Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly Reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation - Committees on Arms Export Controls Contents


10  Countries of Concern

China

117. The EU arms embargo to China was adopted by the European Council on 27 June 1989 in response to the events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989.[185] The arms embargo, was adopted in the form of a European Council Declaration (or Common Policy) prior to the creation of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and so is not legally binding on member states. Our predecessor Committees examined the arms embargo in detail and concluded that it was of political importance in that it provided a strong message in relation to the promotion of human rights in China.[186]

118. The potential lifting of the embargo was first discussed at an EU-level in 2004, when both France and Germany argued that the reasons for first imposing the embargo (chiefly Tiananmen Square) were out-dated. The 2004 European Council "reaffirmed the political will to continue to work towards lifting the arms embargo" and recalled the importance of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports in particular criteria regarding human rights, stability and security in the region and the national security of friendly and allied countries in preventing an increase in arms sales to China from EU member states.[187] Some in the EU, led by France and Spain, have again called for the lifting of the embargo.[188]

119. During this inquiry, we asked the Government for its view on maintaining the arms embargo with China. The FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, told us that "the position of the British Government is that they fully support the embargo, which is intended to continue."[189]

120. We recommend that in view of the continuing serious human rights violations taking place in China, the Government maintains its position of fully supporting the retention of the EU arms embargo on China.

Israel

121. The previous CAEC's report, which was published in March 2010, included the following recommendation:

    We repeat our conclusion that it is regrettable that arms exports to Israel were almost certainly used in Operation Cast Lead. This is in direct contravention to the UK Government's policy that UK arms exports to Israel should not be used in the Occupied Territories. We further conclude that the revoking of five UK arms exports licences to Israel since Cast Lead is welcome, but that broader lessons must be learned from the post conflict review to ensure that UK arms exports to Israel are not used in the Occupied Territories in future. (Paragraph 141)

    We recommend that the Government, in its Response to this Report, set out clearly the longer term lessons learnt post Operation Cast Lead and how they will impact in practice on the issuing of future licences for arms exports to Israel. (Paragraph 142).[190]

122. Surprisingly, the present Government's response to that report stated: "The UK Government does not have a policy that UK arms exports to Israel should not be used in the OPTs [Occupied Palestinian Territories]"[191] We asked the Foreign Office Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, to clarify whether the UK's policy that arms exports to Israel could not be used in the occupied territories had changed. He told us:

    The use of arms in a specific area or a specific territory is not part of the criteria. What the criteria seek to make clear is that it's the end use of the arms which is the determining factor.

    And he added:

    The criterion as drawn, because it allows us to look at past behaviour and to take into account what has happened, is sufficiently robust to ensure that, in a situation where arms may have been used in the occupied territories, it would be highly likely that the criterion that affects the application would ensure that there probably would not be an export licence granted. What we seek to make clear is that it isn't about the territory, at the end of the day; it's the end use. The criterion is sufficiently robust to cover any external factor like the territory in which arms might be used; and that would always be covered by the criterion. Our policy has not changed from the previous Government's in relation to the use of arms in the occupied territories, or the criteria that would be applied in making a decision about whether or not an arms export to Israel would be likely to end up being used there.[192]

123. When asked about monitoring the situation on the ground, the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, said:

    In the current process, as you will know as well as most, there is intense scrutiny of what happens on the ground in the occupied territories, and rightly so. That information feeds back to posts. If information comes in that indicates that a licence criterion has been breached, it would result in an inquiry that would allow for the revocation of a licence. I do not believe it is a process that, at present, we need to be more proactive on than is already the case. There is an extensive and, as I indicated, quite proper network of scrutiny of what happens in the occupied territories to give us the information we need. It is important for the Committee[s] to know that we would take exactly the same view of breach of criteria as that taken in the past, because, again, the criteria allow for that. Where information is found that shows that there has been a breach of the criteria, existing licences can be revoked and that feeds into information on new licences.[193]

124. We note that the previous Government obtained a categorical assurance from the Israeli Government, in writing, dated 29 November 2000, which included: "No UK originated equipment nor any UK originated systems/sub-systems/components are used as part of the Israel International Development Force's activities in the Territories".[194] In a letter to the Chair of 10 February 2011, the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, says:

    I can confirm that UK policy on the export of controlled goods and equipment to Israel has not changed since the Coalition Government took office. All export licence applications to Israel are considered on a case- by- case basis against the Consolidated EU and National Export Licensing Criteria.[195]

It is far from clear how this assurance can be reconciled with the Government's response referred to in paragraph 122 above.

