



House of Commons
Public Administration Select
Committee

Who does UK National Strategy? Further Report

with the Government
Response to the
Committee's First Report of
Session 2010–11

Sixth Report of Session 2010–11

*Report and appendices, together with formal
minutes*

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The Public Administration Select Committee

The Public Administration Select Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the reports of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and the Health Service Commissioner for England, which are laid before this House, and matters in connection therewith, and to consider matters relating to the quality and standards of administration provided by civil service departments, and other matters relating to the civil service.

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Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only.

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Clive Porro (Clerk), Ben Williams (Second Clerk), Alexandra Crampton (Committee Specialist), Paul Simpkin (Senior Committee Assistant) and Su Panchanathan (Committee Assistant).

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Contents

Report	<i>Page</i>
Who does UK National Strategy? Further Report	3
Appendix 1—Letter from the Foreign Secretary	6
Appendix 2—Letter to the Prime Minister	7
Appendix 3—Government Response	9
Formal Minutes	16
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament	17

Who does UK National Strategy? Further Report

1. We reported to the House on “Who does UK National Strategy?” in our First Report of Session 2010-11, published on 18 October 2010 as HC 435.
2. The Foreign Secretary wrote to the Committee on 14 November 2010 about the Report. It was evident from the terms of that letter that our proposals were not finding favour in Whitehall. The letter is published as Appendix 1.
3. We were concerned that the Government’s response would seek primarily to justify the *status quo*. We therefore agreed that the Chair should write to the Prime Minister encouraging him to pause and reflect on the implications of our findings and the importance of our recommendations, before finalising the response. This letter is published as Appendix 2.
4. The Government response was received on 21 December 2010 and is published at Appendix 3. We are disappointed that, despite our urging to the contrary, the response has failed to engage more fully with our findings or to address adequately our proposals for improvement.
5. The central contention of our Report is that Government has lost the capacity to think strategically. The burden of expert evidence we received was that short termism and reaction to events predominate in recent Whitehall practice. The ability to articulate our enduring interests, values and identity has atrophied. Strategy is too often thought of as a plan for action or a document rather than a process which needs to be articulated constantly and updated regularly. We argued that the Government needs to reclaim the art of creating “national strategy” which should encompass all areas of Government activity and not focus just on national security. Our Report advocated an overarching and ongoing strategy-making process.
6. The Government’s response suggests that there are fundamental confusions about terms, no agreed definitions and hence at present none of the prerequisites for constructive engagement with the analysis in our Report. It is entirely prescriptive. In its response, the Government asserts that its overall strategy is set out primarily in the document “*The Coalition: our programme for government*”.¹ Allied economic, defence and national security strategies are contained in the Budget, the Spending Review, the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and in the National Security Strategy (NSS) (which is also more ‘review’ or ‘plan’ than ‘strategy’). Departmental business plans, in turn, determine priorities for the whole of Government. However, important as the terms of the Coalition Agreement and the other statements of policy may be, they are by no means a statement of Britain’s enduring national strategic interests: nor could be expected to be such. The Government’s response confuses interests with tactics. It is an illustration of why so many of our witnesses came to the conclusions they did.

¹ Cabinet Office, *The Coalition: our programme for government*, May 2010

7. The Government insists that it is right to confine strategy to the narrow context of national security, and there to frame it in terms of the NSS. In our view the response fails to acknowledge the significant and serious concerns expressed to us by the former Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), retired senior military officers and other observers, that the UK has “*lost the institutional capacity for, and culture of, strategic thought*”.² What is also missing is recognition that strategic aims cannot be set or adjudicated without an articulated account of who ‘we’ are and what we believe, both about ourselves and the world. Many of our witnesses were concerned that there were hidden assumptions underpinning present policies. These need to be exposed so that they may be tested and, if necessary, altered.

8. Our main recommendation is to create a “*community of strategists*” from across Whitehall - and beyond - to provide the necessary capacity for analysis and assessment to support a National Security Council (NSC) with a widened remit encompassing National (or ‘Grand’) Strategy. Such assessment would include a standing requirement to judge how well the various methods of analysis and different issues from across Whitehall are brought together. We remain concerned that without this capacity the NSC can only broker compromises between departmental views based on incompatible principles, and that the failure to establish a common language and idiom of thinking about strategy is bound to leave different parts of Whitehall at cross purposes, as is widely believed to be evident in the outcome of the SDSR.

