Written evidence submitted by Cat I
M Tully
1. As a Strategy Project Director in the
FCO Strategy Unit for the past two years until earlier this month,
I have been privileged to see many of the challenges and opportunities
facing the strategic development of the UK's foreign, defence
and national security (FDNS) policy. Some of these are being addressed,
in particular through the recent establishment of the NSC. Others
remain insufficiently acknowledged or addressed. I therefore have
taken the opportunity to respond to your request for responses
to your inquiry on "Who does UK Grand Strategy", by
laying out some personal reflections on my time in the FCO SU.
I hope they will be relevant, since my role's principle objective
was to drive strategic decision-making and capability in foreign
policy—I am certainly happy to elaborate further on them
informally.
2. I have structured my responses to your
questions around the following headings: strategic context, definition,
structure/process, and method. In summary:
— Most countries are facing the need to
be more strategic in their FDNS policy. The UK is in a good position
to do so.
— There is some good practice, but as a
whole, UK FDNS policy making is not systematically strategic.
There are top-down (political) as well as bottom-up (Departmental
practice) drivers of existing UK FDNS policy incoherence. Following
the establishment of the NSC, HMG should focus on the latter.
A combination of new incentives, processes and structures will
be needed to encourage closer cross-Departmental working.
— HMG can approach this by: first, identifying
lead Departments or Cabinet Office Secretariats responsible—and
resourced—for leading HMG strategies (both Grand Strategy
and thematic/country strategies); and second, developing a clear
doctrine on what good strategy-making involves. There is a growing
body of knowledge on this.
Strategic Context: strategy-making is increasingly
important for FDNS policy—but is hard
3. Common and well-explored drivers (technological,
economic, demographic) are leading to increasing complexity in
the international sphere.
— The line between domestic and foreign
policy is ever-more blurred, with the increasing, non-linear impacts
of vectors such as climate change, diaspora, logistical and financial
flows, and extremist ideology requiring responses abroad and at
home. Experts in the domestic sphere increasingly play a part
in international fora and our actions abroad progressively impact
the UK citizen on the street.
— New players, with different approaches
and perspectives, have more impact. Not just countries such as
the BRICS, but also non-traditional actors, eg sovereign wealth
funds, philanthropists, epistemic communities, criminal networks
and business.
— In addition, strong economic pressures
require a more efficiently delivered and effectively prioritised
FDNS policy. The increasing complexity and unpredictable nature
of the international system also puts greater weight on risk management,
resilience and flexibility, over traditional policy responses.
4. In response, many western governments—and
some developing countries—are explicitly searching for a
clearer articulation of their strategic interests, priorities
and approach: a "Grand Strategy". They are also looking
to understand the systemic nature of the interlinkages of different
policy areas and tools that were previously more distinct.
5. The UK is in a particularly good position
to be able to do this:
— we have an excellent set of well-respected
delivery arms each containing excellent technical expertise, including
the Armed Forces, diplomatic service and aid agency, but also
SOCA, DECC and OSCT;
— a strong reputation and links to the
wider global public and non-traditional actors, including through
the BBC and British Council, leadership on global responses to
challenges like climate change, and support for the value of openness
and trade; and
— HMG has state-of-the-art strategic capability
in the domestic policy sphere (through the work of Departments,
the Strategy Unit network and the Futures community).
6. However, the UK also faces external and
internal challenges in developing strategic clarity in the FDNS
policy realm:
— The main external challenge is the UK's
status as a global power. It has hugely complex, multiple interests,
not least the maintenance of the international system and its
norms. The holy grail of identifying the UK's `core national strategic
interests' is therefore somewhat illusory. Prioritising among
issues, countries and stakeholders is difficult for a P5 country,
since both a global presence and policy position on most issues
are expected. It is much easier for smaller countries (Nordics,
Singapore, Canada) to be clearer about their priorities and distinct
contribution.
— Internally, the UK faces the challenge
that there is little common agreed HMG understanding of the strategic
context (drivers and the role of the UK) and the role of Departments
in developing and delivering a UK Grand Strategy. The result is
different perspectives across government on the definition, structure
and processes to do with strategy, and of the value of embarking
on such endeavours in the FDNS policy realm. For example, I have
heard both deep scepticism and strong support for the value of:
counter-factual thinking and exploring different future scenarios;
working with different actors; or the extent to which different
Departments should be focused on newer policy issues, eg climate
change. There have been many diagnoses of this internal incoherence
in government, and they tend to fall into two camps:
— Top-down explanations locate the source
of incoherence within the political leadership of the time. A
common recent narrative identifies sofa-government, presidential-style
foreign policy decision-making, the break-down in Cabinet government
and rifts between relevant Ministers, for the lack of clear strategic
vision and delivery.
