10 Countries of Concern
China
117. The EU arms embargo to China was adopted by
the European Council on 27 June 1989 in response to the events
in Tiananmen Square in June 1989.[185]
The arms embargo, was adopted in the form of a European Council
Declaration (or Common Policy) prior to the creation of the EU's
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and so is not legally
binding on member states. Our predecessor Committees examined
the arms embargo in detail and concluded that it was of political
importance in that it provided a strong message in relation to
the promotion of human rights in China.[186]
118. The potential lifting of the embargo was first
discussed at an EU-level in 2004, when both France and Germany
argued that the reasons for first imposing the embargo (chiefly
Tiananmen Square) were out-dated. The 2004 European Council "reaffirmed
the political will to continue to work towards lifting the arms
embargo" and recalled the importance of the EU Code of Conduct
on Arms Exports in particular criteria regarding human rights,
stability and security in the region and the national security
of friendly and allied countries in preventing an increase in
arms sales to China from EU member states.[187]
Some in the EU, led by France and Spain, have again called for
the lifting of the embargo.[188]
119. During this inquiry, we asked the Government
for its view on maintaining the arms embargo with China. The FCO
Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, told us that "the position of
the British Government is that they fully support the embargo,
which is intended to continue."[189]
120. We recommend that in view of the continuing
serious human rights violations taking place in China, the Government
maintains its position of fully supporting the retention of the
EU arms embargo on China.
Israel
121. The previous CAEC's report, which was published
in March 2010, included the following recommendation:
We repeat our conclusion that it is regrettable
that arms exports to Israel were almost certainly used in Operation
Cast Lead. This is in direct contravention to the UK Government's
policy that UK arms exports to Israel should not be used in the
Occupied Territories. We further conclude that the revoking of
five UK arms exports licences to Israel since Cast Lead is welcome,
but that broader lessons must be learned from the post conflict
review to ensure that UK arms exports to Israel are not used in
the Occupied Territories in future. (Paragraph 141)
We recommend that the Government, in its Response
to this Report, set out clearly the longer term lessons learnt
post Operation Cast Lead and how they will impact in practice
on the issuing of future licences for arms exports to Israel.
(Paragraph 142).[190]
122. Surprisingly, the present Government's response
to that report stated: "The UK Government does not have a
policy that UK arms exports to Israel should not be used in the
OPTs [Occupied Palestinian Territories]"[191]
We asked the Foreign Office Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, to clarify
whether the UK's policy that arms exports to Israel could not
be used in the occupied territories had changed. He told us:
The use of arms in a specific area or a specific
territory is not part of the criteria. What the criteria seek
to make clear is that it's the end use of the arms which is the
determining factor.
The criterion as drawn, because it allows us
to look at past behaviour and to take into account what has happened,
is sufficiently robust to ensure that, in a situation where arms
may have been used in the occupied territories, it would be highly
likely that the criterion that affects the application would ensure
that there probably would not be an export licence granted. What
we seek to make clear is that it isn't about the territory, at
the end of the day; it's the end use. The criterion is sufficiently
robust to cover any external factor like the territory in which
arms might be used; and that would always be covered by the criterion.
Our policy has not changed from the previous Government's in relation
to the use of arms in the occupied territories, or the criteria
that would be applied in making a decision about whether or not
an arms export to Israel would be likely to end up being used
there.[192]
123. When asked about monitoring the situation on
the ground, the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, said:
In the current process, as you will know as well
as most, there is intense scrutiny of what happens on the ground
in the occupied territories, and rightly so. That information
feeds back to posts. If information comes in that indicates that
a licence criterion has been breached, it would result in an inquiry
that would allow for the revocation of a licence. I do not believe
it is a process that, at present, we need to be more proactive
on than is already the case. There is an extensive and, as I indicated,
quite proper network of scrutiny of what happens in the occupied
territories to give us the information we need. It is important
for the Committee[s] to know that we would take exactly the same
view of breach of criteria as that taken in the past, because,
again, the criteria allow for that. Where information is found
that shows that there has been a breach of the criteria, existing
licences can be revoked and that feeds into information on new
licences.[193]
124. We note that the previous Government obtained
a categorical assurance from the Israeli Government, in writing,
dated 29 November 2000, which included: "No UK originated
equipment nor any UK originated systems/sub-systems/components
are used as part of the Israel International Development Force's activities in the
Territories".[194]
In a letter to the Chair of 10 February 2011, the FCO Minister,
Mr Alistair Burt, says:
I can confirm that UK policy on the export
of controlled goods and equipment to Israel has not changed since
the Coalition Government took office. All export licence applications
to Israel are considered on a case- by- case basis against the
Consolidated EU and National Export Licensing Criteria.[195]
It is far from clear how this assurance can be
reconciled with the Government's response referred to in paragraph
122 above.
