Conclusions and recommendations
What should Ministers do?
1. The
Government's drive to reduce public expenditure is forcing all
public servants to re-evaluate the way they work; ministers should
be no exception. Like the rest of the public service ministers
will have to find ways to do more with less. Currently ministers
engage in unnecessary activities and take too many low level decisions.
Some activities ministers engage in gain little from having a
minister conduct them and they could cease. This would provide
ministers with more capacity to focus on the important tasks and
provide them with the time necessary to give them proper detailed
consideration. ministers must focus on the key strategic decisions
that need to be made in their department. Having fewer ministers,
so that they have to prioritise on their core responsibilities,
could help bring about this change in culture.
(Paragraph 31)
Accountability
2. This
inquiry has not identified a perfect solution to these questions
around ministerial accountability but one possibility would be
for the Ministerial Code to make explicit reference to "redirectory
responsibility" as a legitimate aspect of ministerial accountability
in the context of a more decentralised state. This would militate
against the contemporary practice in governments from all parties
to remain answerable for many functions for which departments
no longer exercise direct control. (Paragraph 42)
Parliamentary Scrutiny
3. Following
the implementation of the Government's proposals to devolve responsibility
for public service delivery to local communities we would invite
the Procedure Committee to re-examine the rules surrounding the
content of Parliamentary Questions to ensure that they reflect
new realities about responsibility and accountability for service
delivery. (Paragraph 48)
Ministers in a 'Post-Bureaucratic Age'
4. The
Government has set out a radical agenda for the reform of public
services which focuses on decentralisation and moving responsibility
for service delivery to a local level. While ministers will be
required to implement these changes, a smaller centre that is
not directly responsible for delivery will require fewer ministers.
(Paragraph 55)
5. To realise the
Government's aspiration to reduce the number of ministers we recommend
that, following the introduction of these reforms, the Government
conduct a fresh review of ministerial numbers by midway though
this Parliament. We expect this review to identify scope for significant
reductions. If this does not happen we will interpret this as
a sign that the Government has failed in its ambition to devolve
real power and responsibility to local communities; a central
tenet of its Big Society agenda. (Paragraph 56)
Ministers and departmental structures
6. We
recommend that as departments adapt to meet the requirement for
a reduction of a third in their administration budgets, the continuing
existence of ministerial posts as well as those of officials should
be within scope of the restructuring plans. This should include
examining which departments could be merged together to reflect
their decreased responsibilities. Similarly, the Government's
review of ministerial numbers should focus on functions rather
than posts. It is essential to identify those tasks of Government
which need to be fulfilled and then allocate ministerial posts
as appropriate to carry them out. What must be avoided is the
patronage-driven route of creating posts and then allocating tasks
to keep the office-holder occupied. (Paragraph 64)
7. We also recommend
a serious look at the Whitehall Departments of State for Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland (subject to the special circumstances
of the security consideration in Northern Ireland) in particular
to ensure that political structures in Whitehall reflect and reinforce
Parliament's clear intentions, expressed in legislation, to devolve
power and responsibility. (Paragraph 65)
Ministerial effectiveness
8. The
UK Government is thus distinctive not only for having a relatively
large number of ministers, but also ministers who are unspecialised
in the areas for which they are responsible and for which they
may have responsibility for only a short space of time. This lack
of continuity in government departments can only serve to undermine
ministerial effectiveness. Prime Ministers should resist the temptation
to hold regular, extensive reshuffles. (Paragraph 70)
Training and Guidance
9. We
endorse the recommendation of PASC in the last Parliament that
there should be more systematic training, mentoring, coaching
and assessment of ministers. While we concur with the scepticism
expressed that it is impossible for any training or induction
to prepare a minister for all the challenges that he will facing
during his time in office, this does not mean that such training
is useless, merely that its limitations should be understood.
The purpose should be to help them identify areas of their performance
where they can improve. This should not be seen as criticism of
current ministers' performance, merely an acknowledgement that
everyone, including ministers, can always find ways to be better
at their job. (Paragraph 79)
Ministers in a coalition
10.
