Conclusions and recommendations
Lead Government Departments (LGDs)
1. We
consider that, more important than having a list of pre-identified
LGDs, it is essential to have a flexible and fast mechanism to
ensure that the most appropriate LGD is appointed. One of the
Cabinet Office's first tasks in an emergency should be to review
whether the pre-identified choice is most appropriate. During
a long-running crisis where the emergency evolves and the focus
of the response may change (for example, from the initial response
to recovery phase), COBR should review the lead periodically.
(Paragraph 38)
2. We recommend that,
in responding to this report, the Cabinet Office clarify how it
makes the decision to appoint the first LGD if one has not been
pre-identified. (Paragraph 39)
3. We recommend that
a LGD/LGDs for a space weather emergency be identified alongside
the publication of the 2011 National Risk Register. (Paragraph
42)
Risk assessment
4. We
are surprised and concerned that the Government Chief Scientific
Adviser (GCSA) had no direct involvement with the National Risk
Assessment (NRA) process until recently. In addition, we are concerned
that the GCSA's oral evidence appears to be at odds with the Government
on an issue that is a matter of fact—either GO Science and
the GCSA are involved with the NRA process or they are not. We
consider that science should be at the heart of the NRA process
and ask the Government and the GCSA to clarify this matter. (Paragraph
54)
5. Severe weather
is already included as a risk on the National Risk Register. We
are disappointed that it appears, from the Secretary of State
for Transport's comments, that the GCSA had little or no input
to the risk assessments that must have taken place on severe weather.
(Paragraph 55)
6. The Government
Office for Science, working with the Cabinet Office, should be
involved at all stages in the NRA. We recommend that the GCSA
should be formally involved in the NRA process at a high level.
The NRA should not be signed off until the GCSA is satisfied that
all risks requiring scientific input and judgements have been
properly considered. (Paragraph 56)
7. We recommend that
the Government Office for Science, while remaining a semi-autonomous
body, be located within the Cabinet Office. (Paragraph 61)
8. We recommend that
the Government clarify why no review of the risk of disruption
to aviation caused by a natural disaster, including volcanic eruptions,
was undertaken in 2009; and provide the evidence behind the decision.
(Paragraph 65)
9. It appears that
there may have been a breakdown of communication between the earth
sciences community and Government. We recommend that the GCSA
assess whether this was the case and improve the mechanisms by
which scientists can engage with the Cabinet Office. (Paragraph
66)
10. We are pleased
that the Government is assessing the risks posed by space weather
ahead of the next solar maximum. This is vital given that the
Government believes the National Grid could be at risk. The Government
should take all possible action to put in place and coordinate
resilience measures across different sectors. (Paragraph 69)
11. We are disappointed
that the GCSA has little involvement with the Domestic Horizon
Scanning Committee in the Cabinet Office. We recommend that GO
Science and the GCSA consider ways of assessing the quality of
the Domestic Horizon Scanning Committee's work. (Paragraph 71)
12. We recommend that,
in replying to this report, the GCSA clarify why SAPER was abolished
and to what extent its functions, particularly in planning for
emergencies, have been retained and by whom. (Paragraph 73)
13. We consider that
the NRA would benefit from more scientific scrutiny. We recommend
that a new independent scientific advisory committee be set up
to advise the Cabinet Office on risk assessment. This committee
should review the NRA, setting up temporary sub-committees as
appropriate. Having an independent scientific advisory committee
for risk assessment to review the NRA would improve public and
parliamentary confidence in a necessarily unpublished document.
The committee should inform the judgement of the GCSA in ensuring
that all risks requiring scientific input and judgements have
been properly considered in the NRA and support his greater involvement
with the Domestic Horizon Scanning Committee. (Paragraph 74)
Reasonable worst case scenario
14. We
are concerned that the word "reasonable" appears to
be influenced by the need to find a reasonable level of public
expenditure for contingency planning rather than outlining the
worst scenario that might realistically happen, based on the best
available evidence. (Paragraph 87)
15. We welcome the
fact that the GCSA is reviewing the concept of a reasonable worst
case scenario. We request that, if possible, the results of this
review are sent to us and published before any policy change is
adopted. (Paragraph 88)
The National Risk Assessment and Register
16. We
conclude that it should be clear what criteria are used in developing
risk comparisons, particularly when they cut across Government
Departmental responsibilities. We recommend that the Government
clarify the common methodology and scale for assessing the likelihood
of risks that are used in developing the NRA and NRR. (Paragraph
95)
17. We are concerned
that the development of the NRA and NRR appears to be a "top-down"
process hindering the involvement and influence of local authorities.
