Written evidence submitted by Dr Robin
Niblett
SUMMARY
— This paper takes Grand Strategy to be
the application of a state's means in particular ways towards
achieving its long-term national interests on the international
stage.
— The question today is whether the complexity
of international affairs places a premium on flexibility and crisis
management over developing a Grand Strategy that may tie a government
to policy and resource choices that prove incapable of foreseeing
the threats of the future.
— However, the UK confronts in 2010 a series
of profound changes in the world which demand not just crisis
management but also proactive UK responses based on clear strategic
thinking.
— Moreover, the coalition government appears
to have rejected an international posture that is reactive in
the face of global change. It has stressed the importance of building
the UK's bilateral relations with key emerging powers, placed
open markets at the heart of its foreign policy and established
a National Security Council (NSC) that is tasked with coordinating
a new Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).
— But adopting a proactive approach to
global change will only work if the Government submits itself
to the discipline that must accompany strategic decision-making.
The Government faces one near-term and two longer-term challenges
to converting its strategic instincts into something approaching
a Grand Strategy.
— The near-term challenge is that the intense
pressures to cut government expenditure will subvert the process
of basing the new NSS and resulting SDSR on `grand' strategic
thinking.
— The first longer-term challenge is that
the urgent is likely to continue trumping the strategic. The NSC
is also responsible for coordinating the UK Government's response
to short-term internal and external threats. This means that it
is under constant pressure to ensure that it not fail the test
of watchfulness and rapid, effective response.
— The second is that the Government's approach
to strategic decision-making appears to be focused principally
on national security and not on how to pursue the long-term national
interests of the country in the round, ie including the Government's
broader diplomatic and economic interests.
— For Grand Strategy to have the space
to flourish within the UK Government's decision-making, there
needs to be an organisational approach that protects as far as
possible the strategic from being swamped by the urgent and that
also enables the Government to think strategically beyond threats
and risks and towards opportunities and ambitions.
— As a central element of this approach,
the FCO should be responsible for driving a strategic, cross-departmental
process of consultation that synthesises long-term UK interests
towards global issues, such as energy security, climate change
and open markets, alongside the country's relations with existing
and emerging powers.
— Second, with severely reduced financial
resources and an expanding range of risks and opportunities in
a changing world, any UK Grand Strategy will require that the
UK leverage the support of other countries who share the country's
broad interests.
— The UK will also have to be a proactive
player in institutions that reflect and promote its values and
interests. NATO, the UN, the G20 and the EU will all be essential
for the UK's future strategic security and prosperity.
INTRODUCTION
1.1 What is Grand Strategy in relation to
foreign and security policy? Ideally, it is the application of
a state's means in particular ways towards achieving its long-term
national interests on the international stage.[3]
1.2 As such, it requires three assets. First,
the ability to define the state's long-term national interests
within its geopolitical context, as distinct from the near-term
threats to its well-being. Second, it requires a comprehensive
understanding of the resources at the state's disposal, not just
in terms of quantity, but also quality. Third, it demands that
a government be capable of applying the means at its disposal
towards the country's long-term goals in the most effective ways
possible. As military history has taught us, superior numbers
do not lead automatically to victory on the battlefield—it
is both the quality of a country's resources and the ways in which
they are deployed that can carry the day.
1.3 This paper offers some ideas for how
Grand Strategy might be incorporated into the UK Government's
planning and decision-making process. It starts with a brief statement
in support of the concept of a Grand Strategy. It then notes the
pressures that can and will militate against a Grand Strategy
and strategic thinking in general. It closes with some suggestions
of how to help ensure that strategic thinking is fostered over
the long-term within the Government in support of the UK's national
security and broader national interests.
WHY A
GRAND STRATEGY
2.1 It is not axiomatic that every government
interested in promoting its national interests and protecting
the country's national security should give priority to developing
a Grand Strategy. Especially today, it can be argued that the
complexity and unpredictability of international affairs and the
proliferation of risks to national security place a premium on
flexibility and adaptability. Developing a Grand Strategy may
tie a government to objectives and policies as well as to ensuing
resource choices that prove incapable of foreseeing the threats
of the future.
