Written evidence submitted by Professor
Julian Lindley-French
"Worn down, doubly decimated, but undisputed
masters of the hour, the French nation peered into the future
in thankful wonder and haunting dread. Where then was that SECURITY
without which all that had been gained seemed valueless, and life
itself, even amid the rejoicings of victory, was almost unendurable?
The mortal need was Security".
Winston Churchill on the French after World
War One.[24]
ABSTRACT
Grand strategy is the organisation of large
means in pursuit of large uncertain ends over medium to long time
frames. Such strategy is informed by history, identity and the
credibility of the national narrative both domestically and internationally.
Since the creation of the national debt in the 18th century as
a way of financing war the strategic concept that emerges from
such strategy has traditionally represented a balance between
what must be done and what can be afforded given the severity
of any given threat. A successful strategic concept thus depends
on sound political leadership and strategic judgement for without
such leadership such strategy tends to become a Treasury-led bureaucratic
process of governance. Given the radical shift underway in the
global power balance such a good governance approach to security
may no longer be sufficient. However, given the atomistic structure
and cultural imperatives of Whitehall it will still likely take
a great shock before the conditions for genuine cross-department
thinking and action are created. Therefore, it is vital that strategy
is led by the Prime Minister and seen to be so, possibly through
a small (and inner) Security Cabinet which informs fundamental
decisions of state that go to the first duty of government—the
security of the citizen. However, the UK lacks a consistent and
sustained approach to strategy and it is thus hard for London
to establish a framework for strategy that incorporates prioritisation,
inter-agency response integration, risk awareness and management,
response leadership and accountability. Moreover, "grand"
strategy has recently been too narrowly and heavily focused on
counter-terrorism and Afghanistan. Rather, all possible risks
and threats, both internal and external, must be considered and
assessed for which knowledge and insight will be vital (in addition
to intelligence). Today, affordability is the driving force of
grand strategy and defence is a case in point. Demonstrating the
value of defence investment in peace, ie proving value for money
is akin to proving a negative. If war does not happen to what
extent is it due to defence investment? Since time immemorial
British governments have grappled with this question and by and
large managed to balance strategy and affordability. However,
the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is essentially
misguided because it considers strategy through the wrong end
of the strategy telescope because it takes the financial crisis
as an absolute rather than a phase to be weathered prior to the
return to sound strategy.
THE MAKING
OF BRITISH
GRAND STRATEGY
Recommendations
1. Britain needs a National Security Strategy
(NSS) worthy of the name supported by a suitably authoritative
National Security Council (NSC) that offers a radical new Whole
of Government approach that will enable sound armed forces to
underpin a necessarily activist foreign and security policy built
on a properly funded diplomatic and aid effort.
2. Critical will be a Security Minister
and/or a National Security Advisor of real political stature as
part of an inner Security Cabinet and who is focussed solely on
that brief.
3. The NSC will not dominate the power ministries
(DfID, FCO, Home Office and MOD) but must be able to undertake
the "political entreprenueurship" to give the NSS traction
across Whitehall.
4. Critical will be a National Security
Strategy that has real planning traction. Thereafter, much will
depend on the extent to which the National Security Council (NSC)
with the backing of No 10 (a) can bring together the power ministries
in pursuit of national strategy; and (b) rise above a mainly bureaucratic,
internal approach to reinforce stated political aims with outside
expertise.
5. A much tighter strategic relationship
is needed between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the
Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Home Office and DfID. First,
the FCO needs to become far more adept at exporting the British
strategic message by better promoting the strategic stabilisation/prevention
concept to partners and allies and in so doing build a new diplomatic
and political consensus. Second, far greater efforts are needed
on the part of British diplomacy to communicate British strategic
resolve, as well as openness to new partners. Third, the FCO must
play its full diplomatic role by helping to create the security
space upon which stabilisation and reconstruction relies. Fourth,
the UK must develop an integrated Strategic Communications strategy;
connecting across government, the United Kingdom including Scotland,
Northern Ireland, Wales, London, the City and remaining overseas
Territories (Falkland Islands/Gibraltar), the economy and inclusive
of the BBC.
6. Given the scope and nature of change
in the world and the crisis in British forces and resources the
NSC is the natural focus of a security brains-trust that draws
in the best and the brightest from across the country (and beyond)
to work alongside those charged with the difficult task of discharging
British national strategy.
7. Cross-government structures under the
NSC/Cabinet Office should ideally include a Strategy Group made
up of both officials and non-government experts to build on the
Strategic Trends work of DCDC with a specific remit to establish
likely forecasts and context for Intelligence and Planning.
8. A Security Situation Centre could maintain
a picture across the UK security landscape incorporating both
internal and external threats and linked to a National Intelligence
Council.
9. A consistent strategic framework is needed
across government to establish structure and methodology that
incorporates prioritisation, inter-agency response integration,
risk awareness and management, response leadership and accountability.