This situation is unsatisfactory. We recommend that the Cabinet
Office review its procedures to ensure that the input of local
authorities is given full consideration and appropriate weight.
(Paragraph 97)
18. If it is the case
that access to the NRR alone is insufficient to allow local authorities
to assess the potential impacts of risks to local areas, and access
to the classified NRA is necessary, then we question the operational
value of the NRR. We recommend that the Government conduct a consultation
with Category 1 emergency responders, including local authorities,
to evaluate how useful the information on the NRR is for risk
assessment and emergency planning. (Paragraph 98)
19. We recommend that
the Government review whether those with appropriate security
clearance outside of Central Government have difficulties accessing
the NRA, and put in measures to resolve the problem. (Paragraph
99)
Behavioural Sciences
20. We
are disappointed at the lack of focus on social and behavioural
sciences in Government to date. We expect the newly established
Cabinet Office Behavioural Insight team to provide input to risk
assessment for emergencies. (Paragraph 108)
21. We would like
to know whether and when a Government Chief Social Scientist will
be appointed to replace Professor Wiles. (Paragraph 109)
Conclusions on risk assessment
22. Risk
assessment underpins preparedness. In turn, risk assessment should
be underpinned by the best available evidence. We were very disappointed
to learn that the GCSA has had little involvement with what is
a cross-Government process. It appears that, for both the volcanic
ash emergency and the recent severe winter weather, the GCSA had
been asked to provide advice after the emergency had happened,
although we note with interest that the severe winter weather
was not deemed an emergency. This is simply not good enough: scientific
advice and evidence should be integrated into risk assessment
from the start. (Paragraph 110)
Communication
23. If,
following the GCSA's Blackett Review, the concept of a reasonable
worst case scenario is retained, we recommend that the Government
must make continual efforts to establish the concept of "most
probable scenarios" with the public. While the Government
should be open about the worst case scenarios being used by emergency
responders, it should use the experience of the 2009 pandemic
to emphasise the range and likelihood of various possibilities.
While we do not expect this to remove all the problems associated
with communicating risk and uncertainty, we consider that it may
provide the public with a better sense of the likely risks. (Paragraph
123)
24. We recommend that
there should be a single portal of information for every emergency,
along the lines of flu.gov in the USA. This should be of use to
members of the public as well as emergency responders and should
be the primary source of all information, linking to other websites
as necessary. We consider that maintaining this portal should
be the responsibility of the Lead Government Department, and should
be located within its departmental website. (Paragraph 128)
Seasonal influenza
25. Although the Government
response to seasonal flu goes beyond our inquiry, we were interested
in the ongoing public concern over the risks of swine flu as part
of the seasonal flu outbreak. This is unsurprising, given the
fresh public memory of the pandemic and the Government's 2009-10
pandemic communication programme, as well as the absence of a
seasonal flu information campaign in 2010-11. The Government should
carefully consider the public's assumptions about swine flu (or
any new flu strain) when communicating the risks of that strain
in the context of seasonal, rather than pandemic, outbreak. (Paragraph
132)
26. We recommend that
the JCVI conduct a comprehensive review of the benefits and risks
of extending influenza vaccination programmes to all children
under five, drawing on the experiences of countries, such as the
USA, that already have policies of vaccinating under fives. (Paragraph
133)
Scientific Advisory Group in Emergencies (SAGE):
code of practice
27. It
remains unclear to us whether the Code of Practice for Scientific
Advisory Committees applies to SAGE and we seek clarification
on this issue. (Paragraph 142)
SAGE: membership
28. We
ask the Department of Health to clarify how the gap caused by
the lack of a statistician on the swine flu SAGE was addressed.
(Paragraph 150)
29. Although it may
not be appropriate to name some members, we see no reason why
the membership of SAGE should be kept wholly secret for civil
emergencies. In line with the Code of Practice for Scientific
Advisory Committees, which states that SACs should operate from
a presumption of openness, we recommend that SAGE members and
their declarations of interest are published once initial membership
has been established. (Paragraph 152)
30. While an initial
lack of balance on SAGE can be later addressed through the addition
of members or formation of sub-groups, we consider that it would
be desirable to strike a suitable balance of expertise from the
start. The first step is to ensure that key experts are identified
through the NRA process. We conclude that if risks and Lead Government
Departments can be identified in advance, the Government could
also pinpoint possible expert advisers who may be called upon
to provide advice in the event of an emergency. (Paragraph 154)
31. We recommend that
GO Science, working with Departments, develops and maintains a
directory of scientific experts who can be called upon in emergencies.