— Bottom-up explanations locate the source
of incoherence within Departmental differences in culture, practice,
history, incentives and mission. More weight is given to the role
of Departments in promoting or blocking cross-government coherence.
— Obviously, both explanations provide
a partial explanation of the truth and reflect real problems that
needed to be addressed. The risk I perceived at the end of my
tenure in the FCO SU, however, was that the responses being implemented
to address the lack of FDNS policy coherence were located in the
"top-down" solution set and too little was being done
to tackle the "bottom-up" challenges. In my view, the
creation of the NSC has addressed many of the concerns about "top-down"
drivers of policy incoherence. The key question now is how the
Civil Service can mobilise its dedication and expertise to support
this political statement of intent. I have therefore focused my
comments on the "bottom-up" barriers to FDNS policy
coherence—though recognising that there remains work to
do on the political side.[19]
Definition: "strategy-making" is a process
of alignment, not a piece of paper
7. I use the following definition to explain
what strategy is: "An evidence-based, coherent and aligned
view among a group about where they are, where they feasibly want
to be and how to get there." A strategy requires clarity
on the group's interests, objectives, assets and the context within
which it operates. Strategy-making is therefore a process of alignment—not
a piece of paper. This definition has the advantage of being applicable
to most contexts (eg business, not-for-profit, corporate strategy
as well as policy and delivery Departments, domestic as well as
international policy).
8. Within the HMG FDNS policy realm, I distinguish
three different spheres of strategy:[20]
(a) Grand Strategy, namely the UK's vision of itself
in the world, its high-level interests and objectives, and how
it goes about promoting them;
(b) thematic and country strategies, namely component
parts or sub-sections of the UK's Grand Strategy in relation to
specific themes or countries; and
(c) Departmental corporate strategy, namely each
Department's view of its strategic context, its objectives, and
how it uses its assets to promote them.
9. The key question is how to ensure that:
all three spheres are resourced, informed and developed appropriately;
and they are coherent, in particular that the thematic and country
strategies support the Grand Strategy, and that the Departmental
corporate strategies support the delivery of both.
Structures/Processes: encouraging further cross-departmental
working will need a combination of new institutions and practices—but
most of all, the incentives need to be right
10. The incoherence in FDNS policy, as described
in paragraph 6, comes from a lack of a clear focus within HMG
tasked with owning—ie taking the overall UK perspective
and possessing the necessary decision-making powers—the
planning on (a) and (b). Instead, Grand Strategy and thematic/country
strategies are often the aggregate sum of different Departmental
actions within each policy area.[21]
There are two major problems with this approach: it is inefficient,
since Departmental objectives and levers can pull in different
directions; and it means that policy areas may be over or under-resourced,
because the sum of individual Departmental interest may be different
to the meta-HMG interest. Three examples of this include: low
FCO focus on Latin America, despite a potentially higher HMG interest
due to business, economic factors and organised crime. Another
example is DfID only focusing on Ghana, Sierra Leone and Nigeria
in West Africa, despite the need to develop a more regional approach
to address the variety of security threats to UK interests. The
final example is the ongoing lack of clarity across HMG on who
and how to address longer-term complex issues (like the impact
of demographic changes and global resource scarcity on UK national
security).
11. Does the NSC resolve this? Not fully.
It is a major step forward since it promotes joint working through
commissioning joint pieces of work, it can resolve tensions and
questions about prioritisation, and is a forum for identifying
issues coming up on the horizon and moving resources to new policy
priorities. However, an NSC can only look at the most important
of FDNS policy issues and itself needs to be serviced by an effective
Whitehall machinery that itself works in a truly joint way. This
does not happen at the moment.
12. There is good practice, of course, as
anyone working in this area in government will have experienced:
— Existing structures do promote better
cross-Whitehall strategy development. The National Security Secretariat,
the FDP secretariat in the Cabinet Office, the FCO Strategy Unit
(now Central Policy Group), the joint DECC-FCO Energy Committee,
the China Whitehall Group, the joint DFID-FCO Sudan Unit, the
Stabilisation Unit do so with differing degrees of success (see
next paragraph). The OSCT is an example of a cross-Whitehall structure
with the resources to be able to drive a multi-agency approach
to a thematic challenge.