10. The development of strategic thinking
skills must be taught because strategy must properly encompass
the scope of change. Effective security and defence education
(up to 4/5 star civilian and military level) could be the most
effective way supported by a Strategy Development, Concepts and
Doctrine Centre which promotes a Whole of Government approach.
Much more could be made of the existing defence education structures
(Royal College of Defence Studies and UK Defence Academy) to offer
high-level security and strategy training and simulations to senior
practitioners and politicians, possibly in conjunction with the
National School of Government.
11. It may be useful to establish a special
strategy group of fast track civil servants (not unlike the French
enarques) who are trained from the beginning of their career
in cross-government strategic planning and mobility.
12. In the near term it might be useful
to start a programme of simulations and exercises using the UK
Defence Academy in Shrivenham and/or RCDS across the security
functions of government that adapts the kind of work being undertaken
in NATO under the banner of Project Comprehensive Fusion (which
is building on Exercise ARRCADE FUSION) and which specifically
seeks to develop strategic civil-civil and civil-military working
relations.
13. In an uncertain strategic environment
applied knowledge and the insight that emerges from analysis and
experience provides the context for actionable intelligence. Indeed,
compared with the United States there is very little reach back
to think-tanks and other academic institutions that could challenge
and support the often budget-led assumptions that emerge from
what passes for strategic reviews. Therefore, whilst the American
model has its detractors the US model could prove illuminating.
14. A security audit is needed to test affordability
and to release money for investment in a functioning NSC. For
the United Kingdom affordability is the key to effective grand
strategy and it is clear that any new security structure will
need at the very least to impose no increase to the overall security
investment given the parameters of the Comprehensive Spending
Review (CSR). Given the sheer scale of growth in security investment
over the past decade it is highly unlikely that such investments
have struck a balance between efficiency and effectiveness.
CORE MESSAGE
Grand strategy is the organisation of large
means in pursuit of large uncertain ends over medium to long timeframes
and involves the political calculation of what is vital and essential
to national security given the relative power and position of
a state. Such strategy is normally the preserve of second rank
powers which retain strategic ambition and yet are relatively
short on forces and resources and which need to maximise effect
and influence in complex and changing environments. The United
Kingdom is strange for a great power in that London effectively
abandoned classical grand strategy after the 1956 Suez Crisis.
Indeed, whilst the French decided never again to be dependent
on US grand strategy the British decided to embrace it. Thereafter,
British strategy has by and large been defined by US interests
and the British reaction to it. However, the growing influence
of the European Union in British foreign and security policy has
created a most unhealthy dichotomy which makes British grand "strategy"
at its most simplistic the search for the middle ground between
the US world view and the French and German European view. Consequently,
with the US increasingly focused on Asia-Pacific and the EU ever
more parochial such middle ground is fast disappearing. Therefore,
if the United Kingdom is to influence vital change and protect
itself against the consequences of unwanted events a more activist
grand strategy will be needed. Britain is more an engineer than
an architect of the international system. However, the sheer pace
and change of power in the global power balance would suggest
that for a system to survive that is in the British interest more
than mere good governance is now required, hence the need for
grand strategy. Such strategy would necessarily exploit two traditional
British strengths; the balancing of power and the leverage of
the strategic interests of others in pursuit of the grand British
strategic interest—a stable, trading, open, reasonably secure
state-centric international system. "Balance" is everything
in grand strategy and in spite of the great defence depression
engendered by the Strategic Defence and Security Review (Strategic
Pretence and Impecunity Review?) Britain must look beyond the
short-term (and genuinely so). Britain is too rich and powerful
to hide from strategic change and too weak to dominate which places
particular emphasis on a clever and innovative balancing of ends
and means. Strategy operationalises power and structure follows
power. Therefore, only a National Security Strategy (NSS) worthy
of the name supported by a suitably authoritative National Security
Council (NSC) that offers a radical new Whole of Government approach
will enable sound armed forces to underpin a necessarily activist
foreign and security policy built on a properly funded diplomatic
and aid effort. Critical will be a Security Minister and/or a
National Security Advisor of real political stature. The NSC is
unlikely to be in a position to dominate the power ministries
(DfID, FCO, Home Office and MOD) but should be able to undertake
the "political entreprenueurship" to give the NSS traction
across Whitehall. The alternative is stark; a Treasury-led version
of the 1920s Ten Year Rule by which the British will effectively
contract out of influencing and shaping the environment and focus
rather on the bureaucratic management of decline. Grand strategy
is after all ultimately about influence and Britain is at a grand
strategic crossroads.
Q1: What do we mean by "strategy"
or "grand strategy" in relation to the foreign, defence
and security functions of government in the modern world?
Evidence: According to The Economist in 2007
the British Gross Domestic Product was $2.7tr (world rank: 5),
Britain had 6% of world trade (world rank: 5) and British foreign
direct investment was $224 billion (world rank: 2).
Strategy or grand strategy is the organisation
of large means in pursuit of often large uncertain ends. It concerns
the generation, application and organisation of power, resources
and forces. At its core is strategic judgement which is first
and foremost established on a firm grip by government of the position
of a state in the power hierarchy of states, the type of state
it leads (trading, self-sustaining, educated, uneducated etc),
the physical nature and position of a state (land-locked, long
sea border, island) and the tools available to influence others.
