Examination of Witnesses (Question Numbers
149-218)
Mr Jonathan Baume, Mr Dai Hudd, Mr Geoff Lewtas and
Mr Charles Cochrane
9 November 2010
Q149 Chair: Would
you like to introduce yourselves for the record? Mr Hudd?
Dai Hudd: I will
kick off. Dai Hudd, Deputy General Secretary of Prospect.
Geoff Lewtas: I
am Geoff Lewtas from PCS. I am the Director of Bargaining and
Equality.
Jonathan Baume:
Jonathan Baume, General Secretary of the FDA.
Charles Cochrane:
I am Charles Cochrane. I am the Secretary of the Council of Civil
Service Unions.
Chair: Well, thank you
all very much for joining us. We are discussing quangos this
morning. Mr Elphicke?
Q150 Charlie Elphicke: Good
morning, gentlemen. I was wondering if you could tell us
how far you were consulted about the review process on decisions
to abolish, merge or make more efficient or more effective certain
public bodies.
Charles Cochrane:
I will start, if you like. I think the short answer is, both
in the general and the specific, we weren't. Whilst we initiated
some discussions with the Cabinet Office to ask both about the
general process of reviews and abolition of public bodies and
of the Bill, we certainly weren't subject to any formal consultation.
Certainly, on organisations in which we have a close interest,
whether that is the Audit Commission, Becta or the Civil Service
Appeal Board, in all cases the announcements were made before
there were any discussions with us and I think in at least one
case we are still awaiting discussions with ministers about specifics.
So it is very much a case of no.
Dai Hudd: Can I
give an example of that? The Audit Commission announcement was
made by the Minister, Eric Pickles, on Friday 13 August—it
was a Friday the 13th; that is an irony, if ever there was one—and
it is only tomorrow that we get face to face with the Minister
to discuss the implications of that announcement, even though
already there are 300 redundancy notices that have been issued
as a consequence of that announcement on 13 August.
Q151 Chair: Anybody
else?
Geoff Lewtas: I
think similarly, you could refer to the announcement about the
closure of the Regional Development Agencies, which we see as
unbelievably difficult to justify, in the sense that there is
a need for the type of co-ordination involving private sector
interests and the concerns about economic regeneration in the
regions. There has been no debate at all about the real reasons
for that decision and no possibility since of any proper consultation
that means you can have a dialogue about the reasoning behind
it and the justification for it and start to examine those arguments
and discuss them in a proper manner.
Jonathan Baume:
I have nothing to add on the question of consultation, because
the answer is no, we were not consulted beforehand. On one or
two cases we might have had about an hour's advance notice of
announcements being made, but certainly no advance consultation.
Q152 Charlie Elphicke:
Just before we move on to quangos, looking at public bodies as
a whole, including government, and looking at efficiency and effectiveness,
this Committee has had a lot of concerns about conferences and
things like that. Have any of you heard of a thing called Civil
Service Live, which apparently is a three-day gathering in Olympia,
and have any of you been to it?
Charles Cochrane:
Yes, we have, as have ministers of the current Government and
ministers of previous governments. It is generally seen as a
very worthwhile event for all the participants. It's something
which I believe is also done at little if any cost to government
because it is subsidised by Dods. Can I just make another point,
if I may? You use the word quangos, which, if I remember rightly,
was something coined by Philip Holland MP many years ago—I
have been around long enough to remember it—who wrote a
book on the subject. What was it? Quasiautonomous nongovernmental
organisations. But in fact the bodies we're talking about, their
official title is non-departmental public bodies, and certainly
I think that is the phrase that we think we should be using, rather
than quangos, which I have to say has a slightly pejorative tone
about it.
Q153 Charlie Elphicke: Do
you think, though, that having three days of civil service time,
which could be spent working for the nation, on a conference is
a good idea?
Charles Cochrane:
If you were to ask Francis Maude or the Prime Minister, both of
whom were participants at Civil Service Live, I am sure they would
give you a full answer to that point, but my impression is that
every one of the major speakers there thought it was a very worthwhile
event.
Q154 Chair: I think
the burden of Mr Elphicke's question is: does Civil Service Live
constitute consultation?
Jonathan Baume:
No. Civil Service Live is an event where civil servants—people
do not spent three days there, for the most part; they spend a
day and different groups of people come on different days and
there are presentations and seminars. As I say, ministers from
both governing parties have taken an active part. I am one of
the people on this platform who have taken part in seminars and
presentations there, and there is a wide range of outside involvement
in that. But it is not in any sense about consultation. It is
about giving particularly sometimes junior staff—because
members whom we represent are often party to these wider gatherings—the
opportunity to take part in wider, crosscivil service or
wider-than-the-civil-service events, because they do not often
get it. But it is not in any sense a consultative forum; it is
an area for debate, seminars and presentations, and as Charlie
has said, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David Cameron as Prime
Minister have addressed those bodies and been subject to question
and answer sessions, which bring in far more civil servants than
might otherwise have access to that kind of event. But it is
nothing to do at all with consultation of any kind on these kinds
of matters.
Q155 Nick de Bois: Just
before I ask this question, can I declare an interest? For 25
years I've been running and working in live event management,
and I think the answer is slightly disingenuous. Let me just
ask it again. You may have three days with people coming in and
out, but the time and cost of preparation for putting on a three
day event far exceeds three days. What I haven't heard, and what
any commercial customer would ask, is: what is my ROI? You have
given us what it isn't, so what is it? Justify that one.
Chair: ROI?
Nick de Bois: Return on
investment. You have told me what it isn't; I am looking for
what it is this time.
Jonathan Baume:
I think you would need to ask Francis Maude. You would need to
ask ministers and you would need to ask the Cabinet Office. It
was an imitative launched under the previous Labour Government.
I cannot speak for Gus O'Donnell, but I know Gus was supportive
of it, as a way of trying to reach out and partly present the
Civil Service more publicly, but also to involve civil servants
beyond the immediate Whitehall senior echelons in these wider
events and participation. But the issues about the costings and
the value for money I do not think we are the best people to answer.
Q156 Nick de Bois: No,
you are not; I accept that, but if you are participants, you should
have got something out of it and I am just not quite sure what
it is, but I won't pursue that.
Dai Hudd: Well, we got quite a
few members.
Q157 Charlie Elphicke: So
what were you gentlemen doing? Were you enjoying the junket or
signing up members?
Charles Cochrane:
I don't remember the junket bit. We are talking a little bit—
Charlie Elphicke: It was
late at night.