9. The Government says it shares our views on the importance of strategic analysis to underpin policy making, but the response rejects a systematic approach in favour of the current system of cabinet committees. However, they are primarily decision-making bodies and lack the supporting capacity for assessment and analysis. The NSC is not “*a powerful centre of strategic assessment*” as the response claims because it lacks virtually any staff to undertake such work.

10. The response does accept our argument for stronger collaborative working in Whitehall and agrees to review ways of ensuring better linkage, clearer commissioning and stronger impact of the various existing strategy making networks with the aim of fostering the culture of strategic thinking across government which we believe to be necessary.

11. We welcome this and the Government’s intention to report to the Committee on the outcome of this review in six months time. However, the review will focus only on national security and not national strategy. We are encouraged by the fact that the new CDS will maintain his predecessor’s initiatives on strategy capability and that the Defence Reform Review is considering how to develop these further. However, the response is largely silent on our central recommendation about the need to recruit, train and promote strategic thinkers and to renovate the methodologies currently used.

12. Getting National Strategy wrong has real and sometimes dire consequences. At the time of the Helmand incursion in 2006 only two British soldiers had been killed in battle in Afghanistan. The total is now 349 – almost all as a consequence of the Helmand decision. Yet the Government has failed to respond to evidence given to us that that decision was

² Annual Chief of the Defence Staff Lecture, 3 December 2009

taken in the absence of a coherent strategy at the politico-military level and without any grand strategic sense of our national interest. The Government has yet to produce evidence of the extent to which the doubling of aid to fragile and conflict states will reduce threats to the UK.

13. An inability to think effectively about wider National Strategy in government presents a continuing risk to the UK's future prosperity and safety. Getting it right matters. The failure to anticipate the risk of the banking collapse and take remedial action, for example, has affected the lives of every citizen.

14. As we witness the public and professional discussion of our Report now continuing, we believe that it has provoked a debate about strategy and National Strategy which the Government will have to address. We are in no doubt that a continuation of this debate is in the national interest and can only be of benefit. We therefore intend to pursue opportunities to do so.

15. In particular, the Committee will launch a second inquiry on the question of National Strategy when the Government has reported to us on the outcome of its review in six months' time. We intend that inquiry should focus on how effectively the Government has assessed the UK's national interests; and how decisions to protect and promote them have been reached.

Appendix 1—Letter from the Foreign Secretary

14 November 2010

Thank you for your letter of 26 October, following your Committee's report "Who does UK National Strategy?"

As you know, I agree with the report's finding that under the previous administration, the Government had lost the capacity to think strategically. One of the first tasks of the new Government was to restore that capability and for new Ministers to set a lead in strategic thinking. That is why we established the National Security Council on the day after the election, and published the new National Security Strategy on 18 October. This sets the broad context for our strategic thinking, starting out from our aim to be an open, outward-facing nation whose political, economic and cultural authority is disproportionate to our size, and embracing a whole of government approach and rejecting the idea of strategic shrinkage.

The National Security Council is now building up this whole of government approach for a series of key issues. It has brought coherence to our Afghanistan policy, and to the vital decisions of the Strategic Defence and Security Review. We have now established a new Sub-Committee to the National Security Council on Emerging Powers, to strengthen our approach to an increasingly important set of relationships for the UK's national interest. These structures provide us with an effective way to bring together strategic decisions about our security, defence, diplomacy and development and have already helped bring new coherence to our bilateral relations with India, China, Russia and the countries of the Gulf.

I do not, however, see the need for the National Security Council to develop a new bureaucracy for strategic thinking. Its purpose is not to become a rival source of advice to the Prime Minister, but to ensure that existing Departments work together effectively and that their advice is drawn together for collective consideration by Ministers. My priority remains to reinforce the role of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in leading foreign policy across the whole of government. Within the FCO, that means that strategic thinking must be infused throughout the entire organisation, and should not be considered as an isolated task separate from implementing policy. We shall, however, be taking some steps to reinforce our central policy coordination functions in order to make this happen.

I hope that this approach finds favour with your Committee.

Appendix 2—Letter to the Prime Minister

14 December 2010

I understand that the Government's response to PASC's inquiry is in the advanced stages of preparation and that it is not positive. It was also clear from our exchanges in the Liaison Committee on 18th November, and from the Foreign Secretary's letter to me of 14th November (copy enclosed), that the burden of our recommendations has encountered resistance in Whitehall and from the FCO. I would urge the Government to delay issuing a response until there has been further consideration of the issues raised in our Report.