Grand strategy enables a state through the organisation of all
national means (security policy, of which defence policy is a
part) to secure its vital, essential and general interests, defend
itself and to live at peace with itself and others in (preferably)
mutual prosperity. Such strategy is informed by history, identity
and the credibility of the national narrative both domestically
and internationally. National strategy (grand strategy) operationalises
and informs security policy but comes before (not after) defence
policy which can only be crafted after over-arching national security
aims and objectives have been established. Grand strategy is thus
a function of national intent, the relative power and influence
of others (allies, partners, and adversaries) and the inevitable
friction in the strategic environment. If power is relative, strategy
is relative to power.
Q2: Who holds the UK "strategic concept"
and how is it being brought to bear on the Strategic Defence and
Security Review.
Evidence: The UK national debt is now over
£900 billion or the equivalent of £15,000 per person
in the United Kingdom. It is forecast to become £1.1 trillion,
over 30% of GDP. Between 1920 and 1955 the average was 130% of
GDP. (www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/uk_national_debt_chart.html)
A strategic concept is the what, the where,
the how and the why of national strategy and concerns ultimately
the shape and nature of action. A strategic concept enshrines
the first principle and purpose of a state—the security
of the citizen. However, a strategic concept also concerns the
"how much" of national action. Since the creation of
the national debt in the eighteenth century as a way of financing
war the strategic concept has traditionally represented a balance
between what must be done and what can be afforded given the nature
of the threat. Indeed, it is for that reason the Prime Minister
is also the First Secretary to the Treasury. Today, in the absence
of any existential threat the level of the national debt can be
said to be relatively high in historical terms at over 30% GDP.
However, between 1920 and 1955 the average was 130% of GDP as
both World Wars One and Two had to be afforded together with the
Great Depression that place in the inter-bellum.
Q3: Do the different government departments
(eg No 10, Cabinet Office, FCO, MoD, Treasury) understand and
support the same UK strategy?
The evidence would suggest that departments
of state understand and support UK national strategy only nominally.
That is hardly surprising as supporting strategy requires understanding,
communication and accountability, in addition to being tasked.
Moreover, the focus hitherto on inputs rather than outputs has
led to the National Security Strategy (NSS) being only one of
a raft of initiatives that tended to generate heat rather than
light. Moreover, the most notable cross-government "experiment",
the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan
developed as a consequence of (a) American strategy; and (b) a
decidedly bottom-up approach which emphasised co-operation in
the theatre of operations. Therefore, much depends on the political
leadership's determination to ensure that the national strategic
concept both reflects the contemporary political mission and the
pursuit of structural and enduring British interests. The past
decade has too often reflected the confusion of values with interests.
Of course, to some extent interests must reflect values but a
demonstrable and practical link between the British national interest
and the security of the British tax payer must be central to a
strategic concept. Equally, without political leadership strategy
too often becomes a bureaucratic process of Treasury-led governance.
In the past when a clear and present existential
threat to the country was apparent the UK incurred far more debt
in pursuit of security than is the case today. However, whilst
the strategic environment contains many risks and not a few threats
there is at present no existential threat such as that posed in
the past by Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia. Consequently, in such
an environment "strategy" becomes an issue of choice
and discretion and in the absence of a clear political lead (and
a weak Cabinet Office) the four main foreign and security policy
ministries (DfiD, FCO, Home Office and MOD) lead mini-strategies
that emphasise fragmentation in national strategy. The Overseas
Development Act (ODA effectively established a DfiD foreign policy
of its own, the FCO desperately under-funded leads a depressed
diplomatic corps much of it Europe-focussed, whilst the US-centric
MOD has been trying to keep up with an activist defence-led American
grand strategy on British resources and to all intents and purposes
has been fighting a war whilst the rest of Whitehall has remained
doggedly at peace. The Home Office, with its focus on social cohesion,
policing and counter-terrorism views security from a very domestic
perspective. The intelligence services sit uncomfortably between
the ministries, wary of each other and trying to cope with the
consequences of over-rapid expansion.
Critical will be a National Security Strategy
that has real planning traction. Thereafter, much will depend
on the extent to which the National Security Council (NSC) with
the backing of No 10 (a) can bring together the power ministries
in pursuit of national strategy; and (b) rise above a mainly bureaucratic,
internal approach to reinforce stated political aims with outside
expertise. Indeed, in the past British grand strategy (such as
it has ever existed) has been controlled too tightly by Mandarins.
Moreover, such exercises to date have tended to reflect the political
concern of the moment and the assuaging of public opinion and
have consequently generated little synergy across government (nor
guidance) that has led to real planning traction within government.
With no disrespect to the current incumbents the Security Minister
and/or a National Security Advisor of real political stature focussed
solely on that brief. Indeed, because the NSC is unlikely to be
in a position to dominate the power ministries it must be able
to undertake the "political entreprenueurship" to give
the NSS traction across Whitehall.