Charles Cochrane:
No, it was a serious discussion about serious issues and I think,
bluntly, provided an opportunity for the Government in its very
early days to set out its stall on a range of issues to an audience
who were very interested in what they had to say.
Dai Hudd: At the
last Civil Service Live, the issue of changes to the Civil Service
redundancy arrangements was very, very high on the agenda, and
the workshop session I did with fellow colleague trade unions
was a drop-in session for people to ask us questions of the moment
about where discussions were with government. So it certainly
wasn't a junket and it wasn't overtly a recruiting exercise; it
was an opportunity for civil servants from around the country
simply to talk to the people who represent them directly with
the Minister and the Cabinet Office about what issues were affecting
them.
In terms of its value, I agree very much with my
colleagues; I think those questions need to be put to someone
else. Do I think the Civil Service anxiously waits for Civil
Service Live to come around every year? No, I don't. Do civil
servants say, "Oh, we can't wait for Gus O'Donnell to make
an announcement at the next one and we'll know a bit more about
what's happening"? No, I don't. What I do see there, though,
is an enormous number of private sector contractors very much
bidding for work in the Civil Service. I would argue that it
is as much a showcase for that as it is an audience for particular
civil servants as well. But I very much agree with my colleagues:
in terms of its value, you are asking the wrong people.
Q158 Robert Halfon:
Do you think it would make any difference—
Chair: Sorry, Mr Halfon;
you need to declare your interest.
Robert Halfon: Oh yes,
sorry. I am a member of Prospect, I should say. Do you think
it would make any difference if Civil Service Live did not occur?
Dai Hudd: Well,
this is one we have not rehearsed, so my colleagues will clearly
disagree with me if they so choose, but my own view is that a
Londonbased, centrallydriven event like Civil Service
Live is going to have a limited opportunity to reach out to where
a lot of the Civil Service work occurs, which is outside of the
Whitehall family. I do think there is an argument about taking,
as it were, Whitehall out to civil servants in the greater part
of the country to have some degree of connection with the valuable
work they do and how decisions are made on their behalf. I think
that would be of value. I have doubts myself about how a big
event, run in the way that it is, fulfils that function. But
should something be done on that? I think it should.
Chair: I am going to close
down the discussion about Civil Service Live.
Q159 Mr Walker: Well,
can I just ask a question? Very briefly, since we are on conferences,
the biggest waste of time looks like Davos, so I would not feel
too chased.
Dai Hudd: I have
never been invited.
Mr Walker: I wouldn't
want to go.
Chair: We are not doing
Davos.
Mr Walker: We are not
doing Davos. Well, I don't want to attack these good men for
going to some ghastly thing at Olympia for three days.
Q160 Chair: Have
you finished on consultation, Mr Elphicke? Can I just ask about
the Cabinet Office Business Plan, which was produced just yesterday,
as you know? It says under 1.6.iii, "Review terms and conditions
of … employees of public bodies which are to be removed—completed".
That is an action that has been completed—to review the
terms of employees of public bodies that are to be removed. Have
you been consulted about that?
Geoff Lewtas:
No, I do not think so.
Jonathan Baume:
Not directly, no.
Q161 Chair: Do we
know what it means?
Geoff Lewtas:
I do not believe we have. What we are aware of is that Francis
Maude did set up, along with Danny Alexander, the Chief Secretary,
what is called the Efficiency and Reform Group within the Cabinet
Office, which is looking at a variety of potential changes to
civil servants' terms and conditions, one of which has been the
question of redundancy compensation terms, quite a difficult and
controversial matter.
Q162 Chair: Do you
think that's what that is referring to?
Geoff Lewtas: It
sounds more like it than something that is just relevant purely
to the NDPBs, frankly. We think it is something wider; civil
servicewide.
Chair: In the words of
Jonathan Baume, we will have to ask Francis Maude.
Geoff Lewtas: Indeed.
Q163 Chair: And finally,
do you think consultation should be in the Bill? Because it isn't
at the moment. Is that a quick yes from all of you?
Dai Hudd: Very
much so, yes.
Chair: Thank you very
much. Moving on, Mr Halfon.
Q164 Robert Halfon:
The Government's three tests of impartiality, technical expertise
and independence regarding their decision to abolish some of these
quangos or NDPBs: what do you think of these tests?
Charles Cochrane:
I think we think there is nothing new in them. These tests in
some shape or form have been around for a long time and I think
it formed part of the thinking that has gone on in government
over many, many years about when such bodies are set up. It is
worth saying, isn't it, that some of the NDPBs have been around
for a very long time and have always been subject to a process
of government in setting them up. Even the British Museum, which
is an NDPB, or a quango if you want to call it that; there was
a process that the Government went through—admittedly a
long time ago—to determine why it wanted to set up the British
Museum, in the same way there would be a process that government
went through when it set up the Civil Service Appeal Board or
when it set up the Audit Commission. Similarly, there have been
processes of reviews of NDPBs for many years. At one time—it
may not continue at the moment—there was a formal process
of quinquennial reviews of all NDPBs, and very searching they
were, too. Certainly for some, that continues. I know I have
mentioned it three times already, but the Civil Service Appeal
Board, which it has been announced will be abolished, was subject
to a quinquennial review in the early part of this year that it
came through with flying colours.
Q165 Robert Halfon:
And do you think that the Government has actually adhered to the
three tests it has set itself in deciding which quangos are to
stay and which are to go?
Geoff Lewtas: I
do not think we know the answer to that question, because although
they have said what the tests are, they have not explained in
each case how those tests have been applied, what the thinking
in relation to the specific functions of a particular body is
or how those tests are relevant to that body. Clearly some of
the tests are not relevant to all the bodies, because there is
such a variety of them and a whole range of different functions
are carried out. But I think that goes back to the question about
consultation; that has not been sufficiently thorough from our
point of view, because we are not clear how each of these tests
has been applied in the way it has. You can use an example like
the Gangmasters Licensing Authority, where it was said, "Yes,
that carries on, because impartiality is required", but that
has not been explained and it leaves you thinking, "Well,
how has that test of impartiality been applied to some of the
other examples where decisions to abolish or close have been made?"
Q166 Chair: So is
this a general view, that there is not enough definition to these
tests?