The central finding of our Report (unanimously agreed) is that you have inherited a system that has lost capacity to think strategically. This reflects what the recently retired CDS told us. This was confirmed by virtually all our witnesses. Their concerns were not confined to the previous administration, as the Foreign Secretary's letter erroneously suggests. We also concluded that this is a concern for the whole of government.

To improve the quality of strategic thinking, it is necessary to understand that "strategy" is not the same as "a plan". Strategy is about dealing with uncertainty, complexity and the dynamic. Strategy is not policy but the means of making policy effective. Grand Strategy (or National Strategy) is about ensuring that the whole of government identifies and acts effectively upon the national interest. It needs to be articulated constantly and updated regularly.

We welcome the Foreign Secretary's drive to create more coherence (National Strategy) across government, but neither he, nor the FCO, nor the NSC as presently supported can achieve this. The national interest is expressed in terms so broad ("security, freedom and prosperity") that they lack meaningful application. We conclude that, as things stand, there is little concrete idea of what the UK's national interest is, and therefore what our national strategic purpose should be. There is a disconnect between the language rejecting "strategic shrinkage" and cuts in defence capability and diplomatic capacity. The NSC can do little more than attempt to broker competing agendas and interests from across Whitehall, rather than setting down coherent National Strategy which leads departmental thinking.

This was evident in the closing stages of SDSR. Each of the armed services also sought to promote their own version of National Strategy, inevitably reflecting their own perspective and interests. In the absence of a coherent National Strategy laid down by the NSC, what else could they do? NSC is incapable of generating coherent National Strategy, because it lacks access to the necessary capacity for analysis and assessment. It cannot therefore ask the right questions or make fully informed judgements. It is entirely right that the final decisions on such matters as the SDSR are for the Prime Minister and senior ministers, but you must have been concerned that the process left you with so many irreconcilable dilemmas.

Its security remit is also too restrictive. If the NSC is confined to the security issues, who creates the remaining aspects of National (Grand) Strategy and ensures NSS is integrated with the whole? The Cabinet has no body or structure to support it in this role. This is why we recommend that the NSC take on the wider role for National Strategy (or "grand

strategy"). This is not so that it should usurp the Cabinet's role or to become a rival power centre, but to strengthen the quality of Cabinet decision making by ensuring that there is proper examination and challenge of all the options put before it. The Cabinet is fundamentally a decision-making body, not a deliberative one.

Evidence to us also suggested that cross-departmental collaboration on strategic thinking is variable and often conflicting. Analytical resources are underutilised, and different departments understand and discuss strategy in different and incompatible ways. (Many seem to think that their departmental business plan is "strategy". The MoD has 14 roles within the department with "strategy" or "strategic" in the job title).

We did not recommend "a new bureaucracy" for strategic thinking as the Foreign Secretary's letter suggests. We do say it is essential to recruit, train and promote "a community of strategists" from across Whitehall with different experiences and expertise, who can work collectively, sharing the same language and idiom of thinking. There is absolutely no reason why this cannot be achieved from within existing resources.

When there is a new and completely unexpected strategic shock, creating a new crisis, to whom does the Cabinet (and indeed, to whom do permanent secretaries) turn? The lessons of recent experience suggest that advice from those who have done speculative analysis and assessment is at a premium at such moments. The NSC represents potentially good architecture, but it cannot operate effectively without comprehensive research and assessment capacity in support.

Put in these terms, I would be surprised if either the Cabinet Secretary or the National Security Adviser would disagree with this. I would also expect the Foreign Secretary to support a structure which would give him more leverage at the centre of government to create cross-departmental coherence around foreign policy, rather than relying on his single department to have the necessary influence.

I trust that the Government's considered response to PASC's report will not simply seek to justify the *status quo*. It should reflect a fuller appreciation of what the word "strategy" means, what National Strategy should be, and how it should be more effectively supported. If the Government's response is essentially a rejection of our findings, PASC is not minded to let matters rest.

Appendix 3—Government Response

Government Response to the Public Administration Select Committee First Report of Session 2010-11 ‘Who does UK National Strategy?’

The Government welcomes the Committee’s detailed consideration of this important issue and recognition by the Committee of the progress in strategic thinking made by the establishment of the new National Security Council. Our response to the Committee’s Report addresses each of the recommendations (in bold type below) in order.