Q4: What capacity exists for cross-departmental
thinking? How should government develop and maintain the capacity
for strategic thinking?
Quotation: "In a period of crisis there
is a balance to be struck between taking all measures necessary
to provide adequate military defence, and taking steps which could
themselves accelerate deterioration into conflict. The Government's
crisis management machinery must be capable of this balancing
act. It must cope with situations which could vary from tension
drawn out over months to developments measured in hours. It must
be able to offer Ministers a range of options for resolving the
crisis. It must be able to bring together and assess rapidly information
from a wide variety of diplomatic, political, economic, military
and intelligence sources". PDGS http://www.pdgs.org.ar/Archivo/omd-crisis.htm
The key word phrase is "cross-departmental
thinking". During crises there is an effective system for
crisis management which serves the Cabinet through the Defence
Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) and the Permanent Joint
Headquarters (PJHQ). The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) considers
the political and strategic implications of actionable intelligence.
However, in normal times there is marked degree of stove-piping
with ministries too often competing with each other over budgets
etc than really looking to establish cross-departmental approaches.
Indeed, one of the many problems faced by the Comprehensive Approach
(systematic civil-military co-operation) is that whilst field
officers of various ministries (and governments) tend to make
things work in the field during operations cohesion at the strategic
level has proven to be very difficult. This has been exacerbated
over the past 10 years by cultural and political differences between
the ministries, most notably DfID and the MOD.
Equally, there are some efforts to create more
synergy. There are many inter-departmental committees across Whitehall
and the number of postings between ministries is increasing. However,
there is very little structured high-level strategic thought or
collaboration across Whitehall with the specific and sustained
objective of generating a high-level cross-Whitehall strategic
picture that properly considers the position, role and interests
of the United Kingdom in a changing strategic environment.
Where attempts have been made to develop a cross-department
culture that would support such thinking, such as the Prime Minister's
Strategy Unit, the Conflict Pools, the Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Unit and its successor the Stabilisation Unit, the level of leadership
has made it hard to get ministries to properly support such efforts.
This atomistic approach to government is reinforced by funding
arrangements by the Treasury which tends to promote a culture
of competition rather than co-operation by ministries that see
themselves as separate orbs in an essentially anarchic realm.
This tendency towards competition is reinforced
by the culture of the British Civil Service. Understandably resistant
to and suspicious of les grands dessins so favoured by
the French, strategy has come to mean good governance, management
and managing reduction which reflects the fact that for some two
hundred years Britain has been the status quo power. The mission
therefore has been to stop dangerous change rather than as a matter
of principle foster constructive systemic change. Britain is more
an engineer than an architect of the international system. However,
the sheer pace and change of power in the global power balance
would suggest that for a system to survive that is in the British
interest more than mere good governance is now required, hence
the need for grand strategy. Sadly, given the atomistic structure
and cultural imperatives of the Government it will likely take
a great shock before the conditions for genuine cross-department
thinking to achieve critical national security goals are created.
Q5: What frameworks or institutions exist
or should be created to ensure that strategic thinking takes places
and its conclusions are available to the Prime Minister and Cabinet?
As the turf-battles in the US attest a more
presidential approach to security leadership by government does
not necessarily lead to more strategic synergy across government.
Given the scope and nature of change in the world and the crisis
in British forces and resources the NSC is the natural focus of
a security brains-trust that draws in the best and the brightest
from across the country (and beyond) to work alongside those charged
with the difficult task of discharging British national strategy.
As such, any such grouping must be in a position to challenge
Whitehall conventions as much as seek creative solutions to the
essential British security dilemma of the age—how to leverage
influence and effect to close the gap between what British security
demands and what it can afford, as well as prepare for a future
that given the friction in the world is almost certainly going
to be dangerous. Additionally, cross-government structures under
the NSC/Cabinet Office should ideally include a Strategy Group
made up of both officials and non-government experts to build
on the Strategic Trends work of DCDC with a specific remit to
establish likely forecasts and context for Intelligence and Planning.
A Security Situation Centre could maintain a picture across the
UK security landscape incorporating both internal and external
threats and linked to a National Intelligence Council. Certainly,
the seniority and influence of the Security Minister would need
to be strengthened to be at least on a par with the Secretaries
of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence.
Ultimately, it is vital that the Prime Minister
is seen to lead such thinking by investing real political capital,
possibly through a small (and inner) Security Cabinet which would
inform fundamental decisions of state that go to the top (and
first duty) of government—the security of the citizen. To
that end, any such structure (and supporting national security
strategies) must satisfy consistently and address continually
five critical questions:
1. Does strategy offer the prospect for developing
a more integrated response framework?
2. Does strategy adequately provide for mechanisms
to recognise and raise awareness of the early signs of new threats
or hazards?
3. Does strategy recognise and seek to address
any deficiencies in risk analysis and risk identification?
4. Does strategy contain a clearly thought
out method of prioritisation?