Dai Hudd: I do
not think there are enough definitions. I think the other thing
the Minister has not set out is what the process is for testing
the definitions and who or what will be the organisations that
will test those. One of the things we would want to consider
is whether it is an appropriate mechanism through the Select Committee
process to test not only the criteria but the organisations against
each of those. I don't think it would be right if a minister
has sole discretion as to how they are defined and how they are
applied.
Jonathan Baume:
The problem is—on the point that was just being made by
Geoff—that this is such a diverse range of bodies, from
very small committees to very long-standing national organisations
like, say, the Land Registry, to things like the Civil Service
Appeal Board that Charlie was just mentioning, et cetera. It
is a complete hotchpotch of different types of organisations,
which in itself I think is an illustration of part of the problem;
that we have allowed, if you want, the accretion of arm's length
bodies—whatever acronym you want to use—with all kinds
of odd structures and accountability lines.
In one sense, this is a very long overdue exercise,
and it was about time somebody sat down and went through this
map of all kinds of bodies and said, "Do we need this? Has
it gone past its point of adding any value?" and just stood
back. Now, you can criticise the process by which individual
institutions were judged, as Dai and my colleagues were just saying,
but I don't think it takes away from the fact that somebody needed
to go through this enormous wealth of bodies.
Actually, we can argue about aspects of the definitions
of the three tests that were used, although the danger is you
end up with so many different alternative tests that it is hard
to take decisions. I think part of the point for me also comes
back to our need to be using those tests to set bodies up in future,
because I think part of the problem was both the Conservative
Government in the 1990s and the subsequent Labour Government often
set bodies up without a great deal of thought that then just continued
with a life of their own; functions mutated, changed and expanded.
So the exercise in itself was, I think, a very valid exercise,
even if you might have criticisms about particular decisions that
were taken. If I may say so, I think if the Select Committee
can hone up what the tests ought to be for the future, that will
help administrations decide whether bodies should continue or
whether new bodies should be set up in the first place.
Q167 Chair: May I
just pitch in? You are saying we should have a set of our own
tests. What tests do you propose? It may be too long an answer—I
don't want a very long answer at the moment—but I would
invite you to submit what the tests should actually be.
Jonathan Baume:
We will give that some thought. I have to say personally I think
they are broadly the right kind of tests, because I think the
danger is you end up with too long a checklist and try to make
it too complex. But in the end it is going to be a judgment:
do we think a particular function is better placed within the
core of a department—then you get into the issues about
accountability that I know the Select Committee has been looking
at—or is it better that it is at arm's length from the minister
and the department and fulfils an independent function? And what
are the tests for making it independent of direct ministerial
control?
Q168 Chair: Okay.
But the particular test about technical capability and expertise;
why is that a test? There are expert committees in departments;
there are quangos that have been maintained because they have
technical expertise. Why is this a test? How is it a test?
Dai Hudd: Well,
part of the problem is that the Government does not have sufficient
scientific engineering expertise within its own ranks and therefore
has to refer itself to various advisory bodies to get that independent
scientific advice. Coming back to the tests, I do not think it
is the tests; it is the how and who does it. One of the criteria
ought to be whether the Government has the right scientific and
technical expertise at its disposal, either in an arm's length
body or within the ranks of its own civil servants, to be able
to make good policy. That is something I think could be well
tested in the Select Committee structure, which is very much dealing
with the policy issues as well.
Q169 Robert Halfon:
The Government have denied that the primary consideration in getting
rid of some of the quangos is cost-cutting. What is your view
about that?
Charles Cochrane:
The feedback we are getting from our members in some of those
bodies that have already been announced as closing—the Audit
Commission is one; Becta is another; the Commission for Rural
Communities is another—where it is already clear there is
going to be significant cost in relation to redundancies, is that
there are ongoing costs in many cases and it is very difficult,
certainly for the people working there, to see where savings are
going to come anywhere in the short term, particularly when it
also appears that some of the work is going to carry on in other
places. So, picking up a point a number of colleagues made, in
all this process there really seems to be a lack of transparency
as to what the real reasons for closure were and what the costings
are going to be. I have to say, the perception of our people
is that in some cases, these are very arbitrary decisions that
have been taken.
Q170 Robert Halfon:
Mr Baume, you smiled when I asked that question.
Jonathan Baume:
Well no, because I agree. I think it is very hard to define clearly
what the cost savings are. In a sense, England—and many
of these are English bodies—is somewhat behind the loop
here, because both the Scottish Government and the Welsh Assembly
Government went through a similar process; certainly, in Wales,
I think it was about three years ago, and quite a number of arm's
length bodies were brought back into the Welsh Assembly Government
structure. That is fine, although you get people issues and anomalies
if people were brought in on higher pay, and all those second-tier
issues that departments have to struggle with. I think it might
have made a simpler structure and at times it might be easier
for the public to understand, but I have never seen an analysis,
if one was done, of what the savings were in either Scotland or
Wales; that would be an exercise on a smaller scale but with a
similar objective.
Q171 Robert Halfon:
And have you made any estimates of the number of jobs that you
estimate to be lost under this?
Geoff Lewtas: We
think, in terms of our own membership in PCS, there are probably
something like 30,000 across what is actually a whole range of
large and small bodies of this type. Of course, not all of them
are being abolished or closed, but quite a number are. So our
estimate is running probably into the thousands of potential or
actual redundancies. This is happening at a time when, of course,
the Spending Review announcement last month tells us that civil
service main departments and agencies are also facing large staffing
reductions in the course of the next few years.
Chair: Hang on just a
minute. Can we deal with redundancies later, because it comes
later in our questions? We need to deal with the Bill.
Q172 Charlie Elphicke:
Yes. On clause 8 of the Bill, there are two other tests that
have been proposed: achieving increased efficiency and effectiveness,
and securing the appropriate accountability. Are these the right
measures for taking a decision on the fate of quangos?
Geoff Lewtas: I
certainly think there are some issues that cause us concern about
the question of the minister having due regard, as the Bill suggests
in clause 8, to efficiency and effectiveness. I will take one
example; it is one I have touched on already—the closure
of the Regional Development Agencies. A problem that looms very
large and soon is the fact that European development money, which
is channelled through the Regional Development Agencies at the
moment, will presumably in future be handled through the local
enterprise bodies that are envisaged. But they are not set up;
they have to be set up, they are going to have to get accreditation
and it is likely to take some time before they are recognised
by the European Union as an acceptable organisation to deal with.