We have interpreted the Committee’s findings as being primarily concerned with strategy formulation and strategic thinking in national security, and we have framed our response accordingly. However, where appropriate we have also made reference to the Government’s broader strategic agenda and strategy formulation.

Recommendation 1 (Page 27, paragraph 7):

If the UK is to navigate its way successfully through the networked world, and to ‘lift its eyes to the wider strategic needs of this country’, we need a National Strategy.

2. Cabinet, as the most important collective decision making body of Government has responsibility for the Government’s overall strategy, and considers directly, or through its Cabinet Committees, any significant international or domestic policy issues. The Government’s overall strategy is set out primarily in ‘The Coalition: our programme for government’ document, but also, in terms of economic strategy, in the Budget and the Spending Review. Additionally, the Business Plans of Government Departments, published on the No 10 website, set out the priorities for all areas of Government and the role of all Departments in the delivery of the Government’s strategy.

3. The new National Security Strategy (NSS) is an important component of national strategy. Together with the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) it sets out Government’s strategic decisions and priorities on security and defence based on an assessment of the strategic context, Britain’s place in the world and an analysis of the risks and opportunities we face. The SDSR sets out how the Government will deliver the priorities in the Strategy and established a number of committees, each led by Ministers, to take forward specific aspects of the Review. An Implementation Board of senior officials will provide further drive and a monitoring function against delivery of all the commitments made in the NSS and SDSR.

Recommendation 2 (Page 28, paragraph 11):

It is ... essential for ministers to invest time and energy into strategy making. It is the demand from ministers for strategic appraisals which will create the ‘strategic

appetite' within Departments and Whitehall more generally for better and soundly based strategic analysis.

4. The Government shares the Committee's views on the importance of strategic analysis to underpin policymaking. The Cabinet and its Committees, including the National Security Council, and the Home and Economic Affairs Committee, give strategic direction to the Government's work. The Economic Affairs Committee, for example, ensures that issues relating to the economy receive thorough consideration by Ministers. It will play a key role in driving forward the Growth Review, which is taking a fundamental look at what each part of Government is doing to remove barriers to investment. In addition there are Departmental strategy groups, for example the Strategic Policy Group in the FCO which considers key strategic policy issues and advises the Foreign Secretary. The Defence Secretary's Defence Strategy Group provided perspective and direction in support of the SDSR.

5. The National Security Council (NSC) is a powerful centre of strategic assessment and decision-making at the heart of Government. This is under-pinned by joint analysis: where relevant, meetings of the NSC begin with the latest assessment from the Joint Intelligence Committee, ensuring that strategy is based on a shared understanding of the political, economic and/or military context. The Council will oversee the implementation of the NSS and the SDSR across the whole of Government. The discipline of systematic, weekly consideration of national security priorities, in a ministerial forum chaired by the Prime Minister, is encouraging a more coherent approach to strategy across Government departments.

6. Within individual Departments, Secretaries of State will chair Departmental Boards which will provide strategic leadership. They are responsible for developing the strategies for their Departments, in line with the Government's overarching strategic agenda as set out in the Coalition's Programme for Government. They will have access to advice on strategy from senior leaders from the commercial private sector and the third sector, who will sit on Departmental Boards as Non-executive Directors. Individual Department Business Plans will be scrutinised against priorities and milestones and to check the effectiveness of the strategies and progress in delivering them.

Recommendation 3 (Page 28, paragraph 12):

There is a second and equally important element about strategy: the need to ensure democratic legitimacy and to recognise the political limits of what strategy and our national interests can achieve. Elected representatives are best placed to articulate an understanding of what the electorate will find acceptable.

7. The Government fully accepts the clear role for Parliament in this area. Parliamentary Select Committees scrutinise the work of individual Departments. In addition, a number of Committees look at cross-cutting issues, including: the Public

Administration Select Committee, in its remit to monitor the quality and standards of the Civil Service; the Liaison Committee, in its function of bringing together the work of all the Select Committees; and the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy which will look at all aspects of the Government's approach to national security.

Recommendation 4 (Pages 28-29, paragraph 16):

The Government should expand the remit of the NSC and of the National Security Adviser to take on a central co-ordinating role for National Strategy.

8. The National Security Council is a useful model of how a Ministerial body can oversee the development and implementation of a strategic agenda. However, Cabinet, as the overall decision-making body of Government, has ultimate responsibility for the Government's strategy.