5. Does strategy offer an adequate leadership
model?[25]
Q6: How is UK strategy challenged and revised
in response to events, changing risk assessments and new threats?
Quotation: "The Cold War threat has been
replaced by a diverse but interconnected set of threats and risks,
which affect the United Kingdom directly and also have the potential
to undermine wider international political stability. They include
international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, conflicts
and failed states, pandemics, and trans-national crime. These
and other threats and risks are driven by a diverse set of underlying
factors, including climate change, competition for energy, poverty
and poor governance, demographic changes and globalisation".
The UK National Security Strategy.
Every British and Western government has faced
a profound challenge over the past 10 years in that almost all
the "events" that have occurred have been very hard
to anticipate, (as had American responses to them). In essence,
in an attempt to maintain the Special Relationship with the US
the UK was in 2001 forced suddenly to switch from a primarily
European-focused security and defence effort to a global-reach
effort. Consequently, whilst the 1998 Strategic Defence Review
hinted at such possibilities no-one in London could have foreseen
the sudden demands on British armed forces (in particular) that
were made. Therefore, since 1998 British strategic analysis has
been endeavouring to catch up with change that is probably as
rapid and as uncertain as at any time in the past century through
a series of DfID, FCO or MOD white papers or "new chapters"
which in the absence of an overarching grand strategic framework
has tended to emphasise contending strategies and partial responses.
In other words, the British have been "muddling through",
by simply trying to doing more of the same better. Some moments
of strategic transition do not favour such an adjustment approach.
Clearly, some events can never be foreseen (or
the reaction to them of key partners which is a key factor in
British grand strategy). Where there has been particular fault
is not so much in an inability to make strategic judgements to
deal with likely shocks, but rather the inconsistent and often
seemingly unconnected flow of defence reviews, security strategies
and development acts together with how best to deal with the relationship
between internal and external security that any Whole of Government
approach must necessarily consider.
In the absence of a consistent strategic framework
across government it is hard to establish structure and methodology
that incorporates prioritisation, inter-agency response integration,
risk awareness and management, response leadership and accountability.
Rather, "grand strategy" has in fact been heavily focused
on a counter-terrorism strategy and the role of Britain in Afghanistan
in relation to that. This has made consideration of the implausible
but possible impossible which after all is also the purpose of
grand strategy. Certainly, the confluence of energy competition,
regimes legitimised by economic growth rather than democracy,
the democratisation of weapons of mass destruction and huge illicit
capital flows, not to mention weak states and religious fundamentalism,
demand that such dangers be considered as part of balanced national
strategy. With the establishment of the NSC the UK thus needs
to become far more systematic in the use of both national security
strategies and defence reviews and therein properly understand
the relationship between strategy and policy. Security policy
establishes vital, essential and general interests; strategy operationalises
policy, whilst defence policy and strategy are the military components
of overall national strategy. Moreover, such an exercise should
be carried out at least every four years, quasi-independent of
government and inform not justify government choices. The two
dangers that emerge from the current and flawed risk assessment
and "strategy" process is either an obsession with fighting
the last "war" better or a determination to recognise
only as much threat as the Treasury thinks the country can afford.
Q7: How are strategic thinking skills best
developed and sustained within the Civil Service?
Quotation: "global warming, flu pandemics,
the emergence of rogue states, globalisation and its impact on
power balances, global poverty and its impact on population movement,
energy security, the proliferation of weapons of destruction and
organised crime are all significant security problems, and we
shouldn't exaggerate the threat from international terrorism"
Sir Richard Mottram, 2007
The development of strategic thinking skills
must be taught because strategy must properly encompass the scope
of change. Indeed, effective strategy identifies which tools and
structures should lead to prevent, and which to deal with consequences.
The Civil Service rightly prides itself on detail. However, implementing
grand strategy requires the ability to generate a big strategic
picture that can be shared across government and implemented down
the command chain—both civil and military, national, regional
and local. Effective security and defence education (up to 4/5
star civilian and military level) could be the most effective
way supported by a Strategy Development, Concepts and Doctrine
Centre which promotes a Whole of Government approach. Strangely,
whilst military officers are given education and training at every
level of command below the general rank, it is assumed that grand
strategy is understood once promoted to 2-star rank and beyond.
The same would appear to apply to the Civil Service. Britain's
radical idea in 1960 was the move away from a conscript military
and the professionalisation of the armed forces, the radical organisational
idea needed in 2010 is a genuine Whole of Government structure
from strategy to implementation focussed on output performance
rather than simply input measurement and underpinned by knowledge
and access to it. Much more could be made of the existing defence
education structures (Royal College of Defence Studies and UK
Defence Academy) to offer high-level security and strategy training
and simulations to senior practitioners and politicians, possibly
in conjunction with the National School of Government. Put simply,
it can no longer be assumed that politicians charged with onerous
security responsibilities of state can suddenly and magically
develop the expertise that effective strategic decision-making
in a complex environment so patently requires. That is the essence
of strategic judgement and it must be informed judgement.