There is a serious risk of hundreds of millions of euros in development
money being held back and possibly not being made available in
the eventual situation that we are currently facing. That seems
to me to be a pretty dire consequence, and it is a very serious
risk that does not seem to have been taken into account. There
will be, if things do not improve, a really hard consequence financially
as a result of these changes.
Chair: Okay. Unfortunately,
we are very short of time, and we are going to have to have shorter
answers. I am very grateful for the full answers you have been
giving us, but we are going to have to speed up to get through
all the material that we have. Your final question?
Q173 Robert Halfon:
Yes. You proposed an independent analysis of the net economic
costs and other costs of abolition itself. Would this be in addition
to the efficiency, effectiveness and economy tests proposed by
the Government in the Bill, or instead of them?
Dai Hudd: Well,
in our submission, one of the areas we quote as being a problem
for simply applying these criteria is the Forestry Commission.
We find it very difficult to see how issues such as efficiency
and effectiveness—which usually are code for costs and being
able to cost things, but not necessarily the value—apply
to areas like wildlife conservation and water management. Those
are critical issues that the Forestry Commission has responsibility
for right across a wide geographic and national area. How is
that to be maintained if the Forestry Commission were to be broken
up or in some way taken away from where it currently is? How
would you use those measures to say overall whether that was a
good decision or not?
Q174 Robert Halfon:
And should accountability be part of this analysis or not?
Jonathan Baume:
Yes, absolutely. A key issue has to be accountability. Accountability
to whom is always an issue. I think there will be certain issues
around which in the end, regardless of any legal status, the minister
responsible will be held accountable and responsible, both by
the public and by the media. That cannot be dissociated from
where a function rests, and therefore that is an entirely appropriate
test to have, as well as the accountability to any wider group
to whom that body provides some kind of service. Sometimes that
will be the general public; sometimes that might be a very specialist
community. But I think part of the whole debate about arm's length
bodies has always been about accountability.
Chair: Very briefly.
Q175 Robert Halfon:
My very final question: some people have described the cull of
the quangos as more of a barbecue on a damp Sunday afternoon than
a bonfire. What is your view?
Charles Cochrane:
Certainly, if does not look like a damp squib to those who work
in one of these organisations, including some of those that may
be continuing but will be very worried. There are very real issues,
both about people's employment and about the services they provide.
So I think from our perspective and the perspective of users,
these are seen as very important issues indeed and certainly not
a damp squib. Perhaps I would prefer it if it was a damp squib.
Chair: I think we take
the impact this has on people's lives very, very seriously. Mr
de Bois.
Q176 Nick de Bois:
Yes, thank you Chairman. My questions focus entirely on that.
We did start to touch on it, but could you very briefly tell
me whether each of you has made a formal assessment of how many
jobs may be lost?
Jonathan Baume:
I haven't, but it is very, very difficult to get to grips with
that, because some of the functions will be transferring into
departments. People will follow them, but I think most people
do not yet have clarity. In the regional bodies, for example,
people have, if you want, a parent government department. They
return to that department, and in a sense then become part of
a wider pool in a department. The department itself may be losing
jobs, but they won't know as individuals whether they are the
people who will actually go. So this is quite a complex process.
Q177 Nick de Bois:
Is that true of all of you?
Dai Hudd: My organisation,
which tends to represent the more specialist grades within the
Civil Service, estimate that as a consequence of what is planned
for the quangos—as you describe them; we would prefer to
call them arm's length bodies and NDPBs—the figure is between
3,000 and 4,000.
Charles Cochrane:
To give you a specific example, if you take the Commission for
Rural Communities, which I think is one that has already been
announced for closure, it looks like about 80% to 90% of the staff
will be redundant. A small group will probably transfer in some
shape or form back into Defra, and that seems to be a similar
pattern in Becta. The overwhelming majority of staff face redundancy;
a small group are likely to transfer back into the main department.
Q178 Nick de Bois:
Mr Baume, I take your point about the greyness of it, because
we are talking more about introducing transparency and accountability,
and are therefore shifting to some departments, et cetera. I understand
why that is difficult. That effectively sounds like slightly
more moderate language than was initially being used, when the
phrase "bonfire of quangos" was being used. Would you
say that it is a fair statement that now that we are looking closer—indeed,
I accept that we need more clarity—perhaps some of those
earlier statements were a little alarmist?
Dai Hudd: Can I
answer that in a slightly different way? I think it is very regrettable
that some very senior ministers decided to use some of the language
they did in relation to organisations where people do valuable
work and feel they are valuable public servants. For example,
on the Government Offices, this is a quote from Bob Neill at the
time: "It seems quite literally that the Government Offices
for the Regions were taking the taxpayer for a ride. They were
living it up at the taxpayers' expense while thousands of households
were struggling to make ends meet." With the greatest will
in the world, for many ordinary civil servants in the regions
doing valuable work—go around the North West, for example,
in particular, which I know quite well, where the Regional Development
Agency have done a superb job in supporting the local economy—officials
and ministers speaking in that way is highly offensive and I think
unfortunately the language of this debate was very coloured by
some of those unfortunate very early statements.
Q179 Mr Walker: You
did say senior ministers, though. With the best will in the world,
Bob Neill is not a senior minister. Can you give some examples
of senior ministers?
Dai Hudd: Well,
we can come back with even more quotes. I have only used that
one as an example; I have written to Bob Neill specifically on
that issue.
Q180 Chair:
I know Eric Pickles referred to "form fillers and bean counters".
Is that the sort of language you are talking about?
Dai Hudd:
It is, very much so.
Chair: Moving on.
Q181 Nick de Bois:
Yes, I will move it on. I think the point I am getting to is this:
do you think, now, that we are past that stage where, I suggest,
emotive language might have been used on both sides, and that
we are getting to a more rational look at what may be happening
in terms of future job losses? As you say, Mr Cochrane, we really
are talking about people's lives here, so do you think you are
heading towards that, and that you are getting more clarity?
Geoff Lewtas: Can
I try to answer that very briefly? I think that what we have
seen with the announcements about what is happening to a whole
range of different bodies is that there are a variety of solutions.
Quite a lot are a case of moving the work into a government department
and there are consequences about costs in relation to that that
are difficult to judge. But there are still, I would say, some
really stark examples of bodies that are being closed down, effectively,
with no real decisions yet as to how any of those functions are
going to continue to be done in some other way, if at all. All
of that is extremely unsatisfactory because of the lack of what
I would regard as proper consultation and thinking through of
consequences and impact.