2.2 The most recent heyday of strategic
thinking accompanied the Cold War. During this period, however,
the UK and its allies confronted a relatively well-defined enemy
(the Soviet Union) and an ideology (communism) that threatened
UK and allied interests. As a member of the US-led "West",
the UK followed US Grand Strategy, even as it adapted and mutated.
George Kennan's strategy of "containment" was one Grand
Strategy designed to confront the Soviet threat. Under President
Ronald Reagan, the idea of "competitive strategies"
was designed to challenge the Soviets in terms of military-technological
investments and support for proxies.
2.3 In contrast, the post-Cold War world
appears to be particularly ill-suited to strategic thinking—not
only because of the loss of a clearly defined external opponent,
but also because of the proliferation of new threats and the unpredictability
of their interaction. Transnational risks, such as climate change,
international terrorism, WMD proliferation, food and energy insecurity,
and cyber-security, pose direct threats to a United Kingdom that
is among the most integrated into a just-in-time global economy.
Confronting their effects requires the support not just of allies
such as other EU members and the United States, but also of countries
that are competitors economically and geopolitically, such as
China and Russia.
2.4 In such a context, it can be argued
that the Government's principal responsibility in the context
of national security and international policy is to maintain the
capacity for effective crisis management.
2.5 However, the UK confronts in 2010 a
series of profound changes in the world which demand not just
crisis management but also proactive UK responses based on clear
strategic thinking. Otherwise, the UK will condemn itself to becoming
a victim to the negative aspects of those changes while potentially
foregoing opportunities to promote its interests in a changed
world.
2.6 The key trends that define the changing
international context for the UK have been listed in numerous
recent publications, among them two recent reports from Chatham
House's project on "Rethinking the UK's International Ambitions
and Choices".[4]
These trends could be defined as the shift in
the global centre of economic and political gravity from West
to East; the growing competition for resources that is accompanying
this shift; new patterns and characteristics of conflict, where
non-state actors using a combination of basic and sophisticated
technologies can stymie forces that are far superior in number
and equipment; the decline in US power relative to emerging powers
and non-state actors; a Europe that appears to be hobbled by negative
demographics and a lack of institutional coherence at the EU level;
and the emergence of new structures of global governance involving
a more diverse and self-confident range of countries.[5]
2.7 Recognizing the importance of these
changes, the UK released two National Security Strategy (NSS)
documents in 2008 and 2009. As their title indicates, however,
the documents are focused principally on the changing nature of
the threats to the UK rather than on the mix of threats and opportunities
that the changing world now offers.[6]
2.8 The coalition Government appears to
have rejected an international posture that is reactive or purely
threat-driven in the face of global change. It wants to be proactive
in adjusting the UK to changed international circumstances. It
has stated the broad outlines of its intended foreign policy as
..."a distinctive British foreign policy that is active in
Europe and across the world; that builds up British engagement
in the parts of the globe where opportunities as well as threats
increasingly lie; that is at ease within a networked world and
harnesses the full potential of our cultural links, and that promotes
our national interest while recognising that this cannot be narrowly
or selfishly defined".[7]
2.9 Among its distinctive strategic priorities
is the need to build "strong bilateral relations for the
United Kingdom".[8]
In addition, the Government has placed a special emphasis on trade
and open markets, pointing to the opportunities for the UK offered
by major emerging markets from China and India to Turkey and Brazil.
Prime Minister David Cameron has asserted that the UK "should
be messianic in wanting to see free trade and open markets around
the world".
2.10 Most significantly from the perspective
of this paper, the Government has instituted a formal mechanism—the
National Security Council (NSC)—responsible for "strategic
decisions about foreign affairs, security, defence and development'
and that will align national objectives in these areas".