Q8: Should non-government experts and others
be included in the Government's strategy-making process?
In an uncertain strategic environment applied
knowledge and the insight that emerges from analysis and experience
provides the context for actionable intelligence. Indeed, compared
with the United States there is very little reach back to think-tanks
and other academic institutions that could challenge and support
the often budget-led assumptions that emerge from what passes
for strategic reviews. Therefore, whilst the American model has
its detractors the US model could prove illuminating. Think tanks
in Washington are staffed with those temporarily out of government
and those with real expertise. Thus, analytical excellence and
experience work side by side on a daily basis helping to challenge
and inform policy and planning. This modus operandi contrasts
with the recent experience of London which has seen government
employ huge numbers of political or special advisors, the vast
majority of whom enjoy either very narrow expertise or were charged
with maintaining ideological momentum. Very little outside expertise
can be said to really influence British national strategy.
Q9: How should the strategy be communicated
across government and departmental objectives made consistent
with it?
At the very least a much tighter relationship
is needed between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the
Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Home Office and DfID. First,
the FCO needs to become far more adept at exporting the British
strategic message by better promoting the strategic stabilisation/prevention
concept to partners and allies and in so doing build a new diplomatic
and political consensus. Second, far greater efforts are needed
on the part of British diplomacy to communicate British strategic
resolve, as well as openness to new partners. Third, the FCO must
play its full diplomatic role by helping to create the security
space upon which stabilisation and reconstruction relies. Fourth,
the UK must develop an integrated Strategic Communications strategy;
connecting across government, the United Kingdom (including Scotland,
Northern Ireland, Wales, London, the City and remaining overseas
Territories (Falkland Islands/Gibraltar), the economy and inclusive
of the BBC. These are all key to the stabilisation and prevention
message. Once a strategic narrative has been crafted for external
and public consumption it will be easier to then organise bureaucracies
behind it. Communication is ultimately about leadership and thus
must be jealously guarded by the political leadership to prevent
it being "finessed" too much by senior civil servants
with more parochial ambitions.
Q10: How can departments work more collaboratively
and co-ordinate strategy development more closely?
Evidence: The 2010 defence budget is less than
half that of 1979 and less than a third that of 1986. At roughly
£30 billion per annum it is also 25% less than it was in
2000 prior to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Author's own research.
As the evidence presented above attests the
first requirement is to establish a reasonable link between the
scale of the security challenges, its affordability and the resources
so allocated. Having assessed the scale and nature of challenges
then decisions can be made as to the tools needed to deal with
them and where to place those tools. Certainly, for the United
Kingdom to maximise influence ministries are going to have to
become far more "joint" to use the military jargon,
and be very clear about their place and responsibilities under
national security strategy. The work being undertaken by the British-led
Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) to operationalise the Comprehensive
Approach could offer a way forward. First, a distinction will
need to be made between the strategic function of government and
the roles of ministries therein (that is by and large already
in place but needs to be more clearly enunciated). Second, the
normal delivery functions of ministries need to be maintained.
Third (however), it may be useful to establish a special strategy
group of fast track civil servants (not unlike the French enarques)
who are trained from the beginning of their career in cross-government
strategic planning and mobility.
Such an approach would of course take time and
thus it might also be useful in the near term to start a programme
of simulations and exercises using the UK Defence Academy in Shrivenham
and/or RCDS across the security functions of government that adapts
the kind of work being undertaken in NATO under the banner of
Project Comprehensive Fusion (which is building on Exercise ARRCADE
FUSION) and which specifically seeks to develop strategic civil-civil
and civil-military working relations. In effect, government would
create a deployable group of strategy experts to advise and lead
within government. However, to do so would require of government
a systematic approach at the highest levels to generate all elements
and partnerships vital to the successful generation and conduct
of complex strategy reliant on complex civilian and military partnerships.
Q11: How can reduced resources be appropriately
targeted to support delivery of the objectives identified by the
strategy?
Evidence: Defence spending since 1997 has increased
by 11%. The US has increased its defence expenditure by 109%,
China by 247%, Russia by 67% and Australia by 56%. Since 1997
the British have increased expenditure on health by £45.1
billion (147%), whilst on education by £35 billion (75%),
whilst overseas aid now at 0.7% GDP[26]
(one third of the Defence Budget) has increased in real terms
by 215% whilst the intelligence services have seen a fourfold
increase since 2001. Defence spending since 1997 has increased
only by 11% which is less than historical inflation over the same
period. Author's own research.
For the United Kingdom affordability is the
key to effective grand strategy and it is clear that any new security
structure will need at the very least to impose no increase to
the overall security investment given the parameters of the Comprehensive
Spending Review (CSR). Equally, the above figures would suggest
some room exists for a reallocation of expenditures. Indeed, such
large and relatively rapid increases in expenditure that have
taken place over the past decade driven as they have been by an
input culture are rarely efficient. Thus, the challenge for the
government will be to establish strategy that balances efficiency
with effectiveness. However, using the defence budget to help
fund such a structure would be ill-advised due to the sheer exhaustion
of a defence force and bureaucracy that for 10 years at least
has been operating well beyond defence planning assumptions.