Q182 Nick de Bois:
One more area: have you been able to explore the impact outside
of London and the South East on possible job losses? We have
talked about areas where civil servants are working outside London
and the South East; that is quite important. Have you been able
to make any assessment in your opinion of what that might be like?
Charles Cochrane:
Yes, certainly. The obvious one, of course, is the RDAs, which
are based throughout England in the regions, but there are a number
of others. Becta and—let me get the acronym right—QCDA—I
think I have that in the right order—are both based in the
Coventry area, so there is a significant impact there.
Jonathan Baume:
The General Teaching Council is there as well.
Charles Cochrane:
The General Teaching Council is there.
Q183 Nick de Bois:
Would you make an assessment where you are looking at the split
perhaps more accurately? Is that something you will do—or
can, should I say, do at this stage?
Charles Cochrane:
It is difficult to do it at this stage, but of course many of
the organisations—if I could use the Audit Commission as
an example—have their headquarters in London, of course,
but their staff are based throughout the country. The Forestry
Commission, which someone has mentioned, again has its headquarters
in Edinburgh and is based around the country. Just as an aside,
it is also worth saying that of course a number of the organisations
we have mentioned today are not by any definition, even if I liked
the word, quangos, because they are actually part of the Civil
Service. The Government Office network is part of the Civil Service—
Jonathan Baume:
The Land Registry is civil service.
Charles Cochrane:
The Land Registry is civil service; the Forestry Commission, whilst
it's one of those interesting organisations, is, again, a part
of the Civil Service. So the questions about accountability are
very strange in that context, because they have exactly the same
accountability as any other department of state.
Chair: I think we will
come back to that. Mr Flynn.
Q184 Paul Flynn:
I think we all see this as a piece of the crowd-pleasing, headline-grabbing
moves that new governments do, particularly the Tea Party wing
of the present Government, or the Daily Mailinfluenced
wing. They know that civil servants are not popular—they
have done so much to denigrate them over the years—and quangos
are not popular, and the idea is that we get rid of them and we
achieve paradise on earth. Can you see elements of political
spite or malice in this? I am thinking of the Agricultural Wages
Board that is to be abolished, which protects the very low wages
of agricultural workers who are very poorly organised. At the
same time, landowners and big farmers are having their income
not only maintained at £3 billion a year in public hand-outs,
but actually increased by about 3%. Do you think there is a political
agenda there?
Charles Cochrane:
Yes, there is always a particular agenda. Political agendas are
not necessarily bad things, of course, and I think all of us would
accept that any government has the right when it comes in to make
changes. I think the point we are trying to make is that there
should be a rational, transparent process to do it, and in making
those decisions there needs to be an understanding of what the
impact will be both upon the staff who work there and upon the
services that are provided. On the Agricultural Wages Board,
I am conscious that there are a whole series of wages boards that
were established many years ago that were largely abolished by
the previous Conservative Government, but there was a specific
case made for retaining the Agricultural Wages Board, for reasons
that most people understood at the time, and it seems odd that
that has now been overturned. I am not an expert on the agricultural
industry.
Chair: Well, it was before
the national minimum wage, which is now part of the landscape.
Q185 Paul Flynn:
Well, that does not seem much, if all they can rely on is a national
minimum wage. These are skilled workers. Let me take another
example. If any advisory group well deserves to be abolished,
it is the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs. The previous
Government sacked the Chairman because he was caught in possession
of an intelligent idea, and he has gone off and formed his own
committee of independent people who are advising on drugs and
not acting as poodles for the Government. Do you think the reason
they have clung on to this discredited group, and possibly got
rid of the Audit Commission, is that they saw the Audit Commission
as being a thorn in their side and the Advisory Council on the
Misuse of Drugs as being an obedient lapdog?
Geoff Lewtas: I
think you really ought to put that question to ministers, frankly.
Paul Flynn: I think we
should.
Geoff Lewtas:
But I understand the point that you are making, and one of our
big concerns is about the fact that in changing the nature of
a lot of these bodies, in some cases—which I will not go
into now—you see in them a future failure for ministers
to get the kind of independent, impartial advice on a range of
matters that ministers ought to be getting. Even if it is controversial,
even if it is difficult to hear and deal with, they should still
be getting that advice, or there should still be that service
provided by bodies that are independent and impartial and have,
as Dai says, the necessary scientific, technical engineering knowledge
to be applied.
Q186 Paul Flynn:
To give a real example of the damage done by taking jobs out of
areas of high unemployment, say 250 jobs were going; it is a serious
threat. It will save £2 million to the Government; it will
cost £3.5 million in redundancy; it will probably cost
another £3 million, which would be continuing, in welfare
payments, dole and so on, for the foreseeable future because people
are not likely to be reemployed in areas of high unemployment.
Do you think that this process is being carried out with a disregard
for what has been accepted by all governments of the past 50 years—that
it is desirable to take jobs out of the South East of England
and relocate them in areas of high unemployment? Has that been
taken into account, do you think, when the quangos are being destroyed?
Geoff Lewtas: I
would be astonished if that sort of wider balance sheet has been
considered, and if there has been a longer-term look at the financial
consequences. We have seen nothing of that as far as we are concerned.
Q187 Chair: So in
terms of the cost-benefit analysis, you do not think there is
any process by which, in submitting these plans to a department,
the department has to assess the oncost to the benefit system
and the likelihood of those people being re-employed?
Dai Hudd: Well,
the Audit Commission example—and we give you figures in
our submission—would tend to suggest that has not happened,
because the claimed savings from the Audit Commission closure
by Eric Pickles were £50 million. The consequence of
making people redundant and the retirement costs are probably
going to exceed £200 million. That being said, we are
not putting forward to you a proposition that arm's length bodies
are in some way ways of keeping people employed, regardless of
what they do. We are not saying that. What we are saying is that
the first principle is issues of accountability, that should be
addressed, of course. But when it is put forward as an argument
that there are cost savings where there are not, that should be
exposed and the accountability of ministers for their decisions
should be explored.
Q188 Chair: But that
is an argument about cost savings, rather than the review of NDPBs,
because the minister himself says that this is not a cost saving
measure; it is about accountability.
Charles Cochrane:
If we were to be cynical, and of course we never are, the minister
seems to have been saying that more in the last few days than
at the start of this debate. When the early announcements were
made initially—not by the same minister, but in education,
shortly after the Government was formed—there was no evidence
that the decision to shut down Becta, which I keep returning to,
was anything to do with accountability. It just seemed to us
to be a snap decision based on no evidence whatsoever.