The NSC will bring together "all the Departments of Government
in the pursuit of national objectives, so that foreign policy
runs through the veins of the entire administration".[9]
Reflecting this central, strategic role for
the NSC, the National Security Adviser, Sir Peter Ricketts, and
his staff have been given the responsibility for pulling together
the Government's new NSS and the resulting Strategic Defence and
Security Review (SDSR). The SDSR will have a wider scope than
previous reviews of this sort and will, "guide the work of
all the departments concerned with national security including
the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
the intelligence agencies and elements of the Home Office's work
such as counter-terrorism and organised crime. It will also look
at the UK's support for international development where this contributes
to international security and stability".[10]
2.11 But adopting a proactive and strategic
approach to global change will only work if the government submits
itself to the discipline that must accompany thinking through
a Grand Strategy—ie it needs to institute a process that
goes beyond a one-off defence and security review, however strategic
its intent, and that articulates clear long-term goals for all
of government while defining the means and methods of achieving
them. The Government faces one near-term and two longer-term challenges
to converting its strategic instincts into something worthy of
being called a Grand Strategy.
OBSTACLES
3.1 The near-term challenge is that the
intense pressures to cut government expenditure will subvert the
process of basing the new NSS and resulting SDSR on `grand' strategic
thinking.
3.2 The size of the overall cuts in government
spending that are envisaged means that anything but across-the-board
reductions of relatively similar sizes between the three military
services could lead to the long-term degradation of a particular
military capability (carrier-based air projection; amphibious
landing; mine clearing; major land intervention; long-range bombing
etc).
3.3 This presents a serious dilemma for
a country like the UK that is mid-sized in terms of its financial,
military and diplomatic resources, but that has retained global
security and diplomatic commitments from an era when it oversaw
a world-spanning empire and, then, played a leading role in a
NATO alliance that confronted a world-wide communist threat.
3.4 Faced with the prospect of losing the
UK's full spectrum of capabilities, the case for stating that
the world is unpredictable in terms of security threats can become
self-justifying. The idea that the UK then simply needs the same
combination of military capabilities, but at a lower level can
appear "strategic".
3.5 But cutting UK defence capabilities
across the board may not enable the UK either to promote or protect
its interests in a world where the scale and ubiquity of the risks
are likely to grow.
3.6 A UK Grand Strategy should highlight
geographic regions and geopolitical risks or opportunities where
the UK could concentrate its influence and resources and highlight
others where it could decide to relinquish capacity and influence
or rely on the support of allies.
3.7 The first longer-term risk is that,
however much the creation of the National Security Council is
meant to embed strategic thinking at the heart of UK decision-making
and action in the field of security, it is likely that the urgent
on its agenda will trump the strategic.
3.8 The fact that the number of staff currently
working in the National Security Secretariat on crisis-prevention/management
(including counter-terrorism and cyber-security) appears to outnumber
those who are focused on the country's longer-term security interests
at a ratio of roughly two-thirds to one-third, reflects a dilemma
for the NSC.
3.9 The NSC is responsible for coordinating
the UK Government's response to immediate internal and external
threats. This means that it is under constant political pressure
to ensure that it not fail the test of watchfulness and rapid,
effective response. The default instinct of NSC discussions, therefore,
is likely to be towards international crises (the latest developments
in Afghanistan or North Korea, for example; or the latest cyber-threat
or the latest terrorist plot) and not towards re-configuring the
nation's means and resources towards the security challenges of
a rapidly changing world (such as UK energy security or how to
prepare for possible rifts between India and China or how to build
a global consensus on mitigating climate change).
3.10 The second long-term risk is that the
Government's approach to strategic decision-making appears to
be focused principally on national security (via the central role
of the NSC) and not on how to pursue the long-term national interests
of the country in the round, ie including its broader diplomatic
and economic interests.