It is worth dwelling on the defence dilemma
for a moment as strategically credible armed forces are the bedrock
upon which grand strategy is ultimately established. Demonstrating
the value of defence investment in peace—the mantra of Value
for Money for example—is indeed akin to proving a negative—if
war does not happen to what extent is it due to defence investment?
Since time immemorial British governments have grappled with this
question and just about managed to balance strategy and affordability.
However, the response to the current financial crisis threatens
to break that linkage, perhaps for the first time in perhaps four
hundred years.
Between 1979 and 1986 the British defence budget
increased in absolute terms for a range of factors such as the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Euromissiles crisis. Moreover,
in 1982 Britain also fought a short war against Argentina to recover
the Falkland Islands. Equally, the then incumbent government under
Margaret Thatcher believed that relatively strong British armed
forces were a vital tool of British influence. However, over the
period 1986 to 2010 the defence budget as a function of gross
domestic product (GDP) declined from 5% to 2.1% and yet over the
same period the tasks and scope and intensity of operations climbed
markedly. In fact, having stripped out historical inflation and
allowing for Defence Cost Inflation[27]
the 2010 defence budget is less than half that of 1979 and less
than a third that of 1986. At roughly £30bn per annum in
cash terms, it is also 25% less than it was in 2000 prior to wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan. In other words, successive British governments
over recent times have made a conscious decision to ask a lot
more from the British armed forces for a lot less investment.
This "do more with less" syndrome has been
apparent since before the end of the Cold War. Since 1981 there
have been four separate defence reviews all employing various
euphemistic titles to cut cost. The New Management Strategy of
the late 1980s; the Peace Dividend 1990 and Options for Change
incorporated with the 1994 Front Line First: The Defence Costs
Study. The 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) which sought to
make sense of the role of armed forces in the post-Cold War world
and the 2002 SDR New Chapter. Only the SDR tried to consider the
size and shape of the armed forces in relation to strategic and
structural change in the world, but its findings and proposals
were then starved of funding year on year thereafter and it effectively
described the wrong world. In effect, the ends became the means.
Between 1979 and 1986 Britain did manage to
maintain a performance advantage over potential adversaries that
also helped the British to exert significant influence over both
allies and adversaries. In the jargon of the day Britain "punched
above its weight" which was achieved mainly by aligning British
grand strategy closely with that of the US. These forces proved
reasonably effective during the 1991 Iraq War, as well as during
the Balkan Wars of the 1990s and Sierra Leone in 2000. However,
as the first decade of the 21st century has unfolded the reserve
of effectiveness, competency and prestige of British armed forces
has dissipated as the investment, size and use have become unbalanced,
mainly due to following an activist post 9/11 American grand strategy
on British resources and mismatched/imbalanced capabilities.
The supporting figures bear this out. Between
1979 and 1992 British defence expenditure remained ahead of defence
and historical inflation and saw balanced investment in both the
teeth (front-line) and tail (research, procurement, development,
education and logistics tails). However, by 2000 the military
performance advantage was in steep decline and by 2010 it had
effectively been exhausted. Consequently, the gap between forces
and resources left British armed forces fielding many force structures
affordable at 5% GDP, but no longer affordable at 3.5%, let alone
the 2.1% expended in 2010. In effect, the British concentrated
on maintaining capability at the expense of scale and strategic
performance was thus sacrificed to maintain operational performance
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
However, the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security
Review (SDSR) would appear to be compounding these mistakes because
it considers strategy through the wrong end of the strategy telescope
because it takes the financial crisis as an absolute rather than
a phase to be weathered prior to the return to sound strategy.
As such it employs the language of a great defence depression
to justify the budget rather than the need, similar to that of
the Great Depression of the 1930s that to all intents and purpose
destroyed any level of ambition. Indeed, by creating a narrative
of effective decline it highlighted the bureaucratic management
of decline rather than the political leadership of strategy, which
should always be front and centre in British defence policy. Specifically,
the SDSR is based upon existing operational analysis models designed
to balance between existing force structures and capabilities
and emphasise precision (intervention) over mass (stabilisation);
not to devise new strategic designs. The SDSR is thus run by the
MoD simply to achieve the 20% salami-cuts required to meet the
Comprehensive Spending Review; not to enable strategic thinking.
The final SDSR decisions will likely then be given to a newly
formed and critically understaffed National Security Council,
formed at the 5 Star level and required also to deliver on National
Security Strategy.
Q12: Do other countries do strategy better?
Quotation: "Our strategy starts by recognizing
that our strength and influence abroad begins with the steps we
take at home. We must grow our economy and reduce our deficit
... Simply put, we must see American innovation as a foundation
of American power ... We must also build and integrate the capabilities
that can advance our interests, and the interests we share with
other countries and peoples. Our Armed Forces will always be a
cornerstone of our security, but they must be complemented".