— Departments do respond to the changing
strategic context independently, eg the recent FCO work exploring
how it can better support the UK's economic recovery.
— And many desk officers have excellent
networks across Whitehall and work effectively with their counterparts
in different Departments on their day-to-day work.
13. The challenge is that practice is ad-hoc
across Whitehall, reinvents the wheel frequently and depends on
the individuals involved. There are few incentives, apart from
professional dedication, to working systematically with other
HMG Departments. And these solutions do not always work when Departmental
interests and priorities are in conflict. This means:
— the quality of strategies are variable.
"Strategies" can be a shopping list of interests, objectives
and activities, rather than reflecting a common understanding
of priorities and policy tensions, with feasible outcomes and
effective risk-management plans. They are sometimes reactive,
short-term and based on the status-quo;
— the quality of collaboration is variable.
Joint strategies led by Departments sometimes do not reflect a
truly cross-Whitehall perspective, but instead a partial perspective.
The "strategies" pulled together at the centre can sometimes
be an amalgamation of different Departmental inputs. As discussed
in paragraph 7, strategy-making instead requires a process of
alignment between the parties involved. The fora and process for
facilitating these discussions do not always occur. The FCO recently
examined a series of country strategies and identified huge variation
in process and cross-Whitehall buy-in;
— existing excellent HMG analytical resources
(eg MOD and DFID analysts, the FCO's Research Analysts) are under-utilised
in strategy-making. The sum of expertise on different themes and
countries across government is vast—and insufficiently influence
policy across Departmental boundaries; and
— cross-Whitehall horizon scanning and
risk-management falls short of what individual Departments do
separately, compounded by the fact that FDNS and development Departments
have different time horizons.
14. The two-pronged response is to define
ownership and develop a common cross-Whitehall process. Or, in
MOD-speak, "Command and Control" and "Doctrine".
A possible response is that on Grand Strategy, key strategic countries
and themes, the NSS should take the lead with a clear mandate
to do the following: collect evidence; incorporate external expert
views; hold an overview of the UK's full assets, interests and
objectives; horizon scan; and make proposals to ministers about
resolving strategic tensions or different options. There are obviously
existing bodies, eg OSCT, that should take a similar role for
their policy areas. The FCO should then have the lead on most
remaining country and thematic strategies. This is only a suggestion—what
is important is a clear cross-Whitehall lead who takes the overall
HMG perspective and can propose unpopular resourcing or prioritisation
decisions. For this to have legitimacy and credibility, however,
there needs to be an agreed set of consultation and analytical
processes. Namely, common practice that ensures all Departmental
views and information are incorporated—and to address the
shortcomings identified in paragraph 13.
| Possible solutions[22]
| Structures and institutions | Processes
|
| (a) Grand strategy | — Expanded National Security Secretariat to service NSC with seconded staff from different Departments, or a joint FCO-Cabinet Office NSS
— Specific sessions of the NSC to discuss horizon-scanning
| — Clearly defined process for developing Grand Strategy, with the thinking done at the centre, rather than commissioned out in bite-sized bits
— FDNS Strategy Units to become centre of excellence on strategy-making
|
| — Fora for FDNS Department senior leaders/policy DGs to meet and discuss common issues and align strategic vision
| |
| — A joint FCO, DFID, MOD Strategy Unit, commissioned by NSC and FDNS Department senior leaders
| |
(b) Thematic and country strategies
| — Clear departmental leads for each thematic and country strategy
— A joint FCO, DFID, MOD Strategy Unit, commissioned by NSC and DGs
— Joint Units and budgets
| — Clearly defined process and methodology for developing thematic and country strategies
— Joint training on strategy-making
— Joint analytical units or establish analytical communities of interest around country or thematic topics
— A joint professional cadre that work across FDNS Departments
— All SMS/SCS policy posts are open to external recruitment and are fixed-term posts
|
(c) Corporate Departmental strategies
| — HMT to assess alternative ways to resourcing FDNS than only Departmental budgets. Separate the policy-making part of the Departmental budget from the delivery side, and encourage Departments to bid jointly
| — Coordinated Departmental business planning processes
— Include incentives for working on cross-government strategies
— Hard incentives for all SMS/SCS to work in different Departments (and externally)
|
15. More radical solutions have been proposed elsewhere,
including in studies from previous decades. One suggestion is
to separate the delivery arms of the defence, diplomatic (and
development) departments and unite their respective policy roles
into one central "global issues" policy department.