125. We conclude that the present Government's policy on exporting arms or components of arms that could be used in the Occupied Palestinian Territories appears to be confused. Given that the Government in its response to the previous Committees' last Report stated: "That the UK Government does not have a policy that UK arms exports to Israel should not be used in the Occupied Palestinian Territories", we recommend that the Government re-states what specific arms or components of arms it is willing to approve for export to Israel that could be used in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. We further recommend that if the Government is unable to identify any such arms or components of arms, it formally withdraws the statement of policy quoted in this paragraph.

Saudi Arabia and Yemen

126. In its submission, UKWG expressed concern at the possibility that UK-supplied weapons were used by Saudi armed forces in attacking Northern Yemen in 2009/10. UKWG told us:

    Eyewitness testimony, including photographic evidence, clearly conveys a scene of near total devastation, with sustained and intensive bombardment by Saudi Arabian planes reported to have killed hundreds of people, caused widespread damage to homes and infrastructure and displaced up to 280,000 people.[196]

127. UKWG went on to say that Amnesty International was

    particularly concerned that two days after publication of its findings, a new Open General Export License (Military Goods: Collaborative Project Typhoon) entered into force, allowing inter alia for the maintenance of Typhoon combat aircraft in Saudi Arabia. It is of serious concern that such a permissive general licence with minimal scrutiny should be available for end-use in Saudi Arabia....Current UK arms export control policy is designed to prohibit the supply of military equipment where there is a clear risk that such equipment will be used in human rights violations or violations of international law, the kind of attacks that appear to have taken place in Yemen.[197]

128. In his letter to the Chair of 10 February 2011, the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, said:

    It is clear from the reports we have received that Royal Saudi Air Force Tornado aircraft, supplied by the UK, were used during the recent border conflict in 2009.[198]

129. In addition and according to information provided to us by the Government in 2010 in response to our questions on licences in the first quarter 2010 report, UK licences granted to Saudi Arabia included aircraft accessories for Tornado aircraft. We asked the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt about the allegations of illegal acts against Yemen, specifically the risk assessments the Government had made when determining whether to provide licences for arms exports to Saudi Arabia. The Minister told us that the "robustness of the criteria" remained the guide and that all licence applications were determined "on a case-by-case basis".[199] We also asked what view the FCO had taken of the allegations of illegal acts against Yemen at the time the licensing decisions were being approved and whether the FCO had carried out a thorough risk assessment before granting these licence applications. In response the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt said:

    We do believe that Saudi Arabia had a legitimate right to respond proportionately to incursions into its territory resulting from the conflict between the Houthi rebels and the Government of Yemen. The Government followed the situation closely at the time and, after consulting a number of information sources, concluded that the Saudi response and the use of British-supplied military equipment was not inconsistent with the export licensing criteria. So, the short answer to your question is that we use the same criteria as we do for everyone else, which take into account past behaviour, in considering any new licences.[200]

130. We note that military operations ended during January 2010 and have not resumed since February when a ceasefire was agreed. There are also reports that Houthi forces have withdrawn from Saudi territory. However, given the fragility of the situation, there is some risk that the conflict may flare up again in the region. There is currently a serious crisis in Bahrain where a "State of National Safety" has been declared. Saudi and other Gulf Co-operation Council forces entered Bahrain in March. We recommend that the Government keeps its policy on approving arm exports to Saudi Arabia under review in the light of the specific allegations surrounding the 2009-10 conflict in Yemen and current events in Yemen, Bahrain, and the wider region.

Arms exports to authoritarian regimes in North Africa, Middle East and worldwide

131. The Government's policy on arms exports to a considerable number of individual countries, and on making arms exports generally a high Government priority, has been brought sharply into focus by the uprisings and demonstrations in recent weeks in North Africa and the Middle East, and the armed response made to them which has resulted in the death or injury of civilians.

132. The government makes public on the BIS and FCO websites a quarterly list of those export licences it has granted. It also provides to the CAEC more detailed information on a confidential basis. Tables using information from the BIS and FCO websites of selected arms export licence approvals to countries in North Africa and the Middle east of arms and components of arms that could be used for internal repression are set out in Annex 4.

