary, with the Prime Minister, should focus
his leadership of National Strategy more explicitly through the
NSC rather than relying too much on his own department. (Paragraph
55)
Improving cross-departmental working
18. Evidence
to us suggested that in fact cross-departmental collaboration
is variable, analytical resources are underutilised, and that
different departments understand and discuss strategy in different
and incompatible ways. Departmental collaboration therefore falls
short of what individual departments can do independently. The
whole is less than the sum of the individual parts. The emerging
Strategic Defence and Security Review
would seem to be a case in point.
(Paragraph 60)
19. We
strongly support the efforts of the former CDS to engender the
culture of strategic thinking. We commend his initiatives of setting
up a strategic advisory group and a forum for the practice of
strategy. It is disappointing and telling that his broader Whitehall
efforts gained so little support. It has served to reveal the
apathy and intellectual weakness, even antipathy, towards strategic
thinking in the rest of Whitehall. We invite the new CDS to ensure
that this initiative is maintained and if possible enhanced and
to explain personally to us how he plans to do so. We would also
exhort the rest of Whitehall to engage in the process. (Paragraph
68)
Strategic thinking skills
20. It
is essential to recruit, train and promote a community of strategists
from across Whitehall with different experiences and expertise
who can work collectively. Without this, strategic thinking will
be misinformed leading to a mis-appreciation of the true strategic
situation, particularly when we are hit by 'strategic shocks'.
Moreover, strategy is a skill that can be learned. We recommend
that the Royal College of Defence Studies and the National School
for Government and others should consider how best to devise a
joint forum and programme of education to provide the cultural
change that is necessary.
(Paragraph 72)
21. Strategic skills
should not only be valued but properly recognised in the appraisal
system. Such skills would help provide the UK with greater sense
of strategic direction and national purpose. (Paragraph 73)
A national strategic assessment capability
22. Ministers
will always have the decisive and crucial role in National Strategy.
Consequently, to make the best of the time they devote to strategy
making, they must have the information,
analysis and assessment available—supplied by trained staff—in
order to make rational, long-term strategic judgements.
(Paragraph 76)
23. We therefore recommend
that a capability review of National Strategy should start as
soon as possible. It should report within a year. It should examine
the various parts of Whitehall which should be contributing to
National Strategy, as well as in No. 10 and the Cabinet Office.
The capability review should
determine how far the strategy functions in each department consider
themselves part of a wider strategist 'profession'; to what degree
there is shared training, ways of working; and ensure there is
'strategic literacy' to support national strategy.
(Paragraph 79)
24. In the longer
term, we would hope that enhanced Whitehall collaboration will
lead to the development of a new agency to complement the existing
arrangements. The new agency's Director would be a key player
in Whitehall with regard to National Strategy, and whose inputs
and assessments would complement the joint intelligence assessments.
(Paragraph 80)
External input to National Strategy
25. There
needs to be a constant refreshment of thinking, with genuinely
challenging analysis and ideas. This must be regularly within
reach of the Prime Minister and other ministers. There should
be greater interchange between outside experts and Whitehall and
career progression should involve spending time both within and
outside of government as part of a wide and diverse strategy community.
(Paragraph 83)
26. We
are realistic about the prospects of providing any additional
funding directly to university departments to support strategic
studies. However, the Government must ensure that funding for
research into National Strategy and strategy making is not squeezed
out by funding for more fashionable or profitable academic programmes.
The reallocation of funding required is minimal and would be in
the national interest. (Paragraph 84)
Accountability and scrutiny
27. We
recommended earlier that the role of the NSC should be broadened
to encompass national strategy. We would invite Parliament to
consider that the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy
should likewise have
its remit broadened to become the Joint Committee on National
Strategy and Security. We would also invite the House to re-consider
its membership. Contributions to National Strategy and National
Security derive from a variety of departments, not least from
the Cabinet Office. We suggest that membership of the Joint Committee
should therefore be drawn from all appropriate departmental select
committees. It would include this Committee, which oversees process
at the heart of National Strategy and National Security.
(Paragraph 86)
28. In our view, reinvigorated
strategic studies in universities and elsewhere will be essential
for the Joint Committee to carry out its scrutiny and accountability
role, and to give authority and support to external challenge.
(Paragraph 87)
29. In the meantime,
in the absence of the formalised scrutiny structures for National
Strategy, we intend to continue to scrutinise the development
of strategy making in Whitehall as part of our future work and
we will return to this topic
periodically. (Paragraph 88)
Funding National Strategy and strategy-making
30. Ensuring
that national strategic priorities, once identified, are adequately
resourced is an important corollary to strategy making. The allocation
of resources must be embedded in the process of National Strategy.
In this way, decision making will reflect the limitations of resources,
but priorities when set, will attract the funding they require.
(Paragraph 91)
31. As for strategy
making itself, we are conscious in these financially constrained
times of the need to recommend proposals
which are affordable and practical. We would anticipate that the
reorganisation and redeployment of these resources, which are
already funded, should be cost neutral. There can be no excuse
for the Government to neglect the necessity for, and value of,
properly marshalled staff work. (Paragraph
92)
32. We would support
a small, central budget allocated to National Strategy making;
either under the control of the Cabinet Secretary, or the National
Security Adviser in his a wider, National Strategy, role. This
funding would enable coordination of National Strategy making
in each department, to ensure that departmental contributions
to National Strategy are compatible, to promote common training,
and to draw all those involved
into a 'community' of Whitehall strategic thinkers.
(Paragraph 93)
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