This is a "nuclear" option—and risks absorbing
resource internally at the expense of a focus on delivery, but
it should be explored at least.
16. In summary, the solutions to the coherence challenge
is as much about process and incentives as about structure and
institutions. How does HMG resource these ideas? Most do not require
extra resources. However, they do require time, changes to Departmental
culture and reprioritisation of existing resources. Most important,
senior leaders in Departments need to believe that there is value
in investing their resources into this objective—that there
will be tangible outcomes from introducing a more systematic approach
to strategy-making versus the status quo. From my personal experience,
some people get the need to enhance cross-Whitehall working—and
some do not. The case needs to be made powerfully, because those
who do not buy into it can create profound barriers despite strong
ministerial and significant senior leadership support. So the
most important step is for FDNS Department senior leaders to agree
the problem and the potential prize. Then a cross-FDNS Departmental
group could be pulled together from existing analytical, strategy,
futures (and possibly HR and finance) units to develop a realistic
proposal for implementation.
Method: good strategic thinking on FDNS issues is a complex
undertaking, but a toolkit can be developed to propagate it—similar
to that by the PMSU on domestic policy[23]
17. Having come to the FCO from the domestic policy-focused
Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, a few things struck me about the
nature of strategic thinking in foreign policy (not all applicable
to Defence, National Security (or Development) policy):
— The nature of research and evidence is different.
There is little quantitative analysis available, and policy discussions
on issues tend to be influenced by well-respected individuals
("talking heads") rather than a well-established body
of research. Group-think, narratives and metaphors proliferate,
a useful heuristic for speedy decision-making but that militates
against fresh thinking. The role of evidence in policy-making
is comparatively minor and undervalued.
— There are a variety of pressures for foreign policy
decisions to be made quickly, including genuine reasons beyond
the gift of HMG (world events change daily), as well as ones that
could be internally addressed (eg under-resourcing, a culture
of accepting strategic rethinks done by one person in a week).
— In comparison to domestic policy, the FDNS policy
process within government is more complex, since with very few
exceptions it involves at least two and often many more Departments.
— The domestic strategy toolkit therefore needs to
be adapted to reflect these differences. For example, it needs
to show its value in responding to unexpected events, use the
excellent diplomatic network as a more regular source of data,
provide systematic challenge to group think and establish clear
processes for coordination between Departments. It also needs
to strengthen skills that are used more regularly in FDNS policy,
for example:
— The ability to systematically analyse different
future scenarios—because of high external uncertainty, relatively
low impact of HMG levers on foreign policy issues, and the necessity
therefore to prepare for different eventualities and stress-test
HMG's proposed objectives and policy.
— The ability to systematically analyse and engage
with all types of stakeholders—since influencing is the
key foreign policy lever (as opposed to the wider set of domestic
legislative, tax and exhortative levers). Stakeholders tend to
be greater in number, diversity and complexity in foreign policy
issues, including the internal Whitehall stakeholders that are
an integral part of developing and implementing effective policy.
September 2010
19
Eg one key area of FDNS policy needing continuing political
leadership is around promoting and shaping a public debate about
the role of the UK in the world, both taking into account what
UK citizens think and making the case for particular policies
if necessary. Back
20
There may be a case for cross-Whitehall strategies on engaging
key non-state actors (eg International Organisations, business,
civil society groups) but this is a second order question and
shelved here. Back
21
The current SDSR, managed from the Cabinet Office, has made
a brave attempt to take on the task of pulling together the collective
view, but suffers from many of the challenges outlined in paragraph
13. Back
22
There are additional ideas in the informal note "A conversation
on National Security convened by Libra Advisory Group and Institute
for Government on National security 2010 and Alex Evans and David
Stevens report for Chatham House on Organising for influence:
UK foreign policy in an age of uncertainty". Back
23
The FCO has been developing a useful systematic approach to
international policy-making. This could be combined with other
FDNS departments' approaches to form the basis of a FDNS toolkit. Back
|