9. The Cabinet Committee system, of which the National Security Council is part, allows smaller groups of Ministers to think strategically, and in more detail, about areas in which they may have specific expertise and interest. It is important that the National Security Council and its sub-committees concentrate on national security, to allow a proper focus on those issues, just as other Cabinet Committees focus on other aspects of the Government's responsibilities – particularly the economy and the domestic agenda. These elements are then brought together for collective consideration by Cabinet.

Recommendation 5 (Page 29, paragraph 19):

We strongly support the efforts of the former CDS to engender the culture of strategic thinking. We commend his initiatives of setting up a strategic advisory group and a forum for the practice of strategy. We invite the new CDS to ensure that this initiative is maintained and if possible enhanced and to explain personally to us how he plans to do so. We would also exhort the rest of Whitehall to engage in the process.

10. The new CDS will continue to promote strategic thinking within the Ministry of Defence, including by maintaining the panel of independent strategic advisers set up by his predecessor. The MOD's Defence Reform Review will consider how to build on this initiative to develop strategy capability further, integrated across the Ministry of Defence and with the rest of Whitehall.

Recommendation 6 (Page 29, paragraphs 20 and 21):

It is essential to recruit, train and promote a community of strategists from across Whitehall with different experiences and expertise who can work collectively. We recommend that the Royal College of Defence Studies and the National School for Government and others should consider how best to devise a joint forum and

programme of education... Strategic skills should not only be valued but properly recognised in the appraisal system.

11. The Government agrees that it is important to continue to develop the capacity for strategy making and strategic thinking within Government. Strategic skills are already a required element in the Senior Civil Service appraisal process. They are also measured at other grades in specific posts: the 'Professional Skills for Government' core competencies include strategic thinking and the new Policy Skills Framework for Civil Servants adds further weight to this by providing a common language on strategy.

12. In terms of national security there is an existing network of Strategy Units in a number of Departments with national security responsibilities, including the FCO, the Home Office, DfID and the MoD which support the development of forward thinking in foreign, defence and security policy. Following the SDSR we will be exploring ways to strengthen their collective working and will report on progress to the Committee in six months' time. The Government is already building a cadre of civil servants who have experience of strategy in national security and have spent their careers delivering that function in different Departments. Options are also being explored to improve education in strategy. For instance, the UK Defence Academy is providing pilot courses on strategic leadership on national security issues for attendees from across government.

13. This Government is committed to ensuring that national security considerations are fully considered in all aspects of our thinking. So, in bilateral relationships with partners, the UK's strategic approach to advance our national interest will be based on multiple elements including economic, political and of course international and regional security considerations. In the recent Strategic Defence and Security Review for example, the Government committed to doubling aid to fragile and conflict states. Our work to tackle poverty and assist development in these countries will help to address the risks to the UK associated with conflict and fragility, and is strongly in our national interest. Increasingly the threats we face will stem from, or be associated with, events elsewhere, so we are investing more in preventing and tackling threats at source before they escalate into full blown conflicts or materialise on UK shores. The UK's international agreements also advance our National Security in the wider sense, as does our general interaction with partners and allies.

Recommendation 7 (Page 30, paragraph 23):

We...recommend that a capability review of National Strategy should start as soon as possible. It should report within a year. It should examine the various parts of Whitehall which should be contributing to National Strategy. [It] should determine how far the strategy functions in each department consider themselves part of a wider strategist 'profession'; [and] to what degree there is shared training, [and] ways of working.

14. We very much welcome the Committee's focus on how best to develop collective thinking – particularly on national security issues across the relevant Government Departments. We will explore the possibility of examining the effectiveness of collaborative working on national security issues and provide the Committee with an update in six months' time.

Recommendation 8 (Page 30, paragraph 24):

In the longer term, we would hope that enhanced Whitehall collaboration will lead to the development of a new agency to complement the existing arrangements. The new agency's Director would be a key player in Whitehall with regard to National Strategy, and its inputs and assessments would complement the joint intelligence assessments.

15. Paragraph 6.6 of the SDSR made a commitment to improve collaboration between the various Departmental strategy units which support the development of forward-looking defence and security policy, and create a more formal strategic thinking network overseen by the National Security Adviser (NSA). Heads of Strategy Units and those involved in strategic pieces of work across defence and security departments will attend the network, which will co-ordinate work programmes and consider specific pieces of collaborative work. This will build upon the informal network of Heads of Strategy Unit mentioned earlier, through which Departments have already delivered a range of joint strategy work.