Q189 Mr Walker: What
is Becta?
Chair: For the record,
tell us what Becta is.
Charles Cochrane:
I thought someone was going to ask me that question and I am going
to struggle.
Geoff Lewtas:
British Educational Communications and Technology Agency. It
handles, largely, the provision of IT for schools. That is one
of its biggest functions. Just by way of a comment, we looked
with interest at the report that had been commissioned from Sir Philip Green,
and a lot of what he said in his report was about the need for
central procurement for the whole range of government services.
Here we have a decision with regard to Becta where you are just
taking away that central support function, in terms of procuring
IT for schools. Heaven knows, there are going to be 1,000 different
contracts now, each school determining what it wants—what
software, what equipment, et cetera. How much resource will that
take up, in terms of educational costings?
Chair: Well, we are going
to look at IT and government; it is a different story.
Geoff Lewtas: But
it is a question we cannot answer.
Chair: There may be a
different story. Mr Flynn, you were finished?
Q190 Paul Flynn:
Just on the triennial review, do you think this is an adequate
mechanism? I think we would all agree that there should be changes
and savings where they can be made. Mr Cochrane, you have forecast
pretty serious consequences of this action. Have you done a proper,
rigorous analysis of how things will turn out in education and
so on as a result of the disappearance of some of these bodies?
Charles Cochrane:
I think it would probably be fair to say it is work in progress.
It is obviously an area where we need to talk to our colleagues
in the education unions and so forth to determine the impact,
but certainly the preliminary analysis seems to suggest that there
must be a risk that in years to come, someone is going to come
along and say, "We really need to set up a new body to look
at x and y," and that has happened before. Going
back to Philip Green suggesting there ought to be coordination
of government purchasing, some of us are old enough to remember
that there used to be a body called the Crown Suppliers that did
just that, which was abolished, and now we seem to be advocating
setting it up again. But these things always go round in circles.
Chair: With respect, we
are not discussing procurement, though I accept that was a procurement
agency you were talking about. Moving on, Mr Roy.
Q191 Lindsay Roy:
Good morning, gentlemen. Transitions, euphemistically, are times
of challenge. What discussions have you had with departments
about the transition period and how it will be managed? Have
you had any discussions at all? Are there any plans to do so?
Charles Cochrane:
Just to pick one example, if I may, the windup of the RDAs
is particularly complicated because there are a very large number
of them and we are pressing BIS to try to have some coordinated
discussions with them about some of the consequences flowing from
it, because to try to have 11 different discussions about the
same issues with all different RDAs taking slightly different
discussions about their windup periods does not strike us
as a sensible way of proceeding at all. So very clearly, while
none of us wants to be in this situation, where the department
has got engaged in the process of wind-up and is participating
in the discussions—and there are examples of that—it
certainly helps the process. It is not something that departments
can or should walk away from; they have a responsibility to be
active participants in the process.
Q192 Chair: So when
you say departments, who actually is responsible for the transition?
Charles Cochrane:
I think it would depend on which department it was.
Q193 Chair: Take
RDAs, for example. Is there somebody in the department who is
responsible for the transition?
Charles Cochrane:
Yes.
Q194 Chair: There
is? So there is a mechanism?
Charles Cochrane:
Yes. It is sometimes not as clear in some areas as others, but
yes, there will always be someone at a policy level.
Q195 Chair: That
would seem to be good practice, wouldn't it?
Charles Cochrane:
Yes.
Dai Hudd: Particularly
where they are geographically dispersed.
Charles Cochrane:
Yes.
Q196 Lindsay Roy:
Are there areas where there is a complete vacuum at the moment?
Dai Hudd: I think
we could probably provide you with a list.
Chair: Well, if you could
alert us to any case where you feel the transition is not being
properly managed, that would be very helpful.
Dai Hudd: Yes,
okay.
Chair: Mr Roy, any more?
Q197 Lindsay Roy:
Yes. One of the key findings in the report, "Read Before
Burning", states that "Good performance management is
essential for effective arm's length government, yet Whitehall's
capability in this area is particularly weak." Do you agree
with that assertion? Have you any evidence to support that claim?
Jonathan Baume:
The performance management of the organisation?
Lindsay Roy: Performance
management within Whitehall.
Jonathan Baume:
Are we talking about the performance management of staff or the
performance management by the sponsor department of the quango?
Lindsay Roy: Performance
management of staff. If it is weak, what can be done to enhance
it?
Charles Cochrane:
I do not think necessarily it is weak. The Civil Service and
NDPBs all have staff performance appraisal systems, as do all
big organisations. We have all at times, as unions, been critical
of the detail of some of those systems, but I think we all sign
up to the fact that performance appraisal is something that should
exist. I do sometimes think the time and effort that goes into
it does not necessarily match the outputs that come out of it,
but that is a separate topic.
Jonathan Baume:
I do not think there is something that is systemic to the Civil
Service that is not there in most large organisations in the public
or the private sector. I talk to people in the private sector
and they will say, "Actually, we are not that good at performance
management". I think it is one of those issues that threads
right the way through people management across the whole economy,
and it is something that some people are good at and some people
are not good at, and organisations are constantly testing, trialling
and amending their systems to do it. But I think it is just one
of those very, very difficult issues about managing people; how
do you do it in a way that gives good performance appraisal, gives
good feedback and gives people a chance to understand where they
might be going wrong and improve performance? There is bookshelf
after bookshelf full of tomes about how to do this, and I do not
think the Civil Service is any worse or any better than others;
it is just an issue that is constant for larger organisations.
Dai Hudd: I think
also it would be wrong to put all arm's length bodies into the
same category as the Civil Service. Some of the reasons why they
are arm's length is because they are much closer to the user groups
and therefore, if you like, a critical analysis of what they do
is more readily identified. Many of them have very rigorous financial
regimes, which the core Civil Service doesn't have in the same
way. Many have business planning processes, some of them independent
boards, often appointed by the minister to oversee their work.
So I would argue that for some NDPBs, there is a greater degree
of scrutiny of performance and operational performance than you
may see in the mainstream Civil Service, but it is very much a
mixed bag.
Chair: I think we are
moving off the subject of transition.
Q198 Lindsay Roy:
Yes. But it is not a blanket approach, in essence?
Jonathan Baume:
No.
Lindsay Roy: Thanks.
Q199 Chair: Moving
on? Actually, before we leave the question of transition, do
you think people tend to underestimate the legal complexity of
moving around the deckchairs?