133. The Government's policy on arms exports in relation to internal repression was clearly stated by the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt,

    The longstanding British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.[201]

134. Since the uprisings and demonstrations began, the Government has been vigorously backpedalling on its arms exports to North Africa and the Middle East, and up to the time this report was concluded has taken the following steps:

  • On 17 February, the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, announced that all arms export licences to Bahrain were being reviewed.[202]
  • On 18 February, the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, announced that a review of arms exports licences to the wider region, including Yemen was on-going.[203]
  • On 26 February the UK Government supported the United Nations Security Council Resolution (1970) imposing an arms embargo on Libya[204]
  • On 28 February the UK Government supported a European Council Decision to impose an arms embargo on Libya.[205]

In answer to a Parliamentary Question asking how many arms export licences had so far been revoked as a result of the Government's review, and to which countries, the BIS Minister, Mr Mark Prisk, replied:

As at 3 pm on 3 March 2011 the following export licences have been revoked under this review:

Tunisia

One Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL) was revoked on 27 January and Tunisia was removed as a permitted destination from one Open Individual Export Licence (OIEL) on 28 January.

Egypt

36 SIELs were revoked between 7 February and 11 February and Egypt was removed as a permitted destination from eight OIELs between 10 February and 1 March.

Libya

62 SIELs were revoked between 18 February and 3 March and Libya was removed as a permitted destination from nine OIELs on 23 February.

Bahrain

23 SIELs were revoked on 18 February and Bahrain was removed as a permitted destination from 16 OIELs between 18 February and 2 March.

The review is ongoing as we continue to monitor how the situation develops in this region.[206]

135. We conclude that both the present Government and its predecessor misjudged the risk that arms approved for export to certain authoritarian countries in North Africa and the Middle East might be used for internal repression. We further conclude that the Government's decision to revoke a considerable number of arms export licences to Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia is very welcome.

We recommend that, in its response to this Report:

  • The Government provides us with full details on arms export licences it has revoked since the beginning of January 2011 when the recent uprisings and demonstrations in North Africa and the Middle East started;
  • The Government states what specific and systematic consideration of arms exports is carried out within the National Security Strategy and at meetings of the National Security Council;
  • The Government states the outcome of its review of arms exports to the wider Middle East region as announced by the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, on 18 February;
  • The Government states what changes it will make to improve both its arms export control procedures and its judgements about the risk of arms exported from the UK being used for internal repression by authoritarian regimes.

We further recommend that the Government extends immediately its review of UK arms export licences announced by the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, on 18 February 2011 to authoritarian regimes worldwide in respect of arms or components of arms which could be used for internal repression.



185   EU Declaration on China Arms embargo - European Council: Madrid, 26-27 June 1989 Back

186   CAEC, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2010), Session 2009-10, HC 202 Back

187   Brussels European Council, 16/17 December 2004, Presidency Conclusions Back

188   For example, see "The EU and arms for China", The Economist 1 February 2010 Back

189   Q 178 Back

190   Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2009-10, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2010): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2008, Quarterly Reports for 2009, licensing policyand review of export control legislation, HC 202 Back

191   Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2009-10, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2010): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2008, Quarterly Reports for 2009, licensing policyand review of export control legislation, HC 189 Back

192   Q 150 Back

193   Q 163 Back

194   See letter from the Israeli Government to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Nov. 29, 2000, Back

195   Ev 41 Back

196   Ev 55 Back

197   Ev 55 Back

198   Ev42 Back

199   Q166 Back

200   Q166 Back

201   "Foreign Office Minister comments on review of arms exports" FCO press notice, 18 February 2011  Back

202   "Foreign Office Minister comments on review of arms exports" FCO press notice, 18 February 2011  Back

203   "Foreign Office Minister comments on review of arms exports" FCO press notice, 18 February 2011  Back

204   UN Security Council Resolution on Libya of 26 February (UNSCR 1970/2011) Back

205   Details are available in Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP (published in the Official Journal of the European Union L58, 3.3.2011, p53). The Council Decision was given legal force by Council Regulation on 2 March 2011. Back

206   HC Deb, 9 Mar 2011 col 1173W

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© Parliamentary copyright 2011
Prepared 5 April 2011