125. We conclude that the present Government's
policy on exporting arms or components of arms that could be used
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories appears to be confused.
Given that the Government in its response to the previous Committees'
last Report stated: "That the UK Government does not have
a policy that UK arms exports to Israel should not be used in
the Occupied Palestinian Territories", we recommend that
the Government re-states what specific arms or components of arms
it is willing to approve for export to Israel that could be used
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. We further recommend
that if the Government is unable to identify any such arms or
components of arms, it formally withdraws the statement of policy
quoted in this paragraph.
Saudi Arabia and Yemen
126. In its submission, UKWG expressed concern at
the possibility that UK-supplied weapons were used by Saudi armed
forces in attacking Northern Yemen in 2009/10. UKWG told us:
Eyewitness testimony, including photographic
evidence, clearly conveys a scene of near total devastation, with
sustained and intensive bombardment by Saudi Arabian planes reported
to have killed hundreds of people, caused widespread damage to
homes and infrastructure and displaced up to 280,000 people.[196]
127. UKWG went on to say that Amnesty International
was
particularly concerned that two days after publication
of its findings, a new Open General Export License (Military Goods:
Collaborative Project Typhoon) entered into force, allowing inter
alia for the maintenance of Typhoon combat aircraft in Saudi Arabia.
It is of serious concern that such a permissive general licence
with minimal scrutiny should be available for end-use in Saudi
Arabia....Current UK arms export control policy is designed to
prohibit the supply of military equipment where there is a clear
risk that such equipment will be used in human rights violations
or violations of international law, the kind of attacks that appear
to have taken place in Yemen.[197]
128. In his letter to the Chair of 10 February 2011,
the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, said:
It is clear from the reports we have received
that Royal Saudi Air Force Tornado aircraft, supplied by the UK,
were used during the recent border conflict in 2009.[198]
129. In addition and according to information provided
to us by the Government in 2010 in response to our questions on
licences in the first quarter 2010 report, UK licences granted
to Saudi Arabia included aircraft accessories for Tornado aircraft.
We asked the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt about the allegations
of illegal acts against Yemen, specifically the risk assessments
the Government had made when determining whether to provide licences
for arms exports to Saudi Arabia. The Minister told us that the
"robustness of the criteria" remained the guide and
that all licence applications were determined "on a case-by-case
basis".[199] We
also asked what view the FCO had taken of the allegations of illegal
acts against Yemen at the time the licensing decisions were being
approved and whether the FCO had carried out a thorough risk assessment
before granting these licence applications. In response the FCO
Minister, Mr Alistair Burt said:
We do believe that Saudi Arabia had a legitimate
right to respond proportionately to incursions into its territory
resulting from the conflict between the Houthi rebels and the
Government of Yemen. The Government followed the situation closely
at the time and, after consulting a number of information sources,
concluded that the Saudi response and the use of British-supplied
military equipment was not inconsistent with the export licensing
criteria. So, the short answer to your question is that we use
the same criteria as we do for everyone else, which take into
account past behaviour, in considering any new licences.[200]
130. We note that military operations ended during
January 2010 and have not resumed since February when a ceasefire
was agreed. There are also reports that Houthi forces have withdrawn
from Saudi territory. However, given the fragility of the situation,
there is some risk that the conflict may flare up again in the
region. There is currently a serious crisis in Bahrain where a
"State of National Safety" has been declared. Saudi
and other Gulf Co-operation Council forces entered Bahrain in
March. We recommend that the Government keeps its policy on
approving arm exports to Saudi Arabia under review in the light
of the specific allegations surrounding the 2009-10 conflict in
Yemen and current events in Yemen, Bahrain, and the wider region.
Arms exports to authoritarian
regimes in North Africa, Middle East and worldwide
131. The Government's policy on arms exports to
a considerable number of individual countries, and on making arms
exports generally a high Government priority, has been brought
sharply into focus by the uprisings and demonstrations in recent
weeks in North Africa and the Middle East, and the armed response
made to them which has resulted in the death or injury of civilians.
132. The government makes public on the BIS and
FCO websites a quarterly list of those export licences it has
granted. It also provides to the CAEC more detailed information
on a confidential basis. Tables using information from the BIS
and FCO websites of selected arms export licence approvals to
countries in North Africa and the Middle east of arms and components
of arms that could be used for internal repression are set out
in Annex 4.