3.11 To be sure, each government department
responsible for the UK's international relations has its strategy
units and heads, and there are multiple avenues for inter-departmental
coordination on specific aspects of national strategy. But it
is unclear whether there is a central organisational or political
focus in government for Grand Strategy as there is for National
Security. William Hague, the Foreign Secretary, has articulated
the some long-term strategic priorities for the country in his
recent speeches, but delivery and oversight of these objectives
are not resourced in the way that national security is through
the NSC.
WAYS FORWARD
4.1 For strategic thinking to have the space
to flourish within the UK Government's decision-making, there
needs to be, first, an organisational structure in government
that protects as far as possible the strategic from being swamped
by the urgent and that also enables the Government to think strategically
beyond threats and risks and towards opportunities and ambitions.
4.2 In a recent Chatham House paper entitled,
Organizing for Influence: UK Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty,
Alex Evans and David Steven suggest that the Government split
more formally the responsibilities for the near-term and longer-term
between different branches of government. Specifically, they recommend
distinct responsibilities for the NSC, FCO, and DFID.
4.3 Their major recommendations are as follows:
— The Government should view the UK's international
strategic objectives through three overlapping and complementary
lenses: national security, global issues and fragile states.
— The National Security Council should
not define the national security mission too broadly—it
should focus principally on direct threats to British citizens
that could have severe consequences for their welfare within a
limited time horizon.
— The Foreign and Commonwealth Office should
be responsible for driving strategic, cross-departmental consultation
that synthesises long-term UK interests towards global issues,
such as energy security, climate change and open markets, alongside
the country's relations with existing and emerging powers.
— The Government should ensure the Department
for International Development has a preventive agenda toward fragile
states, which could be a major source of insecurity in the future,
but which rarely receive the coordinated UK government attention
that they warrant.
4.4 Second, with severely reduced financial
resources and an expanding range of risks and also opportunities
in a changing world, any UK Grand Strategy will require that the
UK leverage the support of other countries who share the country's
broad interests.
4.5 The UK will also have to be a proactive
player in institutions that reflect and promote its values and
interests. NATO, the UN, the G20 and the EU will all be essential
for the UK's future strategic security and prosperity. Once again,
giving the FCO the responsibility to coordinate and drive the
UK's agendas in these institutions will be essential.
4.6 In the end, however, the Government
will need the British public's support if it is to marshal the
financial resources and the political legitimacy with which to
pursue a bold Grand Strategy. The Government should talk frequently,
openly and honestly about how the world is changing, about the
challenges, opportunities and choices that this presents and the
resources that the UK should be prepared to allocate to promote
its future prosperity and security.
September 2010
3 The Brady Johnson Program in Grand Strategy at Yale
University, led by Paul Kennedy, John Lewis Gaddis and Charles
Hill classifies Grand Strategy as "a comprehensive plan of
action, based on the calculated relationship of means to large
ends", http://www.yale.edu/iss/gs/index.html. Paul Kennedy
also describes Grand Strategy in Grand Strategies in War and Peace
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) as "the capacity
of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements
[of power], both military and non-military, for the preservation
and enhancement of the nation's long-term (... best interests)". Back
4
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/UKrole. Back
5
For further elaboration, see Robin Niblett, Playing to its
Strengths: Rethinking the UK's Role in a Changing World (London:
Chatham House, 2010); and Alex Evans and David Steven, Organizing
for Influence: UK Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (London:
Chatham House, 2010). Back
6
The first line of the 2009 NSS update states that, "Providing
security for the nation, safeguarding our citizens and our way
of life, remains the most important responsibility of government".
Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom:
Update 2009: Security for the Next Generation (London: TSE, 2009). Back
7
William Hague, "Britain's Foreign Policy in a Networked World",
speech at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 1 July 2010. Back
8
William Hague, "Britain's Foreign Policy in a Networked World". Back
9
William Hague, "Britain's Foreign Policy in a Networked World". Back
10
See Cabinet Office website on the National Security Strategy and
Strategic Defence and Security Review, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/intelligence-security-resilience/national-security/strategy-review.aspx. Back
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