Jonathan Baume:
Sometimes, without a doubt.
Dai Hudd: Absolutely.
If I can use a specific one—I have used it about four times
already—in the case of the Civil Service Appeal Board, there
are potentially quite significant legal issues arising from that,
because the right of appeal to the board may well be a contractual
entitlement contained in civil service staff handbooks.
Q200 Chair: And there
is the cost, even if people are not made redundant, of including
people into different terms and conditions of employment and different
career structures.
Jonathan Baume:
Yes, that was very much the experience in Wales in particular.
Dai Hudd:
Yes, it was.
Q201 Chair: So do
you think the savings that this review promises are actually going
to be delivered?
Charles Cochrane:
I doubt it.
Geoff Lewtas:
I think in a lot of cases the answer will be no. There could
be additional costs in a range of cases.
Charles Cochrane:
Unforeseen costs, yes.
Q202 Chair: Okay.
Moving on, we are going back to the subject of accountability.
Do you think there is a difference in the quality of accountability
that a minister experiences for what goes on in his own department
and for what happens in an arm's length body? Is there a different
degree of accountability? There seems to be a very strong argument;
the Minster is saying that if you include something in a government
department, by definition it's more accountable. Do we accept
that?
Jonathan Baume:
I would personally accept that as a matter of principle, but that
is about the whole structure of Parliamentary accountability,
isn't it? It is this wider issue. If an issue arises in a department,
there are very clear lines through the Permanent Secretary as
accounting officer, through the minister answering on the Floor
of the House and through Select Committees. With the best will
in the world, that is not going to be there in the same way with
an arm's length body, even though the chief executive or the chairman
of an arm's length body might be summoned before a Select Committee.
But the mechanism works differently, and I think one of the problems
of the arm's length body structure has been the extent to which
it is publicly accountable for performance, for delivery, et cetera.
So I think there is a rational argument there, and if there are
weaknesses in ministerial accountability, that is a whole other
debate that I know this Committee has, in the past, at times turned
its attention to.
Q203 Chair: But from
the perspective of opposition, I personally have sometimes felt
that the Government is fielding the chairman or chief executive
of an NDPB to take some political flak for what is essentially
a political choice of the Government's.
Jonathan Baume:
Which was the point I was making earlier, that there are times
when actually, if the minister is the person in the end who is
going to be held accountable and should be held accountable, then
the function should be clearly integrated within the department,
so that in a sense, the minister can take the responsibility one
way or the other if things go wrong: it is the part of the department
and it is the responsibility of the minister in the end to be
accountable for that. You cannot offshore the blame to an arm's
length body, but at the same time, if the arm's length body fails
spectacularly, as occasionally happens, and the minister is in
the end going to be held to account for that, why should that
function not actually be directly accountable through the minister?
Dai Hudd: I think
it depends as well on what the issue is. Can I give you two examples
where socalled arm's lengths bodies can be catapulted right
to the centre of the political stage? The first is the Environment
Agency in the flooding in Cumbria that happened just over 12 months
ago. They were very much in the spotlight, in terms of the rapid
response and what had happened previously to it. So there is
an example of an arm's length body really becoming central to
the political process. The second one is Defra and animal health.
In the foot and mouth outbreak, Debby Reynolds, who was then
Government Chief Vet, pretty much was the person put forward by
the Government to respond to questions from the public. It was
interesting in the polling there, because Debby Reynolds gave
a greater degree of confidence to the public than did the minister
at the time. Those are two instances where arm's length bodies
can appear arm's length, but in reality, when something happens
out there, they rapidly become central.
Q204 Chair: But scientists
generally are much more trusted than politicians, aren't they?
Charles Cochrane:
It would not be for us to comment on that.
Dai Hudd: You could
have a whole range of a debate on that. I would naturally agree
with you, given the background of my union.
Q205 Chair: I don't
think one can draw any particular conclusions from that. But
do you think Select Committees hold NDPBs accountable effectively?
Charles Cochrane:
I don't think it is done in a terribly structured way. My sense
is—and I think you will be more of an expert on this than
perhaps I am—that while there are ad hoc occasions when
NDPBs are invited to come and give evidence on a specific thing,
it doesn't seem to be done in a systematic way as a process of
holding them to account.
Q206 Chair: Well,
when I was on the Defence Committee, we were under an injunction
to do one or two agencies per year. Did we really want to do
the Army Base Repair Organisation? Why should Select Committees
be bogged down in scrutinising public bodies when they feel they
have more important things to do?
Charles Cochrane:
Of course—Dai will know this better than I—the Army
Base Repair Organisation is actually part of the Civil Service
and therefore is accountable through the minister.
Q207 Chair: So it
is not an NDPB.
Charles Cochrane:
It is not an NDPB. But if one were to take the Learning and Skills
Council as an example—it is safe to take it, because it
does not exist anymore—something that was dispersing £10 billion-worth
of government money each year, it would seem to make some sense
that it should be reporting and held to account on a fairly regular
basis because of the scale of money. It is not an argument about
whether they should be an NDPB or not; it is simply saying, "If
you are spending that amount of money on education, then somebody
ought to be holding you to account," and Select Committees
seem a good way of doing it.
Q208 Chair: Could
be done better.
Charles Cochrane:
Yes.
Chair: We need more staff.
Mr Flynn.
Q209 Paul Flynn:
What is your understanding of the reason behind the decision to
reconstitute some of the advisory committees as internal departmental
committees of experts, while others retain their status? We're
seeing a collapse in the Government's confidence in this Bill
and they seem to be using accountability to sugar the pill. But
do you think the idea of reorganising them is going to produce
a real improvement?
Geoff Lewtas: I
think that the issue here probably relates to questions about
impartiality, technical competence and the degree of independence
about that technical advice or other sorts of specialist advice
that ministers need. These are judgments which, going back to
one of the things we were saying before, have not been brought
out into the open and allowed for some sort of public consultation
about how—we are talking about a whole range of different
types of issues here—each of the different areas of advice
or concern should be properly handled. I can see that there will
be cases where it's judged that it does need to be taken out of
the department and handled in a more independent framework situation,
as opposed to others where moving it into the department as an
advisory group is something that could be more comfortable. But
we need to have a debate.
Q210 Chair: It is
about objectivity and impartiality, rather than technical expertise?
Geoff Lewtas: It
is, looking at the painting behind you, horses for courses.
Paul Flynn: It's beyond
embarrassment, that painting. We will have it taken down, I think.