133. The Government's policy on arms exports in
relation to internal repression was clearly stated by the FCO
Minister, Mr Alistair Burt,
The longstanding British position is clear.
We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk
the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal
conflicts or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.[201]
134. Since the uprisings and demonstrations began,
the Government has been vigorously backpedalling on its arms exports
to North Africa and the Middle East, and up to the time this report
was concluded has taken the following steps:
- On 17 February, the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair
Burt, announced that all arms export licences to Bahrain were
being reviewed.[202]
- On 18 February, the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair
Burt, announced that a review of arms exports licences to the
wider region, including Yemen was on-going.[203]
- On 26 February the UK Government supported
the United Nations Security Council Resolution (1970) imposing
an arms embargo on Libya[204]
- On 28 February the UK Government supported
a European Council Decision to impose an arms embargo on Libya.[205]
In answer to a Parliamentary Question asking how
many arms export licences had so far been revoked as a result
of the Government's review, and to which countries, the BIS Minister,
Mr Mark Prisk, replied:
As at 3 pm on 3 March 2011 the following export
licences have been revoked under this review:
Tunisia
One Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL)
was revoked on 27 January and Tunisia was removed as a permitted
destination from one Open Individual Export Licence (OIEL) on
28 January.
Egypt
36 SIELs were revoked between 7 February and 11
February and Egypt was removed as a permitted destination from
eight OIELs between 10 February and 1 March.
Libya
62 SIELs were revoked between 18 February and
3 March and Libya was removed as a permitted destination from
nine OIELs on 23 February.
Bahrain
23 SIELs were revoked on 18 February and Bahrain
was removed as a permitted destination from 16 OIELs between 18
February and 2 March.
The review is ongoing as we continue to monitor
how the situation develops in this region.[206]
135. We conclude that both the present Government
and its predecessor misjudged the risk that arms approved for
export to certain authoritarian countries in North Africa and
the Middle East might be used for internal repression. We further
conclude that the Government's decision to revoke a considerable
number of arms export licences to Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia
is very welcome.
We recommend that, in its response to this Report:
- The Government provides us with full details
on arms export licences it has revoked since the beginning of
January 2011 when the recent uprisings and demonstrations in North
Africa and the Middle East started;
- The Government states what specific and systematic
consideration of arms exports is carried out within the National
Security Strategy and at meetings of the National Security Council;
- The Government states the outcome of its review
of arms exports to the wider Middle East region as announced by
the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, on 18 February;
- The Government states what changes it will
make to improve both its arms export control procedures and its
judgements about the risk of arms exported from the UK being used
for internal repression by authoritarian regimes.
We further recommend that the Government extends
immediately its review of UK arms export licences announced by
the FCO Minister, Mr Alistair Burt, on 18 February 2011 to authoritarian
regimes worldwide in respect of arms or components of arms which
could be used for internal repression.
185 EU Declaration on China Arms embargo - European
Council: Madrid, 26-27 June 1989 Back
186
CAEC, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2010), Session
2009-10, HC 202 Back
187
Brussels European Council, 16/17 December 2004, Presidency Conclusions Back
188
For example, see "The EU and arms for China", The
Economist 1 February 2010 Back
189
Q 178 Back
190
Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session
2009-10, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2010): UK Strategic
Export Controls Annual Report 2008, Quarterly Reports for 2009,
licensing policyand review of export control legislation, HC 202 Back
191
Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First
Joint Report of Session 2009-10, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls
(2010): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2008, Quarterly
Reports for 2009, licensing policyand review of export control
legislation, HC 189 Back
192
Q 150 Back
193
Q 163 Back
194
See letter from the Israeli Government to the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office on Nov. 29, 2000, Back
195
Ev 41 Back
196
Ev 55 Back
197
Ev 55 Back
198
Ev42 Back
199
Q166 Back
200
Q166 Back
201
"Foreign Office Minister comments on review of arms exports"
FCO press notice, 18 February 2011 Back
202
"Foreign Office Minister comments on review of arms exports"
FCO press notice, 18 February 2011 Back
203
"Foreign Office Minister comments on review of arms exports"
FCO press notice, 18 February 2011 Back
204
UN Security Council Resolution on Libya of 26 February (UNSCR
1970/2011) Back
205
Details are available in Council Decision 2011/137/CFSP (published
in the Official Journal of the European Union L58, 3.3.2011, p53).
The Council Decision was given legal force by Council Regulation
on 2 March 2011. Back
206
HC Deb, 9 Mar 2011 col 1173W
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