President Barack Obama, US National Security Strategy, May 2010
Not really, although some think they do—most
notably the Americans and the French. The problem is to grip the
nature of uncertainty and avoid the wrong call which will result
in over-investment on inappropriate structures and forces. However,
where both Paris and Washington are more effective than the British
is the use of the process of grand strategy making to shape the
agenda to which others react and to see such strategy-making as
a continual process to inform both leaders and practitioners.
The Americans produce a National Security Strategy every four
years by law and with it a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which
promotes a continual process of re-evaluation and re-invention.
The French produce regular Livres Blanc and Loi des Programmations.
Where both the Americans and French differ from the British is
the extent to which (a) outsiders are involved; and (b) the time
given to ministers to consider strategic implications. Indeed,
it is a mark of British muddled thinking that a new National Security
Strategy will come after the SDSR (given the recent change of
government) demonstrating the degree to which in the UK the defence
policy cart comes before the strategic horse.
This contrasts with Paris. In a speech in June
2008 President Sarkozy established the parameters of contemporary
French grand strategy when he said "...the changing world
forces us to prepare certain shifts. In short, I believe the time
has come to give French diplomacy a `doctrine'. This must not
prevent pragmatism in the conduct of affairs. A doctrine means
a clear-cut vision of the world, and of the long-term objectives
and interests we defend. It's a set of values which guide our
action. It's what gives us meaning and coherence over time. It's
the pre-requisite for our independence".28 Indeed, the Sarkozy
Doctrine (ie the parameters for the organisation of large French
means in pursuit of French ends) reflects (and informs) similar
statements made by the new British Government as it tries to establish
a pragmatic foreign and security policy in an age of austerity
in which the generation of influence through institutions (EU,
UN, NATO, OSCE) remain critical to French grand strategy.
At a declaratory level the stated ambitions
of French foreign and security policy are effectively those of
the British. France seeks to ensure the security and independence
of France and the French. Paris has world-wide interests and thus
global responsibilities. Paris stresses that French security interests
cannot be separated from the rest of Europe, "and our partners
who share our destiny and values". Co-operation is vital
in the face of new threats such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation
and what President Sarkozy has called "ecological disorder".
Finally, to Sarkozy the promotion of French economic and commercial
interests in a globalised world will be central to French foreign
policy.
THE MAKING
OF BRITISH
GRAND STRATEGY
For British grand strategy to be worthy of the
name the centre of gravity of British national strategy must thus
be the successful shaping of the strategic environment in accordance
with British national interests: nothing more, nothing less. Traditionally,
the British have been rightly suspicious of radical prescriptions
for international relations and thus understandably nervous of
"grand" strategies and the "grands dessins"
that have sometimes been favoured on the other sides of both the
Atlantic and the Channel. Indeed, the role of "balancer"
is deeply embedded in the British strategic mind. Lord Palmerston's
famous dictum that nations had neither permanent friends nor enemies,
only permanent interests might have been uttered at the height
of 19th century British imperial power but still to an extent
holds true today, albeit in a far more nuanced manner.
The strength of Britain's partnerships and alliances
will ebb and flow with the political and strategic requirements
of Britain and its partners at any given time. Indeed, that is
political reality. However, the opportunity afforded by victories
gained in both World War Two and the Cold War still have political
traction but only if Britain has the vision, the will and the
commitment to seize the opportunity. Unfortunately, too much of
the effort of government today suggests repeated attempts to re-label
impotence in an attempt to mask the pace and extent of self-imposed
relative decline from the British people. Whilst it is certainly
the case that the emergence of China, India and others on the
world stage is leading to a new balance of power, neither the
West nor Britain are in terminal decline. However, unless the
despond of defeatism that seems to affect and afflict much of
Europe is overcome decline could well become a self-fulfilling
prophecy and Britain must act to stop it. Indeed, the zero sum
game and with it the idea that if power rises on one part of the
planet it must by definition decline elsewhere, is a compelling
and neat academic treatise. Unfortunately, it is wrong. There
is no automatic reason why an increase in the power of China,
India et al should automatically lead to a loss of Western
power. Power and its wielding are subject to many factors.
September 2010
28 Interview given by President Nicolas Sarkozy,
"Politique Internationale", May 2007. www.ambafrance.ng.org
24 Churchill, Winston S. "The Second World War,
The Gathering Storm", Vol. 1. p 6. Back
25
The author acknowledges the work of Frank Gregory in identifying
these questions. Back
26
The BBC has been remarkably reluctant to reveal its actual budget
but estimates and releases suggest that the BBC and Overseas Aid
(DfID) budgets are both about 0.7% GDP. Back
27
There is ongoing discussion as to Defence Cost Inflation as to
whether it exists as a system (Defence) wide phenomena of a unit
level intergenerational/unit purchase cost. Increasingly, given
the complex nature of the Military Industrial Complex, it is recognised
that DCI (at somewhere between 6-8%) needs to be addressed at
the system rather than exclusively the unit level. Back
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