The directory should include information on expertise area, current
security clearance and previous experience advising Government.
We anticipate that focus should be placed on the risks identified
in the NRA, although not exclusively. We conclude that having
a SAC for risk assessment in the Cabinet Office, as we recommended
above, could also assist GO Science in identifying members for
this directory. (Paragraph 155)
32. International
sharing of scientific data and expertise will often be pivotal
to the resolution of an emergency. We recommend that the GCSA
clarify how he ensures that SAGEs draw on international expertise
and what formal role SAGE members may play in this. (Paragraph
157)
33. We recommend that
GO Science and the Cabinet Office develop an appropriate remuneration
policy for future SAGE members by September 2011. We recommend
that they also consider whether compensating SAGE members' employers
would be appropriate. (Paragraph 160)
SAGE: transparency and openness
34. It
is important that the existence of SAGE and how it can be accessed
is made known during an emergency so that those with alternative,
credible scientific views can contribute. Such input would need
to be screened and evaluated, but that would be part of SAGE's
challenge function. (Paragraph 165)
35. We consider that
the Government Office for Science website should be the first
port of call for information on every SAGE. We recommend that
if GO Science provides the secretariat, details of members and
minutes of meetings should be published on the GO Science website.
If information on a SAGE is best sourced through the LGD, we consider
that GO Science's website should link to the relevant Departmental
webpage. It should be clear from GO Science's website where information
on the SAGE is published, and how the secretariat can be contacted.
(Paragraph 166)
36. Although we accept
that there are circumstances where a SAGE should operate in confidence,
we see no reason why, after the emergency, minutes of meetings
should only be released in response to a Freedom of Information
(FoI) request. We recommend that all SAGE meeting minutes and
other documents which would be made public following a FoI request
are published immediately, in full or redacted form as appropriate.
(Paragraph 167)
37. We are concerned
that the SAGE mechanism operates under a presumption of secrecy
rather than transparency and openness, and this was particularly
and unnecessarily so during the volcanic ash emergency. (Paragraph
168)
38. We recommend that
SAGE and its secretariat have a responsibility to identify and
support SAGE members willing to communicate scientific issues
to the public during an emergency. We further recommend that the
GCSA and GO Science, in consultation with Cabinet Office and external
centres of expertise such as the Science Media Centre, develop
suitable protocols, procedures and guidance for SAGE members.
(Paragraph 172)
SAGE: independence
39. While
we do not doubt Sir Gordon Duff's independence from Government
in his role as SAGE co-chair, it is still not clear to us how
independence of the swine flu SAGE as a whole was maintained,
particularly as it included Government officials. It is difficult
to evaluate the independence of scientific advice when the operation
of SAGE is confidential. (Paragraph 175)
40. We have stated
previously that the ability to draw upon an existing SAC to form
the swine flu SAGE was helpful. However, it must be made clear
how SAGE retains a SAC's level of independence from Government.