Dai Hudd: I think
part of the problem is that, by definition, if you bring together
experts in particular topics of scientific or technical expertise,
they all tend to be independent characters, although most of their
work will have been peer-group reviewed anyway, so there is an
accountability route in that sense. If such expert groups were
made accountable to the minister, you would take away their raison
d'être, because in reality, they are accountable to their
expertise and advice, and they should only be accountable to that;
otherwise you dilute the evidence and the information given not
just to the minister, I would argue, but frankly to the public
at large, on which ministers then base their judgments, as they
rightly can, but that has to be done on the basis of sound expertise.
Q211 Paul Flynn:
But you gave a striking example, supported by the Chairman, who
said that the public trust a scientist more than they trust politicians.
They trust almost everyone more than they trust politicians, but
we are taking into the political arena a huge area of work for
which the public have to have impartial, objective knowledge.
That is going to be tainted because it won't be coming from an
independent person in a white coat; it will be coming from a politician
whose reputation might well be tainted. Is that a step backwards?
Jonathan Baume:
But surely the challenge is for politicians to restore trust.
Paul Flynn: Indeed.
Jonathan Baume:
Actually, what we seem to be going through—and this is a
much wider issue—is a process by which Parliament, through
one step or the other, is handing away authority, whether to judges,
scientists or whoever, and who holds them to account? In the
end, if we live in a democratic society, politicians have to earn
and have the trust of the public through the way that they work
individually in the system of the House and elsewhere. But the
fact that there are trust issues is not an excuse for saying,
"Okay, we will give up and just hand it over to somebody
else". I think there is a time when you do put up the Chief
Vet or the Chief Medical Officer because they are experts in a
way that no politician could possibly claim to be, but in the
end, the advice that they offer has to be taken forward through
policy and government and that is what the politicians are there
to do. So I think handing away the powers from Parliament and
ministers is not the solution.
Q212 Paul Flynn:
Would we be losing, do you think, the expertise of people who
give their services usually on a voluntary basis because they
want to contribute for the public good? Do you think there is
any way this can be improved to make it a positive move, rather
than there being the damage that looks likely to happen with the
advisory bodies?
Dai Hudd: I think
one of the things that would not just be very helpful but actually
bring clarity to it is a proper definition, accepted by Parliament,
as to what expert advisory committees do. I think that would be
enormously helpful and beneficial to our whole democratic process.
There is a role for independent scientific and technical advice,
and I think that should be enshrined in some form of statutory
protection.
Chair: That is a good
challenge to the Committee and your advice on that will be particularly
welcome. Briefly, before we close this session, Mr Halfon.
Q213 Robert Halfon:
I just have three quick questions. Do you think that quangos
should be allowed to employ lobbyists to lobby government?
Chair: Yes or no.
Jonathan Baume:
Personally, no.
Dai Hudd: No.
Charles Cochrane:
No.
Robert Halfon: No, okay.
Q214 Chair: Mr Lewtas,
you were silent on that question. You agree?
Geoff Lewtas: I
agree with my colleagues, yes.
Chair: Thank you.
Q215 Robert Halfon:
You talked about the Regional Development Agencies, but would
you not agree that some of the pay of senior quangocrats, if you
don't mind me using that word, has spiralled out of control?
To take the East of England Development Agency, the Chief Executive
earns more than the Prime Minister. Do you think that is justified?
Charles Cochrane:
I think there is a link between what you just asked and the point
that you were making earlier about the Cabinet Office Business
Plan and the work that had been signed off. I have a recollection
that there was a piece of work that was commissioned by government
looking at the pay of very senior staff in some NDPBs. I think
what we would say is that the pay of the people who are our members
in NDPBs is by no means excessive and follows very much the same
pattern as what people get in the Civil Service.
Jonathan Baume:
We represent some of the people in these bodies. There is the
work done by the Senior Salaries Review Body earlier in the year
on executive pay and there is Will Hutton's work going on at the
moment, to which we have all given evidence, on pay in the round
and differentials. I think there is a challenge to restore public
confidence in how salary levels are set, and hopefully the Government
and this Committee will be looking at the outcomes of that kind
of deliberation to help ensure that we have fair structures that
people understand. It doesn't mean that somebody should not be
paid more than the Prime Minister, who also, of course, receives
an MP's salary as well, but people should have confidence that
there is transparency, et cetera. So I think there is an ongoing
process there of perhaps restoring trust in some cases about how
executive pay is set.
Chair: Final question.
Q216 Robert Halfon:
My final question is: despite your differences with the Government
on how they have done the cull of the quangos, do you accept that
there needed to be some rationalisation of quangos and that some
of them were not fit for purpose? Do you have any quangos in
mind that you feel you do not need any more?
Charles Cochrane:
No.
Jonathan Baume:
I said earlier that I thought the exercise was a worthwhile one
and was overdue, and I think the idea of the triennial review
is a good one.
Q217 Robert Halfon:
Sorry, can I just stop you? Are you saying there is not one quango
that you think should have been culled?
Chair: NDPBs.
Robert Halfon: Or NDPBs,
quangos and so on.
Charles Cochrane:
I would be hard pressed to go through a list of executive NDPBs—I
draw a distinction there with advisory NDPBs, of which there are
far, far more, and I would not claim to know the full landscape
there—and think of an example where the role of an executive
NDPB is unnecessary. I think that is borne out by some of the
present experience, where in many cases we are having to look
to find someone else to do the work that has already been done
by them.
Q218 Robert Halfon:
Is that the view of the rest of you?
Chair: Very briefly, please.
Dai Hudd: There
are several NDPBs, I think—and I include the Audit Commission
in that one—that should be reformed. I agree with Charlie;
I cannot think of one, other than one that advises you on how
you buy your wines for the House of Commons, that could actually
be abolished. But the argument about reform in some areas is
quite powerful.
Jonathan Baume:
I think the focus needs to be on function, not on the organisation.
Geoff Lewtas: I
am quite sure, in looking at what is a very varied range of bodies
here, that there are inevitably going to be questions raised about
whether they need to be reformed, changed or merged, in some cases.
There may be reasons for that. However, what we have found is
that the whole process of putting this together has been extremely
unsatisfactory in terms of the consultation and the implications.
Chair: Right, we've got
that. I am sorry to cut you off, but thank you very much indeed,
gentlemen; you have been very helpful witnesses. We will take
a very brief adjournment before we bring in our new guests.
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