We are
not persuaded by the argument that coalition government requires
additional members. All parties are coalitions of different viewpoints
so there will always be a need to reconcile different positions
within Government when formulating policy. The normal mechanisms
for cabinet government should be sufficient to deal with these
challenges. The existence of the Coalition should therefore not
provide any justification to increase ministerial numbers on the
grounds of increased workload. (Paragraph 87)
11. Even
if the Coalition does create additional work, this is not work
that would justify the appointment of additional ministers. As
studies of other countries with experience of coalitions has shown,
Special Advisers and senior civil servants can perfectly adequately
perform the consultation and co-ordination tasks created by a
coalition. (Paragraph 90)
Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies
Act
12. It
is important to understand not only how the number of ministers
in the House of Commons is set but also why they are set at their
current level. Prime Ministers and their Chief Whips have every
incentive to increase their patronage over those who determine
the progress of legislation. The temptation to create more and
more 'jobs for the boys' (and girls) is not conducive either to
better government or better scrutiny of legislation. A further
increase in the proportion of MPs who are ministers does not reflect
the Coalition's stated objective of "strengthening Parliament."
(Paragraph 98)
13. We
agree with our predecessor Committee that the Ministerial and
Other Salaries Act 1975 should be regarded as setting an absolute
limit on the number of ministers. Government should not appoint
unpaid ministers if this results in them having more ministers
than envisaged by the Ministerial and Other Salaries Act. (Paragraph
99)
14. Furthermore,
in line with the Prime Minister's desire to reduce the cost of
politics, and following the decision to reduce the number of MPs,
the Government needs to legislate for a corresponding reduction
in the upper limit for the number of ministers. This should be
done by reducing the upper limit for the number of ministers who
can sit in the Commons as set out in the House of Commons Disqualification
Act 1975. These changes should take effect in 2015, when the reduction
in the number of MPs also comes into force. (Paragraph 100)
Further Reductions
15. We
believe that adherence to the MOSA and modest reduction in the
limit set by HCDA should only be the start of the process. For
the reasons we adduce in this Report, we believe there is scope
for much greater reductions. Therefore we repeat the recommendation
made in our original Report that, over the course of this Parliament,
the total number of ministers should be reduced to 80 shared between
the Commons and Lords. (Paragraph 103)
Using the Whips
16. There
is scope for greater use to be made of Whips in the performance
of some Parliamentary duties, such as responding to adjournment
debates. This would be a better use of resources and provide scope
for ministers to focus on their other tasks. (Paragraph 108)
Ministers outside the Commons
17. It
is important that ministers who are not Members of the elected
House can be answerable to the Commons. This would allay any concerns
that Secretaries of State have been appointed from the House of
Lords can avoid legitimate scrutiny by the elected Chamber. We
believe that the pilot of having Lords ministers answer questions
in Westminster Hall, as previously recommended by the Procedure
Committee, should be conducted as soon as possible. While there
is no urgency, as no Secretary of State currently sits in the
Lords, this provides an opportunity to try out new arrangements
in a less politically charged environment. (Paragraph 112)
18. The
issue of Lords ministers cannot be considered without acknowledging
the likelihood of future reforms. If the Government proposes,
and Parliament agrees, to create a wholly or partially elected
Upper House it will have to think both about how it distributes
its ministers between its two Chambers, and how democratically
elected representatives can hold ministers to account, regardless
of which Chamber they were elected to. We encourage the Government
to consider all these issues as it develops its policy on Lords
reform. (Paragraph 114)
Parliamentary Private Secretaries
19. We
do not believe that the Government needs as many PPSs as it currently
has. They perform few functions of real value; the few they do
could easily be performed by others, notably the Whips. We recommend
that only Secretaries of State should be allowed to appoint Parliamentary
Private Secretaries and that the Ministerial Code be amended to
limit PPSs to one for each department. (Paragraph 125)
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