We conclude that clarifying a code of conduct and publishing the
names of members of future SAGEs, with their declarations of interest,
could only be useful in this respect. (Paragraph 176)
SAGE and other sources of scientific advice
41. While
there will be scientific advice to Government from sources other
than SACs, we see benefits in coordinating advice from SPI and
JCVI for future pandemics. Given that the SPI advisory committee
was effectively drawn upon to form the basis of SAGE membership,
we consider that a future pandemic influenza SAGE should include
members of the JCVI (in addition to the JCVI Chair) either as
core members of SAGE or a sub-committee. This could speed up the
process by which ministers receive advice on vaccination strategies
while retaining the crucial challenge function. (Paragraph 179)
42. Because of the
CAA's groundwork and the relatively late formation of SAGE during
the volcanic ash emergency, it appears that SAGE contributed little
to scientific understanding of the key issue: the ash tolerances
of engines and aircraft. We question how much additional knowledge
SAGE added to enable airspace to be reopened. (Paragraph 182)
43. While we take
the view that there is merit in combining the forces of SACs such
as SPI and JCVI under a SAGE for future influenza pandemics, we
do not consider that the CAA's work on resolving the issue of
ash tolerances of engines and aircraft during the volcanic ash
emergency could have been carried out as quickly under the umbrella
of SAGE, because of SAGE's more limited membership. (Paragraph
183)
44. The SAGE mechanism
has been used twice, and is therefore relatively new. We expect
the Government to have evaluated the impacts that both SAGEs have
had and whether SAGE's ways of working need improvement. We recommend
that, in responding to this report, the Government provide us
with its evaluation on the effectiveness of both SAGEs. (Paragraph
184)
SAGE: secretariat
45. The
Government should explain who provided the secretariat for the
volcanic ash SAGE. (Paragraph 187)
46. Where the LGD
is unclear or yet to be identified, we consider that GO Science
should by default provide the secretariat to support a SAGE. (Paragraph
188)
SAGE: conclusions
47. We
recommend that the GCSA either clarify what guidelines/codes of
conduct apply to SAGE or, if no existing ones apply, produce guidelines
governing how SAGEs should operate. The guidelines should address
independence, transparency, confidentiality and the conduct of
members, the Chair and the supporting secretariat. We recommend
that the guidelines be published. (Paragraph 189)
Changes to the Health Protection Agency and Joint
Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation
48. We
recommend that the Government sets out how the independent advisory
functions of the HPA and JCVI will be maintained. If any function
of the HPA or JCVI is cut, we consider that a justification should
be published. (Paragraph 193)
Use of Research Council resources
49. We
are concerned that the delayed reimbursement to NERC for use of
the Dornier 228 aircraft has damaged trust between the Government
and the research community, with the danger that there may be
reluctance to make such resources available in future. We recommend
that the Met Office, whom NERC supported, and the Department for
Transport, the LGD, take responsibility for ensuring that NERC
is reimbursed in full immediately. (Paragraph 196)
Security and scientific advice
50. We
consider that the Government must actively ensure that requirements
for security clearance do not deter academics from providing scientific
advice to Government. (Paragraph 202)
Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance
51. In
its response to this report, we recommend that the Government
clarify the powers and funding of the Office for Cyber Security
and Information Assurance. (Paragraph 210)
Space Situational Awareness
52. We
recommend that the Government review the need for the UK to increase
its participation in, and contributions to, ESA's Space Situational
Awareness programme, following the outcome of the 2011 National
Risk Assessment. (Paragraph 216)
Regulations on flying through volcanic ash
53. We
are concerned that, when asked why the UK was unprepared for volcanic
ash disruption, the former Secretary of State for Transport chose
both to distance himself from, and to pass responsibility to,
the CAA, a body for which he had ministerial oversight. This is
unsatisfactory. (Paragraph 222)
54. We conclude that
it is essential that the Department for Transport and the CAA
sustain the ability, in the face of any new hazard, to access
the full range of science, engineering, operating and regulatory
resources necessary to determine whether existing regulations
are adequate and appropriate. (Paragraph 223)
55. We do not agree
that the closure of airspace imposed unreasonable restrictions
upon operators. Given the uncertainties involved and the lack
of prior risk assessment, it was necessary to take a precautionary
approach until aircraft and engines tolerances to ash had been
identified. We expect that, if a similar situation occurred in
future, the UK would be better prepared to conduct analyses and
make decisions on an appropriate emergency response. However,
the Government will need to resolve the following three policy
and process issues: (i) the CAA's contribution to EASA's decision-making
processes; (ii) the suitability of the Met Office's computer predictions
and (iii) the involvement of airline operators in decision-making.
(Paragraph 224)
International data sharing during the swine flu
pandemic
56. We
conclude that there needs to be a better mechanism of data-sharing,
particularly sharing of raw epidemiological data. We recommend
that the UK, as a member state of the WHO, propose the formation
of an international working group under the WHO to discuss how
to share effectively epidemiological data between countries in
the run-up to a new pandemic. (Paragraph 228)
Conclusions
57. We
are concerned that the Government's attitude to scientific advice
is that it is something to reach for once an emergency happens,
not a key factor for consideration from the start of the process.
We conclude that scientific advice and an evidence-based approach
must be better integrated into risk assessment and policy processes
early on. (Paragraph 229)
58. We do not accept
that SAGEs should be given a carte blanche to operate however
they please just because an emergency is occurring. We conclude
that the Government Office for Science should take responsibility
for ensuring that all future SAGEs operate in a more organised,
transparent and accessible manner and adhere to a published code
(existing or new). (Paragraph 230)
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