16. The National Security Secretariat works closely with Government Departments, and in particular with their Strategy Units. It also consults agencies and organisations outside Government for strategic advice and expertise, including think tanks, academia and wider international organisations. Similar networks are already in place in other areas of Government such as the FCO, DECC and the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office.

17. The Government will explore ways of ensuring better linkage, clearer commissioning and stronger impact of the various existing networks. The aim should be, as the Committee notes, to foster the culture of strategic thinking across Government. The Government does not believe that a new Agency is the right approach to develop better strategy making in Whitehall.

Recommendation 9 (Page 30, paragraphs 25 and 26):

There should be greater interchange between outside experts and Whitehall and career progression should involve spending time both within and outside of government as part of a wide and diverse strategy community. Government must ensure that funding for research into National Strategy and strategy making is not squeezed out by funding for [other] academic programmes. The reallocation of funding required is minimal and would be in the national interest.

18. Engagement with outside experts is now a normal part of strategy and policy work across government, through formal advisory fora, frequent informal contact, and official participation in external conferences and studies. The Government already regularly draws on external input to strategy through inward secondments and fixed term appointments from the wider public sector, the private sector, the voluntary sector and academia. In addition, non-executive Directors will bring external expertise into Government Departments at the most senior level.

19. This approach is also being considered in other areas. For example, the Joint Intelligence Committee invites academics to some of its meetings to provide additional challenge, the Foreign Office maintains close relationships with international think tanks and academic communities. In the Home Office, the Government's Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) workshops have been externally facilitated and based on extensive research of both open source and classified material.

Recommendation 10 (Page 30, paragraph 27):

We would invite Parliament to consider that the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy should likewise have its remit broadened to become the Joint Committee on National Strategy and Security. We would also invite the House to reconsider its membership. Contributions to National Strategy and National Security derive from a variety of departments, not least from the Cabinet Office. We suggest that membership of the Joint Committee should therefore be drawn from all appropriate departmental select committees. It would include this Committee, which oversees process at the heart of National Strategy and National Security.

20. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy was set up 'to consider the National Security Strategy', on the basis of a 2008 proposal from the then Prime Minister. The Government has no plans to propose a change to the Committee's Terms of Reference.

21. When the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy was first established, the Commons Liaison Committee and the Prime Minister agreed that its membership should include the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee and the Chairs of the Business Innovation and Skills, Defence, Energy and Climate Change, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, International Development and Justice Departmental Select Committees, plus four other Members in addition to the ten Lords members. However, appointments to the Joint Committee remain a matter for the two Houses.

Recommendation 11 (Page 31, paragraph 32):

We would support a small, central budget allocated to National Strategy making; either under the control of the Cabinet Secretary, or the National Security Adviser in his wider, National Strategy, role. This funding would enable coordination of

National Strategy making in each department, to ensure that departmental contributions to National Strategy are compatible, to promote common training, and to draw all those involved into a ‘community’ of Whitehall strategic thinkers.

22. The Government believes that Departmental co-ordination and collaboration will deliver the best results in this area. The NSS and SDSR commitments mentioned in the response to Recommendation 8 give the National Security Adviser a formal role in promoting this. The Government believes there is no requirement for a new budget to deliver these improvements.

Formal Minutes

Tuesday 25 January 2010

Members present:

Bernard Jenkin, in the Chair

Nick de Bois
Charlie Elphicke
David Heyes
Kelvin Hopkins

Greg Mulholland
Lindsay Roy
Mr Charles Walker

Draft Report (*Who Does UK National Strategy? Further Report with the Government Response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2010–11*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 15 read and agreed to.

Papers were appended to the Report as Appendices 1, 2 and 3.

Resolved, That the Report be the Sixth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Tuesday 1 February at 10.00 am

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

The reference number of the Government's response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

Session 2010–11

First Report	Who does UK National Strategy?	HC 435
Second Report	Government Responses to the Committee's Eighth and Ninth reports of Session 2009-10	HC 150
Third Report	Equitable Life	HC 485 (<i>Cm 7960</i>)
Fourth Report	Pre-appointment hearing for the dual post of First Civil Service Commissioner and Commissioner for Public Appointments	HC 601
Fifth Report	Smaller Government: Shrinking the Quango State	HC 537